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
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THE
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CONDUCTED BY

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THE
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SECOND SERIES NO. XXIII. WHOLE NO. LV.

ARTICLE I.

WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER.

By C. E. BROWE, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

WE have already given a brief review of the writings of Luther during the first three years of the Reformation, from 1517 to 1520. We now propose to pass by entirely that period of most thrilling interest, the Diet at Worms, and the events and writings connected with it; because this part of the reformer's career is so fully delineated by d'Aubigné in his popular and useful work, that it would seem superfluous for us at this time to go over the same ground. We prefer to pass on to a period that has not yet been reached by the Genevan historian. The materials are so ample that there is no occasion for repeating what d'Aubigné has already written so well; and without further remark we proceed to the Augsburg Confession, and the events and writings connected with it. This was the earliest of the Protestant formulas of faith, and indeed the first doctrinal symbol (except the so-called Athanasian creed) that obtained any considerable circulation and influence subsequent to the celebrated Nicæno-Constantinopolitan creed, which was published in the year 381.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. XII. NO. I.

HISTORY OF THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION.

In May, 1525, Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony, died, and was succeeded by his brother John. The death of Frederick was a great loss to the cause of the Reformation, and contributed much to embolden its enemies. The elector of Saxony and the young landgrave of Hesse were the only princes of much political consideration, who had till then espoused the interests of Luther; and their dominions were in the vicinity of violent and embittered enemies, particularly duke George of Saxony and the elector Joachim of Brandenburg. The latter had urged with great vehemence, during the diet at Worms, that the imperial word ought to be broken, and Luther put to death there; and he actually drew his sword on the elector palatine Lewis for opposing this perfidious counsel. Subsequently, Elizabeth, the wife of Joachim, embraced the doctrines of the Reformation, and so uncontrollable was his rage that he gave orders to have her built up in a wall with brick and mortar, and there left miserably to perish; but she found means to escape, and fled to Wittenberg, where she took refuge in the family of Luther. This violent and cruel papist entered into a league with George duke of Saxony, Henry duke of Brunswick, and Albert electoral archbishop of Mainz, to assault by surprise the elector of Saxony, and the landgrave of Hesse, and divide their dominions among themselves, unless they withdrew from Luther their protection.

The elector and landgrave, on discovering this conspiracy, consulted with Luther whether it would be right for them to take up arms against these princes. He answered most decidedly in the negative, exhorting them to do violence to no man, to stand firmly for the right, and repose unwavering trust in God. His two brief, but eloquent and most Christianlike papers on this occasion are given entire by Von Gerlach, Vol. IX. p. 160-4. This was Luther's uniform course; he never would permit the name of God to be defended by an appeal to arms; but he subsequently addressed letters to duke George and the cardinal Albert, which were sharper than swords, and more piercing than bayonets. These two specimens of masterly and well-merited invective are given by Lomler, Vol. II. p. 213-33, and 498-503. It would give me great pleasure to present all four of these pieces to the readers of the Repository in a

translation, but the limits of a periodical, necessarily embracing a variety of topics in every number, will not allow it.

The emperor Charles had been obliged at first to be lenient towards Luther, for he greatly needed the aid of the princes who desired reformation, especially the elector of Saxony in the cabinet, and the landgrave of Hesse in the field. His plans of ambition were very extensive; he was surrounded by jealous rivals and enemies; and the Turks were pressing fearfully on the eastern borders of his empire. In 1529 they actually besieged Vienna, made a furious assault upon the city, and were with very great difficulty repelled. The princes favorable to reformation, therefore, though few in number, it was important for him to conciliate. Accordingly, though to satisfy the papists he issued an edict against Luther, and put him to the ban of the empire, immediately after the diet at Worms he withdrew to Spain, and left the edict to execute itself.

The emperor's plans for a while were very successful. At the battle of Pavia he defeated his rival Francis I. of France, took him prisoner, carried him to Madrid, and dictated to him peace on his own terms. The pope, attempting to check the progress of Charles in Italy, the imperial troops, under the constable Bourbon, took the city of Rome by storm, ravaged and pillaged it in the most thoroughgoing manner, shut up the pope and cardinals as prisoners in the castle of St. Angelo, and treated the old men so savagely as to make their situation very uncomfortable. When Charles heard that the pope was a prisoner, he affected the most pious horror at such sacrilege, ordered the public rejoicings for the birth of his son Philip to be suspended, and directed prayers to be offered in all the churches for the immediate release of his holiness and the holy college; seeming to forget that the smallest bit of paper signed with his name would be more effective towards setting the pope at liberty than all the prayers of all the papal priests in Christendom. However, he let the pope be prayed for long enough to make full proof of the efficacy of papal prayers, and then dictated to him such terms of peace as he had to Francis. When Charles saw that every thing was arranged just to his mind, then there came a wonderful answer to the prayers of the faithful, and the pope regained his freedom.

In his arrangements with the pope, Charles on his part agreed to put down the heretics, and exterminate them, if need be, with fire and sword. This he was fully disposed to do, and

so far as human means were concerned, he had abundant power to accomplish it. He was of a very haughty spirit, and could not endure that any body in his dominions should presume to think for themselves without asking his leave. The despotic character and gloomy magnificence of the Romish religion suited well the tenor of his mind ; and, moreover, he had made a compromise with conscience, and intended by the strictness of his catholicity to make amends for the total want of moral principle which he manifested in all his political dealings. He was free from degrading vices ; he was not intemperate, lewd, or cruel ; he had a fine person and a commanding air ; he was always very becomingly dressed, and his manners were such as became a mighty prince ; and such was the whole impression made by his person, station, and character, that even the vehement Luther always spoke of him with the greatest respect, and manifested toward him a high degree of affection. This respect of Luther Charles fully reciprocated ; but as to the affection, he had little capacity of feeling any for any one except himself. With all his magnificence, his soul was cold, dark, and selfish. Never was there a more perfect contrast than was exhibited in the characters of Charles and Luther.

Under these circumstances, when the imperial legislature assembled at Spire in 1529, the papal princes, knowing the determination of the emperor, and having a decided preponderance in numbers, wealth, and military power, assumed a very confident tone, and carried matters with a high hand. Frederick the Wise had been four years dead, and his successor John had neither the tact nor the influence of his elder brother. The reformers were already divided on the sacramental controversy, and a most painful schism was created by the obstinacy of Luther in making his opinion on that point a condition of communion. Had it not been for the clearsightedness, the decision, and the firmness of the landgrave of Hesse at this crisis, it seems as if the hopes of the reformers would have been entirely wrecked.

The diet at Spire by a large majority passed an edict, that the reformed religion should not be extended beyond the places in which it was already established, that, not only should the reformed princes have no power to extend the reformation even in their own territories, but they must allow the papal priests full power to celebrate their worship and make proselytes wherever they chose. When this edict was passed, the minor-

ity, (twenty out of about two hundred,) on the 19th of April, 1529, entered a solemn protest against it, and demanded that their protest should be placed on the records of the diet. The protest took the ground that in matters of conscience the majority should not bind the minority, that they had equal rights with the papal princes, and could not give them up; and, moreover, it had been agreed upon in the diet at Worms, that all religious differences should be referred to an impartial general council, which had not yet been called together. On the 25th of April they issued an appeal from the decision of the diet to the emperor, and to a national or general council, and to all impartial Christians. The signers of this protest and appeal were referred to in the debates of the diet as the *protestants*, and hence the origin of the name. They were the following, namely, John elector of Saxony, George margrave of Brandenburg, Ernest and Francis dukes of Lüneburg, Philip landgrave of Hesse, Wolfgang prince of Anhalt, and the deputies from Strasburg, Ulm, Nuremberg, Constance, Reutlingen, Windsheim, Memmingen, Lindau, Kempten, Heilbronn, Isny, Weissenburg, Nordlingen, and St. Gall. A brief but clear account of this momentous transaction, and two striking letters of Luther in reference to it, are given in Von Gerlach, Vol. IX. p. 177–190.

The diet refused to put the protest and appeal on record, whereupon the Protestants sent a deputation of three of their number to present the papers to the emperor, who, having just completed his league with the pope, was then at Placentia in Italy. Charles met the deputies with a frown, and because they importuned him from day to day and insisted that he should receive their papers, he at length, on the 13th of October, put them all under arrest. But he did not then fully understand the men with whom he had to deal. The imprisoned deputies found means to issue a protest against their unlawful imprisonment by the emperor, and they appealed from him to a free Christian council. Charles, after holding them in durance seventeen days, and finding that he gained nothing by it, at last set them at liberty. It was now plain that the emperor meditated violence, and the Protestant princes, though feeble and divided, began again to think of defending themselves by arms. But this Luther now, as he had always done before, decidedly opposed, and such was his influence that no religious war broke out till after his death. The letter which he wrote to the elector on this occasion is given by Von Gerlach, Vol. XIV. p. 208–

12. It was one of the wonderful things in Luther's conduct, that with all his ardor and fearless courage, and vehement indignation against wrong, he always on principle resisted every appeal to arms in the cause of religion.

But whence did Luther look for help? This may be seen from a little book which he published a short time after this, a commentary on Psalm cxviii., (see particularly verses 5-15,) in the preface to which he says, "I have returned to my estate, and taken before me my dear psalm, the beautiful cxviii., and have now put my thoughts upon it on paper, because I am sitting here in solitude, and must sometimes relieve my head, and intermit the toil of translating the Hebrew prophets, which, nevertheless, I hope to have completed very soon. This, I say, is my psalm, for I love it; for although the whole psalter and all the Holy Bible is dear to me, and is, indeed, my only comfort and life, yet I am especially indebted to this psalm; so that it must be called mine and be mine, for it has often done me very great service, and has helped me out of many and great difficulties, so as no emperor, king, sage, saint, or prudent man could help me, and it is dearer to me than all the honor, wealth, and power of pope, Turk, emperor, and all the world, so that I would not exchange this one psalm for them all. If any one thinks it strange that I should boast of this psalm as my psalm, when it belongs to all the world, let such an one know that when I make this psalm mine, I do not take it away from any body else. Christ is mine, and yet the same Christ belongs to all the saints besides. I will not be stingy with my psalm, I will be very generous. Would God that all the world might lay claim to this psalm as well as I; that would be a glorious, lovely litigation, such that no harmony or peace were worthy to be compared with it." (See *Lomler II.* p. 441-43.) These were the feelings which sustained Luther. The word of God was to him in place of all other weapons whether of offence or defence, and this weapon, the sword of the Spirit, though not carnal, was mighty through God; and the world looked on in perfect amazement at the skill and power with which he wielded it.

January 21st, 1530, the emperor summoned a new diet to meet at Augsburg on the 8th of April following. Here it was expected and affirmed that definite measures would be taken for the final adjustment of all religious difficulties. The Protestants looked forward to the time with the greatest anxiety.—

During the diet at Spire, Luther, at the request of the elector, had sketched the heads of a remonstrance, which the princes were to draw up in form and present to the legislature and the emperor. Considering all the circumstances under which it was composed, it is one of the noblest documents ever written. It is inserted entire in Von Gerlach, Vol. IX. p. 183–86. It is too condensed to admit of abridgment, too closely woven together to allow of selections, and too long to be copied entire into this article. Let the reader peruse it just as Luther wrote it, and see how calmly, dispassionately, I may even say, sweetly, this great man would speak, and yet with the most unwavering decision, at a time when every thing he valued was in imminent peril, and he was exposed without human aid to the vengeance of the mightiest monarch of the age.

February 24th, 1530, Charles was crowned by the pope at Bologna, and though all the subsequent German emperors were Roman Catholics, this was the last time the ceremony of the coronation was performed by the pope.

The elector of Saxony was earnestly advised not to attend the diet at Augsburg, but he had no intention of showing the white feather on such an occasion. On the 14th of March, he sent to Luther to draw up a creed to be presented to the diet as the Protestant confession of faith. Luther immediately composed seventeen articles, which, having been received by the elector in the city of Torgau, are known by the name of the Torgau articles. These seventeen articles are the groundwork on which the famous Augsburg confession was afterwards constructed. They may be found in the Leipsic edition of Luther's works, Vol. XX. p. 1–3.

On the 3d of April, the elector set out for Augsburg, taking with him, besides a large company of nobles and lawyers, the theologians, Luther, Melancthon, Spalatin, and Justus Jonas. At every place where they stopped long enough to admit of it, Luther preached to immense congregations, which were always ready to concentrate on any point where it was supposed his voice might be heard. They at length arrived at Cobourg, a small city with an old fortified castle on the northern frontier of Saxony. Here the elector was determined that Luther should remain, and not hazard his person in Augsburg. As an outlaw, he had no legal protection, and at Augsburg there were thousands of papists who would think they were doing God service by assassinating him. Luther remonstrated, but the

elector was inexorable. He assigned him a small but strong room in the third story of the castle, promised that he would keep him constantly informed of all that was going on at Augsburg, and take no important step without his advice: and then ordering the garrison to keep a guard of at least twelve armed horsemen constantly, day and night, in the yard before Luther's apartment, he took his departure.

Luther again found himself a prisoner, as he had been in the Wartburg. He filled up his time with writing, and turned off new works with almost superhuman rapidity. But the confinement preyed upon his health and spirits; he suffered extremely from pains in his head and breast, and was so afflicted with nervous depression, that, thinking he must soon die, he selected a spot in the castle ground where he desired to be buried. As was usually the case when he was most depressed, his disposition to fun and drollery was most irrepressibly active. It was at this time that he threw off those unique specimens of wit and humor, the *letter to his messmates in Wittenberg*, and to his dear little son Jacky, then about four years old. They are both given by Lomler, Vol. II. p. 496 and 505, and Von Gerlach promises them in the last volume of his collection, which I have not yet seen.

The elector reached Augsburg on the 2d of May, and though the city was then full of nobles, ecclesiastics, and military men in attendance on the diet, the emperor had not yet arrived. The elector immediately employed Melancthon to draw up from the seventeen articles of Torgau a Protestant confession of faith, and that distinguished theologian then made the first draft of the afterwards so celebrated Augsburg confession. On the 11th of May, the elector sent a copy to Luther, for his revision, who returned it unaltered, saying it was as good as it could be, and he had no corrections to make. Luther had not a particle of jealousy or envy in his composition, and whatever any one did well, pleased him quite as much as if he had done it himself. But though Luther was satisfied, Melancthon was not; for, on looking it over a second time, he made a great number of changes, and sent it again to Luther, who again returned it unchanged, with the remark that it was good enough before, and better still now, and that he was not capable of improving it.

The Protestant princes all brought their preachers with them, and they had divine service in some of the city churches every

Sunday, on the reformed model. This was a great eyesore to the papists, and they were exerting all their influence with the emperor to get it prohibited; but the landgrave of Hesse avowed his determination to have Protestant preaching at the point of the sword, if he could get it in no other way. On these and other topics the elector kept up a constant correspondence with Luther, and nothing gives the image and body of the time like those letters, none of which, so far as I know, have ever yet appeared in English. They may be found in Von Gerlach, Vol. X. p. 60-66.

On the 1st of June, Luther published what he had written the April preceding, *an admonition to all the clergy assembled at the diet in Augsburg*, one of his most eloquent and effective productions. He here depicts the oppressiveness, the corruptions, and the abuses of the Romish church in colors so lively and yet so true, and demonstrates so forcibly the necessity of reformation, that the papists dared not attempt a reply to it. It was read with avidity by the imperial court at Inspruck, and the bishop of Augsburg even took it into an assembly of the Romish clergy, and read it there. "The Romish church (says Seckendorf, Lib. II. p. 188) is here so truly and so vividly painted, that it were to be wished that the *admonition* might be read by all the world,"—a wish, I am sure, which every friend of morals and religion, who reads it, will heartily reciprocate. There is a deep, solemn earnestness in its style, a crystal-like clearness in its statements, a full-hearted, glowing sincerity in its tone, that makes you love Luther with an overflowing love, and brings the warm tears to your eyes, at almost every page. It may all be read in Von Gerlach, Vol. X. p. 8-60.

On the 14th of June, while the emperor was waiting at Inspruck, his high chancellor Mercurius Gattinara died. This was a sad blow to the Protestants, for Gattinara was a wise and prudent man; he had great influence with Charles, and notwithstanding the feebleness of his health, he had determined to accompany the emperor to Augsburg for the express purpose of preventing any violent measures against the reformers. The cause of the Reformation, to human appearance, was now desperate. Charles, a powerful and politic prince, brought up under the strictest papal influences, and constitutionally inclined to superstition, flushed with his successes against his most powerful rival, the king of France, and his recent victory over the pope himself, was now inclined to put forth all his power to

compel religious uniformity ; while the Protestants were numerically weak and divided by controversy. Melancthon was timid, and inclined to make almost any concession for the sake of peace ; and every thing seemed to depend on the confidence and energy of Luther and the unflinching steadfastness of his two principal friends, the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse.

It had been cunningly arranged that the emperor should make his public entry into Augsburg on the 15th of June, Corpus Christi day, a festival on which such ceremonies would be performed, that it would be almost impossible for the Protestant princes to attend to their official duties about the imperial person, without seeming to countenance by their presence the most idolatrous portion of the Romish ritual. The elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse made up their minds beforehand, that, whatever it might cost them, all the world should see that they no longer had any connexion with the Romish superstitions.

At about six o'clock in the afternoon, the emperor, in company with his brother Ferdinand, king of Hungary, was met with great ceremony by the princes and ecclesiastics belonging to the diet, on the bridge outside of the city, the elector of Saxony, as grand marshal of the empire, bearing the naked sword before him. Joachim, elector of Brandenburg, addressed the emperor in a Latin speech, "because (says Spalatin) none of the bishops understood Latin well enough to attempt the task." Within the walls his imperial majesty was received by the bishop of Augsburg and his assembled clergy. The procession then proceeded to the Cathedral, where the bishop pronounced the benediction on the emperor, who went directly afterwards to the great altar, knelt before it for some time in silent prayer, then arose from his knees and took his seat in the choir. The *Te Deum* was then sung and high mass celebrated. When they came to the passage in which the ritual requires all to kneel, Charles, to show his devotion and set a good example to others, rejected the embroidered cushion which had been provided for him, and placed his royal knees directly on the hard brick floor, which, besides being cold and damp, was probably none of the cleanest. But the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse would take no hints, not even from the emperor, and kept to their feet, notwithstanding that George, duke of Saxony, already on his knees in the extremities of devotion, enforced the imperial example by nodding and shaking his fist at his brother with

great energy. George, margrave of Brandenburg, a younger brother of Joachim, and a sincere and whole-hearted Protestant, under the influence of long habit and the circumstances of the occasion, at first knelt with the rest; but happening to raise his eyes and observe the tall, majestic form of the elector of Saxony, as calmly erect as one of the pillars of the cathedral itself, and the fierce little landgrave of Hesse stiffly upright and looking defiance at all the world, he also sprang to his feet as if the floor burnt his knees; and these three princes, of all the great lords of Germany, were the only ones who dared to stand during that ceremony.

When the ceremony was over the archbishop of Saltzburg, as it was his duty to do, began to pronounce the benediction; but the papal legate came bustling up, exclaiming, "It is not for you to pronounce the blessing. that belongs to me," and taking the words out of the archbishop's mouth, finished the benediction himself. During this scene, the landgrave of Hesse, to show that he had neither part nor lot in the matter, set himself down behind one of the wax candles. The emperor bore every thing with exemplary patience, and seemed to take no notice of these little incoherences.

It was ten o'clock at night before he retired to his lodgings in the palace of the bishop of Augsburg; and notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, and the fatigues of the day, he summoned the princes of the empire to meet him there immediately. Here king Ferdinand, in the name of his brother, peremptorily ordered the Protestant princes to put an end to Protestant preaching in the city, and to join in the procession to be formed the next Lord's day, in honor of the sacrament of the body of Christ. They respectfully, but decidedly, refused to do either the one or the other. The margrave George of Brandenburg, the youngest of the princes, standing directly before the emperor, said to him, "Before I will thus deny my God, I will kneel down here before your imperial majesty and let my head be taken off," at the same time stooping forward and drawing the edge of his hand across the back of his neck. Charles blushed and smiled, and said in reply, "No, my dear prince, no heads off, no heads off, I hope." The emperor gave them time till next morning for consideration; but that very night, before he retired to rest, he issued a positive order that they should do as his brother had commanded.

The citizens of Augsburg were strongly Protestant, and but

very few of them still adhered to the Romish church. They sent a deputation to Charles with an honorary present, which he received very graciously; and with great appearance of devotion he begged an interest in their prayers, both for himself and his brother Ferdinand. "Pray (said he) to Almighty God for me a poor sinner, that He may grant me His Holy Spirit, to instruct me, and lead me in the right way, that these great matters may be settled in a satisfactory and Christian manner, and that God's wrath may not be excited against us."

The next day the elector of Saxony was sick and unable to wait on the emperor, but the other princes appeared before him, and in their name George, margrave of Brandenburg, reiterated their determination neither to discontinue the Protestant preaching nor attend the Corpus Christi procession. "So far are we (said the margrave to the emperor) from being willing to sanction by our presence and example usages so manifestly contrary to the word of God and the commands of Christ, that we hereby avow our determination to banish, so far as in us lies, all such ungodly human abuses entirely out of the church of Christ, that the pure and sound members of the church be not corrupted and destroyed by the deadly poison. Let not your imperial majesty be angry with us; for in a matter which pertains to God and our own consciences we shall stand firm, whatever dangers may threaten us; for it is written, we ought to obey God rather than man. In this matter, therefore, which I know to be eternal truth, and the voice of the Son of God, I am ready to die if need be; for I hear that death is threatened to all who persist in the profession of the truth." As to the preaching, they affirmed they would no more dispense with that than with their daily food, nor did they think it right that the word of God should be bound. In this they went further than Luther advised. Charles for the present made no reply, but hastened to prepare himself for the great procession which was to take place that very day.

The host was carried by the archbishop of Mainz, and followed by an immense multitude in most splendid array, consisting of the princes who had come to attend the diet and their military followers; but all the Protestants absented themselves, and of the citizens of Augsburg (says Spalatin) not a hundred were present. So great had been the influence of the Reformation in that city. Of all that numerous procession no one seemed so pious and devout as Charles. He followed directly after the host in his heavy imperial mantle, bareheaded, and with the

burning sun beating directly into his face, and holding a large wax candle in his hands, and so continued during the whole morning till the clock struck one.

The emperor, finding that the Protestants were not to be shaken from their purpose, issued by his herald the following proclamation in the public streets. "Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye, what the Roman imperial majesty now ordains; that no preacher here in Augsburg, be he who he may, henceforward preach, except those whom his imperial majesty himself shall appoint, as they would avoid the highest displeasure and severity of his imperial majesty." Accordingly there could be no preaching during the session of the diet by either Protestants or Catholics; and till further orders public worship must be celebrated by prayers, church music, and reading the Scriptures only. In this arrangement, on account of its apparent impartiality, the Protestants silently acquiesced; determined, however, that if any papist ventured to preach they would preach also. Charles sent his Spanish secretary to Melancthon to obtain from him a brief summary of the Protestant doctrines for his private use. On this occasion the secretary told Melancthon, that the Spaniards generally supposed the Lutherans to be complete atheists, and that to kill a Lutheran was doing God a greater service than even to kill a Turk.

On Sunday, the 20th of June, the emperor summoned all the princes to his lodgings to attend him to church and hear solemn mass before the opening of the diet. The elector of Saxony replied that he would attend the emperor with the drawn sword as grand marshal of the empire, but that he should not recognize the mass at all, nor join in any of the rites of worship. Similar declarations were made by all the Protestant princes. With this understanding they all attended as officers of the empire, but were careful to do nothing that could be construed into a recognition of the religious services of the occasion.

Monday, June 21st, the elector of Saxony shut himself up in his room and spent the entire day in fasting, prayer, and reading the Scriptures, particularly the Psalms, in reference to the difficulties and dangers which now pressed so hard on him and the whole Protestant cause. In the evening he called all the Protestant princes and theologians to his lodgings, and with great anxiety and many tears they deliberated as to what they ought to do, and with earnest prayer committed their whole cause to God. Melancthon in his anxiety and timidity was

willing to make great concessions for the sake of peace; but the elector, true to his promise, would take no important step without first writing to Luther and getting his advice. When Luther's answers came, they always thundered away all Melancthon's concessions, and scattered them to the four winds. In all this there was no interruption of friendship between these two great and noble men. Melancthon still venerated Luther next to Jesus Christ, and almost worshipped him; and Luther loved Melancthon more than any other human being except his own wife and children. All this is manifest from their correspondence and their whole intercourse with each other.

Luther, in his seclusion at Coburg, was very busy with his commentaries on Daniel, Ezekiel, the Psalms, and other parts of Scripture; he was writing on schools, composing school books, and refuting the papists; and his correspondence alone seemed enough to take the whole time of several men. June 20th, 1529, he writes, "Every morning the letters pour in upon me up to my neck; and here they lie, my table, my chairs, my footstools, my writing desk, the very floor itself covered with them." He preached continually, and administered the sacrament of the Lord's supper every alternate Sabbath. He spent much time in prayer, he read the Bible much for devotional purposes, and sang many hymns, especially his own magnificent psalm which he had lately written and set to music:

"Ein veste Burg ist unsrer Gott,
Ein gute Wehr and Waffer.
A tower of strength, our God is still
A good defence and weapon."

An idea of his habits and feelings at this time may be formed from a letter written to Melancthon by Veit Dietrich, a young man who was studying theology with Melancthon, and who remained with Luther in the capacity of personal attendant during the whole of his stay at the castle of Coburg. "I can never sufficiently admire (says Dietrich in his letter) Luther's exceeding steadfastness, joy, faith, and hope, in these distressing times. This feeling he augments every day by a diligent use of the word of God. Not a day passes in which he does not spend at least three hours, and those the best for study, in prayer. I sometimes have the good fortune to overhear his prayers. My God! what a spirit, what faith there is in his

words; he prays so devotionally, as one who is speaking with God, and yet with such confidence and faith, as one who is talking with his father. 'I know (said he in his prayer) that thou art our dear God and Father, and therefore I am certain that thou wilt bring our persecutors to naught. If thou doest it not, the danger is thine as well as ours; the whole cause is thine; what we have done we were obliged to do; and therefore, dear Father, thou wilt protect thine own cause.' When I heard him from a distance praying in such words, with his clear sonorous voice, my heart burnt in my body for joy, because I heard him speaking so devotionally and so lovingly with God; but especially because he urged so hard the promises in the Psalms, as if he were certain that what he asked for must be granted. Therefore I doubt not that his prayers will be a great help to us in this (to human appearance) desperate cause, which is now in discussion before the diet."

With this knowledge of the devotional habits of Luther, we can easily account for the style and tone of the letters which he wrote at this time to his friends in Augsburg. For more than two months he wrote nearly every day, and every letter breathes the same spirit which Dietrich describes as pervading his devotions. These letters would make a volume of intense interest, illustrating the power of faith and a good conscience more vividly perhaps than any thing else that ever proceeded from an uninspired pen. We can give only a few extracts as specimens, like a broken stone or two from an edifice such as Solomon's temple. In a letter to Brueck, chancellor to the elector of Saxony, dated August 5th, 1530, he says, "Some of our friends are anxious and desponding as if God had forgotten us; but He cannot forget us, He must forget himself first. Otherwise, our cause were not His cause, nor our doctrine His word. But if we are certain and without doubt that this is His cause and His word, then our prayer is certainly heard, and help for us is already resolved upon and prepared; and we shall be helped, and there can be no failure. For He says, 'Can a woman forget her infant, that she should have no feeling for the fruit of her body? Yes, she may forget, yet will I not forget thee; behold, I have engraven thee on the palms of my hands.'"

"I have lately seen two wonders: First, I was looking out of my window at night, and saw the stars in the heavens, and God's great beautiful arch over my head, but I could not see any pillars on which the builder had fixed this arch; and yet

the heavens fell not, and this arch stood firm. Still there were some who were seeking for the pillars, and were longing to touch them and feel of them. And because they could not do this, they stood quivering and trembling, as if the heavens would certainly fall, and for no other reason than because they could not see and feel the pillars which held them up. If they could only grasp the pillars, then the heavens would stand fast.

"Secondly, I saw great thick clouds sweeping over us, of such weight and burden that they might be compared to a mighty sea; but there was no floor for these clouds to rest upon, and no barrels to barrel them up; yet they did not fall upon us, but saluted us with a scowling visage and fled away. And when they had gone, then both the floor and our roof, which had held them up, shone down upon us, the beautiful rainbow. Yet that was so small, thin, weak a floor and roof, that it disappeared in the clouds, and seemed more like a shadow, like an image in a painted glass, than such a strong floor, so that one might well be in doubt whether such a floor could bear up so great a weight of water. Yet, in point of fact, the waters were borne up and we were protected; still some will be feeling to see what holds the waters up, and because they cannot find it, are in dread of an eternal flood.

"Such a work as God by his grace has given us to do, He will by His Spirit prosper and advance: and the way and time and place to help us will come right, and will be neither forgotten nor delayed."

In a letter to Melancthon, dated June 29th, 1530, he writes: "I hate from the heart your great anxiety about which you write; it is not the great perils of the cause, it is your own great unbelief which distresses you. There was far greater peril in the time of John Huss, and at many other times, than in our times. And though the peril may be great, yet He whose the cause is (for it is not ours) is also great; He hath begun it, and He will carry it through. Why give yourself such constant trouble? If the cause be not a good one, why, then, let us give it up; but if it be a good one, why should we make God a liar in so many and great promises which He has given us that we may be quiet and content? *Cast thy care upon the Lord*, Ps. 55: 23, 1 Pet. 5: 9. 'The Lord is nigh to all that *call upon him*,' Ps. 34: 19, 145: 18. Think you that He speaks such words to the wind, that He casts such pearls before swine?

I sometimes have fears, but not all the time. It is your philosophy and not theology that plagues you so.—What can the devil do more than put us to death?

"I pray you for God's sake take up arms against yourself, for you are your own worst enemy and give the devil all the weapons he can use against you.

"Christ has died unto sin once for all, but to righteousness and truth he never dies, but lives and reigns. If this be true, why should we fear for the truth while he reigns? Yes, you reply, but by God's wrath is the truth cast down. Then let it be cast down by God's wrath, and not by our cowardice. He is our Father, and He will be the Father of our children.

"I pray for you constantly, and am troubled because your anxiety, greedy as a horse-leech, sucks out all your blood and makes my prayers powerless. So far as the cause is concerned, I have no anxiety, (whether from stupidity or from the Spirit my Lord Christ knoweth.) God can raise the dead; He can maintain His cause although it fall; He can raise it up, He can make it prosper; if we are not fit for the work He can do it by others. If we cannot have confidence in His promises, who in the world is there that can? But of this more another time, though I am but carrying water to the ocean. May Christ himself comfort, strengthen, and teach you by His Spirit. Amen.

"If matters go ill with you, I shall scarcely any longer be able to refrain myself from hurrying to you, that I may see how terrible the devil's teeth look round about, as the Scripture saith in Job xli."

In another letter to Melancthon of the 27th of June, he expresses himself as follows: "I am occupied with our cause day and night; I think it through, examine it, dismiss it, search throughout the whole Scripture; and I become more and more convinced every day that it is the cause of truth; and this confidence, by God's help, no man can ever take from me, let things go as they will."—"The father of lies hath sworn to be the death of me, that I know well; he will give himself no rest till he have swallowed me up. Very well, let him swallow me—by God's will, he will then get a stomach-ache and a purging such as he never had before."—"If Christ be not with us, where in the whole world shall we look for him? If we are not the church, or at least a part of the church, where then is the church? Is the duke of Bavaria, the pope, the Turk, and the like of them, the church? If we have not the word of God, who is it then that has it? And if God be for us, who can be against us?"

In another letter to Melancthon, of June 30th, he says, "If it be a lie, that God spared not his own Son, etc., Rom. 8: 32,

then the devil may be a man in my place : but if it be true, then what do we with our empty care, fear, trembling, and sorrow, as if He would not stand by us in those little matters when He has given his own Son to die for us, or as if the devil were stronger than God ?”

“I pray you for Christ’s sake, cast not to the winds the divine promises and comforts, as when He says, ‘*Cast thy cares upon the Lord,*’ Ps. 55: 23. ‘*Wait on the Lord, and be of good comfort,*’ Ps. 22: 14 ; and such like passages, of which the Psalms and the Gospels are full. As for example, John 16: 33, ‘*Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.*’ That Christ has overcome the world, I know full well ; and why should I fear a conquered world as if it were the conqueror ? Were we obliged to go on our knees to Rome or Jerusalem for such promises, we should value them ; but now we have them so numerous and so near at hand, we regard them not. This is not good. I know well that it comes from the weakness of our faith. Let us pray with the apostles, ‘*Lord, increase our faith,*’ Luke 17: 5.”

“As to my own salvation, I sometimes have doubts ; but as to the great cause, I never have any. You say that you can at any time hazard your life, but your fears are for the great cause. You fear for the cause as I for my own salvation ; and I have no fear for the cause, as you have none for your salvation. As to the cause itself, I am quite at ease and content ; for I know it is the cause of truth and righteousness, and, what is more, the cause of God and Christ. If with such a cause we fall, then Christ falls with us, Christ the ruler of the universe. And should Christ fall, then would I far rather fall with Christ than stand with the emperor. To tell the truth, the cause depends not on us ; yet I stand by you with prayers and tears. Would God I could be with you in bodily presence.”

“I have not undertaken this work on my own account ; I have sought neither honor nor profit in it. This the Spirit testifies to me ; and my own course shows it to the world, and will continue to show it more and more to the end.”

But we must not indulge ourselves with further extracts. The whole correspondence may be read in the Leipsic edition of Luther’s Works, vol. XX. p. 171–196. A part of it is given by Von Gerlach, vol. X. p. 60–85, and Marheinecke, vol. II. p. 450–511. Vol. III. 1–80. We now resume our narrative of the proceedings of the diet, with respect to the Protestants.

On the 21st of June, Charles gave orders that the Protestants must have their confession ready to present to the diet by the 24th. This put Melancthon into a great tremor, for he thought he could not possibly revise it and get it all right by that time; but the elector told him he must have it ready by the morning of the 23d, and then it must be read article by article before all the Protestant princes and theologians before it was presented to the diet. Melancthon and his associates immediately set themselves to work, and labored day and night till the morning of the 23d, when, at the general meeting for consultation, with some few verbal corrections, it was unanimously approved. They all agreed to stand by it to the last, and on the morning of the 24th it was ready for public presentation.

The diet was held in the city hall; the number of the princes was forty-two, besides the deputies from the free cities. Charles was seated upon the imperial throne hung with golden embroidery, his brother king Ferdinand sat over against him, and Frederick elector palatine of the Rhine opened the sessions with a brief address to the princes and deputies.

When the diet was opened on the morning of the 24th, cardinal Campeggio the papal legate had his audience with the emperor, who rose with all the princes and went to meet the legate at the steps of the hall. The cardinal made a flowery Latin speech on the heresies which distracted Germany, praised pope Clement, and eulogized the emperor Charles, but said not a word about calling a general council or reforming the abuses of the clergy. Albert archbishop of Mainz, the primate of Germany, replied in much the same strain. The evangelical princes now thought it a good time to present their confession; but the emperor said he must first give audience to the Austrian ambassadors, who had come to speak to him respecting the war with the Turks. When this was through, the emperor said it was then too late to hear the confession that day, but they might hand it to him and he would read it over by himself. But the Protestants had been very much slandered, their doctrines were misrepresented and distorted in every possible way, their views and purposes were very generally misunderstood. Accordingly, it was their wish that the confession should be read publicly, and they feared if it now got into the emperor's hands he could easily contrive to keep it out of the legislature altogether; for their enemies were as anxious to suppress it as they were to publish it. They, therefore, strenuously urged that it should be read the next day. To this Charles at length

assented, but requested, nevertheless, that the copy might be given him to look over that evening. They did not wish to trust him even so far, and excused themselves by saying (what indeed was very true) that it was so interlined and blotted he would find it very difficult to read it, but they would have a fair copy made for him the next morning. With this the session of the day closed and the Protestants went to their lodgings, rejoicing and feeling encouraged that they had got on so well, and that as yet they had lost nothing. They were determined that their confession should be publicly read before the emperor and the diet, and as many of the people as could be brought together; for they knew that this was the only way to secure for it a fair hearing, to refute slander and overcome prejudice. Charles's papal counsellors were well aware of the same thing, and therefore used all their art to prevent a public hearing.

Saturday morning, June 25th, the Protestants were ready with two fair copies of the confession, one in German, the other in Latin. As a public hearing could not now be prevented, the papists persuaded Charles to summon the diet to meet, not in the city hall, the usual place of meeting, but in his own private chapel in the palace of the bishop of Augsburg, which could scarcely contain two hundred persons. In their zeal many spectators crowded into the chapel, but Charles ordered all to withdraw who were not members of the diet, or entitled to a seat with them. He then directed the chancellor of the elector of Saxony, Dr. Christian Bayer, to read the Latin copy. The elector immediately arose and observed that they stood on German soil, that they were assembled as a German legislature, and he hoped the German language would be heard. Charles coldly assented. It was 3 o'clock in the afternoon, an immense crowd had assembled in the yard before the palace, it was oppressively warm, the chapel windows were necessarily thrown open; and Dr. Bayer commenced reading the Augsburg confession in German, with a voice so clear and penetrating that every word was distinctly heard, not only by the members of the diet, but also by the crowd without, who all maintained a breathless silence during the entire two hours that were occupied in the reading. It was heard by many more than could have heard it, had it been read in the city hall. Thus providence overruled the arts of the papists to their own confusion. It produced a tremendous effect. People had no idea that Protestantism was such a noble system of doctrines and records,

or that Protestants could quote such Scripture or adduce such reasons for their faith. Charles himself was deeply affected. He rested his head upon his hand, and never removed his eyes from the chancellor all the time he was reading. When the reading was finished and the chancellor was about to hand the copy to the imperial secretary, the emperor reached out his hand and took it himself; and when the other copy was offered to the secretary, he took that also. The German copy he then gave with his own hand to Albert archbishop of Mainz, the primate of Germany, and retained the Latin one himself.

That very night the confession was translated into Italian, French, Portuguese, and English, and sent off immediately to the pope and to the kings of England, France, and Portugal, by the ambassadors of those several potentates. It was a proud day for Protestants; they had had a public hearing before the emperor and the legislature of Germany and the ambassadors of the European sovereigns; they had told what their faith was; slander was silenced, prejudice was allayed; the mouths of gainsayers were stopped.

Luther was immediately informed of the whole transaction by the elector of Saxony, and the following paragraphs are extracts from his reply.

"The adversaries thought they had managed wonderfully well when they induced his imperial majesty to prohibit the preaching; but they never imagined, the poor fellows, that by means of this written confession more preaching was actually done than ten preachers could have accomplished. It is a piece of wisdom and wonderful wit that Mr. Eisleben and a few others are made to keep silence, when, instead of them, here come the elector of Saxony and the other princes with their written confession and preach to the imperial majesty itself and the whole empire, under their very noses, and they must hear it, and can have nothing to say against it. They would not allow their servants to hear the preachers, but now they themselves must hear it still worse (as they would say) from the great lords, and be silent. Christ is not silent at the diet, even though they go mad, and they must hear more from the confession than they would have heard in a year from the preachers. So it goes, as St. Paul says God's words will not be bound. When it is forbidden in the pulpit, it must be heard in palaces. When the poor preachers are silenced, then the great lords and princes preach. In short, when every mouth is stopped the stones cry out, as Christ declared."

"If they decide on this matter without the Scripture, or will that their decision be received without the Scripture, then will their own mouths condemn them, for they would claim to be Christian princes without Christ, which is worse than a landholder without land, a rich man without wealth, a scholar without learning."

"Let your grace be of good comfort. Christ will honor your grace before his Father, since your grace has honored him before an evil generation; for he says, him that honoreth me, I will honor. The same Lord who hath begun will carry it through, Amen. I pray for your grace with all diligence and earnestness, and would do more if I could. The favor of God be with your grace as heretofore, and abound more and more."

As to the light in which this transaction was viewed at the time, and the effect it produced, we will take the testimony of Spalatin, chaplain to the elector of Saxony, who was present on the occasion, and wrote his account on the spot a few hours after the confession was read.

"Last Saturday the greatest work was done at this diet of Augsburg that ever was done on earth; for on that day in the afternoon my gracious lord, the elector of Saxony, duke John, margrave George of Brandenburg, duke John Frederick of Saxony, duke Ernest of Brunswick and Lüneburg, landgrave Philip of Hesse, duke Francis of Brunswick and Lüneburg, prince Wolfgang of Anhalt, and the two cities of Nuremberg and Reutlingen, caused to be read article by article, not only before all the electors, princes, estates, bishops, and counsellors there present, but also before the imperial majesty itself and its brother king Ferdinand, openly and with fine Christian comforting courage and heart, the confession of their faith and of the whole Christian doctrine, which is preached in their principalities, countries, and cities. The lord chancellor, Dr. Christianus, read it, and he read it exceeding well, so loud and clear that not only every body in the hall heard it distinctly, but also without, in the court, that is, the yard of the bishop of Augsburg's palace, where his imperial majesty has his lodgings."

"The confession is written both in Latin and German, with such sure Scripture proof, and so solidly and clearly, that no such confession has been made, not only these thousand years, but never since the world stood. The like cannot be found in any history, nor in any of the old fathers or doctors."

"The imperial majesty and king Ferdinand, the dukes of

Bavaria, and some of the bishops, listened with very earnest attention. You may be sure that they had never, all their lives long, heard so much of this doctrine; for his imperial majesty, the king, and many princes and bishops considered us real Mamelukes, without God or faith. When the chancellor was reading, in the confession, that, some four hundred years ago, the pope prohibited marriage to the priests in Germany, and the then archbishop of Mainz published the decree, and endeavored to compel submission to it, and his clergy revolted, and he lost his life in the disturbance—on hearing this, king Ferdinand turns round to the archbishop of Mainz and asks, "*Is this true?*" Whereupon Mainz replies, "*Yea, it is true.*"

"Therefore let us hope in God, and may God grant us more grace, that we, in all our churches and sermons, may, with all earnestness, seasonably and with diligent prayer, seek God, that God himself may conduct this business to a blessed termination, that we may abide by God's word and maintain good peace. Let us all pray for it seasonably and in earnest. For, should this thing turn out prosperously for us, then in God's fear we can go on the further; but should it terminate adversely, then there will be great destruction to land and people; perhaps not only with loss of body and goods, wife and children, but also with loss of the eternal goods: from which evils may God defend us."

"May God help us in all our remaining business with all grace and mercy. Amen."

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the papists to prevent it, the Protestant confession had now been publicly read, and the reading of it had produced a strong and decided impression in favor of the Protestants. The emperor felt that something must be done to counteract this impression. He accordingly selected nineteen of the ablest papal theologians present to write a confutation of the confession. Among these were some of Luther's earliest and most distinguished antagonists, such as Eck, Wimpina, Cochläus, Faber, and others. Charles gave them a strict charge to avoid all passion and reproach, and confine themselves strictly to a calm, dignified, theological, and scriptural refutation of the statements of the confession. "This document (he said) is written in a dignified, unrepachable, candid style, and the answer to it, to be effectual, must bear the same character." The emperor probably was not aware how exceedingly difficult a task it must be to write such an answer to such a document as the Augsburg confession.

Faber, Eck, and their associates, set themselves diligently to work, and, after the lapse of some weeks, presented the result of their labors to the emperor. Charles looked it over, and found it to contain so much of abuse and so little of argument, that he immediately handed it back to them, and told them they must do better than that—the confutation must be entirely re-written. They resumed their labors with the best grace they could, and, after a few days, presented him with a revised copy containing two hundred and eighty leaves. The emperor took it and began to read; but soon coming to a passage which displeased him, he tore out the leaf and threw it down. He read on a while longer, and then tore out another leaf with great show of dissatisfaction. Faber and Eck, who had done the most in writing the confutation, seeing the reception it met with, soon grew as angry as the emperor, but nobody spoke a word. Charles kept on reading and every few seconds tearing a leaf out of the book, and Drs. Eck and Faber stood by growing very red in the face, all in marvellous silence, till at last, when the reading was through, of the two hundred and eighty leaves with which Charles had begun there were only a dozen left—two hundred and sixty-eight he had torn out and thrown on the floor. The dozen leaves he handed to Dr. Eck and told him to make something decent out of them. It was written over five times before the emperor would accept it, and in this labor six weeks passed away.

When the confutation was ready, it was publicly read before the diet, and the Protestants requested a copy of it; but this was refused, except on those conditions to which they would by no means submit. These were, first, that they should write no answer to it; second, that they should not print it, nor in any way cause it to come before the public; and, third, that they should submit to the emperor and the papal princes, and agree to the sentiments of the confutation. These conditions very plainly expose the opinion which the papists themselves had of the confutation, considered as an argument, when compared with the confession. Nothing was so much desired by the Protestants as the fullest publicity, both to their opinions and their arguments—nothing so much dreaded by the papists.

Notwithstanding this refusal, Melancthon began to write a reply to the confutation from such notes as could be taken by his friends, particularly Camerarius, during the public reading of it. Those notes were necessarily imperfect, and the defence

of course incomplete; but, incomplete as it was, the elector of Saxony was determined it should be presented to the diet. Accordingly his chancellor, in presence of the emperor, handed it to the count palatine of the Rhine, the proper officer to receive it. The emperor saw what was going on, whispered to his brother king Ferdinand, who sat by him, and then beckoned to the count palatine to give the paper back to the Saxon chancellor. Thus the emperor refused to receive a defence, the writing of which he had prohibited. This, however, happened very well, for, before the diet broke up, Melancthon by some means (Eck says, *furtim et fraudulenter*) got possession of a complete copy of the confutation. With this he was delighted, as if it were the richest prize in the world; and hastening to Altenburg with it, he there, in the house of Spalatin, wrote that celebrated apology for the Augsburg confession which the Lutherans have ever since received as one of their symbolic books. In this composition he had the presence and advice of Luther. With such zeal did he labor day and night on this work that his friends became alarmed for his health. Luther, who was never afraid of labor himself, at this period sometimes actually went to Melancthon's room, and, without ceremony dispossessing him of pen, ink, and paper, compelled him to allow himself a little relaxation. The apology was completed and published about the middle of April, 1531.

In 1540, Melancthon, on his own responsibility, published a revised edition of the confession, with some important changes, evidently with the intention of making the statement of the doctrines in some instances more clear, and taking away, so far as possible, the obstacles to a closer union among Protestants. The tenth article which originally read, "De Cœna Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in Cœna Domini; et improbant secus docentes"—was changed so as to read thus: "De Cœna Domini docent, quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi vescentibus in Cœna Domini." Luther had been exceedingly tenacious on this point, and yet it is remarkable that in regard to these changes made by Melancthon he preserved the most profound silence. A great clamor was raised against Melancthon, and he was accused before the elector of departing from the original ground of the confession; and Luther wrote to the elector most affectionately and earnestly in defence of his friend, and even then said nothing about the alterations. "I beseech your grace (said he) not to write hard to master Philip and our

friends, lest he grieve himself to death ; for they do hold fast to our dear confession, and they will abide firm and pure thereto though every thing should fail." If Luther had manifested the same moderation on this point ten years earlier, it would have averted a vast amount of evil from the Protestant cause.

Calvin expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the confession as published in 1540. Writing to M. Schalling in 1557, he says ; " Non vero Augustanam confessionem repudio, cui pridem volens ac libens subscripsi, sicut eam auctor ipse interpretatus est."

It is on the basis of this confession that the king of Prussia has recently formed an alliance with the church of England for the establishment of the bishopric of Jerusalem and the protection of Protestant missionaries against the assaults of the papal governments. Would that all true Protestants might unite on the same basis. How it would rejoice the spirit of Melancthon, the amiable writer of this admirable formula of doctrine, even now in the heavenly world ! While on earth he always labored to heal the divisions among Protestants, and in a letter to one of his friends he thus expresses himself on this point : " Oro te propter Christum, ut cogites, sananda esse potius quam exacerbanda hæc dissidia. Mihi illa fulmina anathematum nunquam placebant, etiamsi quid in aliquibus desiderabam—nec me pœnitet mei consilii, quod hactenus ab his rixis omnino fere abstinui."

The materials for the preceding narrative have been drawn principally from the Leipsic edition of Luther's Works, vol. XX., Marheinecke's Geschichte der deutschen Reformation, vol. II. and III., Seckendorf de Lutheranismo, Kœllner's Symbolik aller christlichen Confessionen, Vol. I., and the editions of Luther (so frequently referred to) by Lomler and Von Gerlach.

The diet at Augsburg at length broke up without accomplishing any thing for the security of the Protestants, but even leaving them in more imminent and immediate danger than they had ever been before. Luther then wrote and published his *Warning to his dear Germans*, a piece no less eloquent and effective than the *Admonition*, with which he had approached the diet at its commencement. The tone of the *Warning* is plaintive and even melancholy, full of the eloquence of grief and disappointed patriotism ; yet magnanimous, courageous, and spirit-stirring, as the notes of a trumpet. No one with the feelings of a Protestant or a Christian can read it without being alternately melted to tears and roused to indignation, without feeling at one moment like calling upon God in the agony of his soul to

have mercy on his poor, feeble, persecuted church, and at the next seizing the sword of the Spirit to annihilate at a blow all God's enemies on earth and in hell. It is inserted by Von Gerlach, vol. X. p. 85-120.

LUTHER'S PRINCIPAL GERMAN WRITINGS.

One great object I have in view in preparing these articles, is to direct the attention of the many who are now studying the German language in this country, to the writings of Luther. They are not obsolete, most of them are as good now as ever they were, and admirably adapted to the state of theological discussion at this time both in England and the United States. To give some idea of the number and variety of topics which engaged his pen, a condensed bill of fare to the student who would feast upon his works, I here subjoin, in chronological order, a select list of his principal German writings. The complete catalogue of all his works, Latin and German, comprises twenty-four large folio pages, closely printed in double columns in the appendix to Seckendorf.

1517 and 18.

1. Sermon on Indulgences and Grace. 2. Defence of the Sermon. 3. The Seven Penitential Psalms, with a Commentary. 4. Exposition of the Lord's Prayer. 5. Sermon on Penitence. 6. Exposition of the 110th Psalm.

1519.

7. A brief Guide to Confession. 8. Sermon on Usury. 9. Sermon on the Sacrament of the body of Christ, (advocating the use of the cup for the laity.) 10. Sermon on Excommunication. 11. Sermon on Marriage. 12. Instruction respecting certain articles alleged against him by his opponents. 13. Sermon on Prayer and the Procession. 14. Sermon preached at the Castle in Leipsic. 15. Sermon on Preparation for Death. 16. Another Sermon on Usury.

1520.

17. Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation. 18. Sermon on the Mass. 19. On the Freedom of a Christian Man. 20. Exposition of certain Articles in the Sermon on the Sacrament of the body of Christ. 21. Protest and Appeal. 22. Answer to a paper published under the seal of the Official at Stolpen. 23. On Good Works. 24. On the Papacy of Rome.

25. On Eck's new Bulls and Lies. 26. Against the Bulls of Anti-Christ. 27. Why the Pope and his Disciples have burnt Dr. Martin Luther's Books. 28. Ground and Reason of all the Articles which are unjustly condemned by the Romish Bulls. 29. A short Exposition of the holy Lord's Prayer, before and behind, (that is, what is expressed and implied.) 30. A brief Form of the Decalogue, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer.

1521.

31. Instruction to Penitents respecting the prohibited Books of Dr. Martin Luther. 32. Sermon respecting the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of Herod, preached on Three Kings' Day. 33. The Sufferings of Christ and Anti-Christ illustrated in 26 engravings by Cranach the elder. 34. Sermon on the worthy receiving of the Sacrament of the true Body of Christ, preached at Wittenberg before his Serene Highness the Prince and Margrave of Brandenburg. 35. Sermon preached at Erfurt on the Journey to Worms. 36. Sermon on a threefold good Life, to instruct the Conscience. 37. Instruction how men are rightly and understandingly to be baptized into the Christian Faith. 38-41. Four Tracts in answer to Bok and Emser and Murner in respect to the Leipsic Discussion. 42. Whether the Pope has Power to require Confession. 43. The 119th Psalm in German, to aid in useful Prayer, and to exalt God's Word against its greatest enemies, the Pope and the Doctrines of Men. 44. The 37th Psalm of David, to teach and comfort a Christian man against the Plots of the wicked and malicious Hypocrites. 45. German Exposition of the 68th Psalm for Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost. 46. The Magnifical (Luke i. 46-55,) translated and expounded. 47. Gospel of the ten Lepers (Luke xvii. 11-19) translated and expounded. 48. Judgment of the Paris Theologians on the Doctrine of Dr. Luther, and Dr. Luther's Anti-Judgment. 49. Dr. Martin Luther's Letter to the Diet at Worms, after his departure therefrom, sent from Friedberg.

1522.

50. Exhortation to all Christians to keep themselves from Uproar and Rebellion. 51. Eight Sermons preached at Wittenberg, (against all violent measures in promoting reformation, among the most eloquent of all Luther's productions.) 52. On the Abuses of the Mass. 53. The Bull in *Cæna Domini* of his Holiness the Pope, translated into German by Dr. Martin Luther,

with King David's Commentary on this Bull in Psalm 10th. 54. Treatise against Dr. Carlstadt's Innovations at Wittenberg. 55. Dr. Martin Luther's Opinion on receiving the Sacrament in both Kinds. 56. On shunning the Doctrines of Man. 57. Answer to the Texts quoted to strengthen the Doctrines of Men. 58. Sermon on the future Coming of Christ. 59. On the Sufferings of Christ. 60. Sermon on John xvi. 61. Against the spiritual State falsely so called of the Pope and Bishops. 62. German Answer of Martin Luther to the Book of King Henry of England. I fear not the Truth—Lies touch me not. 63. German Translation of the New Testament, with a Preface. 64. Exposition of the Epistles and Gospels which are read in the Church from Advent to Christmas. 65. The same, from Christmas to Sunday after Epiphany. 66. On Married Life. 67. A Christian Sermon preached at Erfurt, for the Reformation of every Christian man. 68. Do. on Faith and Works. 69. Reflections and Instructions on Monasteries and all spiritual Vows. 70. Exhortation, Warning, and Retrospection. 71. A Missive to all who are suffering Persecution for the Word of God, comfortingly written by Dr. Martin Luther to the noble and steadfast Hartmuth von Cronenberg. 72. To the Bohemian Legislators assembled at Prague.

1523.

73. On the Obedience due to the civil Magistrate. 74. On the Order of Divine Service in the Church. 75. On the Order of a common Treasury. 76. Sermon on the Birth of Christ. 77. Explanation of two abominable Figures of the Ass-pope and the Calf-monk, set forth by Melancthon, with Luther's Amen. 78. Exhortation to the German Clergy to abandon false Chastity, and hasten to the right connubial Chastity. 79. Reason and Answer why the Nuns may in a godly sort forsake the Nunneries. 80. That Jesus Christ was born a Jew. 81. Manual of Baptism in German. 82. Ground and Reason out of the Scripture that a Christian Congregation or Church have the Right and Power to judge of Doctrine, to call their Teachers, and to install and dismiss them. 83. Instruction and Proof that the Profession of the evangelical Doctrine in Word and Deed, and the reception of the Sacrament in both Kinds, cannot with good conscience be dispensed with through fear of Man. 84. Christ's Indulgence. 85. Poem on the two Martyrs of Christ, who were burnt at Brussels by the Sophists of Louvaine. 86.

Letter to the Prebendary of Wittenberg to put an end to the Disorders in Public Worship. 87. Exhortation to all the Christians in Worms to hold fast the Gospel-Doctrine they had received. 88. To the dear, elect Friends of God, all the Christians in Riga, Reval and Dorpat in Livonia. 89. A Letter of Comfort to the Christians of Augsburg. 90. Exposition of the seventh Chapter of the First of Corinthians. 91. The Epistle of Peter preached and explained. 92. Translation of the five Books of Moses with a Preface. 93. A Writing of two Kinds of Men who hold themselves in the Faith, and what that is. 94. An Advice that Princes should not take Arms against the Sovereign on account of Persecution for the Faith. 95. Answer and Supplication on the request of the Elector of Saxony, that he would abstain from severity in Writing. 96. A papal Brief against Luther to the Council of Bamberg, with Luther's Notes.

1524.

97. To the Councillors of all the Cities of Germany that they should establish and maintain Christian Schools. 98. Sermon on the Circumcision, Luke ii. 21. 99. Brief Exposition of John i. 29-34. 100. A History how God helped an honorable Nun, Florantina of Upper Weimar, with a Letter to the Counts of Mansfeld. 101. A Christian Letter of Comfort to the Miltenbergers, and how they should avenge themselves on their Enemies, out of Psalm cxx. 102. Exposition of Psalm cxxvii. for the Christians of Riga in Livonia. 103. The Epistle of Jude and the Second of Peter preached and explained. 104. Two Imperial Edicts, inconsistent and contradictory, against Luther, with Luther's Preface and Postscript. 105. A Writing against the blind and mad Condemnation of the Seventeen Articles by the miserable and shameful University of Ingolstadt. 106. Advice that Parents should neither force nor hinder the Marriage of their Children, and that Children should not make Matrimonial Engagements without the Consent of their Parents. 107. A Writing against the new Idol and old Devil, which is said to be raised at Meissen, (on the canonization of Benno, an old Bishop of Meissen.) 108. A Letter to the Princes Frederick and John of Saxony, on the Rebellious Spirit. 109. Reflexion whether we should decide by the Mosaic or the Imperial Code. 110. Reflection whether a Man should abstain from Marriage on account of the Poverty of his Family. 111. On Trade and

Usury. 112. On the Sum of God's Law, and the Use and Abuse of the Law, from 1 Tim. i. 3. 113. The Abominations of the Silent Mass. 114. Prefaces to Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes. 115. The Psalter in German, after the manner of the Hebrew language. 116. Several Sermons. 117. Luther's Correspondence with Wolfgang of Saalhausen. 118. On the Use and Profession of Christian Freedom. 119. To the Chapter of Wittenberg to put away the Ungodly Ceremonies. 120. To a Gentleman in Austria instructed in the Christian Doctrine.

1525.

121. Against the Heavenly Prophets on the Images and Sacraments. 122. Martyrdom of B. Henry, burnt in Diedmar, with an Exposition of Psalm ix. 123. Two Bulls of Pope Clement VII. on the Papal Romish Jubilee, translated into German with a Preface and Notes. 124. A Lecture against Rebels, on 1 Tim. i. 18-20. 125. An Address to be read before receiving the Sacrament. 126. A Warning to all the Christians in Strasburg to be on their Guard against the Fanaticism of Dr. Carlstadt. 127. An Exhortation to Peace, (to the Swabian Peasants.) 128. Against the Thievish and Murderous Peasants. 129. A Letter respecting the severe Books against the Peasants. 130. A dreadful History and Judgment of God on Thomas Muenzer. 131. Two Sermons on the Death of Frederick, Elector of Saxony, from 1 Thess. iv. 13-18. 132. Sermon on Psalm xxvi. 133. A Christian Exhortation respecting the externals of Public Worship and Uniformity therein, to the Christians of Livonia. 134. Exposition of the Epistles and Gospel for the Feast of the Three Kings, and from Advent to Easter. 135. Preface to John Walter's Psalm-tunes set to four Parts. 136. Various Sermons. 137. Exhortation to Wolfgang Reissenbusch, to betake himself to the married state. 138. A Letter to Cardinal Albert, Archbishop of Mainz, advising him to get married.

1526.

139. The German Mass and Order of Public Worship. 140. The Papacy and its Members depicted and described. 141. To all the Christians of Reutlingen. 142. Against Ecolampadius. 143. Sermon on the Body and Blood of Christ, against the Fanatics. 144. The cxiith Psalm of David, on the Wealth, Honor, and Pleasure, which the Godly use well and the Ungodly

abuse. 145. Two Sermons on Acts xv. and xvi. 146. Answer to Passages quoted from Scripture in favor of Monastic Vows. 147. The Prophet Habakkuk expounded. 148. A good Sermon of Dr. Luther's on the text, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God. 149. Four comforting Psalms expounded to the Queen of Hungary. 150. Instruction and Warning against the right rebellious and treacherous Council of the whole Clergy of Mainz. 151. Dr. Luther's Advice to the Saxon Chancellor Brueck, as to what the Elector should do against the Confederacy in Mainz. 152. Explanation of certain Chapters in Exodus. 153. Certain Reflexions on subjects connected with Marriage.

1527.

154. That these Words, *this is my Body*, stand fast against the Fanatics. 155. Whether a Man may flee through fear of Death, (written when the Plague raged at Wittenberg.) 156. Whether Soldiers can be in a condition of Salvation. 157. Sermon on Matt. xi, 25—30. 158. Answer to the King of England's blasphemous Title. 159. Consolation to the Christians of Halle on the Death of their Preacher. 160. Various Sermons. 161. The Predictions of John Lichtenberger, in German. 162. Blessed History of Leonhard Kaiser, who was burnt in Bavaria for the Gospel's sake. 163. Sermon on Christ's Kingdom and Christian Freedom. 164. Reflexions on a Case of Matrimony. 165. A faithful Warning and Exhortation to all the pious Christians of Erfurt to beware of false Doctrine, and hold fast the true. 165. On the first Book of Moses, with an Instruction how Moses is to be read. 166. Five Reflexions of Luther to certain of the Nobility.

1528.

167. On the Lord's Supper. 168. A new Fable of Æsop, of the Lion and the Ass, lately found and translated into German, (a humorous satire on certain would-be Poets.) 169. The Prophet Zechariah expounded. 170. On Anabaptism. 171 and 172. Two Treatises on the Sacrament in both kinds. 173. A beautiful Christian Letter of Consolation to a considerable person in Lower Saxony, who was burdened with various Thoughts concerning God's Providence. 174. On the false, mendicant Roguery. 175. On the marriage of the worthy Priest S. Klingbeil, to the Bishop of Camin. 176. Exposition of the Decalogue. 177. Brief Exhortation to Confession.

1529.

178. On private and stolen Letters, together with an exposition of a Psalm, against George Duke of Saxony. 179. A small Catechism for common Pastors and Preachers. 180. The German Catechism. 181. Sermon on the Lies against the Holy Ghost. 182. The Wisdom of Solomon, to Tyrants, translated into German. 183. To the high-born Princess, the Lady Sibyl, Duchess of Saxony, on Christian Housekeeping. 184. Sermons to the Suffering, from John xviii. xix. and xx. 185. War Sermon against the Turks. 186. A Writing to John, Elector of Saxony, respecting defensive War. 187. A Writing of Comfort to a person in great Temptation, with the addition of Psalm cxlii.

1530.

188. Admonition to the Clergy assembled at the Diet of Augsburg. 189. Description of a Court Life in Venice. 190. Certain Fables of Æsop, translated into German. 191. A Sermon that men should keep their Children at School. 192. A Letter on Translation (defending his version of Romans iii. 28.) 193. A Warning to his dear Germans. 194. On Marriage. 195. A short and clear Instruction how the secret Revelation of John is to be understood and interpreted, very useful and consoling for those Times. 196. The Prophet Daniel, in German. 197. The Prophecy concerning Gog in Ezekiel xxviii. and xxxix. 198. Select and beautiful Passages of the Holy Scripture, wherewith Dr. Luther comforted himself in great Temptations. 199. A Writing to the Landgrave of Hesse. 200. The beautiful cxviiith Psalm. 201. Certain Reflexions on controverted Articles laid before the Diet at Augsburg. 202. Answer to Questions proposed to Dr. Luther by two Persons of high Rank. 203. Martin Luther's Revelation respecting Purgatory, to all Posterity. 204. Exposition of Psalms cxvii. and lxxxii. 205. On the Keys. 206. Exhortation to the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of our Lord. 207. Exposition of the cxith Psalm. 208. Prefaces to the Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament. 209. Instruction to two Preachers whether they should leave their Churches, and give way to the Enemies of the Gospel. 210. Brief Exposition of the first Twenty-five Psalms. 211. Do. of the vi. vii. and xvii. ch. of John. 212. Nine Sermons preached at Coburg, during the Diet at Augsburg. 213. A Confession of the Christian Doctrine and Faith in Seventeen Ar-

ticles. 214. Answer to the Clamor of certain Papists against the Seventeen Articles. 215. Fine Christian Thoughts of the holy Fathers and Doctors, that a Christian should bear every Cross with Patience. 216. Advice to a Pastor how a Jewess should be baptized. 217. Answer to five Questions proposed by a Person of Quality, on the right Use of the Sacrament. 218. On the Intercession of the Saints.

1531.

219. On the pretended Imperial Edict issued after the Diet of 1530. 220. Letter to Spengler, whether Man may resist the Emperor. 221. Letter to a Citizen of Nuremberg, whether Men with a good Conscience may enter into combination against the unrighteous and violent attempts of the Emperor. 222. To the Citizens of Frauenstein. 223. Against the Assassins at Dresden. 224. Sermon on the Cross and Sufferings, and how a Man should behave himself under them. 225. A Sermon on John xx. respecting Mary Magdalene. 226. Instruction and Warning to the Christians of N., near Freiberg, to receive the Sacrament in both Kinds. 227. A Writing that Christian Preachers, by their Office, are bound to reprove the People for their Sins. 228. How Christians should act in affairs of Matrimony. 229. Prefaces to the Psalter, Jeremiah, and the minor Prophets. 230. Summaries of the Psalms, and Reasons for translating. 231. Sermon on the Destruction of Jerusalem, from Luke xix. 41. 232. Sermon on the Angels. 233. A Marriage Sermon, from Hebrews, xiii. 4. 234. Advice as to what a faithful Preacher of the Word should do when his Office is despised and he is persecuted. 235. Comfort to an afflicted Person of Quality.

1532.

236. Exposition of Matthew, v., vi., and vii. 237. Do. of Psalm cxlvii. 238. To the Council and nine Monks of Herford. 239. How the Law and the Gospel may be right solidly distinguished, and what Christ and his Kingdom are. 240. Exposition of the Benediction pronounced in the Mass. 241. Letters to the Elector John of Saxony. 242. Letter to Albert Margrave of Brandenburg, against certain rebellious Spirits. 243. Letter against Sneaks and secret Preachers. 244. Two Sermons at the Funeral of John Elector of Saxony. 245. Letter of Consolation to a Nobleman. 246. Do. to the expelled Leipsicers. 247. A comforting Sermon on the Coming of

Christ and the promised Signs of the Last Day. 248. A Prophecy of Dr. Martin Luther, after the Death of the Elector John.

1533.

249. To the Christians of Oschatz. 250. Answer and Instructions to the Leipsic Protestants expelled by Duke George. 251. Sermon on Jesus Christ, preached before the Electoral Court of Torgau. 252. Some fine Sermons on Christian love, from the first Epistle of John. 253. Form of the Christian life, from St. Paul, 1 Tim. i. 254. To the Christians of Frankfurt on the Maine. 255. Four Reflexions of Luther and his Colleagues on a Council. 256. To the Council of the Imperial City of Augsburg. 257. Answer to the Uproar of Duke George, and a Letter of Comfort to the Christians wickedly expelled by him from Leipsic. 258. A little Answer to Duke George's last Book. 259. Three Sermons on good and bad Angels. 260. On private Masses and Consecration to the Priesthood. 261. Letter to a good Friend on the Book respecting private Masses. 262. Dr. Martin Luther's Catalogue of all the Books published by him, from 1518 to 1533, with a Preface.

1534.

263. Exposition of Psalms lxxv. and ci. 264. Reflexions to the Elector John Frederick. 265. Four Letters of Comfort to a Person in private Rank in bodily and mental Distress. 266. Comfort to a Person afflicted with Melancholy and Gloom. 267. On the Resurrection from the Dead, 1 Cor. xv. 268. Counsel and Warning to an offended Person to avoid avenging himself. 269. Reflexions on fleeing from Solitude. 270. Comforting Instructions how we may resist bodily Weakness, Pusillanimity, and other Temptations of the Devil. 271. Prayer for the Hour of Death. 272. Preface to the Acts of the Apostles.

1535.

273. Reflexions whether a Christian who is well instructed in Divine Truth can attend idolatrous Worship without violating his Conscience. 274. Sermons on Baptism. 275. Reflexions whether it is lawful to marry a deceased Wife's Sister. 276. Reflexions whether the Holy Sacrament in both kinds may be administered in a private house. 277. A simple Guide to Prayer for a good Friend. 278. Reflexions whether a Christian with a good Conscience can be present at the Consecration of a

papal Bishop. 279. A comforting Writing for Christians banished for the sake of the Gospel. 280. The last and earnest Letter of reproof to Cardinal Albert, Archbishop of Mainz. 281. Reflexions on two Cases of nuptial Desertion. 282. Convocation of a free Christian Council.

1536.

283. Marriage Sermon on Ephesians, v. 22-33. 284. Instruction that the Spiritual and Temporal Authority should be carefully distinguished. 285. Reflexions on the Sins of the Elect. 286. Severe Reproof and Warning to the Cardinal Albert, Archbishop of Mainz.

1537.

287. Complaint of the Birds to Luther against his Servant, W. Siebergem (a humorous reproof of the Servant for his fondness for ensnaring and caging Birds). 288. Exposition of the Christian Faith, preached at Smalkalden. 289. Comforting Letter to a person who was fearful and sad in sickness. 290. Twenty-one Sermons. 291. Letter to Jezeln, a Jew of Rosheim.

1538.

292. On the Value of History. 293. Articles to be discussed at the Council of Mantua, and what we on our part can give or take. 294. Letter to a good Friend against the Sabbatarians. 295. Reflexions on the Expedition against the Turks. 296. Program against the Epigrams of Lemnius. 297. The three Confessions of the Christian Faith used harmoniously in the Churches. 298. The glorious Mandate of Christ, *Go ye into all the World, and preach the Gospel to every Creature*. 299. The expression of Paul, *Christ hath given Himself for our Sins*, wholesomely and comfortingly explained to all troubled and anxious Consciences. 300. Writing to Count Albert of Mansfeld.

1539.

301. On the Councils and Churches. 302. Against the Bishop of Magdeburg. 303. Letter to a Pastor respecting taking Arms against the Emperor, if he should attack the Protestants. 304. To the Council of Nuremberg, respecting general and special Absolution. 305. Writing respecting holy Water and the Pope's Agnus Dei. 306. Writing to Margrave Joachim II. of Brandenburg, respecting the Order of the Churches. 307. Letter to

the Provost of Berlin respecting certain Ceremonies in Divine Worship. 308. Answer to Landgrave Philip of Hesse respecting his Bigamy. 309. Report on Mr. Eisleben's false Doctrine and shameful Conduct, and Answer to his insignificant and groundless Complaints against Luther.

1540.

310. Exhortation to Pastors to preach against Usury. 311. Warning to a good Friend not to withdraw himself from the Lord's Supper on account of a Lawsuit.

1541.

312. Against Hans Worst. 313. Exhortation to Prayer against the Turks. 314. Thoughts on Religious Peace. 315. Collation Speech on Transubstantiation. 316. Another Letter to a Person of high Rank respecting Transubstantiation.

1542.

317. Example of the Consecration of a right Christian Bishop, as it took place at Nuremberg in 1542. 318. Preface to the Latin and German burial Hymns. 319. German Translation of Richard's Refutation of the Koran. 320. Owl's Looking-glass and Alcoran of the barefaced Monks. 321. Exhortation to Peace, to the Elector John Frederick and Duke Maurice of Saxony. 322. Letter of Consolation to the Widow of Cellarius on her Husband's happy Death. 323. Letter to Prince George of Anhalt respecting the Elevation of the Host. 324. Comfort to pious Women who are unfortunate in Child-birth. 325. Lady Music (a poem). 326. On the Jews and their Lies. 327. Earnest Writing that a faithful Pastor should not be deposed because he had severely reprov'd Vice. 328. On the Genealogy of Christ. 329. On the last Words of David. 330. Reflexions on the Re-establishment of the papal Ceremonies. 331. Earnest Exhortation to the Students at Wittenberg to keep themselves from Prostitutes. 332. Comforting Letter to W. Heinzen, Organist at Halle. 333. Exposition of the Epistles and Gospels for a Year.

1544.

334. Short Confession respecting the holy Sacrament. 335. Comforting Letter to Jerome Baumgartner's Wife respecting her Husband's Imprisonment. 336. Comforting Letter to pious

Parents whose Son had died at the University. 337. Family Sermons.

1545.

338. On the Use of Picture Books in religious Instruction. 339. Letter to the Elector of Saxony and Landgrave of Hesse respecting the Imprisonment of the Duke of Brunswick. 340. Representation to the Elector of Saxony against secret matrimonial Engagements. 341. Against the Roman Papacy established by the Devil. 342. An Italian lying letter, published at Rome, respecting Luther's Death, with Notes. 343. Sermon on the Kingdom of Christ, from the viiith Psalm. 344. Luther's Dialogue with Dr. George Major.

1546.

345. A little Book for simple Pastors. 346. Letter to the Congregation at Pensa. 347-52. Several Sermons. 353. Sermon on Matt. xi. 25-30, (preached two days before Luther's death—the last he ever preached).

The preceding list is but a selection from the German writings of Luther, and the four folios of Latin works are entirely omitted. It is exceedingly interesting and instructive to the philosophic mind to run over the titles of these several publications in the order of their production, and with reference to the times and circumstances which called them forth. Some of the titles we have considerably abridged, but have endeavored to retain, so far as possible, their spirit and meaning. I hope the reader will not neglect to give this register at least one perusal, and I am sure it must suggest to his mind many reflexions respecting the causes and progress of the Reformation, and the agency of Luther in it, that had not before occurred to him. Every one of these works was read with avidity all over Europe as soon as it was out of the press.

Many important branches of our subject still remain untouched, especially *Luther's services as a hymnologist and composer of Church music*. This is a topic of such deep interest that we must draw still further on the patience of our readers, and make it the subject of a separate communication.

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE II.

THE WORKS OF SAMUEL PARR, LL. D., WITH MEMOIRS OF HIS
LIFE AND WRITINGS. LONDON.

By REV. CALVIN E. PARR, Waterville, Me.

THE works of Dr. Samuel Parr, styled by his contemporaries the best schoolmaster that ever existed, and the profoundest scholar of his age, are in eight octavo volumes. The first contains his life by Dr. Edward Johnston; the second contains several sermons, among which is the famous Spital sermon with its wonderfully copious notes; the third and fourth are filled with various moral, political, and philosophical tracts; the fifth and sixth with sermons; and the seventh and eighth with selections from his correspondence. The object of this article is to sketch briefly the life of Dr. Parr, and to estimate the nature and value of the services which he rendered to literature and religion.

He was born at Harrow on the Hill, in the year 1747. His father, whose name he bore, was a surgeon of considerable eminence in his profession; distinguished for his strong common sense and the correctness of his taste in the Latin and English languages; the stern rectitude of his principles and the manly and dignified independence of his spirit; qualities which were inherited in no slight degree by his more eminent son. The same ardor in the pursuit of knowledge, by which Dr. Parr was so remarkably characterized in his riper years, manifested itself in his earliest childhood. When only four years of age, he was placed at the public school in Harrow, and at fourteen he was pronounced the head boy in the school. Among his school-fellows was that prodigy of scholarship, Sir William Jones. A very close friendship was formed between him and Parr. Their literary activity was not confined to the regular business of the school. The leisure, which the other boys spent in amusement, Parr and Jones devoted to serious intellectual labor. They acquired together the art of logic, disputing with each other, sometimes on subjects connected with natural science, and at others on points suggested by reading the French translation of Plato's Dialogues; they wrote tragedies founded on the stories

which caught their attention in the course of their studies ; and accustomed themselves to imitations of the more elegant English writers, for their own improvement in composition. The crudeness, which is apt to be seen in juvenile efforts of this sort ; was doubtless perceptible in these exercises of Parr and Jones ; but the happy influence of them on their intellectual character cannot be disputed.

Ten years were spent in this school, and at the end of this period, he was taken home to be employed in the business of his father. The progress which he had made in his studies while at school, and the habits of application which he had formed, enabled him to devote what leisure he could command to literary pursuits with characteristic ardor and with eminent success. He earnestly applied himself to those philological inquiries, which afterwards engaged so much of his attention ; at the same time, indulging his fondness for metaphysical investigations, and improving himself by incessant practice in English composition.

Memorials of Parr's childhood do not seem to be very copious. He was always fond of whatever belonged to the church ; and long before he was of sufficient age to be ordained, he was used to equip himself with wig, beaver, and the other paraphernalia of the highest prelatical dignity. His grave and somewhat heavy features were well suited to the character he was so apt to assume. He would frequently read the church service to as many auditors as he could collect, and, when twelve years of age, he composed a sermon for a Christmas occasion, which was shown to the Vicar of Harrow, and pronounced by him to be so good and appropriate a sermon, that no clergyman could be ashamed to deliver it. He discovered such a decided predilection for the clerical profession, that his father at length determined to gratify it, although it would have been more in accordance with his views that his son should follow his own business. Amusing anecdotes are told of the premature seriousness of deportment which this designation led the youth to assume. He would sit on the churchyard gate at Harrow, looking most grave and serious, while his school-fellows were playing around ; and when asked, why he did not join in their sports, would answer in a very solemn tone, Do you not know, sir, that I am to be a parson ? This anxious culture of outward propriety of manners, and zeal and energy in the pursuit of learning, seem to have been all the qualifications which he thought necessary for the sacred office.

In the autumn of 1765 he was entered as a pensioner at Emanuel College, Cambridge. He seems to have been unusually qualified to be benefited by a residence at the University. He had habits of intense application to study. He was a genuine lover of learning; already had he made uncommon attainments in classical erudition; and with his superior native talents and the facilities for their successful culture, which were now placed within his reach, one might suppose that no degree of professional eminence was unattainable. To us, however, who are not used to see young men beginning the business of preparation for the ministry, without furnishing any proof of personal religion, it is painful to observe that Parr's character was apparently deficient in this indispensable feature. We do not learn, indeed, that he was addicted to any vicious practices; he seems to have been of an affectionate temper, and we have already adverted to the seriousness which he evinced in his childhood. But these traits of character do not appear to have been the offspring of spiritual religion; nor, so far as can be gathered from the memoirs, did either he or his biographers ever suspect that the *natural man*, unaltered except by the necessary influence of academical pursuits, was not perfectly qualified to occupy the station of an ambassador of God.

Parr left Cambridge after a residence of one year. The narrowness of his circumstances was one inducement to this removal. The whole of his worldly wealth was but three pounds and seventeen shillings. His father had died not long after his entrance into the University, and he had lost his mother three years before. He suspected that his straitened circumstances were imputable to the avarice of his step-mother, who had engrossed a disproportionate share of his father's property. There was also a suspicion, either well founded or imaginary, of ill-treatment from one of the tutors. This tutor was Dr. Richard Farmer, the celebrated commentator on Shakspeare. Parr complains that he was neglected by him on account of his poverty; but, according to the testimony of a common friend, Farmer neglected every body. He was a man of such singular indolence as to neglect the usual duties of his office, as tutor of a college, in sending the young men's accounts; and he is supposed to have burnt large sums of money, by putting into the fire unopened letters, containing remittances, accompanied by remonstrances and requiring answers. Parr embraced an offer from Dr. Sumner, the head-master of the school at Harrow, to

become one of his assistants. He occupied this post for five years. It was one in which he was well qualified to win applause. He had been always noted for the ascendancy, which he managed to gain over the minds of his companions, and for the didactic tone even of his earliest epistolary performances. His classical acquisitions were certainly adequate to the duties of the place. He was admitted into clerical orders in 1769, and immediately became curate of two parishes in the neighborhood of Harrow.

In the correspondence, we find a letter from David Roderick, who was also assistant at Harrow and quite intimate with Parr, which narrates many pleasant particulars of his character and habits. This was the period in which the controversy between the House of Commons and Mr. Wilkes was at its height. Parr espoused the popular cause with his usual strength of feeling. His friend once went with him to Brentford for the purpose of voting for Wilkes. It was with difficulty that he escaped the violence of the mob, notwithstanding his person was profusely decorated with election labels, with the motto "Wilkes and liberty." The populace could not believe that an adherent of Wilkes would wear so clerical an attire. On this occasion, as on some others, Parr sacrificed his personal interests to his political predilections.

The next year, Parr's happiness was interrupted by the death of his cousin, Francis Parr, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. His character is exhibited in a very favorable light, by his friendship for this young man. Three letters are preserved, written to his cousin in view of the certainty of his speedy death. We shall transcribe a single paragraph, which evinces great affection for his relative, mingled with strong and sincere, if not entirely correct, religious feeling. "I know not how it came about; last Saturday, my dear friend, I went to London with a full resolution to open my bosom and to talk with you, both seriously and copiously, about the concerns of another life. Such a conversation would certainly have been not inconsistent with my clerical character. It would have been not improper from one, who has that earnest hearty affection for all your interests that I pay to yours. It would not have been offensive to a man of your sound understanding and firm faith. Yet my unwillingness to deject you got the better of all my determinations, and I kept the secrets fast within my bosom which have now found their way into this letter. In a word, my dear fellow-

Christian, let me beg of you to think earnestly of another state. If it is at hand, such thoughts are peculiarly seasonable ; if it be far distant, they yet become your present situation. These are moments in which I cannot stoop to trifle or dissemble with you. I should disdain to dissemble myself. I should be angry, if in such circumstances, you from benevolence should wish to deceive me. If you are unfit for another life, it is high time to rouse you from your lethargy ; if you are fit it is the only prospect that ought to employ your attention, because the only one that can deserve it. Oh, my friend, address your prayers to Almighty God, in the name of His Son ; beg His mercy to all the follies and irregularities of your youth.

“Without sorrow you cannot repent. Without repentance you cannot be saved. With repentance you will have comfort here and joy hereafter. I beg of you, again and again, approach in thought and prayer that God, before whom it may be our lot to appear very soon. But why should we be shocked ? Christianity unfolds futurity in every cheering, every delightful representation : it shows the mercy of our God, and the love of our Saviour. It shows that, through the Gospel covenant, our imperfect services shall be accepted, and our numberless sins forgiven. It shows us that you and I, with all our follies and with all our faults, may, I trust, humbly trust, shall meet in Heaven, never, never to be separated.”

Dr. Sumner, in the autumn of 1771, was carried off by an apoplexy, and Parr was the person naturally pointed out as his successor. He accordingly applied for the vacant mastership, but fruitlessly. The Governors, partly on account of the youth of the applicant,—he was then but twenty-five,—but more perhaps on account of the superior qualifications of Dr. Benjamin Heath, then assistant at Eaton, elected the latter. Parr acknowledged afterwards that Heath was a very good scholar, and by his personal merit justified his election. Yet the disappointment greatly angered him. “It was impossible,” he said, “to describe the anguish of his honest and ingenuous mind, when he was thus forcibly driven away from the place, where he had drawn his first breath, in which he had formed the most endearing connexions, and in which he had faithfully discharged the most important duties. His friends had flattered him with hopes of success. Bennet, afterwards Bishop of Cloyne, told him that the genius of the school waited for his resolves in silence ; that nature and reason looked upon him as the only person that could

prevent Harrow from sinking into the lowest contempt. He believed, also, it was Sumner's wish that he should be chosen. Every boy in the school signed a petition in his favor, but in vain. The reason of his ill success, as he afterwards asserted, was the vote he had given for Wilkes; and a suspicion that his independent spirit would lead him to govern the school according to his own notions. The consequence was, that Parr indignantly resigned his place as assistant. The scholars shared in his feelings, and more than forty of them abruptly quitted Harrow; and when their former assistant established a rival school at Stanmore, they joined it.

This disappointment is considered by Parr's biographers as the crisis of his fate. He was deprived of a situation which would have yielded him a revenue adequate to all his reasonable wishes, and wherein his extraordinary stock of erudition and his ardent thirst for learning might have been fully displayed. He was placed in a situation in which he long felt the miseries of dependence, and in which his vast accumulations of knowledge were rendered comparatively useless. Yet he found in these disheartening circumstances friends who cheered him with their sympathy, and discharged offices of more substantial advantage. From the relatives of the late principal he received large accommodations of money. From the heavy expenses he was obliged to incur in the establishment of his school, this aid was peculiarly welcome.

At Stanmore the number of his pupils was not large, never exceeding sixty. Among them, however, were several names which subsequently became eminent in the state or in literature. Yet his situation was by no means enviable. The school at Harrow was too near, and the influence in its favor too mighty to allow the rival establishment to meet with an extensive patronage. He fell into a quarrel with the rector of the parish, who, when Parr came to Stanmore, was one of the warmest of his friends. The quarrel grew from a slight coolness, produced by an assumption of superiority on the part of the rector, which such a spirit as Parr's was not at all inclined to brook, into a total interruption of intercourse. The rector was a man of great abilities, and had been brought up at Litchfield with Johnson and Garrick; and being possessed of wit, which he was wont to display with little regard to the feelings of his friends, the rupture between him and Parr ceases to be wonderful. Irritated by this circumstance, and by the disappointment he had met

with at Harrow, and provoked and chagrined by the decline of his school, in the spring of 1777 he forsook Stanmore and took up his residence at Colchester.

Every one who has heard of Parr has heard of his inveterate habit of smoking. The best likeness we have seen of him represents him seated in his arm chair, enveloped in his study gown, with pipe in hand. Robert Hall, who, when settled at Cambridge, was somewhat in his society, according to his own statement, was obliged to take up smoking in self-defence. "To smoke, talk Greek, and talk politics," were his three favorite amusements. The most valuable gift which Mr. Fox thought he could offer him was a superb Turkish tobacco-pipe, six feet in length. He began the practice of smoking at Harrow, but the contentment of his mind and his constant employment gave him little time for such an indulgence. What time he could then spare from his school was devoted to reading and the preparation of sermons; but, at Stanmore, he abandoned himself to the practice without restraint. His favorite beverage was port wine and water; and one of his friends testifies—a testimony which we should think ought to have been entirely superfluous, considering the clerical character of Parr—that he never knew him to transgress the bounds of the strictest sobriety. He brought upon himself the ridicule of the people of Stanmore by frequently riding through the streets in high prelatical pomp, on a black saddle, bearing in his hand a long cane which was meant to resemble a bishop's crosier: at other times he would inconsistently suffer himself to walk through the same streets in a dirty striped morning gown.

Parr, as we have said, went to reside at Colchester, in the spring of 1777. He was received with open arms by his friend Dr. Nathanael Forster, and "that exquisite scholar, the Rev. Thomas Twining." Here he resumed his intention of taking priest's orders, in which he had been frustrated at the time he left Harrow, in consequence of an unfounded report of his having stimulated the scholars to rebel at the election of Dr. Heath. He was now ordained by Bishop Lowth. His curacies were the two churches in Colchester where his friend Dr. Forster was the incumbent. Though his efforts to establish a school were not very successful, his residence in Colchester was in many respects advantageous to him. It established his reputation as an instructor, and above all confirmed the friendship of the two eminent men whose names have just been mentioned. The latter

of these is well known to scholars by his translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*. The conversation of Dr. Forster was peculiarly agreeable to Parr, from the depth and clearness of his views on metaphysical subjects; nor was their friendship ever disturbed by their opposite political sentiments; Parr being as hostile to Lord North's administration and as friendly to the Americans, as Forster was inimical to the Americans and in favor of Lord North; though Forster was a fearless speaker of his thoughts, and Parr certainly was not less so.

Parr always reverted to his residence at Colchester, as to a time when he enjoyed much, in spite of many circumstances that conspired to embitter his happiness. Here he had a considerable addition to the number of his scholars; and being at a greater distance from Harrow, his spirits were revived and refreshed by better hopes and fairer prospects. His friends had the highest ideas of his learning and taste and manner of teaching. "I have never met with such a man yet," says one of the most acute and accomplished of these, "in the shape of a schoolmaster. How he is in point of discipline and severity, I cannot pretend to say: I have been told that he flogs too much; but I doubt those from whom I heard it think any use of punishment too much. In conversing with him, I have heard him disapprove of beating children. I have heard him say, that words were his worst rod: that what all his boys most dreaded was his talking to them and shaming them before the whole school." His society was highly prized. "I heartily wished for you last Friday," says Mr. Twining, "when Mr. Parr and the Forsters were here. The day passed most pleasantly. The party was well assorted, and Mr. Parr in high *εὐθυμία*, as he himself said, and full of that social and convivial spirit, that is so charming a thing to me, when it animates a cultivated and well-stocked mind, and sets sense, fancy, and knowledge a flowing; and so melancholy a thing when it produces nothing but barren jollity and laughter without humor; when it makes no other difference in a man, but that his talk is louder and his face redder than at another time."

As usual, it was not long ere Parr was in a quarrel. His foes were the Trustees of the school, and the subject of dispute was a lease. He drew up a pamphlet which he was dissuaded from publishing. The advice that Sir William Jones gave him, on this occasion, deserves to be quoted. "Oh, my friend! remember and emulate Newton, who once entered into a philosophical

contest, but soon found, he said, that he was parting with his peace of mind for a shadow. Surely the elegance of ancient Poetry and Rhetoric, the contemplation of God's works and God's ways, the respectable task of making boys learned and men virtuous, may employ the forty or fifty years you have to live, more serenely, more laudably, and more profitably than the vain warfare of controversial divinity, or the dark mines and countermines of uncertain metaphysics." This pamphlet was marked, to an amusing degree, by all the peculiarities of its author's style; its frequent antitheses and copious illustrations and splendid imagery; all in most ludicrous contrast with the frivolous nature of the occasion. Don Quixotte himself could not have declaimed more magniloquently. "When I first entered the lists against these hardy combatants, I determined to throw away the scabbard; and firmly as I confided in the strength of my cause, I imagined that my antagonists would not yield me the *dulcem sine pulvere palmam*, that they would dispute every inch of ground with me, and at least save their credit by retreating with their weapons in their hands. But my expectations were disappointed; instead of the fury of a contest we had not even the mockery of a skirmish; not one threat was denounced, not one argument was produced, nor was any allusion dropped upon the offensive topic of the agreement."

The head-mastership of the Norwich school became vacant in 1778. Parr had many agreeable connexions in Norfolk. Robert, the brother of Francis Parr, resided in Norwich, to whom he was fervently attached. He was induced to become a candidate for the vacant situation. He succeeded in being elected, and removed thither in January 1779. He was indebted for his success to the recommendation of Dr. Johnson. The corporation of Norwich applied to Johnson to point out to them a proper master, and he suggested to them the name of Parr.

The next year he appeared, for the first time, before the public as an author. He had intended, it seems, when at Colchester, to publish a sermon which he preached there; but he had never done it. Jones begs him to send the manuscript to him. "You may rely," he says, "on my sincerity, as well as on my attention; but in the name of the muses, let it be written in a legible hand; for to speak plainly with you, your English and Latin characters are so ill-formed, that I have infinite difficulty to read your letters, and have abandoned all hopes of deciphering many of them. I will speak with the sincerity which you like; either

you can write better or you cannot ; if you can, you ought to write better ; if not, you ought to learn." This was not the only rebuke nor the severest, which Parr received, for his abominable penmanship. "My dear and respected friend," said Lord Tamworth to him, "pray do make some one write for you ; for I really cannot decipher your Greek characters. You told me that you was only, only once flogged for bad writing ; how often have you not deserved it ?" "I know you are a great casuist," Archdale livelily said to him. "Do tell me which is the worse of the two, he who never writes, or he who writes so as never to be read." Jeremy Bentham besought him to employ ~~some~~ hand other than his own, if he wished whatever he wrote to be read by any body ; otherwise, what he wrote might as well be in the language of the moon, as in what seemed to him to be English. Mr. Bentham's advice would have been appropriate to his own works, but for a greater reason. "If the handwriting on the wall was like yours," Twining said to him, "Daniel was a clever fellow. I thought myself a tolerable adept in the art of *scoteinography*, but I give you the wall." The rebukes and the jests of his friends were, however, useless. His chirography remained a perfect scrawl.

We have been drawn a great way aside. We resume our narration. Parr was invited by the mayor of Norwich, in his official capacity, to publish two sermons which he had pronounced in that city. The first of these sermons is from Paul's words : But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son. We are tempted to give our readers a somewhat lengthened account of this sermon, as one of the best of Parr's pulpit performances.

In the introduction it is observed, that in an age in which the authority of prescription is openly disavowed, and inquiry carried on with a spirit of incredulity which may be called rigorous to excess, it is to be expected, that Christianity should attract the attention of speculative men. But as the abilities displayed in the defence of the Gospel, bear no dishonorable proportion to the exertions of those by whom it has been secretly undermined or openly assaulted, the most pious ought not to be alarmed. Among the topics which are now very commonly discussed, may be placed the late appearance of Christianity, its partial propagation, and its imperfect efficacy.

The validity of the principles, by which objections drawn from these topics, may be shown to be unphilosophical as well

as irreligious, is first established; and the separate objections are then examined.

In the physical and moral constitution of the world, the schemes of God are often found to be progressive in their execution; and the scheme of redemption, in particular, extends back to the first design of God in creating this system, and stretches forward to the eternal interests of many beings who are ordained to act in it. But in so wide and complicated a scheme, some parts may be expected totally to escape our observation, and others to be imperfectly understood. We cannot catch more than a faint and scanty glimmering of His purposes. As it is impossible, therefore, that the scheme of redemption should, in general, be otherwise than imperfectly comprehended, the obscurity attendant upon particular parts of it, should not lead to universal skepticism. It should be borne in mind, too, that Christianity is, in general, supported by evidences on the force of which our reason may decide. And if the difficulties which attend Christianity impede our assent, the evidences of its divinity should, to an equal degree, engage our belief. The conviction, which is built on dispassionate inquiry into what can be known, ought not to be shaken by imaginary and unknown possibilities. The objections made against Christianity are often rested upon arguments *a priori*, which are equally delusive in matters of religion and of science. Upon religious subjects, also, the opinions of men take a coloring from their wishes, from their prepossessions, and from peculiar casts of temper. Their opinions, consequently, are very likely to be erroneous.

The first objection particularly alluded to, is that drawn from the late publication of Christianity. The propriety, however, of supposing in the divine mind the distinctions of past, present, and future, may be safely denied. The objection is equally applicable to the creation and the redemption of men. [This remark, however, cannot be allowed to be correct; for, through the delay of our creation, no positive suffering was occasioned; through the delay of our redemption, great suffering was occasioned.] It is said that Christianity is a perfect scheme, and essentially necessary to the salvation of mankind; but how can that scheme be called necessary, which is not made known to those to whom it is asserted to be necessary, before their probationary state is brought to a period, or perfect, which does not include the spiritual interests of all the world? But necessity

and perfection are relative terms, to be understood with restrictions, when applied to the divine government ; and it may safely be affirmed that, whatever God has done, it was necessary should be done, and whatever is left undone, is omitted because it is not necessary ; and the schemes, which may seem imperfectly adapted to gain some ends, are perfectly fitted to gain *the end*, which Jehovah proposed. It is impossible, moreover, to answer the question, why moral evil exists. But, if the attributes of God can be vindicated in the permission of the existence of sin, they may be vindicated in its gradual instead of its instantaneous removal. So long a time, too, may elapse between the advent of Christ and the end of the world, that the time which elapsed before the former event, in comparison with what shall elapse after it, may be reduced to a very trifling amount. Mankind may advance so far in knowledge and holiness, in consequence of the publication of Christianity, that, instead of wondering its publication was delayed so long, they will be disposed to thank God that he interposed so early, and afforded to mankind a sufficient length of time for such signal improvement.

A second objection is that drawn from the partial propagation of the Gospel. But those, to whom the scheme of Christianity has been disclosed, can be certain that they have received such a disclosure, from the intrinsic force of the evidences by which it is attended. They ought not, then, to reject a gift which has been conferred on them, because it has been withholden from others. We ought not to turn scornfully from our own abundance to the wants of others, and make these wants an excuse for our own ingratitude. And it may be no more inconsistent with the attributes of God, to bestow the light of Christianity on some and not on others, than to distribute the gift of reason only to a portion, and to favor some men with stronger faculties than others. [This is true, unless the distinction made among men occasion positive suffering ; in which case it does not seem to be a conclusive answer to the objection.] Again, if limitation in point of time be not a solid objection to the rectitude of the divine government in this matter, limitation in point of space may be an objection no more weighty. There might have existed several beings, possessed of exactly the same nature as Jesus Christ, and so the universal diffusion of Christianity might at once have been effected. But such a procedure would not have been proper, on account of the state of the world when Christianity was proclaimed. The Gospel was progressively

communicated to those to whom it was first made known ; so to the world at large, and with equal propriety may there be a progressive communication. Besides, the propagation of the Gospel is intrusted to human agency ; and it has become a part of our trial, whether we will faithfully discharge this trust.

A third objection is that derived from the imperfect efficacy of the Gospel. This objection may be met on analogical grounds. No remedy for physical disorders has as complete an efficacy, as its intrinsic qualities might give ground for predicting. The edge of the objection may be blunted by recurring to the actual efficacy of the Gospel. But to this topic, the irreligion and luxury of the age may be opposed. But the salutary influence of the Gospel is seen in the increased eagerness of infidels. The vigorous and skilful preparations of the enemies of Christianity, are imputable to well-founded apprehensions of its growing strength. As good springs from evil, so every accession of good tends, incidentally, to the production of evil, and of evil, too, which, in malignity, bears some proportion to that good by which itself is meant to be counteracted.

The subject of the second sermon is the education of the poor. The author aims to exhibit the importance of education, and refute the objections which are sometimes urged against the general diffusion of knowledge. A most generous philanthropy breathes throughout this discourse. "It is urged," he says, "that where numbers are associated together, the lewd inflame the lewd, and the audacious harden the audacious. But this objection extends equally to all seminaries. Will it be pleaded that there is a delicacy of sentiment peculiar to noble minds ? Virtue is not, like fortune and title, hereditary. The love of virtue sometimes finds a place in the bosom of the poor, and it may be encouraged in those schools where the poor are from their infancy habituated to the desire of praise and the dread of infamy. But if there be something coarse in the texture of their minds, something illiberal in their manners, something violent in their tempers, will these evils be eradicated by the mere want of company ? May not their excess, at least, be corrected in scenes where a decent behavior meets with applause, and an irregular behavior with punishment ? Schools, therefore, in which many of these children are permitted to meet together, are not always hurtful to their morals upon that account, and frequently upon the same account are useful to their understanding. The powers of the human mind do not often expand in

solitude. Emulation is not entirely a stranger to the breasts of these little ones. It may be awakened even amidst the humbler studies, which they are directed to pursue ; it is to be kept alive only by repeated comparison, and the effects of it are both salutary and permanent."

Parr's literary friends were loud in their applause of these sermons. Sir William Jones said, that he read them with no less eagerness than pleasure. You call for censure, he adds ; I have none to send you, nor have I time to give them their due praises. Forster cavilled somewhat at the first of the sermons, but yet he affirmed, that they were beyond all praises of his.

Parr published, in 1785, another discourse on education, and on the plans pursued in charity schools, which was meant as a sequel to the last of the sermons just alluded to. This is

The Education Sermon *rather long*,
By Dr. Parr, all in the *vulgar tongue* ;

which had to bear the lash of Matthias's quiet but severe criticism in the Pursuits of Literature. Its length might well be found fault with, for it occupies in the Works no less than one hundred and seventy-four pages. The Rev. Mr. Kettledrumle, we are told, could preach "two mortal hours at a breathing," but Parr fairly outstrips him. He says in the preface, and we believe him, that for the unusual length of the sermon he is unable to make any satisfactory apology. He also says, that he had studiously preserved a plain style, and professed only to deliver such common and useful observations, as are adapted to the apprehension of common and well-disposed readers. Yet no one of his sermons is so deficient in simplicity and clearness of thought, no one is embellished with such a profusion of imagery, the diction of no one is more turgid and further removed from the purity and plainness of the Saxon idiom. We selected a page at random, and were at the pains to count the words. There were, in all, two hundred and seventy-two. Of these, one hundred and twenty-two are nouns, adjectives, verbs, or participles ; fifty-one of which are of Latin origin ; the rest are either French or Saxon. An analysis of few pages, except those of Johnson, would show a similar result. Never, surely, did an attempt to be simple and intelligible, more completely fail.

In the interval between these publications, Parr had given to the world, *A Discourse of the Late Fast*, by Phileleutherus Norfolciensis, printed in 1781. This discourse was published, as

will be seen from the date, after the fate of our revolutionary struggle had been decided; and its topics were meant to be adapted to the state of public feeling which had been occasioned by that event. Its general subject is the liableness of nations to punishment, on account of the vices which prevail among them. It is an honest and fearless exposition of the author's views. We know of little finer declamation, united with just sentiment, than the following passage:

“ War, though it be undertaken according to popular opinions and popular language, with justice, and prosecuted with success, is a most awful calamity: it generally finds men sinners, or makes them such; for so great is usually the disproportion between the provocation and the punishment, between the evil inflicted or suffered and the good obtained or even proposed, that a serious man cannot reconcile the very frequent rise, and the very long continuance, of hostilities, to reason or to humanity. Upon whom, too, do the severities of war fall most heavily? In many cases, they by whom contention is begun or cherished feel their influence extended, their dependants multiplied, and their wealth, in the regular and fair course of public business, increased. While fields are laid waste and cities depopulated, the persons by whose command such miseries take place, are often wantoning in luxurious excess, or slumbering in a state of unfeeling and lazy repose. The peaceful citizen is in the mean time crushed under the weight of exactions, to which, for conscience' sake, he submits; the industrious merchant is impoverished by unforeseen and undeserved losses; and the artless husbandman is dragged away from those who are nearest and dearest to him, in order to shed the blood of beings as innocent and as wretched as himself, to repel injuries which he never felt or suspected, and to procure advantages which he may never understand or enjoy. Such are the aggravating circumstances belonging to war, when it is carried on against a foreign enemy, and though it be disarmed of many terrors which accompanied it in less enlightened and less civilized ages. But our situation is attended with yet heavier distresses. We are engaged in a contest where the most sacred ties are torn asunder, the fondest affections alienated, the most useful attachments disregarded; where every warrior points his sword against the bosom of a fellow-citizen, and every conqueror may stain it with the blood of a friend.”

Unfortunate for Parr's peace of mind and for his success in life, was the ardor with which he rushed into the political contests of the day. Porson said of him that he would have been a great man, but for three things—his trade, his wife, and his *politics*. He had, already, as we have seen, lost an honorable and lucrative post by voting for Mr. Wilkes; and so cordial is

our detestation of the character of this demagogue, though we are no strangers to the benefits which his conduct was the indirect means of producing, that we cannot feel much pity in view of misfortunes which were occasioned by pertinacious attachment to his cause. Parr's political zeal equally misbecame his literary vocation and his clerical character. A clergyman parading the streets on days of election, in his official dress, decorated with election labels, and having to skulk over fences and through by-paths to escape the fury of a mob, is a spectacle, we are glad to say, which, in this country, we must wait to see.

When he went to Norwich, he became curate to one of the clergymen of the city, but he found the duties of the station too arduous, and resigned it in a few months. In the spring of 1780, he was presented, by the mother of one of his pupils, to the living of Asterby; and when he gave this up in 1783, he was presented, by the same lady, to the perpetual curacy of Hatton, in Warwickshire. His clear income from Asterby was but £36. What his income from the school was, we are nowhere informed; but it could not have been great. The curacy of Hatton was worth £80 per annum. We take a few sentences from a letter written in 1782, to illustrate the struggles he had to make with poverty. "You desire my confidence, and I therefore add, that the little progress I have made in worldly matters, the heavy losses I have sustained by the war, the inconsiderable advantages I have gained by a laborious and irksome employment, and the mortifying discouragements I have met in my clerical profession, have all combined to depress my spirits and undermine my constitution. I was content to give up ecclesiastical preferment, while I had a prospect of making some comfortable provision for my old age, in my business as a teacher; but the best of my years have now elapsed, and I am, through a most vexatious and trying series of events, not a shilling richer than when I went to Stanmore; I have, this very week, closed an account on which I stood indebted near £2000, which I was obliged to borrow when I went into active life. My house at Stanmore, I sold, literally, for less money than I expended on the repairs only. To this loss of more than a thousand pounds, I am to add near £700 which I may lose entirely, and must lose in a great measure, by the reduction of St. Vincent and St. Kitts. My patience, so far as religion prescribes it, is sufficient to support me under this severity of moral trial; but the hour is past, in which I might hope to secure a

comfortable independency, and I am now laboring under the gloomy prospect of toiling with exhausted strength, for a scanty subsistence to myself and my family." Yet his friends were not sparing in their efforts to assist him; but they were not always successful. Thurlow, who was then Chancellor, was asked to give him a prebend. His surly reply was, No; accompanied, of course, with an oath. The issue of an application to Bishop Lowth was more favorable. A prebend in St. Paul's was granted. This appointment was the instrument of present independence and of future affluence. The value of it was about £250, and the only duty was a sermon every year.

It was in 1786, that Dr. Parr,—for he had been created Doctor of Laws by the University of Cambridge five years previously—went to reside at Hatton. The motive, which prompted to this change, is not known. Hatton is an obscure hamlet in Warwickshire. The church, which is buried under a clump of trees, will hold only twenty families. According to his description, the people of Hatton were poor, ignorant, dissolute, insolent, and ungrateful, beyond all example, and lamentably defective in ideas of decorum and civilization; yet though not learned, he says they could distinguish between sense and nonsense. His authority among them was without limits. He employed it for the benevolent purpose of healing their differences, and advising them in all their little concerns. Before he left Norwich, he had made an effort to be placed in the commission of the peace, that he might be more extensively useful: but the effort failed. Some years after, when a new commission was issued, he wrote to the Lord Lieutenant of the county, complaining, with considerable warmth, that his name was left out. We will quote his lordship's significant reply:

"SIR—

"I apprehend that the proper answer to the letter which I have just received from you, is, that I do not consider myself as responsible to any individual for the motives of my conduct when acting in the discharge of my public duty."

He was in the habit, instead of preaching his own sermons, of taking into the pulpit a volume of Barrow or Tillotson. He would give some account of the author, and translate the hard words into more intelligible English. We hope he did not fail to do this when he delivered his own compositions; for none

ever stood in greater need of such a service. He exerted himself with commendable zeal for the benefit of his parishioners, though he seems to have mistaken the means which were best adapted to that end. Among other measures which he thought would be extremely useful in bringing his parishioners to the place of worship, and impressing them with ideas of decorum and civilization, was the decoration of his church. He expended large sums for this object. One year, with the aid of his pupils, he gave a chandelier; and he afterwards had a handsome painted window put up over the communion place, to defray the expense of which, he levied contributions on his friends. There is a sermon in the Works, on the occasion of the opening of this window. This reminds us of the religious solemnities observed by the Romans, on the occasion of driving a nail in the capitol.

The dwelling-house at Hatton was not large. It contained no room of sufficient size for his library, and he was obliged, at his own expense, to erect one for this purpose. His library, as we shall afterwards see, was quite famous in bibliothecal history. Though his income was now somewhat enlarged, he still had to take measures for its increase;—he received a small number of pupils, at an advanced price.

One of the most remarkable of Dr. Parr's productions, was his Latin preface to a work entitled, *De tribus luminibus Romanorum*, by William Bellenden, a Scotch writer, who flourished about the beginning of the seventeenth century. He resided many years at Paris, and is said to have been a professor in the university. Among other literary labors, he composed three Latin treatises, which were received with the unanimous approbation of the learned. These he designed afterwards to have published as one work. But his hopes were blasted by a very singular accident. The vessel in which the whole impression had been placed, to be carried to England, was overtaken by a storm and lost, with every thing on board. A few copies of the great work, and some of the separate treatises, seem to have been preserved. He now conceived the idea of the work *De tribus luminibus Romanorum*, in which he designed to have examined the characters of Cicero, Seneca, and the elder Pliny. He lived only to finish the character of the first. To this work Conyers Middleton is said to have been greatly indebted in the composition of his life of Cicero. Henry Homer, one of Parr's literary friends, and a diligent searcher after curious books, found

the three treatises in the British Museum; and the plan was at once formed to publish them. Parr accordingly drew up a Latin preface, dedicating it to the three most distinguished Englishmen of his time—*tria Lumina Anglorum*—Lord North, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Burke. It was published in 1787. It embodied a most violent attack on the ministry; but this intemperate assault on Pitt, and equally intemperate adulation of Fox and Burke, while they exasperated the former, failed to secure him the preferments which he anticipated from the latter. But the literary execution of the preface attracted great applause. Burke assured the author, that it gave him no small pride and pleasure, to find his name perpetuated in the works of a man of the most extensive and classical erudition, and who would have held that rank when there were more who distinguished themselves in that line, than we enjoy at present in any part of Europe. Its Latinity was pronounced to be unrivalled. The Doctor's own sense of the merit of its execution is ludicrously exhibited in the following sentences addressed to his coadjutor. "What shall I say myself, of myself? It is now ten o'clock at night, and *I am smoking a quiet pipe*, after a most vehement, and, *I think*, a most splendid effort of composition—an effort, it was indeed a mighty and a glorious effort." This may be palliated on the ground of its being written to a very intimate friend; but after all deductions, Parr's vanity was most childish and absurd.

Dr. Parr's literary transactions with Rev. Joseph White will, we think, interest our readers. White was Arabic Professor in the University of Oxford. In the year 1784, he was appointed to deliver the Bampton Lectures before the University. These Lectures have been republished in this country, and have been admired, we believe, as a masterly comparison of the religion of Christ with that of Mahomet. In their composition he was assisted to a great extent by Dr. Parr. He seems to have been a man of considerable learning, but his general character was a very bad one. "I believe him to be," says a correspondent of Parr's, "as little restrained, either by feeling or principle, as any man I have known; he looks with equal indifference upon the pains and losses of other men. He is not even influenced by the fears of resentment or hostility. His levity and giddiness, on the one hand, and on the other, the callousness, occasioned by long habits of parasitical and fraudulent deception, have secured him from all those ordinary means which regulate the mind

and manners of common men." He lived in constant poverty and insolvency; three times his debts had been paid by his friends; once to the amount of £1200. Parr had been warned by his Oxford friends to beware of him; but it was some time before he credited their representations. He had been much in the habit of asking literary favors, which Parr was always disposed to grant. We think our readers will be as much amused as we have been, by the frequency and the coolness with which these favors are solicited. They will see an apt illustration of the way in which "one man may labor, and another enter into his labors." "Mr. White presents his most respectful compliments to Dr. Parr, and requests the favor of two or three lines from him on the subject of a proper introduction to the characters of Christ and Mahomet." "If you would be so good as to throw in a brilliant passage or two, particularly a few sentences at the end, it would be esteemed a very great obligation." He begs for a sermon for Whitehall. "It may be on any subject," he says; "I wish it were tolerably legible." It appears, too, that White used to forget to return, and sometimes lost, the sermons which were lent him by Parr. This piece of literary history is not, we believe, without its parallel in our own country. The Doctor rendered his assistance with much freedom and good nature, and according to the preacher's own confessions, it was very valuable; for one of White's friends told him, after the publication of the lectures, that he heard from all parts accounts of their masterly elegance. "That elegance," White adds in a letter to Dr. Parr, "is *wholly yours*." He was overwhelmed with the flattering approbation of the University on account of his lectures; and though he acknowledged to Parr that this chiefly belonged to him, he does not appear to have made a similar acknowledgment to the public; but to have feasted on the admiration he received, with as much satisfaction as if the works which gained it were the offspring of his own mind. But while White was so deeply indebted to Dr. Parr for aid in his lectures, his obligations to another were if any thing more extensive. White wishes this friend, Mr. Badcock, to undertake lectures first, seventh, and eighth. In another letter he devolves on him the whole business, merely suggesting the importance of having the style of the lectures correspond as nearly as possible to his own printed sermons. All this time he was continually asking for help from Dr. Parr, and concealing from him the fact that he was deriving assistance from any other source; leaving to

Dr. Parr the comparatively dishonorable task of amending some passages, and adding a few others. This disingenuousness roused the Doctor's indignation. He declared he was the only man who possessed the confidence of White, and was acquainted with the secret of the composition. When the secret of White's connection with Mr. Badcock transpired, innumerable reflections were cast upon Dr. Parr. His claims to a share in the composition of the lectures were depreciated as of no importance, although, on a minute investigation, it was found that more than a fifth part had been written by him. Angry at the bad treatment which he had received, he intended to revenge himself on his calumniators by an "Expostulation with Dr. White." Mr. Burke's advice prevented the execution of this design. But White's dark manœuvres were at length fully developed, and the laurel placed upon those brows which deserved to wear it.

It must be confessed that warfare and contention were favorite employments with Dr. Parr. He could hardly say, with reference to his controversial writings, what John Owen says of his motives in undertaking a polemical treatise. "I will assure thee, it is not the least thirst in my affections to be drinking of the waters of Meribah, nor the least desire to have a share in Ishmael's portion, to have my hand against others and theirs against me, that puts me upon this task. I never like myself worse than when faced with a vizard of disputing in controversies. What invitation there can be, in itself, for any one to lodge, much less abide, in this quarrelsome and scrambling territory, where, as Tertullian says of Pontus, no wind blows but what is sharp and keen, I know not." Parr directed his next attack against Bishop Hurd, the friend of Warburton. Dr. Jortin had published "Six Dissertations on different subjects," in the last of which he had criticised with severity some of Warburton's favorite opinions; particularly his interpretation of the Sixth Book of the *Æneid*, as a description of the initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries. Bishop Hurd, in 1755, wrote a Tract called *The Delicacy of Friendship*, a seventh Dissertation, addressed to the Author of the sixth. This was an ironical attack on Dr. Jortin, for the freedom with which he had presumed to assault Warburton. This Tract had almost gone out of print, but Dr. Parr had preserved a copy in manuscript, and seems, for several years, to have meditated the use which he afterwards made of it. An occasion for such a use was furnished in 1788,

when a new edition of Warburton's works was published, under the care of Hurd. Certain pieces, which had been written by Warburton in his youth, were omitted, being considered as unworthy of his matured talents. These pieces were his Translations in prose and verse from Roman Poets, Orators, and Historians, and his Critical and Philosophical Inquiry into the causes of prodigies and miracles. This omission was immediately seized by Dr. Parr, as an occasion for an attack on Bishop Hurd, and on the memory of Warburton. Early in 1789, he published "Tracts by Warburton and a Warburtonian, not admitted into the collection of their respective works." The Warburtonian was Bishop Hurd, and the Tracts, ascribed to him, were the *Delicacy of Friendship*, and a letter to Leland, Professor of Rhetoric in Trinity College, Dublin; who had refuted one of Warburton's paradoxes,—mentioned in *The Doctrine of Grace*,—that the barbarism of the style of the New Testament was one certain mark of a divine original. The whole work was preceded by a Dedication and a Preface by the Editor. For such a furious attack on Hurd, as is contained in the Dedication, there does not appear to have been a sufficient provocation. But warfare, as we have observed, was congenial with Parr's temper. Furthermore, he enjoyed the patronage of Bishop Lowth, and the controversy between him and Warburton is well remembered. When Parr removed to Hatton, Hurd becomes his Diocesan. The latter could not have been expected to treat the friend of Lowth with much respect. He manifested towards him, when on a visit at his seat at Hartlebury, the utmost coldness. It had been reported, too, that he spoke slightly of some of Parr's performances. By these affronts the anger of Parr was aroused, and he gave utterance to it, in these Tracts, against both master and disciple.

Neither the moral nor the literary character of Warburton is worthy of any applause. Without any genuine love of truth, he had no aim, throughout his career as a writer, but to maintain paradoxes; the more startling and insusceptible of just defence, the better suited to his purposes; or to direct the most brutal and contemptuous assaults against those who ventured to dispute his opinions. And Hurd seems to have been perfectly contented to serve as his armor-bearer; to utter indiscriminate flattery to his patron, and to decry and insult his antagonists. The fate of those hardy combatants, who presumed to assail the whimsical paradoxes and errors of Warburton and his disciples,

brings to our mind what Dr. South has said of the dangers of administering reproofs to passionate and self-willed dispositions. "We may observe of brambles, that they always grow crooked; for by reason of their briers and thorns, no hand can touch them, so as to bend them straight. And so it is of some dispositions. They grow into a settled, confirmed obliquity, because their sharpness makes them unfit to be handled by discipline or admonition. They are a terror and a grievance to those that they converse with; and to attempt to advise them out of their irregularities, is as if a surgeon should offer to dress a wounded lion; he must look to perish in the address, and to be torn in pieces for his pains." Violent and sometimes abusive as Parr's language is, we believe that he rendered no more than fair retributive justice. Yet, in saying this, we would not be understood to approve the temper in which he executed his task. "The fervent reprehender" of the wrong is not always a consistent practicer of the right. We cannot better express our own views than in the words of Mr. D'Israeli. "The Dedication by Parr stands unrivalled for comparative criticism. It is the eruption of a volcano. It sparkles, it blazes and scatters light and destruction. How deeply ought we to regret, that this Nazarene suffered his strength to be shorn by the Delilahs of a spurious fame. Never did this man, with his gifted strength, grasp the pillars of a temple to shake its atoms over Philistines, but pleased the childlike simplicity of his mind, by pulling down houses over the heads of their unlucky inhabitants." Yet, that Parr, like Johnson, was not always consistent with himself, and honored in his heart those whom he sometimes affected to despise, is clear from the subjoined excerpt from a conversation between George the Fourth, when Prince of Wales, and himself. The conversation was on the comparative merit of Markham and Hurd, who had been the prince's tutors. "Have you not changed your opinion of Dr. Hurd? exclaimed the prince. I have read a work (alluding to the Tracts) in which you attacked him fiercely. Sir, replied Parr, I attacked Hurd on one point, which I thought important to letters, and I summoned the whole force of my mind, and took every possible pains to do it well; for I consider Hurd to be a great man. He is celebrated as such by foreign critics, who appreciate justly his wonderful acuteness, sagacity, and dexterity, in doing what he has done with so small a stock of learning."

The applause which the Tracts elicited was loud and enthu-

siastic ; and so far as it referred to their character as compositions, it was not unmerited. In spite of a degree of mannerism, from which our author's writing was never free, they are distinguished by a masterly elegance of style, and a more than usual share of clearness and force. Its elegance is, indeed, sometimes hurt by an exuberance of metaphor, and its force occasionally degenerates into harsh and virulent invective. But there are few of the metaphors which are not beautiful and illustrative, and little of the invective which was not deserved. We think we shall delight our readers if we set down a few passages. In the dedication, he thus addresses Hurd : " Of the reputation, my lord, which you have so long and, they say, so deservedly enjoyed, a large part is to be ascribed to your insatiable love of novelty ; and yet a larger, it may be, to your matchless dexterity in the defence of theories, at once fantastic and methodical—fantastic I mean without the brilliancy of invention, and methodical without the solidity of logic. It is not quite forgotten by men of letters, that in the earlier stages of your literary and ecclesiastical career, you did not disdain to wield your pen, whether offensively or defensively, in favor of Bishop Warburton. While bigots were pouring forth their complaints, and wittlings were levelling their pleasantries against this formidable innovator ; while answers trembled and readers stared ; while dunces were lost in the mazes of his arguments, and scholars were confounded at the hardness of his assertions, you, my lord, stood forth, with an avowed determination to share alike his danger and his disgrace. You affected to despise, even while you were endeavoring to repress the clamors of the unenlightened herd, who saw, or pretended to see, absurdity in his criticisms, heterodoxy in his tenets, and brutality in his invectives. You made great paradoxes less incredible, by exciting our wonder at the greater, which were started by yourself. You taught us to set a just value upon the eccentricities of impetuous and untutored genius, by giving us an opportunity to compare them with the trickeries of cold and systematic refinement. You tempted us, almost, to forget and forgive whatever was offensive in noisy and boisterous reproaches, by turning aside our attention to the more grating sounds of quaint and sarcastic sneers." He thus delineates the character of Warburton, and contrasts it by implication with Bishop Hurd's. " The Bishop of Gloucester, amidst all his fooleries in criticism and all his outrages in controversy, certainly united

a most vigorous and comprehensive intellect with an open and a generous heart. As a friend, he was what your lordship experienced—zealous and constant; and as an enemy, he properly describes himself to have been choleric, but not implacable. He, my lord, threw a cloud over no man's brighter prospects of prosperity or honors, by dark and portentous whispers in the ear of the powerful. He, in private company, blasted no man's good name, by shedding over it the cold and deadly mildews of insinuation. He was too magnanimous to undermine, when his duty or his honor prompted him to overthrow. He was too sincere, to disguise the natural haughtiness and irritability of his temper, under a specious veil of humility and meekness. He never thought it expedient to save appearances, by shaking off the shackles of consistency; to soften the hideous aspect of certain uncourtly opinions, by a calm and progressive apostacy; to expiate the artless and animated effusions of his youth, by the example of a temporizing and obsequious old age. He began not his course as others have done, with speculative republicanism, nor did he end, as the same persons are now doing, with practical toryism. He was a churchman without bigotry,—he was a politician without duplicity—he was a loyalist without servility."

The character of Dr. Jortin is powerfully delineated in the Preface. "As to Jortin, whether I look back to his verse, to his prose, to his critical, or to his theological works, there are few authors to whom I am so much indebted for rational entertainment, or for solid instruction. Learned he was, without pedantry. He was ingenious, without the affectation of singularity. He was a lover of truth, without hovering over the gloomy abyss of skepticism, and a friend to free inquiry, without running into the dreary and pathless wilds of latitudinarianism. He had a heart which never disgraced the powers of his understanding. With a lively imagination, an elegant taste, and a judgment most masculine and most correct, he united the artless and amiable negligence of a school-boy. Wit, without ill-nature, and sense, without effort, he could at will scatter upon every effort; and in every book the writer presents us with a near and distinct view of the real man."

But we must put an end to our quotations. The commendations which this work received are, in our opinion, hardly exaggerated. In many respects it is, in truth, one of the most striking monuments of English literature. The younger Warton—

no incompetent judge—said, that if he were called upon to point out some of the finest sentences in English prose, he should quote Parr's Preface and Dedication of the Warburtonian Tracts. Yet no one can help regretting, that the powers of Parr's mind were wasted on performances of this kind. Warburton's paradoxes excited but a brief attention. They produced but a momentary change in the public mind, on any important subject in literature or religion. The labors of his followers and defenders had an influence equally short-lived. It was better that they should be left to themselves. Opposition was the strength of their cause. And the decorum of the attack on Hurd was more questionable than its utility. Such virulent invective, against a dignified ecclesiastic of unblemished morals and eminent scholarship, demanded a better apology than could be derived from a supposed or real personal affront. Why did not Parr copy the example of Jortin, which himself not more highly than deservedly eulogizes, and "never grasp at the shadowy and fleeting reputation, which is sometimes gained by the petty frolics of literary vanity, or the mischievous struggles of controversial rage?" The antagonist of shadows, though successful, gains but an empty glory.

The remainder of Parr's life was more barren of incident than the part which we have already gone over; and we suppose we shall better entertain our readers by quitting the exact chronological order which we have hitherto observed. His last removal was from Norwich to Hatton, and in this latter situation was passed the most quiet and happy, and, of course, to the historian, the least interesting portion of his life. His parochial duties must have consumed but a small amount of his time. He took in, indeed, a few scholars; but these engagements must have left him much leisure. Not a little of this leisure he gave up to political exertions. The public mind was now agitated by the Regency question. Dr. Parr sided, of course, with Mr. Fox in favor of the Prince of Wales. His correspondence abounds with allusions to this subject, evincing the same inconsiderate warmth which hitherto he had not been able to restrain, even by a judicious regard to his own personal interest. He seems, too, to have harbored confident expectations that his interest would be signally promoted, if the views which he held on the Regency question should prevail. He had always aspired to a seat on the Bench of Bishops. He once made personal application for the see of St. Asaph; and he thought that his

wishes were now likely to be gratified. But they were destined to a speedy disappointment, as the king's illness was not lasting.

In the efforts which were made to procure a repeal of the Test act, Dr. Parr took no part but that of opposition. "In the earlier part of my life," he says, "I thought the Test act oppressive, but in the year 1782, I very carefully and very seriously re-examined the subject, and changed my opinion. In 1790, I strenuously opposed the attempt to procure a repeal, and yet, I cannot help indulging the confident hope, that in the progress of intellectual and moral improvement, religious animosities will, at last, subside; and that the restraint, for which I have contended, and do now contend, will no longer be thought necessary for the public safety by the heads of that Church, which I have never deserted, and the members of that Legislature, which I have never disobeyed." Like Swift, he was a Whig in politics, but a Tory in religion. He linked himself with the High Church party, in opposition to the repeal of the Act; and we find in the memoirs a long string of resolutions, declaratory of his opinions on this subject, which he caused to be adopted at a county meeting.

When the French Revolution broke out, it was not to be expected, either that Parr would wholly suppress his convictions, or that he would be at much pains to check the freedom and vehemence, with which his native temperament would prompt him to utter them. And when we remember, how deeply the mind of Robert Hall was excited by the events which were then occurring, and with what fervent zeal he espoused the popular side, we can hardly reproach Parr for professional indecorum, in the course which he pursued; and if his political wisdom is to be called in question, the reflexion how gallantly Sir James Mackintosh broke a lance in defence of French principles, will convince us that he erred in honorable company. But he did not meet with that lenity from his contemporaries which posterity will cheerfully award him. He was a prominent butt for the shafts of party malignity; he was traduced as a Jacobin, and vilified as disloyal in the public papers. At the time of the Birmingham riots in 1791, his house was threatened; and his library, for its security from a supposed danger of destruction, was removed to Oxford. It was at this time that the letter from Irenopolis to the inhabitants of Eleutheropolis, was written. Its object was to dissuade the Dissenters of Birmingham from holding a second meeting, to commemorate the

French Revolution. The first meeting had been seized by the rioters as an occasion for their tumultuous proceedings; it was resolved to hold another in defiance. Parr's dissuasive, however, was effectual, and the project was given up. This letter is one of the best of our author's productions. It is expressed not less eloquently than forcibly, and is free from some of the peculiar vices of his style.

Parr's political activity was incessant. He exerted himself to obtain votes for his Whig friends, in every quarter in which he had an influence. He was absent from no election, at which he was authorized to vote. He neglected all consideration of distance of place and length of time, of trouble and expense. He brought upon himself the most violent obloquy by his political zeal. The Pursuits of Literature, whose notice of his Education Sermon has been already alluded to, aimed its severest satire at him. The satire in some respects was perfectly just. "I really think," says the author, "it is impossible to point out any man of learning and ability, who has hitherto wasted his powers and attainments in such a desultory, wild, unconnected and useless manner as Dr. Parr. It would be ridiculous, indeed, to compare the Birmingham Doctor with Dr. Samuel Johnson. What has Dr. Parr written? A sermon or two rather long; a Latin preface to Bellendenus rather long too; another preface to some English tracts, and two or three English pamphlets about his own private quarrels; and this is the man to be compared with Dr. Samuel Johnson!"

Not the least famous of our author's publications was a sermon which he gave to the world in the year 1800. This was the Spital sermon, delivered by the appointment of the Lord Mayor of London. We undertook to prepare an analysis of this celebrated production; but soon found that our skill in this kind of labor was likely to meet with too severe a task, and we abandoned the attempt. We will, however, try to give our readers some conception of the manner in which Dr. Parr was used to address a popular audience. The general aim of the discourse is to oppose the unholy speculations of Mr. Godwin on the subject of universal benevolence. These speculations were zealously propagated at this time, and we have no doubt threatened the extinction of true virtue. They should have been resisted in a way that promised to be successful. Let us see whether Dr. Parr's efforts bade fair to be very serviceable.

"The errors of ingenious men," he remarks in the Introduction,

“in their attempts to unfold the most familiar operations of the human mind, may well humble our pride and awaken our caution. The talents of men have been strangely misemployed in tracing the motives by which we are impelled to do good, and in adjusting the extent to which we are capable of doing it. The Epicureans contended that the ultimate design of every action, was either to procure for ourselves pleasure, or to avert pain from ourselves. The schoolmen represented a direct regard to our own happiness, as the sole motive by which our wills are determined. These theories were revived in the seventeenth century with new modifications, and gradually assumed a more formidable aspect. The influence of speculation is, indeed, inferior to that of common reason and humanity. The doctrine that we are never conscious of a disinterested desire of doing good, has not probably wrought any important change in the sentiments or habits of the people. Yet the novelty of such an opinion gives it a temporary popularity. It ought, therefore, to be resisted. The selfish system has consequently been combated by men of high reputation for the soundness of their judgment and the precision of their reasoning. The opinions which they have advanced will not very soon be disturbed, by the restlessness of innovation, or the craftiness of skepticism. The danger we have to apprehend, proceeds from a different quarter. Certain romantic and even pernicious notions have been recently started in France, upon the powers which are furnished and the obligations by which we are bounden, to promote, by direct aims, the universal good of the species. This new doctrine of universal philanthropy has found its way to our own country. In comparing the selfish with the philanthropic system, it will be seen that the one has never occasioned so much mischief as it seemed to threaten, and the other will be productive of less good than it promises, accompanied by a long and portentous train of evils. The selfish system, on its first approach, scares us with the sternness of its appearance; the philanthropic wears a more engaging form.

“It is then proposed to examine how far, by the constitution of human nature, and the circumstances of human life, the principles of universal and particular benevolence are compatible.

“The strongest barriers oppose the union of our species into one community. When we speak of the community of mankind, we use the language rather of rhetorical ornament, than philosophical precision. Our benevolent affections, consequent-

ly, if attempted to be diffused to all people and nations and languages, would become weak and almost imperceptible. Our moral obligations cannot extend beyond our physical powers. In what sense, then, can we be required to do good unto all men?

“The elements of our benevolent affections are originally called into action, by events which immediately interest ourselves, which produce our own pleasure or remove our own pain. When these affections have been repeatedly exercised on their appropriate objects, we become conscious of a calm desire, that the same causes which have produced our own happiness or removed our own pain, should operate on the condition of others. But this calm desire of universal good cannot, in accordance with the limited nature of our physical powers, and with the circumstances in which we are placed, be followed by any efforts at all correspondent to its boundlessness. The obligation to cherish this calm desire of universal good, and to exemplify it, whenever our circumstances will permit, is fortified by the representations of the New Testament. We are enjoined by our Lord to consider every man as our neighbor. We are directed, also, so far to form ourselves into a likeness of character with our Maker, as to indulge a promiscuous benevolence. Universal benevolence, then, is to be approved as a sentiment of which general happiness is the cause; but, according to the common order of human affairs, general happiness cannot often be its practicable object.

“The theory which inculcates a different notion is pregnant with the most serious mischiefs. When these dazzling phantoms of universal philanthropy have gained one’s attention, the objects that formerly engaged it, shrink and fade. All considerations of kindred, friends, and countrymen, drop from the mind during the struggles it makes to grasp the collective interests of the species. On the other hand, the calm desire of general happiness, contenting itself with the exercise of pity towards the needy and distressed, when they are situated beyond the scope of our physical powers, and sure that, if they were related to us more intimately, it would express itself in active measures of relief, is productive of the most benignant effects; it guards us against the silent encroachments of self-love, quells the fury of our malignant passions, and raises us above the narrow and sordid aims of our selfish affections. He, who thus conducts himself, is a better moralist, than they who would turn aside the

stream of our benevolent affections from its wonted course, scatter it abroad over a wide and trackless expanse of surface, where it could never nourish nor even penetrate the soil; or force it up into thin and fleeting vapors of refinement, from which it seldom would descend in soft and gentle dews of beneficence to refresh the weary.

"We are, then, as Christians bound to wish for the good of all men, and to labor for it as we have opportunity; but we should be cautious lest we waste that strength in visionary schemes for the immediate good of the whole race, which might be expended more judiciously, in those duties to which our particular affections give rise."

Though the views expressed in this sermon must be admitted to be correct, and the exigencies of the times such as demanded they should be earnestly set forth, it may be justly apprehended that this sermon did little towards arresting the progress of French opinions. Hannah More's little story of Mr. Fantom must have been a thousand-fold more serviceable. There is such a lack of lucid arrangement, such an elevation of style, the topics introduced, always of so abstract a nature as to be grasped only with difficulty, are so imperfectly illustrated, that the practical influence of the sermon must have been completely neutralized. One of his friends expresses the fear that he had entered on subjects too recondite for his auditors; but says, strangely enough, that he found, on reading the sermon, his fears were without foundation.

The most amusing feature belonging to this production, is its huge mass of notes. The sermon occupies fifty not very closely printed pages. It was ridiculed for its excessive length, and Parr's biographers are at a good deal of pains to vindicate it from this imputation. It is not, indeed, so long as a sermon of Dr. Barrow's, by one hour. And it fell short by five hours, of the sermons with which the Long Parliament were in the habit of being entertained. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the sermon was "rather long." But the notes occupy two hundred and thirteen pages, they touch on every variety of subject, and quote an innumerable multitude of authors. Our readers will be diverted with Parr's account of their preparation, and his own opinion of their merit. "I am still in a state of incubation over my notes," he writes to D. Maltby. "A month ago, not one was written. I have had three scribes or amanuenses, one expert, one slow, and a third most irregular and provoking.

The notes will be very numerous. They are very important, and in three places the composition equals, in one I think it surpasses, any thing that my mind, in its happiest moments, ever produced. They will repay the public for delay and expectation; they will do credit to my real principles; they will do service to the State and to the Church; they will provoke a rabble of miscreants whom I disdain to propitiate. I was half frantic with ecstasy, three times, [in writing the three notes, we presume, whose composition is so superlatively excellent.] Such are the labors of an unpreferred, calumniated, half-starving country parson." And such too is the unworthy and silly vanity of a weak minded pedant.

He thus speaks of President Edwards. "About eight years ago, I read Mr. Edwards's Inquiry into the modern prevailing notions of the Freedom of the Will. Charmed as I was with the metaphysical acuteness and the fervent piety of the writer, I became very desirous to read his Dissertations concerning the end for which God created the World, and on the Nature of true Virtue. I found in them the same romantic imagination, the same keen discernment, the same logical subtlety, and the same unextinguishable ardor. Mr. Edwards is a writer who exercises our minds even where he does not satisfy them, who interests where he does not persuade, and improves us where he does not ultimately convince." The object of the note, from which we quote these sentences, is to vindicate the Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, from the charge of symbolizing with the views of Mr. Godwin.

He pays a merited tribute to the older divines of the Church of England. "Without any attempt to preserve the peculiar forms of philosophical investigation; without any habit of employing the technical language of it; without any immediate consciousness of intention to exhibit their opinions in what is called a philosophical point of view; their incidental representations of man, in all the varieties of his moral powers and his social relations, have so much depth, so much precision, so much comprehension as would have procured for them the name of philosophers, if they had not borne the different and not less honorable name of Christian teachers. In their professional writings I have often seen the germ of thoughts, which have been expanded into fuller luxuriance and decked with brighter colors in the more popular productions of later times."

One of the most interesting of the notes is on the comparative

mischievous of atheism and superstition, in answer to the remark of Lord Bacon, that "atheism doth not perturb states." The downfall of atheism in France is thus described. "In a neighboring country it has already sunk into decay. There it wanted alike the simplicity of nature and the graces of art. It was bulky without solidity, elaborate without symmetry, and lofty without magnificence. It seized, indeed, the attention of a spectator by the vastness of its dimensions and the novelty of its form, and it impressed him with momentary awe because it stood upon ruins; but it had no foundation in the common sense of men, no superstructure from their general habits, no cement from their nobler affections, no embellishments from their unperverted imaginations, nor pillars from their social virtues. It started up but to vanish, it towered but to fall, and it has fallen, I sincerely hope, to rise no more." This, we take it, is one of the passages, in view of which, when he had finished writing it, he was half frantic with ecstasy.

The Spital sermon was not suffered to pass without severe animadversions. Mr. Godwin was, of course, drawn out in defence of his own views. He had been a personal friend of Dr. Parr. In 1794 he visited Hatton, and avowed that he never spent a week with higher personal pleasure. He seems to have thought Parr was inclined to favor his sentiments on the nature of benevolence and the structure of society. In his reply to the Spital sermon he insinuates, quite broadly, the charge of apostasy and tergiversation. Their correspondence was henceforth discontinued, on the ground of a supposed affront from Parr.

The record of Dr. Parr's correspondence and friendships forms one of the most interesting passages in his history. His hospitality was unbounded. The scholar and the politician were alike welcome to the parsonage. Foxites and Whigs were, of course, received with the most enthusiasm, but Tories and Pittites were not excluded. Hither Porson—who shared with Parr and Charles Burney, the son of the historian of music, the distinction of unrivalled eminence in Greek learning among English scholars—was wont to repair, to enrich his mind with the stores of Parr's library and conversation. His personal habits were very singular, and we judge not very agreeable. He was used to rise late, and rarely walked out, spending his whole time until dinner in the library, reading, and taking notes. He was very silent, seldom speaking to any one except Parr;

yet there were times when his sullen manners and gloomy countenance were relaxed. After dinner or at night, he would collect the young men of the family around him, and, if Parr and the ladies were absent, he would pour forth from the fountains of his memory torrents of various literature. The charms of his society during these hours are said to have been irresistible. But at length he became so disagreeable to the doctor's wife that she could not restrain her impatience. He never repeated his visits, though there was no open breach of friendship.

Sir James Mackintosh was first introduced to Parr's friendship by his reply to Mr. Burke's work on the French revolution, and he often honored Hatton with his visits. That touching letter which he wrote to Parr on the death of his first wife, ranking among the finest specimens of epistolary composition in the language, and not inferior to Swift's celebrated letter to Lord Oxford on the death of his daughter, bespeaks the warm affection which subsisted between them. Parr eulogizes his noble friend most highly, in the notes to the Spital sermon, but not more highly than was deserved. An alienation of feeling, imputable to some causeless misunderstanding, subsequently took place; but after Mackintosh's return from India their ancient friendship was revived.

Dr. Parr was for many years the ardent admirer and confidential friend of Charles James Fox. Their letters to each other, of which many are preserved, present the character of that eminent statesman in a very attractive light—a strange one, possibly, in the estimation of those who have been used to consider him as a mere politician. His love of elegant letters was not displaced by his political zeal. "I, like most other men who live much in the world," he remarks in one of his letters, "have neglected the study of Greek literature far more than I wish I had done for my own pleasure and satisfaction; for, though no great scholar, I have as eager a love and even thirst for literature, as most men who are not very young; and indeed it is a favorite project with me to give up some time in the summer to perfecting myself in Greek, very much with a view to the Greek tragedies, and still more with reference to Demosthenes, of whom I have read but little, but whom that little has taught me to admire to the highest possible degree. I do not mention Homer, because I can still read him with tolerable ease." It is memorable to relate, that he, who was

styled in his day the most Demosthenian of all orators except Demosthenes, yet preferred Cicero to him. "I am flattered," he says to Parr, "as you may suppose I must be, by your comparison [of me] with Demosthenes, whom as a speaker I had much rather resemble, almost with any degree of inferiority, than Cicero or any other. But though as a speaker he appears to me to have been far above all others, I own I have the bad taste to have more pleasure in reading Cicero's orations than his; so very different, in my judgment, is that which is good to be heard from that which is good to be read. And for this reason, among others, I have always hated the thoughts of any of my speeches being published." There is another letter from Fox, which it would be interesting to quote if there were space, evincing the correctness of his taste in English composition, and how well he appreciated the niceties of verbal criticism.

At the funeral of his illustrious friend, Parr mingled, by invitation, with the long train of mourners—of the highest consideration for rank, genius, and learning in the kingdom—which followed the hearse. The body of Fox lies within a span of Pitt's. The fierceness of political contention did not extend its influence to the grave. The design was long cherished by Parr of writing the biography of Mr. Fox, but he never accomplished it. We have, however, an elaborately drawn character of him in a tract entitled *Philopatris Varvicensis*, and another immense body of notes.

Among the literary projects which he never executed was a life of Dr. Johnson. His intimacy with Johnson was never close. If no other circumstance had prevented, the similarity of their characters would have been a sufficient obstacle in the way of a very cordial friendship. In a letter to Mr. Crodock, his intercourse with Johnson is thus described:—"For many years I spent a month's holidays in London, and never failed to call upon Johnson. I was not only admitted but welcomed. I conversed with him upon numberless subjects, of learning, politics, and common life. I traversed the whole compass of his understanding, and, by the acknowledgment of Burke and Reynolds, I distinctly understood the peculiar and transcendental properties of his mighty and virtuous mind. I intended to write his life, and laid by sixty or seventy volumes for the purpose of writing it in such a manner as would do no discredit to myself. I intended to spread my thoughts over two

volumes quarto, and if I had filled three pages the rest would have followed. Often have I lamented my ill fortune in not building this monument to the fame of Johnson, and let me not be accused of arrogance when I add, my own." In 1780 he spent an evening with Johnson at the house of their common friend, Bennet Langton. Mr. Langton says that Johnson was highly pleased with the conversation of that learned gentleman, and after he was gone, said to Mr. Langton, "Sir, I am obliged to you for having asked me this evening. Parr is a fair man. I do not know when I have had an occasion of such free controversy. It is remarkable how much of a man's life may pass without meeting with any instance of this kind of open discussion." The committee of subscribers to Dr. Johnson's monument requested Parr to write the inscription. After much solicitation he was induced to comply with the request.

The seventh and eighth volumes of Parr's works are filled with selections from his correspondence. The extent of this correspondence was remarkable. Three years before his death, he employed himself, for several days, in arranging his letters, which had been accumulating for fifty-seven years; their number considerably exceeded eight thousand. They relate to various subjects of taste, verbal criticism, ethics, politics, theology, metaphysics, and the business of private life. The number of his correspondents was above fifteen hundred. There is scarcely any one of his contemporaries of any note whose name we do not find in the list. Princes of the blood, archbishops, dukes, earls, knights, the most eminent statesmen, and the profoundest scholars maintained, apparently, the most familiar and friendly intercourse with the curate of Hatton. Many of the letters are, of course, of very little value, except as they illustrate the character of him to whom they were addressed. It is Southey, we believe, who somewhere remarks, that one may form a pretty good idea of his own character by the letters which are addressed to him. If this criterion be a just one, certain modern biographers have exhibited their subjects to the view of the public in no very favorable aspect. One cannot peruse the letters which Hannah More was in the habit of receiving, without suspecting either that vanity was a most prominent feature of her disposition, or that she must have been angered with her correspondents for the flattery, "enough to make the vainest sick," which they poured forth so profusely. The unfavorable part of this inference must be drawn, we fear,

with respect to the subject of our present remarks; for his self-judgment, as often expressed in his letters to others, is scarcely less laudatory than the flattering opinions which were uttered by his friends.

We have alluded to Parr's library, as quite celebrated in Bibliothecal history. It numbered about ten thousand volumes. The catalogue of it is a royal octavo of more than seven hundred pages. To one who considers the narrowness of his income, it appears astonishing that such a library could have been collected by him. Not a few of the books, we must suppose, were presents. Like Johnson, he is said to have been indifferent to the external appearance of the volumes. Rarity and intrinsic value were all the qualities which he coveted. "I am content," he said, "with half bindings and old bindings. I hunt not after black-letter nor principes editiones, nor large paper copies; I buy that I may read like a man of letters, not that I may write like a German, nor display my treasures like a collector. To be sure, though a country parson, I have taken care, with a scanty purse, that there should be no want of number and no want of variety in my books; and if you were to spend two or three days among them, you would find them adapted to the mind and pursuits of their owner." On his library he placed a very high value. He was very anxious that it should not be scattered after his death, but should remain together, that the world might see what sort of a collection of books had been made by a country parson. The editor of his works justly remarks that this library, founded by himself, is alone a monument of the intellectual courage and ability of Parr. It was begun when he was a boy at college, and when the price of a book deprived him of some other need or comfort; it continued to accumulate when he was bowed down by penury and opposition. Whatever else he wanted, he always found money to buy books; and the sums he expended in the year 1824, when his life was waning, show that his ardor in the cause of letters was inextinguishable.

Dr. Parr's domestic life was not free from trouble. His struggles with poverty have been already recounted. He had other and severer trials. His first wife, though her character is well spoken of by some of his friends, he obtained, somewhat in the way that "the judicious Hooker" obtained his; and he suffered the usual consequences of such a choice. His domestic happiness was often diminished by her ungovernable temper

In the judgment of Porson she was one of the three insurmountable obstacles to her husband's greatness. Many of the members of Parr's family fell victims to disease during his life. The conduct of others was scarcely less painful than their death would have been. He was twice married, but he survived all his children.

We cannot dwell, at the length we should be glad to do, on Parr's private character and personal habits. There was much affection and good nature belonging to his character; though that could by no means be affirmed of him which was said of Mackintosh; that the gall bladder was entirely omitted in his composition. He was of a hasty temper, irritable, and most impatient of contradiction. He was now and then the tyrant of the fireside. His *Dedication of the Tracts of a Warburtonian*, shows no weak propensity to vilify and abuse those against whom he entertained a pique. He did not live long enough to learn the value of Byron's advice to his friend Har-ness: "You are censorious, child; when you are a little older, you will learn to dislike every body, but to abuse nobody." Of benevolence and compassion he had a large share. In his own parish, almost every individual is said to have been considered as a member of his family, and the necessitous were daily relieved from his table. Money was regularly placed in the hands of the servants, for the relief of beggars. His heart was especially compassionate toward poor and intelligent youth. At all the places in which he taught, he was in the habit of receiving many boys into his school for smaller stipends; and to some their tuition was a gratuity: in this, imitating the conduct of Bernard Gilpin, the Northern apostle, who, in his rides round Houghton le Spring, if he met a poor boy, would make trial of his capacity by a few questions, and if he found it such as pleased him, would provide for his education in his own school.

Of indomitable energy Parr gave the most decisive tokens. When he quitted the university, he was not worth four pounds; yet before he died he had reached comparative affluence. He had collected a library of ten thousand volumes, and arrived at an eminence in scholarship, which was not shared by more than two or three of his contemporaries. Had he taken pains to quench his political zeal, and addicted himself with more constancy to his proper pursuits, he would have been without a rival. It is to be regretted, indeed, that so many literary pro-

jects were suggested to him, which he never executed. How much should we have prized a life of Johnson from his pen! He would have written an invaluable life of Fox, if political heat would have suffered him to be impartial. Matthias entreated him to publish observations on the works of the Poet Gray; assuring him that nothing could have so great an effect on the world of letters, revive the drooping attention of great scholars, and stimulate the industry of the rising youth of this learned country, as for him to produce such a work. But the entreaty was unavailing. Parr's energy and scholarship were undoubted; but that intensity and fixedness of purpose, which are essential to the completion of great designs, he did not possess. In proportion to his other endowments, he had little talent, in the sense in which it is defined by Sir James Mackintosh; power formed and directed by habit to one sort of exertion. His celebrity as a linguist was fully justified by the extent and accuracy of his knowledge in that department of letters. His correspondence with Dr. Bloomfield, the editor of Thucydides, and with Dr. Copleston, and Richard Payne Knight, is sufficient proof of this statement. Yet he has left behind him no work, of a magnitude and importance at all correspondent to his powers and acquisitions.

He had many peculiarities, some of them whimsical and harmless, while others must obviously be set down as positive faults. Among these, not the least prominent, was his unbounded self-esteem. We have already given some diverting proofs of this. Like the Spanish nobleman, who never alluded to himself without taking off his hat, Parr scarcely ever has occasion to mention his own name, without carefully affixing the title of Doctor. He was in the habit of writing sentences on the flyleaves of the books in his library. In these he invariably calls himself Dr. Parr. Moses Greenboy, Esq., *if you please*, was not more solicitous that his title should be remembered. He was fondly addicted to the pleasures of the table; a fault which his biographer mildly describes by saying that he had a good appetite, and ate heartily, and from the necessities of his pedagogic life, hastily. His gastronomic propensities were reviled by his enemies; and not altogether without reason. His friends, too, must have given him credit for a considerable degree of fondness for luxurious eating, if one may judge from the number and value of the contributions which were sent in on his birth days. There were sent him, accord-

ing to his own account, on one of these occasions, four pheasants, six partridges, a gigantic turkey, a stupendous wild goose, a codfish, the jaws of which were capacious enough to swallow a child three years old, two large luxurious pies, and two barrels of oysters. Yet, sad to narrate, Parr was sick at this time, and was compelled to fast while others feasted. The partialities of literary men are often entirely unaccountable. Parr had a violent passion for ringing bells, and was at a good deal of expense to procure a full set for the Hatton steeple, with which to amuse himself. Another of his favorite employments was that of killing oxen. Twining, whose jests on his "skoteinography" have been recorded, exhorts him also to indulge his *φιλοταυροκοπία* without restraint.

Of Dr. Parr's religious character and theological sentiments it is somewhat difficult to speak with confidence, on account of the scanty information which can be gleaned, either from the memoirs or the works. But the imperfect notices which are afforded, do not present his character, with respect to these points, in a very favorable light. Of piety, considering this term as significant of a class of affections, of which God is the peculiar object, we can discern in his history no satisfactory evidence. We are aware that public opinion in Great Britain, especially in the latter half of the last century, permitted a looseness both of religious sentiment and practice, in those who aspired to the sacred profession, which would never be tolerated in our own country, at least by any denomination whose creed is scriptural. And we may be reminded, that it is not right to subject the character of an English clergyman to the same test that is ordinarily applied to the ministry here. But we cannot regard our own rule of judgment as too severe. We doubt if any who cannot sustain its application should ever venture into the ministry. That door must be too wide which allowed the entrance of such men as Scott and Grimshawe and Richmond. The character of these men was, indeed, eventually changed, and they became brilliant examples of ministerial usefulness: but the change should have preceded their assumption of the clerical office. The deficiency in Dr. Parr's character was of a negative description. His eccentricities, his impatient and vehement temper, his disagreeable personal habits, his pedantry and tumid style of composition, would, under any circumstances, have been impediments in the way of his extensive usefulness as a preacher; but these unfortunate peculiarities would probably have been soft-

ened down, had he felt the force of those motives, which ought to hold the ascendancy in the heart of a clergyman. His character was not stained by those positive vices, which have disgraced the name of so many ministers of the English church. He was not a profane swearer, like Swift, nor a drunkard, like Ford, nor a hanger on of the theatres, like Churchill: we do not know that he wrote plays, or hunted foxes, or visited Ascot and Newmarket. But his character should have been something more than faultless. A development is now and then made, indeed, which astonishes a New-Englander. "I shall send you to-morrow," he writes to the President of one of the Oxford colleges, "a dozen of good claret, and in the same hamper will also come another for Mr. Barker of Christ-Church College. I packed it up with my own hands, so as to have aching loins, and a vertiginous forehead, and straining eyeballs, and hands most dirty. I cannot boast much of my skill in packing, for I am not used to the cramming of treasonable books."

The opinions which he occasionally allows himself to express, with regard to the peculiarities of spiritual religion, furnish painful indication of his habitual style of feeling. Godly conversation, in his view, is a vague term, and implies only the absence of profaneness, or infidelity, or immorality. "Methodism," and we well know the meaning of this word in the mouth of an Englishman, he says, "is astonishingly prevalent here. Divine grace is exalted beyond all bounds, and man represented as a mere machine." His opposition to Methodism and Calvinism was in truth most strenuous: it sometimes bordered upon virulence. "Calvinism," he observes, "is a wild and cheerless system. Its founder was a haughty and choleric reformer, who dragged the supposed heretic to the stake, not merely with the insolence of a champion who had conquered his antagonist, but with the more horrid deliberation of the self-applauding enthusiast, who boasts of doing God service, when he at once, at one effectual blow, cuts off the offender from existence here, and hurries him into the torments thought to be reserved for him hereafter." Nor would he always refrain from misrepresentation. "The Calvinists," he says, "suppose that by an irresistible and irreversible decree, a portion of mankind are disabled from obeying the will of God, that they are compelled to disobey it, and that for such disobedience they are to be punished for ever. The effect of this system is to produce hatred towards God, irrevoca-

ble and invincible. Its influence upon the affections which we bear to our fellow-men, is still more disastrous. The love of our neighbor is peculiarly endangered by the Calvinistic system. In its adherents pride too often predominates over piety, in their reflexions upon beings whom they consider as graceless, hopeless outcasts from heaven, and rebels against God. If, in the course of his agency, the Calvinist should despise, should hate, should oppress the reprobates, if he should deride their faint and feeble attempts to do right, if he should exaggerate their guilt when they do amiss, how can his own salvation be affected; for the call is indisputable, the decree is irreversible, the assurance is infallible." We, of course, are not going to detain our readers by pointing out the palpable mistakes which these sentences contain. We do not believe that Dr. Parr ever fairly studied the system which he condemns so roundly. If he never did, his guilt is but slightly mitigated for allowing himself in such gross misrepresentations. We find in the correspondence two sets of directions for study to a student in divinity. There is not a single work alluded to in these directions, from which a student could derive any thing like an accurate idea of the theology of Calvin. There are many which would be likely to impart the most unfair and distorted views.

Dr. Parr's religious opinions were not, we very willingly acknowledge, of the loosest sort. They approach more nearly to the Scriptural type, than those of the denomination generally with whose views his own have been supposed to coincide. His notions of the Trinity, he was used to say, corresponded precisely to those of the profound Bishop of Durham. "Christ," he remarks in one of his sermons, "before his incarnation, was in the form of God. He was united to the Father by a principle of union utterly incomprehensible. He partook of God's glory and God's perfections." He adverts, in another passage, to the distinction between the divine and human natures of Christ, though he nowhere informs us in what he conceived the distinction to lie. "I hold," he observes, "that works do not of themselves expiate sins, for that expiation is effected by the mercy of God, announced to us by Jesus Christ." This assertion, however, is easily reconcilable with the denial of the doctrine of the atonement. We have been delighted, also, with the distinctness and strength with which he enforces the thought, that unless works are performed, forgiveness will not be granted; and that it is only an unsullied and holy life of which heaven

is the recompense. There are many members of sects, far stricter than that to which Parr belonged, into whose mind some of these notions might very advantageously be transfused.

His character, as a parish priest, was in many respects commendable. He emulated, as he said, the Good Parson at least in one thing—

I've taught the Gospel rather than the law,
And forced myself to drive, but loved to draw.

He exerted himself to become acquainted with every individual in the parish, and he was generally on good terms with them all. There were but two exceptions, and the existence of these is quite justifiable: he was frequently angry with the churlish and the avaricious. He visited his parishioners universally, and made a point of attending their clubs. Robert Hall was in the habit of carrying in his pocket his own tea and sugar, when he visited the dwellings of the poor; and in the course of one afternoon would drink thirty-six cups of his favorite beverage. Dr. Parr was used to carry his pipe and tobacco, and smoke with the meanest of his parishioners, we presume, not less often. He was faithful in reproofing the faults of his auditors. In some cases he would mention the name of the offender from the pulpit, and the fault that had been committed. His public and private instructions were characterized by affectionateness, and were as familiar and as well adapted to the meanest capacity, as it was, perhaps, possible for him to make them.

It has already appeared, we think, that the sermons of Dr. Parr were but poorly fitted to subserve the purposes of pulpit instruction. If, as was sometimes the fact, he selected topics which were interesting and profitable, his vicious style and the obscurity of his arrangement, must have effectually prevented any distinct impression from being made upon the hearers. It has astonished many that Bishop Butler should have read from the pulpit, such abstruse metaphysical disquisitions as are found among his sermons. Almost all of Dr. Parr's sermons were equally obscure and unsuited to the character of his auditors. The last of his three discourses on the Paralytic, may very properly rank with the Sermons on Human Nature. Yet there are a few whose style is comparatively plain and perspicuous, and whose influence, if they had been attended to, must have been salutary. One in particular, delivered on Good Friday,

from the words, "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus;" for its simple and unaffected pathos, its transparent style, and its beautifully drawn portrait of the Saviour's character, merits the warmest praise.

Dr. Parr's excellences and faults as a writer very nearly balance each other. His vocabulary was extensive, but it was deficient in the best class of words. That clear and inartificial diction, for which the prose of Dryden, and Pope, and Addison, and Berkeley is so much admired, of which we find such charming specimens in *Pilgrim's Progress* and in *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, which is consistent with the utmost elegance, and the greatest vehemence, which is so perfectly adapted to all the purposes of the poet, the orator, and especially the preacher, displaying rather than enveloping the thought, Dr. Parr never attained. He was too much of a pedant to reach such an excellence. Yet his sins in this respect were somewhat against his own convictions. He once stopped the press to have the clause, "I confess, with sorrow," changed into, "I must confess, then, with sorrow." "You see," he says, "the alteration includes but two words, must and then. I am fond of these particles, and I am sure that Voltaire and Marmontel in French, and Johnson in English, neglected them too much. But with me it is not so, nor with other writers. I feel the anxiety of Addison, who would cancel a sheet to alter the position of a common particle; and it was by this parental care of his words, that they put forth such beautiful blossoms and such beautiful fruits." His sentences are never carelessly constructed, but their rhythm and melody are often produced by a faulty redundancy of words and clauses. His style is never lacking in energy; there is not seldom an excessive vehemence. His quotations are often pertinent and beautiful; but they are too numerous: his figures and illustrations are often aptly introduced, and drawn from sources of sufficient dignity, and their applicableness is sufficiently obvious; they are as frequently employed merely for their beauty and magnificence, and not their utility, and their relation to the subject is very obscure. The viciousness of his style is imputable, in some measure, to his habitual disregard of the rule implied in the remark of Pope: "I believe no one qualification is so likely to make a good writer as the power of rejecting one's own thoughts." His feeling was rather that of Churchill, who remarked concerning correction, that it was like cutting away one's flesh. It was not that Parr was averse to the labors of revision. He was willing to be a

slow composer like Buffon, who strove in solitude to give his ideas all the neatness and precision and elegance of which they were capable, and to the end of his life, was every day learning the art of writing; who wrote the *Epogne de la Nature* at the age of seventy, and copied it eighteen times. There was enough of revision and enough of labor; but the labor was not judiciously laid out. He dreaded to handle the knife.

The vices of Parr's style were the vices of his age. A contemporary critic has observed, that the last half of the last century may be looked upon as the Augustan age of English writing. We doubt the correctness of this opinion. The pernicious influence of Johnson's style was at that time everywhere predominant. We see the traces of this influence in Robertson, whose prose is generally so attractive. Robert Hall, in the early part of his life, avowedly imitated Johnson. He once remarked to Dr. Gregory, "I aped Johnson, and I preached Johnson, but it was youthful folly, and it was very great folly. I might as well have attempted to dance a hornpipe in the cumbrous costume of Gog and Magog. My puny thoughts could not sustain the load of words in which I tried to clothe them." Dr. Parr was charged with the same fault, and in spite of the efforts of his admirers to throw off the imputation, it is easily substantiated. Yet there must be great merit in that writing, which could elicit such praises as Parr's composition often received. Witness these words of Dugald Stewart:—"Your character of Mr. Fox has afforded me more pleasure and instruction, than any book which I have read for years." What Mr. Addison says of the writings of Plato and Cicero, may with equal truth be applied to this Tract; "that it is impossible to read a page of them without being a greater and a better man for it." Commendation equally flattering we have already quoted from judges not less competent. His excellence, however, in English composition would have been still greater, had he formed his style into a more perfect correspondence to his own precept, when speaking of the Epitaph on Johnson's monument. "The words should be so plain, that every sciolist might understand them; the construction so plain, that every school-boy might hope to imitate it; the topics so plain, that every gazetteer would give himself credit for selecting them; and the whole so plain, that he who runs might read, he who reads might think that he understands, and he that understands be disposed to condemn."

We have said so much of the faults of Dr. Parr's style, that we conceive it to be just to give our readers a single specimen, which combines as many of the qualities of good writing as any passage that we recollect in the language.

"Our blessed Lord's family was poor, and his birth very obscure; he associated with men not distinguished by fortune or desert, by intellectual attainments or elevated situation. With respect to himself he appeared in a character scarcely raised above the contempt of a giddy misguided world. So far was he from feeling any passion for riches and honors, that he lamented the infatuation of those who were dazzled by their glare. He professed in the strongest terms, their utter emptiness and insignificance; he lamented the dangers to which they expose a weak understanding, or a corrupt heart; and he inveighed with the most alarming severity against the follies, and the vices of those, whose superficial greatness the giddy multitude revered, and whose supposed happiness the generality of their inferiors were too much disposed to envy. He never affected to conceal his own poverty; he never shunned the inconveniences to which it exposed him, but submitted without a murmur to the scoffs of the proud, and the insults of the vulgar. From the poor he chose out the companions of his labors, and the partners of his sufferings. To the poor he preached the Gospel, and insisted, too, on this very circumstance as the most solid proof of its authenticity—the most distinguishing mark of its excellence—the most eminent instance of its utility. The admiration, the gratitude of his hearers, sometimes led them to load him with the highest commendations, and to force upon him the most illustrious honors; but he studiously declined all their intended favors; he artfully drew off the attention of his hearers from his own works to that piety which they owed to God, and professedly referred the praise of every pious precept, every holy action, every benevolent miracle, to the glory of Him by whom he was sent into the world. Such was his condescension in those public scenes, where his example was likely to have more extensive influence; and if we attend him in his hours of privacy and retirement, we shall find him engaged in the same acts of humiliation, and influenced by the same lowliness of heart. Every proud thought, every aspiring wish, that arose in the breasts of his disciples, he instantly suppressed. Though their acknowledged Master, he vouchsafed to become their servant; he repeatedly pronounced that servant to be the greatest in heaven, who had made himself the least on earth; he founded his own claims to their respect, on actions which seemed most to forbid it; and in spite of the modest refusal, the well-meant opposition of the disciples, he stooped down to wash their feet. Shall we then listen to the scoffs of infidels, who make the meanness of our Master's situation on earth, an objection to the truth of his claims; who call his condescension meanness, and who dare to brand his meekness by the ignominious title of cowardice?"

But we must bring our sketch to a close. The final scene only remains to be described. In the summer of 1824, Parr's

strength visibly declined, his appetite failed, and his spirits sank. He was attacked by his last sickness in January of the following year; it was a fever, accompanied with erysipelas. To the latter affection he had been subject for many years; but it now broke out with uncontrollable violence. Almost from the beginning he was under the influence of delirium, without any lucid interval of much length. Yet he once became sufficiently self-conscious to refer to his present state, and to avow his trust in God through Christ, for the pardon of his sins. Fifty days of helplessness and suffering, sometimes very acute, did he pass, during which his patience and magnanimity must have been drawn upon to the utmost, yet no murmuring accent ever escaped him. He died on Sunday, the 6th of March, 1825, being seventy-eight years of age.

As we take our last view of the life and character which we have undertaken to delineate, we are involuntarily reminded of those half sportive but solemn verses of Cowper, in which he computes the value of a day's conversation, as too justly descriptive of the real worth of Dr. Parr's life and labors.

Collect at evening what the day brought forth,
Compress the sum into its solid worth;
And if it weigh the importance of a fly,
The scales are false, or algebra a lie.

ARTICLE III.

THE IDEAL OF A PERFECT PULPIT DISCOURSE.

By Rev. HENRY N. DAY, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric, Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

WE shall not be chargeable with extravagance or presumption, if we assume that pulpit oratory belongs to the highest grade in eloquence. Whether we consider its designs, its materials, or its occasions, we are constrained to claim for it an equal rank, at least, with any other species whatever.

That the eloquence of the pulpit has actually risen to the highest excellence of which it is capable, may, perhaps, be a matter of doubt. We have, indeed, in our numerous collections

of sermons, beautiful specimens of composition; we have brilliant effusions of genius and great richness of learning; we have, what is more perhaps, unsurpassed efforts in argumentation and persuasion. But where shall we look, in sacred eloquence, for those perfect models which we find in secular oratory? where is the preacher in whom stands forth embodied the idea of a perfect orator? Have we yet, indeed, attained a conception of a perfect standard of pulpit discourse? Where, in all our treatises on the homiletic art—where, in all our systems of æsthetics, is it presented in any such light as to show that the idea has been fully, distinctly, self-consciously grasped? Where is the living teacher, in our numerous schools of sacred rhetoric, who succeeds in infusing this idea into the minds of his disciples, so that they go forth fully possessed of it,—inventing, composing, speaking, under the control of it,—impressing it more or less completely in all their discourses? Has the mind any where been distinctly turned on this point,—the possibility of conceiving a perfect discourse? Has the question been agitated, Can there be in sacred eloquence, as in sculpture, in painting, in the drama, a development of the essential idea of perfection? of the *beau idéal* in pulpit oratory?—does æsthetical science embrace this field, also, in her domain, and can she establish here any firm, intelligible, and trustworthy principles?

Distinguishing, then, as we may, between the theoretical and the empirical—between what is ideally practicable in pulpit eloquence and what has already been attained, we may assume that there is here room for indefinite progress and improvement. But while in any art there may be tendency towards perfection without any distinct apprehension of the essential idea of the art, by which, as a perfect standard, every product of the art may be tried, so, until that idea is grasped and the standard ascertained, it is clear that tendency must be irregular, slow and fitful. Even if that perfect idea is not fully realized, if only approximations to that standard are attained, still, unless essential error be embraced, that imperfect standard will not be without its value in inspiring and directing effort.

In the hope, therefore, of contributing something to the improvement of that most important art—pulpit oratory—we propose, at the present time, to attempt the development of the *essential idea of a perfect pulpit discourse*.

Before entering directly on this design, it will be of use to indicate and justify the ground that is taken in the discussion, as well as more clearly and distinctly to define our object.

It must have been observed, in what has already been said, that we regard pulpit eloquence as an *art*; and not merely an art in that more general sense in which none would deny it to be an art, a product of human skill, but in that stricter, more specific sense, in which it implies a definite aim or end, with a reference to which the whole product of the art is contrived and shaped. For the same may be said of eloquence which has been said with so much truth and beauty of the sister art of poetry. "There is an art, the child of a joyous nature, which sings from a mere inability to do aught but sing. Its song, as has been well said, is the voice of nature—the spontaneous outburst of its own and the national feeling. Very different is her sister art, which selects and considers, has views and follows aims; *art, self-conscious of art.*" There is an eloquence which merely overflows; which issues at no prompting of reason, and follows no guidance of reason; which flows out spontaneously because the fountain is full, and falls, it knows not, it cares not where. Such eloquence is rational only inasmuch as it proceeds from a rational soul, all whose motions are tinged with rationality. Reason, however, in the exercise of its own proper prerogative, exerts upon it no control. This eloquence we sometimes meet with. There are those who court it. The uncontrolled outpourings of a feeling soul, the unchecked roving of a restless imagination are with them the highest effusions of eloquence. Such effusions—they cannot be called productions—are sometimes poured from the pulpit. They constitute, it is supposed, nature's pure eloquence uncorrupted by art. This kind of eloquence, which is mere expression without further object or aim, is not oratory. For oratory, in its essential import, is *address*, and necessarily implies an end out of itself. Such eloquence, therefore, is excluded from the comprehension of art in our notion of the term.

Art, in its stricter sense, necessarily implies the control of the reason; and reason never acts without an aim. Nothing, therefore, is worthy of the name of art in which there is not a definite end or aim proposed and pursued. Art is highest in its nature when the noblest aim is proposed. It is most perfect in degree, when that aim is most strictly and perfectly pursued.

We shall not stop here, from these almost self-evident propositions, to establish for pulpit oratory the highest rank among the arts; or to demonstrate the erroneousness of that opinion which regards the attentive study of the peculiar aim of sacred

eloquence and of the means of accomplishing it, together with all systematic training in the use of these means, as worthless or absolutely injurious, because it cramps the free movement of the spirit; or to expose the folly, we may say the criminality of those, who, to their preparations for the pulpit, apply no severe effort of reason, but leave all to passion, fancy, and a purely spontaneous intellect. But it seems necessary to dwell, one moment longer here, in defining and vindicating the ground from which the development of the essential idea of the art of eloquence must proceed, in order to throw in an illustration or two for the preventing of misapprehension.

It is certain that different minds move very differently in the process of artistic construction. We may distinguish, particularly, two great classes, in this respect, not separated from each other in regard to the individuals which compose them by any well defined line, but represented rather by the extremes to which the one or the other of the individuals more or less approximates. In the one class, we observe *the subject* taking a firm and controlling hold of the producing mind, and, although working even in subordination to the final end or aim, yet seeming to proceed only from its own peculiar grounds, as if irrespective of any such end. In the other class, it is *the end* which seems to control; and the subject seems to be merely an instrument to that end, although never managed in violation of its own nature. We may easily perceive how minds from both these classes might produce, from the same subject and with the same end, essentially the same perfect result, when we consider the matter from this point of view,—that truth in reference to a designated end admits, theoretically, of but one perfect development; and that a particular end to be accomplished by a specified truth can be perfectly attained only in one particular way, and these forms, being in the one case a development, in the other a process, are coincident. We could not desire happier exemplifications of this distinction than are furnished to us in the two great poets of Germany, contemporaries and intimates. Schiller is the representative of the first class. In him the subject seems the great thing. Every where we discover the earnestness which characterizes one wholly possessed of his idea which labors within him struggling for expression, and never resting till it has fully developed itself in objective reality. What that shall be, it seems little anxious. With him art is a travail, and its product is a birth. Goethe is the opposite of all

this. It is the end which always seems uppermost in his mind. He seems to stand aloof from the subject, in respect to which he appears to be perfectly indifferent, and uses it only as a tool to the accomplishment of his object. With him art appears under the image of a sculptor, with the perfect form of an Apollo in his eye, taking almost with indifference his block of marble, and, under the controlling guidance of that ideal form, fracturing and chiseling till his idea is realized. Schiller's birth, it is however to be carefully remarked, is no shapeless monster, although living, nor is Goethe's product mere form without life. The birth and the product are identical. The mistake which we wish to correct or prevent is, that Schiller is not equally under the control of art as Goethe. The difference between them lies not here; but in the different manner in which art influences them. In both cases, there is a perfect conception of what art requires—of the definite end, and of the means of attaining it. In both there is a perfect observance of the end and adherence to the principles of art for its attainment. In the one case, art plants itself on the subject; in the other, upon the end or aim. In both it equally controls the production. Schiller's eloquence is the farthest possible removed from the so-called eloquence of nature.

It would be idle to inquire which method implies the greater mental power; as to inquire whether perfection does not involve a blending of the two. It is evident that in oratory the end and the subject, for they must correspond to each other,—the nature of a given subject determining the end, and a given end determining the character of the subject,—may, each, or both, determine which method shall predominate. In explanation, thus, the method of proceeding must be deduced from the nature of the subject. In persuasion, on the contrary, the method evidently must be more objective.

Regarding, then, sacred eloquence as an art in the stricter sense of the word, "art, self-conscious of art," a perfect product of this art, that is, a perfect pulpit discourse, must be strictly conformed throughout to the great end of all pulpit oratory. Not only must the end be seen and aimed at, but it must be undeviatingly pursued in every part of the discourse. It will be unnecessary for our present purpose to go into any exact determination of the essential idea of the art of sacred eloquence generally.* It will be sufficient to take the popular notion of a

* This point has been discussed at great length by Professor

sermon simply modified by the view we have taken of it as the product of an art, and, therefore, implying a definite end that is undeviatingly pursued throughout the discourse. This popular notion may be set forth in the following terms: a portion of scriptural text expressing some important truth, which, defined and modified according to the design or occasion of the discourse in the preacher's own language, is then developed and applied to the minds of the hearers with specific reference to the instruction or conviction of their intellects, the correction and excitation of their feelings, or the right direction of their wills, and always in subordination to the great end of all preaching, viz. the promotion of practical godliness.* This idea of a pulpit dis-

Schott of Jena, in his "Philosophische und religiöse Begründung der Rhetorik und Homilitik." As the result of some hundred pages of discussion, he gives the following as the fundamental principle of a theory of Eloquence: "So work through a continuous expression of thy inner life upon the feelings of men, that they, as free moral beings, shall unite their efforts in one and the same direction with thine; or, in other words, so work through the unity of thy own efforts, represented in continuous discourse on the feelings of men, that their wills shall unite themselves with thine in a direction which consists with the general strife after the ideal of perfect humanity." p. 443. Leipzig Ed.

* We are aware that the propriety of regarding the text as a constituent part of a discourse has been questioned. But we can perceive no good reason for this. Certainly it is not a sufficient reason that it is not in the preacher's language. For on this ground we must reject all quotations as not properly belonging to the discourse. On the other hand, it seems to us essential. For is that preaching, in the common apprehension of the word, which is not founded on some portion of Scripture? Does not the text, at least ought not the text to enter into the discourse, and modify all its parts? Is it not part of the preacher's task to find for himself a text, to determine how much of Scripture shall be taken for the purpose? Is not, in other words, a part of the preacher's labor in invention to be expended here? The circumstance that it usually precedes and stands distinct from the discourse is a merely accidental one. It might with perfect propriety be placed after the introduction, as is sometimes done.

It might be thought, at a first glance, that the description of a public discourse given in the text does not include exe-

course may be symbolized thus : a scriptural seed germinated in the preacher's mind and developed in the form of a perfect tree, every part of which shall be determined in its character by the germinated seed.

If we analyze now this general description, we shall detect several particulars which enter into it as essential constituents, and which may be distinctly considered. One of these is *scriptural authority*. What we mean is, that unless there be authority derived from revelation for the particular sentiment developed and applied in the discourse, there is wanting an essential feature of a proper pulpit discourse. There is much, we are aware, that goes by the name of preaching, which contains nothing of this ingredient. The text is often regarded as a mere motto of a sermon ; or as furnishing an occasion for saying something ; or as supplying some suggestion which may be conveniently made the theme of a discourse ; or as a mere formal appendage, the use of which is to be justified only on the ground of custom. We are aware that many preachers never dream of endeavoring to found the truth which they propose on any authority of revelation furnished in the text. It is enough if the proposition is in accordance with Scripture. The remotest allusion even in words is sufficient to justify, in their minds, the use of a particular passage. Some even degrade themselves and their calling by the pitiful attempt to show their skill in extorting some strange doctrine from a passage as foreign to it as possible, by applying an unwarrantable force to a word or an allusion that it may happen to contain. We can only say of such, that they utterly misconceive the nature of preaching. If in any thing preaching differs from other species of discourse, it is in this : that the sentiment—the proposition—is scriptural, clearly founded in revelation. If the use of a text can be vindicated on any ground, it is on this : that it conveys the authority of God to the sentiment and its application in the discourse. If it fail to do this, it is obnoxious to all the objections of Voltaire. It is worse than useless ; and the custom of prefixing it to pulpit discourses, in our view, is far more honored in the breach than the observance.

getical discourse. It may not every variety of this species of discourse *in form* ; but, yet, as we apprehend, it *does* in substance. The preacher's own apprehension of the truth is not always presented in a single proposition or in one single view, but it always must appear somewhere, even if in parts.

We regard, then, the office of the text, and from this we deduce the principle of selection and use to be this: to convey divine authority to the discourse. Herein it is distinguished from a mere motto, as well as from the motion which presents the subject of discussion at the bar or in the deliberative assembly. It enters into the very life of the discourse;—rather is the source from which life is derived, and the vehicle by which it is communicated, as the seed is the source of vitality to the tree. It is an essential part of the duty of the preacher to elaborate this vital principle of the text, and through the appropriate organs transmit it to the proposition, in which it is to appear again modified by the soil in which it has germinated, as the trunk from which the branch, foliage, and fruit of the entire discourse shall be derived. Since, moreover, preaching loses its essential character whenever it loses this divine authority from its inculcations, or, what in the present case is tantamount to this, whenever it *appears* to the hearer to lose this authority, it becomes necessary that the sentiment of the discourse not only be in fact revealed in the word of God, but also be clearly *shown* to be thus revealed by means of a lucid exposition. It must be made to appear to the comprehension of the popular mind, that the sentiment is the “mind of the will of God” in the particular passage of Scripture on which the discourse is founded;—not merely that it is a possible sentiment which the passage may convey, but *the* sentiment; otherwise, obviously, no positive authority from inspiration is derived to the discourse.

Inasmuch, however, as a discourse is a development of a truth in the mind of the preacher, it is evident that this divinely authorized sentiment must enter into his mind and partake of its forms of thought and feeling. In other words, it is essential to the perfect development of truth in a discourse, that *it be embodied in the forms of the individual mind*. Until this take place, it is foreign to that mind. The mind cannot enter into it and quicken it with its own life. The development, if possible, must be one in which there is no life. It must be in modes wholly independent of the laws of the preacher’s mind. It cannot possess the characteristics of his creative spirit. It is not, strictly, of his paternity.

This impress of the preacher’s mind, must, of course, be after the present state of the mind, as determined not only by natural idiosyncracies, by education and habit, but, also, by the particular circumstances, occasion, and design of the discourse. All

these enter into the soil in which the divine seed of truth is germinated, and determine the character of its development. Thus, while we retain for preaching its essential character—divine authority derived from the Scriptures, we yet provide for the fullest activity of the preacher's creative spirit. Thus the objection of Voltaire to the use of a text, that it imposes on the preacher the toilsome labor of regulating a whole discourse by a single line, is obviated; for no such shackles as are implied in the objection are laid on freedom of invention. The scriptural text is but the occasion of suggesting truth, which, as con-natural to mind, must find in it a free reception, neither con-straining nor constrained. As food, rather, in the process of assimilation in order to a new form of appearance, it quickens, refreshes, and strengthens. Nor, further, is there any necessary limitation placed on the preacher's power to adapt truth to the particular circumstances of the case. If all preaching, in order to be such, must be founded ultimately on the word of God; if the preacher can never, in compatibility with his distinctive character, desire to go out of that divine record for fundamental truth, the widest liberty is allowed that the nature of the case allows. For although specific applications of truth are not made in the word of God to all the varying circumstances of individual minds, still the general principles are there laid down which are required for any conceivable exigency of human life. Nor, on the other hand, is the view we have given justly liable to the charge of dangerous latitudinarianism, as sanctioning a too free use of scriptural truth. For while the sentiment of a discourse, in accordance with the foregoing principles, may sometimes be given in the original scriptural form, never, however, except when that is coincident with the form of the preacher's mind, yet, even when transformed and colored by his peculiar modes of view, it can never, by the correct application of those principles, go beyond the word of God; but must ever, as still retaining the authority of inspiration, remain circumscribed within it. This constitutes the very calling and function of the preacher as set apart to the "ministry of the word;"—that he not only select that truth of inspiration which the occasion requires,—rightly divide the word—but that he make the actual application to the minds and hearts of his hearers, in specific exhortations or reproofs, encouragements or warnings, doctrines or duties, which their peculiar condition demands. This ministry of the word must unquestionably be in the use of that language which he, as an individual, has learned to use

In other words, the truth of God must be clothed in that form of language in which alone it can appear to him to be truth in its particular bearings and applications.

It is involved in all that has been said, that a perfect discourse must proceed from truth as its gem. It becomes necessary here to determine more strictly what is implied in this statement; especially, as it would seem, vague notions are entertained in regard to what truth is when considered as the germ of a discourse. It is not enough, then, that the terms employed to express what is regarded as the sentiment of the discourse, properly correspond to the particular ideas intended to be expressed. The phrase, thus, "the righteousness of God," is correctly employed to denote certain ideas, or a certain complex idea. But, as we shall see, properly speaking it expresses no truth. Nor is it enough that the ideas thus denoted have their corresponding objects, either possible or actual. There may be a "God" and a "righteousness," or, more correctly, there may be a righteousness which is divine, and yet no truth be expressed in the phrase. For nothing is yet affirmed or denied. It is not asserted that there is "a righteousness of God;" nor that "God is righteous;" nor yet that the righteousness of God possesses certain characteristics, or is exercised in certain ways, or is manifested in certain modes. In short, there is no truth which can be regarded as a germ of a discourse until there is a proposition expressed or implied; until, in logical terms, there is a subject, predicate and copula. Without this, there can be no life in a theme of discourse which can give it development. Without this, it is impossible for the mind to proceed one step in invention. Paradoxical as this may appear at first to some, we are confident that they have only to understand fully what is meant by it, in order to be fully satisfied of its correctness. It is not meant, then, that a single term denoting a single idea may not be the cause or occasion of a thousand suggestions. The "sovereignty of God," or the divine sovereignty distinctly apprehended, may put the mind on an innumerable variety of views and apprehensions. It may lead to thoughts on God, his infinite nature, his perfections; and the mind may go off into any one of these various particular views, and follow one after another without end. But this is nothing but idle musing—empty reverie. There is no development of truth here; no invention in the proper sense. It is not till the mind conceives a proposition; as "God is a Sovereign," that it has any hold upon the subject for applying its inventive powers.

It is to be remarked, moreover, that it is not essential that the theme of a discourse should be actually presented in the form of a logical proposition. In many cases it would defeat in a great measure the very object of a discourse thus to state it. In all discourses, in fact, in which the design is not to prove, or to persuade, but to inform or excite, it would be very difficult to gather the subject into the compact form of a logical proposition. If, for example, it were the object of the preacher to enumerate the particulars which enter into the complex idea of the "divine sovereignty"—to describe it, or to vindicate the particular exercises of it; or to set forth the occasions on which it is exercised, or the like, it might be difficult to gather together into one single proposition all the various items of thought. This is, however, not at all at variance with what we have laid down. In all these cases there is a virtual copula, which makes the discourse, in each, one single discourse, having one vital principle diffusing itself into all the members. The distinction between a mere title and a thesis is thus apparent. A title determines nothing. It simply points to a particular road, along which somewhere the mind of the hearer or reader will find the subject. A proposition defines the exact field within which the view is confined. The title "History of France" thus tells us nothing as to what is to be the subject of the work. It may be a disquisition on the necessary ideas which make up this complex notion; what, in other words, is meant by the term "history," and what country is meant by the term "France." It may be a critique on some history that has appeared. It may be designed only to indicate the necessary sources from which a history of France must be derived. It is not till we pass to the proposition, "the History of France is so and so," that we get the proper thesis. So also in that part of the composition of a discourse which is called invention, it is not until the mind has planted itself on this *copula*—this *is*, that it can do any thing in its work. It is precisely here, we imagine, that the great difficulty of composing, particularly in young writers, lies. They have no idea of what they are to do, because their subject has not passed into the form of a proposition. The subject may be ever so familiar to them; they may be at no loss for words; but still the mind refuses to work. Let the theme be, for illustration, "hope." It is evident that they cannot move a step until they have determined what they are to do with their subject; whether show that there is such a feeling in the human

breast as hope ; or describe in what hope consists, or distinguish it from other affections ; or enumerate the objects or conditions of hope. This determination must be made at the outset ; and when it is made, the subject has assumed the nature of a logical proposition.

It is in the copula, we apprehend, that we are to seek the outermost limits of unity in a discourse. We say outermost limits. For, although it always must circumscribe and include every subject of which rhetorical unity can be predicated ; yet it does not always coincide with the precise limits of such unity. It is merely an *ultra quem non* boundary ; by no means, always a *citra quem non*. That is, unity is not always preserved when the subject can be presented in the form of a logical proposition. For instance, in a discourse on the "passion of Christ," in which the design is to exhibit the peculiarities which characterize it, unity will not be preserved, unless the discourse throughout be managed so as to accomplish one definite purpose in the hearer's mind—either inform his understanding merely, or, including this as a subordinate end, aim to excite his feelings, as of gratitude, confidence, love. With the latter design in view, unity would be violated, if instruction of the intellect were made any where any thing more than a mere subordinate object. This information of the understanding may be necessary, in order to the excitation of the feelings ; it may constitute a great part of the discourse. It must, nevertheless, be colored throughout by the *pathetic* character of the ultimate design of the discourse. It must not follow exclusively and independently the laws of the mere didactic. Those laws, on the other hand, must throughout bend to the higher authority of pathetic discourse, and be interpreted and applied accordingly. Much that would be demanded for a mere intellectual apprehension of the subject, must be passed over. Circumstances unimportant to such an apprehension, will need to be dealt upon, explained, and set forth at length, amplified and elevated by a suitable verbal expression. All discourse, thus centering as to its object, in the mind of the hearer, we must find the determining limits of unity there, and not in the subject merely. It still remains true, that not only does this unity of object frequently coincide with the proper unity of subject, as perhaps generally in didactic and argumentative discourse, but always this objective unity falls within the copula of a logical proposition.

We have thought proper to speak in this excursive and unmethodical manner, of that logical unity in a discourse which is founded on the copula, not merely because it is sometimes convenient to make use of this more genuine test, in judging of the unity of a discourse; nor merely that we might more fully indicate how far we coincide in opinion with those who find here the determination of unity in all discourse; but, also, because, in the actual construction of a discourse, it is in this that the speaker must find his first limits; from within these limits he is at liberty to draw supplies at his will; this field he must thoroughly survey, or he cannot know that all the essential means, or even the best means within his reach, are actually employed to accomplish his end. Indeed, for one great part of his work—logical invention—this is his only unity. In pure didactics, as in systems of science, in narrative and explanatory discourse, where the information of the understanding is aimed at, as well as in argumentation, as has been before intimated, this is the only unity, unless the discourse be regarded as constructed for particular minds, with partial or erroneous views. Where, however, the feelings are to be aroused, or the will is to be moved,* the boundaries of unity become contracted. We proceed now to point out more distinctly and fully the precise nature of this unity, and to show the grounds of its necessity in a perfect discourse. We shall confine ourselves mainly to a purely dialectic consideration of the subject, deriving our illustrations from the definitions we have already presented.

The position before indicated, that the true unity of a discourse must be sought in the object to be effected in the hearer's mind, is sustained by the consideration that a discourse is a product of art, and must submit to all the æsthetic principles of art. Now it enters into the essence of an art, that it have a definite end, which is pursued by a regular method. Art, as critical or æsthetic, fixes its eye at this proposed end as at a focal point, and every ray that comes from the subject, which is not concentrated there, it excludes, as not within its prescribed method. It takes in that focal point the single beam

* We leave out of the enumeration the imagination, because it can never be a lawful object with the preacher to aim merely or chiefly at the gratification of that department of the mind. The imagination is to be pleased only with a view to an ulterior end.

that is collected upon it, and so much of the radiant as furnishes that beam, and nothing more. All besides is extraneous to it, and is rejected. Here is the entire outline of that form, beyond which it does not look, and within which it requires there should be perfect fulness. It is evident, now, that it is the end which determines and limits every thing. The end determines the quantity of material, and the method in which it is disposed. It is true that certain limitations exist in the material. A sculptor would be accounted mad, who should undertake to chisel a Venus from a block of granite; as would be a preacher, who should aim to awaken a feeling of holy confidence in God from the history of Judas. So, also, the development of the subject towards a given end must, as proceeding from the subject, be governed in some measure by it. Still, it is clear, that the subject does not, in the first place, absolutely determine the particular end; and, in the next place, while the development must proceed naturally, that is, in a manner corresponding to the character of the subject, there is nothing in that to determine the direction. It is the end in view that at last comes in and directs the whole. Until that end appear, art evidently can judge nothing respecting the development. It might as well attempt to pass criticism on a pile of brick and mortar, while still ignorant of the purpose for which it was thrown together. It is true, brick and mortar would be very unfit materials for an obelisk. It is true, that brick and mortar must be laid together somewhat differently from blocks of granite, or wood of Lebanon. But, after all, art has nothing to do with the structure till the end or design is determined. Now, the very nature of the discourse fixes that end in the mind of the hearer. For wherefore does a man speak, but to enlighten, convince, please, arouse, or persuade; in short, effect some change in the mind of another. And these ends of instruction, conviction, and the rest, are essentially distinct, and must be sought by essentially different means. We are driven to the conclusion thus, that the unity of discourse must be found in the end to be effected, in the understanding, imagination, passions, or will of the hearer.

The necessity of this unity in a perfect discourse, is still further shown, from a consideration of the nature of method. Method is involved in the very idea of art. As art implies an end, so it implies a way to that end; and method is but that way. There are two things which relatively to each other

determine the law of method. These are the subject and the end proposed. If the end be conviction, then a perfect method requires that all in the subject fitted to produce conviction in the mind addressed, or at least so much as in the circumstances can best be brought forward to effect that purpose, be applied in a manner according with the laws of conviction on the mind of the hearer. There may be much in the subject fitted to instruct. There may be much addressed to gratify the imagination; much to move the passions; but all this must be separated and set aside, and left behind, and nothing but what is suited to convince be taken. It must be borne in mind, however, at the time, that the soul is not a mere bundle of separate faculties and susceptibilities; but that it is essentially one; and no department of its nature is influenced independently of the rest. To convince effectually, you must often work on the feelings, amuse the fancy, inform the intellect. Still, a perfect method requires that these aims be always strictly subordinate. So, also, what of the subject is thus taken must be borne directly forward to the proposed end—conviction. The argument may be clothed, no matter how richly, with the dress of the imagination; it may be animated, no matter how thoroughly, with passion; provided, always, that the hearer be only the more disposed thereby to admit it and feel its force. Whatever is done aside from this, especially whatever tends to lessen the force of argument, or to divert its aim from the mind of the hearer, is a deviation from the law of a perfect method.

The same argument in proof of the necessity of unity in a perfect discourse, a unity determined by the object to be effected in the hearer's mind, may be presented in another form, as derived from the idea of a discourse. We mean, when we speak of a *discourse*, certainly not two or more discourses. We mean *one* discourse. Now, what gives unity to a discourse? How do we distinguish, here, between unity and plurality? Is it enough that all be contained in a single volume? Is it enough that all can be delivered in the space of an hour, less or more? Is unity determined by volume or time? Is it determined by the unity of the occasion; so that if a preacher in the first half hour speak on the subject of faith, and in the second of the millennium, his discourse is one; but if he present to-day one part of his argument in proof of the divine sovereignty, and the other the next week, his discourses are two? Is it determined by the unity of the subject; so that the discourse is perfectly one, if a

man, discoursing on the cross of Christ, should devote one half of his time to the question whether Christ bore his cross all the way to Calvary, and the other to an enumeration of the blessings purchased by his death? What determines a discourse to be one, unless it be a single end pursued steadily from the beginning of it to the close?

We are fully aware that contradictions to this idea may seem to abound on all sides around us. Perhaps a great part of the discourses that we hear, and a great part of those that we find in books, may seem to contradict this representation of unity in discourse. Preachers have not regarded unity as lying here. But is it not possible that the fullest and clearest convictions of the reason may be violated in practice? At all events, is it not possible that habits and customs may prevail for a long time in the community, which not a member of that community, when the matter is clearly presented to his mind, but will admit to be in violation of reason? But we must not suppose that there has been so much ignorance and mistake. We need carefully to distinguish, here, between a merely *verbal* and a strictly *logical* unity. A preacher who should announce his subject in the forms of the following partition: "I shall speak, first, of the nature of evangelical repentance; in the second place, show it to be a scriptural duty; and, in the third place, present some motives for the immediate performance of this duty," merely violates verbal unity. While, undoubtedly, it would be far better to make the verbal form in all respects perfect, and while a skilful artist would carefully avoid any such deformities and discrepancies in his work, still, so far as the development of the truth is concerned, the above partition does not offend against the law of unity. In order to induce men to repentance, which may be the high object in the supposed discourse, it may be necessary to explain the nature of repentance, and to show that it is enjoined in the word of God. If these particular objects were strictly subordinated to this ultimate end, unity would have been preserved.

It might seem at first sight, too, that the appending of inferences, remarks, observations, and the like, so customary throughout Christendom, would be in violation of strict unity. Doubtless unity is, in this usage, frequently violated, but by no means necessarily. The ultimate end in all preaching is, as we have before said, practical goodness; in other words, the direction and confirmation of the will in the way of holiness. But, in order

to move the will, it is necessary to arouse the feelings, to convince the judgment, or enlighten the understanding. So, in order to move the affections, it is necessary to convince of the reality of the object towards which they are to be excited, and to exhibit what in it is fitted to attract them. Explanation of the terms of a proposition is likewise necessary to a conviction of its truth : still further, the conviction of a general truth does not necessarily secure an actual assent to all the particulars comprehended in it. Hence, consistently with a regard to the strictest unity, the subject may be carried forward from one general truth to various particulars involved in it ; from explanation to conviction, and from conviction or explanation to the excitement of the feelings, and from either to appeals to the controlling principle of the soul. But it is equally clear that the reverse process cannot be adopted, as is, in fact, often done, without destroying unity. To turn from appeals to the affections back to argumentation or explanation is, so to speak, advancing backwards ; a new course is taken, and unity of method is lost.

There is, moreover, what is called the *topical* method of preaching, which it may appear difficult to vindicate with this view of unity in a discourse, and which yet we find adopted by the most celebrated and most successful preachers. The distinctive characteristic of this kind of preaching is, that the subject is distributed into several propositions, which are discussed each by itself, and with little or no reference to each other, or to any one final end. Sometimes, indeed, it may happen that a complex subject may be treated topically, as it is termed, without any necessary violation of unity. In an exegetical discourse, founded on any passage of Scripture, the most direct method may sometimes be that which is indicated by the several logical phrases of the text. So also in other kinds of discourse, what is called the topical method may happen to coincide with that which the just development of the subject may require. But these coincidences are merely accidental ; and, in truth, this topical method, regarded as a distinct species, is founded on no correct idea of proper method, and can be justified on no principle whatever. Indeed, the very phrase, topical method, involves contradiction and absurdity, and the propriety of using it can be supported only in indulgence to human weakness and error ; for, if method implies any thing necessarily, it implies unity, and a topical method is a method which has no proper unity. At least, if we may judge from the examples that are given to

illustrate this kind of method, there is no unity, as determined by the end proposed to be attained in the hearer's mind.

It was, we apprehend, this false method which occasioned Fenelon's* rejection of divisions in a discourse. It is plain that he did not condemn what sometimes goes under the name of division. He recommends thus, in opposition to what he calls "our [the French] method of dividing," the practice of Demosthenes and Tully. And these men, he says, in these very words, "pointed out carefully all those things that ought to be distinguished; to each of them they assigned its proper place." Fenelon, then, at the very time when discarding division, distinctly recognized the necessity of *distinguishing* the parts of a subject, and, moreover, the necessity of *arrangement*, which presupposes what may without impropriety be denominated division. But it may be profitable to endeavor to get a still more clear and distinct notion of Fenelon's idea of that division which he so utterly repudiates as irreconcilable with all true eloquence. He every where regards the ancients as true models in oratory. If any one of the ancient orators could be singled out as exemplifying more exactly than any other his idea of a perfect method, free from all that false division which offends him so much, it would be, without doubt, Demosthenes, every one of whose orations, he expressly says, "is a close chain of reasoning." Let us examine for a moment, then, one of his perfect models. We will take that first of all oratorical performances, the oration for Ctesiphon. The apparent subject in this oration was the alleged illegality of a certain decree proposed by Ctesiphon in the senate of Athens. The only issue that could be made from the charge against Ctesiphon was this of illegality; and the only points to be considered were, Are the allegations in the decree of Ctesiphon true, as the law requires? Was Demosthenes, as an officer of the state, debarred by law from the privilege of receiving a crown? And were the time and place of the proposed coronation in accordance with the laws of Athens providing for such matters? These questions arise at once from the three counts of Æschines' indictment. But it is evident that neither Æschines nor Demosthenes regarded this as the main issue of the case. Æschines, indeed, most earnestly insists that Demosthenes should be confined to this issue of illegality; but, at the same time, he shows that he did not

* Dialogues on Eloquence.

regard this as the great question, and directs his efforts toward quite another issue, involving that of illegality, indeed, but otherwise widely to be distinguished from it. The true issue of the case was between Demosthenes and Æschines as personal rivals, and representing two great political parties and systems of administration. The decision involved the triumph of one party and the overthrow of the other. These two systems of policy were not, indeed, viewed on their own exclusive merits. With the utmost art all the personal qualities and acts of the two great representatives of those adverse systems were wrought up into the comparison. The true parties in the trial were not Ctesiphon and the state, but Demosthenes and Æschines. It was, therefore, but a small thing with either advocate to secure the condemnation or acquittal of Ctesiphon. The great and single object proposed by each was to produce in the minds of the judges a conviction that in all their relations to the state, in a just comparison of their personal characters and civil conduct, himself was deserving of approbation and his adversary of condemnation. At this one object Demosthenes aims the whole of his oration. Starting from the position in which the case lay in the minds of the judges, after the oration of Æschines, he proceeds undeviatingly forward, clearing his way as he advances, adapting himself in his thoughts, his feelings, his language, all along strictly to the stage of his progress; at first modestly, as if in doubt of his reception by his judges; then more confidently; and, finally, with the most commanding assurance of triumph, till he fastens his cause firmly on the convictions of his judges. Here we find, indeed, Fenelon's "close chain of reasoning." In one sense there is nothing broken. Certainly there is progress every where—no halting, no retrogression, no digression. There is, strictly, no repetition. His work at the time is thoroughly done, and he has no occasion to turn back to supply a defect. All, indeed, is perfect, admirable, divine. But is there no division? If it be essential to division that the parts should be designated numerically—as first, secondly, etc.—then there is no division. If it be essential to division that all the topics which are to be introduced be distinctly announced at the outset, then we find no such division here. But we do find parts; we find also express intimations of transition from one part to another; we find even a logical distribution of most of the parts of his oration formally given in the beginning. Demosthenes' eloquence is not the eloquence of Chatham—a storm-cloud of

passion, dazzling, indeed, with electric flashes of thought, yet wild, orderless, except in the wild order of stormy passion. It is more like the tropical sun—mild and gentle at its first rising, kindling with brighter light and intenser heat with regular progress, till every thing that comes under its path lies scorched, withered, and prostrate under its mid-day beams. Every where there is aim, progress, order. Its effects are not transient, like the eloquence in which passion predominates over reason—in which reason only so far is admitted as is necessary to communicate passion; for even passion participates in a rational soul, and must be addressed in a rational way. In Demosthenes, passion is ever but a subordinate—an auxiliary. Intellect ever predominates and rules and directs every thing. His method, consequently, is method in its true sense—ever progressive towards a definite end which is never lost sight of. While passion is not wanting—while intellect is ever fired with passion, we may still trace the progress; may even measure off the several stages. He never forgot that his judges were men; and with perfect art he allows them from time to time periods of repose from the exhaustion of strained attention. More than this, he places along his way the mile-stones which might indicate to them the fact and the degree of their progress. In this respect it would seem as if Fenelon's precepts had been at the helm of all his movements. Indeed, we cannot better illustrate the method of Demosthenes in this oration, or Fenelon's idea of a perfect plan of a discourse, than by quoting his language, and then comparing with it the actual course adopted by Demosthenes. "We ought at first," says Fenelon,* "to give a general view of our subject, and endeavor to gain the favor of the audience by a modest and insinuating introduction, and the genuine marks of candor and probity. Then we should establish those principles on which we design to argue; and in a clear, easy, sensible manner propose the principal facts, dwelling on the circumstances which we intend to make use of afterwards. From these principles and facts we must draw just consequences, and argue in such a clear and well-connected manner, that all our proofs may support each other; and so be the more easily remembered. Every step we advance, our discourse ought to grow stronger, so that the hearers may feel more and more the force of the truth; and

* Dialogue II. on Eloquence. We have followed mainly the translation of Mr. Stevenson.

then we ought to display it in such lively images and movements as are proper to excite the passions." Such is the method, in every feature enumerated, pursued by Demosthenes. We have "the modest and insinuating introduction;" the "general view of the subject," with the mode of handling it; the "facts" and "circumstances" constituting the technical "narration;" then the particular statement of the proposition with the mode of defending it, so far as it could with propriety be made, and then the argument presented in "such a clear and well-connected manner, that all the proofs support one another." What is to be particularly observed is, that these several parts of division are all indicated by the orator as he passes from one to another. Such a division, then, as this is not what Fenelon condemns. But there is something more to be remarked on the method of this oration; for we have not yet indicated its entire plan and scope. We have before said that the defence of Ctesiphon was not the main object of the oration. Were this the case, the orator would have stopped with the defence of the illegality; with the vindication of the impeached allegations in the decree that Demosthenes was worthy to receive a crown; the proof that no law prohibited his receiving it, and the defence of the time and place of the coronation. This defence occupies less than one half of the oration. When this is completed, this defence of "the illegality," to which Æschines was so anxious to confine him, he has accomplished but a small part of his design, although an indispensable part. From this point his manner and tone are wholly changed, indicating an important change in the course of his argument. Now he becomes the assailant; and now, instead of the warrior behind his shield, coolly protecting himself against the arrows of a distant enemy, we find the hot combatant in the onset and charge, bearing down his foe, able no longer to assail, but satisfied to defend, with all the force of argument and invective. Here lies the unity of this master-piece of oratory. Here is seen the perfectness of its method. All this Fenelon fully approves. Yet here is division—all that can be meant by division in a discourse. What then is that division which drew forth so severe denunciations from this able critic? If we turn to the pulpit eloquence of France, we shall see at once that it was not a division of the one subject in a discourse; but, in strict language, a division of the discourse into two or more subjects. We shall find what some at least have described as the *topical* method. Even the very first of

French preachers, worthy to be ranked among the first orators of the world, are not free from what we, perhaps presumptuously but yet, we think, supported by the authority of Fenelon, firmly believe to be a serious defect and fault. We may open a volume of their sermons almost at random for an exemplification. We will take the sermon of Massillon "for the day of the Epiphany."* His text is Matt. 2: 2, "We have seen his star in the east, and are come to worship him." His plan is thus proposed. "Let us collect these three characters indicated in our gospel, which may instruct us in all our duties in respect to the truth: truth received, truth dissembled, truth persecuted." We discover here, indeed, certain propositions finely balanced against each other, all sustaining some relation to a centre truth—three graces dancing together around a common throne. But we fail to see any vital connexion between them; any oneness of object pursued in them; any thing worthy of the name of method observed in the discussion of them. We might read or hear the discourse with deep interest. We might leave it deeply impressed. But no one thought has been fixed in our convictions. All is vague and indefinite. In fact we have three different discourses instead of one.

Perhaps no one of the French preachers has exerted a more powerful and extensive influence on the character of our preaching than Saurin. We find in him every where the same characteristic in regard to the plan of his discourses. It matters little where we open the volume. The sermon "on the little success of Christ's ministry" will fairly exemplify the character of his discourses in the particular we are considering. It is founded on Rom. 9: 21, "All day long I have stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people." He thus lays out his plan. "I design, first, to show you the unsuccessfulness of Christ's ministry as a prodigy, as an eternal opprobrium to that nation in which he exercised it. And I intend, secondly, to remove your astonishment, after I have excited it; and by making a few reflections on you, yourselves, to produce in you a conviction, yea, perhaps, a preservation of a certain uniformity of corruption, which we cannot help attributing to all places and to all times."†

* *Œuvres de Massillon*, Tom. I. p. 102. Paris Ed. 1835.

† *Sermons translated by R. Robinson*, Vol. III. p. 129. Lond. Ed. 1796.

These specimens will suffice to show how far Fenelon was justified in his criticism on French preaching. "There remains no true unity after such divisions, seeing they make two or three different discourses, which are joined into one only by an arbitrary connexion." They will, also, we think, suffice to show that what is called the topical method, in so far as it is to be distinguished from other species of method, is necessarily destructive of unity, and is unworthy, except in the loosest use of language, to receive the name of method.

We have hitherto confined ourselves, in endeavoring to show the indispensableness of unity to a perfect discourse, to the merely dialectic argument—to that which is derived from the very idea of a discourse, as being a product of art, and therefore necessarily implying a definite end, and a regular method which ever aims at one, and, also, implying unity of design in the very denomination—a discourse. But we may be met here by the objection, that names are of little account; if preaching may effect its object, as it would seem to be admitted it may, without this nice attention to the principles of art, it is idle to shackle one's self by endeavoring to observe them: it is wiser and better to leave genius to its own course, unbridled and unfettered. It would be enough to say, in answer to this, that the terms we have used denote, we believe, ideas that agree with their objects; and only so far as there is this accordance, is there any force in the argument we have presented. Hence, unless human reason is unworthy of confidence where, if any where, it is entitled to it, in the construction of language, such an argument, in its nature, is the most conclusive of all arguments. But we may take other ground. We may maintain that even genius cannot prosecute its flight so happily and so successfully in any other way; that preaching cannot, in any other way, accomplish so well its object.

Genius has its laws of working. It is but a property of the reason, and is subject to the laws of reason. It is in the highest degree absurd, to suppose that it can soar as well out of its element as in it; that it can pursue its divine work of creation as successfully against the very principles of its rational nature, as in accordence with them. When is genius successful in its work? Is it when it is aimless? What is a perfect product of genius? Is it not necessarily one that has form, regularity, design; in short, oneness in its object? But, in fact, when is the creative work of genius most happily accomplished? When,

judging from experience, does the mind invent most easily, most happily? We answer, with unhesitating confidence, never but when there is unity in its aim. It is even to this that Massillon owes his brilliant success as a pulpit orator. He aimed ever and only at the heart of his hearer. He never sought at the same time to amuse the fancy, to convince the judgment, to instruct even the intellect, as predominant or co-ordinate objects. He seized the richest and boldest images, he wielded the strongest arguments, he concentrated upon his subject the intensest light of illustration, only that he might more effectually reach the heart. He failed only in not having pursued a strict unity in thus reaching the heart. There are emotions of a mutually opposing nature in the human soul; they cannot co-exist in their most vehement exercises; and when accidentally existing at the same time, they strive each to master and exterminate the other. He, therefore, who endeavors to awaken such contrary emotions at the same time in the bosom, and excite them to their highest degrees of exercise, must necessarily fail of his object. Even where the emotions are not thus directly opposed to each other, it is not always the case that the soul will burn most deeply when the fuel is divided and fed out to different sensibilities. It is an undisputed law of the human mind, that its convictions and its passions go out farthest when but a single direction is opened to them; that its impressions are strongest and deepest when the die is single and unchanged. Thus in both ways does unity of object perfect the discourse. It facilitates invention in the speaker, and deepens impression in the hearer.

We have dwelt thus long on the nature of unity, and its necessity in a perfect discourse, because this is fundamental. For it is the condition of all life in eloquence, as well as in every thing else; and without it, there is no such thing as development possible or conceivable. Even when a speaker impresses to some degree without observing it in its strictness, there is a partial observance. In fact, in every such case, there are unities corresponding with the number of objects pursued. Each of these may have its life, and so far its impressiveness. We are ever reminded, in such case, however, of the poverty of the soil, which, instead of sending up to heaven a tall majestic tree, with its stately trunk and wide expanded branches, its exuberant foliage and perfect fruit, can produce only sorry shrub oaks, numerous it may be, but worthless. The distinct conception of

the essential unity of a discourse, as defined by the particular object in the hearer's mind, brings with it, by their necessary connexion, every other idea that enters into the discourse. It affords the only stand-point of criticism from which the excellence of a discourse can be judged.

It remains only, in order to complete our representation of the ideal of a perfect discourse, to consider this essential unity as developed, according to the nature of the germ or the subject, as conceived in the speaker's mind. Now, from the very nature of truth and its correspondence with the laws of mind, this natural development must be symmetrical. It is not more certain that the material particles which constitute any of the various crystallized substances of the earth will, if unimpeded from without, arrange themselves into the perfect form of a crystal, than that truth, brooded over and warmed into life by the contemplating intellect, will shoot forth, as in a growth, and expand itself in perfect symmetry and order. Doubtless, there is a great diversity in mental operations. Doubtless, the same truth, objectively considered, will expand itself variously in various minds. The same grain-seed would develop itself very differently in different soils. Moreover, the same proposition, as proposed from without, becomes greatly modified in the particular mind; and derives a hue from the peculiar color which constitutional temperament, habit, and the circumstances of the moment may impart. Still all mind, as the first great creation of perfect wisdom and order, the very image of its creator, in its unconstrained, unperverted workings, proceeds in accordance with the principles of order. As even, although the soil be feeble, the germ will still send forth a stalk, a head, a seed, ever proper to its kind; so the feeble intellect will develop truth in accordance with the peculiar nature of the truth, unless perverted by false taste and corrupt habits. As truth thus ever admits and demands this symmetrical development, so the mind, to be addressed, is most happily and successfully reached and impressed, when the truth is presented in this its natural symmetry and order.

The living unity of the thought which constitutes the subject of the discourse, as defined by the object, must, moreover, if it be preserved, maintain its own peculiar characteristics throughout the development. The oak develops itself ever under one general law. It impresses its own nobility not only on the trunk, the bark, the boughs, but also on the foliage and bloom.

In every part you detect the peculiar properties of the oak. It is not more unnatural for the peach to ripen on the bough of a sycamore, or the rich bloom of the magnolia to unfold itself on the chestnut, than warm appeals to the passions to be scattered along the path of cold narration or philosophical exposition; for the branches to unite themselves to the trunk by the twigs and leaves, than argumentative inference and explanatory remark to follow urgent exhortation. The mind is subject to its own laws in all its operations, and stubbornly resists every effort to move it in contradiction to those laws. Truth that is unfolded discordantly with these laws cannot meet with a ready entrance. Persuasion cannot thus be made to precede conviction; nor excitement of the feelings, intellectual apprehension. The mind refuses to believe before it understands, and to be turned off from the warm sunny regions of the fancy or of the feelings to the icy sterility of pure argumentation. It equally refuses, when it would feel strongly, or think clearly and vigorously, to put itself at the beck of mere caprice, and follow the motions of an *ignis fatuus*. Not only is it repugnant to taste, but hostile to intellectual apprehension and conviction, as well as to strong feeling and decision, to mingle species with genus, and genus with species; to blend together in the same discourse heterogeneous views, even although they may have some coherence with the general subject; to make oaks, in short, spring from corn seed, or twig and leaf from the root or trunk instead of from the bough and branch.

Every living germ, finally, seeks *complete* and *perfect* development. Nature, unobstructed from without, never stops short of what is perfect in its kind. One-sided developments, truncated, or dismembered shapes, prove that her work has been interfered with.

It is the undertaking of perfect art, to give nature a free and full development, unimpeded by any foreign force. It can never deem its work completed, until the development be carried forward in all its parts, to the suspending of the last leaf and the coloring of the last flower.

Such is the conception of a perfect work of art in eloquence; a single germ of thought germinated in a congenial soil, expanded in natural symmetry, unity of character to completeness in every limb, leaf, and fibre.

Our discussion has been so far extended, that we shall forego obviating some objections that may be raised to the view we

have presented. We entertain a firm conviction that the view presented is founded in truth ; and that, if we have succeeded in giving a proper representation of it as it lies in our own mind, it will commend itself to the convictions of others. If it be correct, it certainly is of the highest importance to the pulpit orator that he thoroughly possess himself of this idea of a perfect discourse. Not only will it enable him to render each particular effort more effective on the minds of his hearers, but it will also enable him to secure a richer variety to his preaching ; for every particular discourse will have its own particular mode of development. It will likewise, as we have had occasion to remark, contribute greatly to fertility of invention, and not less to the culture of taste ; for every new effort in composition will afford a fresh occasion for the exercise of taste. It will, moreover, save him from that fatal mental condition into which the regular pastor, who, Sabbath after Sabbath, for years and years of a laborious life, must come before his people with the prepared word of exhortation and instruction, is so liable to fall : the habit of regarding the preparation for the pulpit a mere drudgery—as mechanical a thing as the treading of the furrow by the ploughman, calling for no effort of creative power, and consequently giving no spring or life to any mental faculty.

ARTICLE IV.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN IN HIS SPIRITUAL RELATIONS.

By SAMUEL ADAMS, M. D., Professor of Chemistry and Natural History, Illinois College.

Und was die innere Stimme spricht,
Das täuscht die hoffende Seele nicht.

SCHILLER.

Introduction.

ALL sentient beings are subject to wants. That is, they are so constituted as to render the attainment of certain ends necessary to their very existence. Each animal is gifted with certain powers of activity, and subjected to certain instinctive desires or vital appetences. To find a sphere for the exertion of its powers,—to attain the objects of its desires, is a necessity of its

being. When all its powers find their appropriate sphere of action, and its sentient nature meets the objects towards which it aspires, *then* it is that the animal may be said to *live* and *enjoy*. To fail of either of these ends involves imperfection, disorder, decay, or death. No animal is a fit representative of his species, which is not allowed to move in the sphere assigned to it by its Creator. That is not the *real eagle* that is trained up within the confines of a cage. If you would see the royal bird in all the sublimity and perfection of his nature, you must view him with giant wing sporting upon the dark bosom of the storm, and listen to his wild scream, shrilling above the roar of the tempest. The *real lion* is not reared within the limits of bars and grates. You may see him now crouching beneath the dark jungles of the East, and now darting with terrific fury upon the huge boar of the forest.

Thus it will be seen that every animal is organized for a peculiar destiny. To reach that destiny is its good, but to fail of that object is to lose the great end of its existence. Happily, however, the countless millions of living beings that inhabit our earth are not doomed to this disappointment. Sentient nature, as it is displayed around us, exhibits one vast system of harmonious relations. We see, on the one hand, every variety of active powers, each moving in a sphere of delightful activity; on the other, every appetite and desire enjoying in full fruition all its objects of gratification. The eye is adapted to the light, and to receive through it the impressions of the pleasing variety of form and color of the objects and scenes around us. The wing finds delightful exertion in cleaving the buoyant air,—the webbed foot and fin in gliding through the liquid wave. No want is unsupplied; no desire unsatisfied. Each sentient existence awakes to the enjoyment of its season of delightful activity, and finds every longing satisfied, till at length it gently sinks to its last repose on the kindly bosom of nature.

These are no speculations of a vain philosophy, but the sober deductions of an enlightened reason. It is a principle of universal belief, that there is somewhere in nature a supply for every want, a scope for the free exercise of every living power; and this conviction is confirmed by the observation and experience of all time. Some may be disposed to maintain that there exists an exception to this principle in the history and present condition of the human race. We admit the existence of an *apparent* exception here; and it is one object of this discussion to

set aside this apparent exception, and to show that all the wants of human nature have been provided for, and that man is placed within the reach of a satisfactory good.

All will admit the truth of the principle above stated, in its application to the inferior animals. The known adaptations of the animal organs and instincts to each other and to external nature, form the basis of a most interesting class of deductions from geological phenomena. On this principle, a skillful naturalist is able to deduce from a single bone of an unknown animal the forms and connexions of the other parts, as well as the instincts and habits of the animal to which it belonged. The illustrious Cuvier, by a profound study of natural history, arrived at such a knowledge of the great principles of harmony and adaptation which run through the anatomical structure of animals, that he was able to construct from single bones models of entire skeletons of extinct species; and subsequent discoveries of whole skeletons proved that he had not mistaken the plan of the great Architect of nature. From the organic remains found imbedded in the crust of the earth, geologists have inferred the forms, sizes, habits, and instincts of its primeval inhabitants. Thus they are able to calculate, with some degree of certainty, the states in which our globe has existed in past periods of time, as well as the changes that have swept over its surface during the lapse of ages. The argument runs thus: "This bone belongs to a skeleton, whose joints admit of a certain range and variety of motions. These motions must have been performed by a corresponding muscular apparatus, and connected with a peculiar organization of the great central organs of life, and of all those parts of the body subservient to them. Such an organization must have destined the animal to a given mode of life, and imposed upon it peculiar instincts and habits. At the time when this animal existed, the earth must have afforded it scope for the exercise of its powers of activity, and yielded it the means of satisfying the cravings of its nature. That is, the earth must have been in a given state at the period when this animal lived.

Thus it may be seen how the human mind, starting from so small a hint as a single bone of an extinct animal, presumes to trace back the path of Providence through the lapse of unknown ages, through changes and revolutions too vast for the conception of finite intellects. At first view, the mind is startled at the boldness of such gigantic conclusions from premises apparently

so insignificant. But admit that natural history is a *science*—that it is a principle of this science that all the races of animated existences are provided with an ample sphere of activity and enjoyment; and the conclusion is bound to the premises with the very chain of destiny itself. Deny this principle, and you not only invalidate the above deductions from geological phenomena, but you sweep away the foundations of the science of natural history itself. Science is but the expression of the permanent relations and adjustments of nature. But if this principle is not true, there is nothing permanent in the relations of sentient beings. Deny this principle, and the golden chain of being is broken. The boasted harmony and order of nature become wild discord and inextricable confusion. All the generations of past ages, together with existing races, are but the abortions of chance, without meaning in the system of nature, without definite character or fixed relations. Indeed, if this principle be denied, the supposed organic remains found imbedded in the crust of the earth, are no longer any evidence even of the *existence* of ancient species of animals, now extinct; much less of a former condition of the surface of the earth corresponding to their natures. We might as well adopt the views of some of the earlier opposers of geological speculations, and contend that these supposed bones and shells of animals are only the accidental forms which matter assumed at its original formation; if, indeed, absolute and universal skepticism were not a more rational conclusion from such premises. This principle, then, must stand, or we must cease to talk of the order of nature—the harmonious adjustments and consentient relations of universal being.

We have dwelt with some detail upon the above illustration, because we wish to present clearly to the mind of the reader the principle which it involves, and because we intend, on this principle, to argue from the nature of man to his relations and destiny, from his moral powers and spiritual wants to his spiritual relations. It may, however, seem superfluous to expend so much labor upon this point, inasmuch as the universal application of the principle at which it aims is admitted, even by those who are most skeptical in matters of religion. Nay, the skeptic himself has eagerly appealed to this very principle, when he has imagined that it would arm him with a weapon of attack against the divine authority of the Bible. In this way an attempt has been made to invalidate the Mosaic account of the

creation. From the organic remains imbedded in the crust of the earth, it has been argued, that the history of our globe goes back to an antiquity far more remote, than the period fixed in the book of Genesis. We shall not stop to clear up this difficulty, but will simply remark, that this argument derives its main support from this very principle, for which we are contending; viz. that nature supplies to all the races of animated existences a sphere for the exertion of their powers, and objects to satisfy their wants. The principle is true. We grant to the skeptic its full benefit, and all the conclusions *logically* deduced from it. We claim the advantage of the same principle in investigating the spiritual relations and destiny of man.

Before entering upon the main subject, it is desirable to remove a prejudice which may exist in the minds of some, against the principle which we have attempted to illustrate, growing out of the scene of disorder presented by the human race. Admit that man is a moral being, and we have a solution of the moral disorder in which the race is involved, without invalidating the principle which runs through all the inferior ranks of sentient existence. That a moral being, like man, should for a long time fail to reap the good, that lies along the path of his existence, is no proof that a satisfying good nowhere exists for him. The *possibility* of going wrong is a necessary element in the relations of a moral being. The possibility of attaining a satisfying good is not only a necessary element in the relations of a moral being, but a *claim* of all animated existence upon the bounteous goodness of nature. The lower animals are chained, as it were, to their destiny by the force of impelling and regulating instincts. They have only physical wants to be provided for. Man is gifted with the powers of reason and deliberate choice. He has intellectual and moral, as well as physical wants. Man may fail to attain a satisfying portion by preferring the transient to the permanent, the present to the future, the lower to the higher good. With the brute there is no conflict between the momentary and the enduring, the present and the future. With him there is no lower, no higher good. The present is to him fraught with an overflowing fullness of enjoyment, and the future is secured to him without his care or concern. He has no intellectual and moral cravings—no conscience to rebuke his entire abandonment to the allurements of sense and the gratifications of the moment.

If it be admitted, then, that man does sometimes or frequently

fail of a satisfying good, his condition is still reconciled to the harmony of nature; if it is also admitted that a real good exists for him, and is attainable in the struggle of moral probation to which he is called, especially is this true, if we consider that his very feeling of want and desolation is a providential means of detaching him from the pursuit of unsatisfying objects, and of leading him to the fountains of true happiness. There is, therefore, no reason to blame the moral government that is over us, so long as man is conscious of his errors and failures, and a voice within prompts him to aspire towards the true good of his being, and to struggle on to its attainment.

We come, next, to inquire, What are the spontaneous movements and aspirations of the human mind? What are the inherent powers and instinctive wants of human nature? These questions being answered, we are led with unerring certainty to the existence of corresponding exterior relations, an appropriate sphere of action, and satisfying objects. If it be not so, man is an absurdity in the system of nature. The existence of such an absurdity cannot be admitted, unless it be absolutely demonstrated, that the objects which can satisfy the wants of human nature, do not lie within the reach of the human faculties.

As this inquiry is to be conducted purely upon the principles which are admitted in the investigations of Natural History, it might be supposed that the Bible should be excluded from the discussion. But there is one aspect, in which it may be viewed in this inquiry without violating the principles which we have prescribed to ourselves. The Bible, so far as it relates to superior powers and intelligences and man's relations to them, can, as we apprehend, be consistently viewed in only one of two aspects. It must be received as a revelation from heaven to man, or as a record of human thought and feeling—as the expression of the mind of God, or as showing the workings of the human mind with regard to its supposed unseen relations. In this latter aspect, we will consent to view the Bible in this discussion. It is not necessary for the purposes of this argument to claim for it even historical accuracy, much less divine inspiration. We will consent to view it, where the skeptic places it, on the same level with the pagan mythologies. We hope, however, in the course of this discussion, to be able by logical argument, to raise it from that degradation to the high elevation which it occupies in the mind of the true believer.

In investigating the wants and tendencies of human nature, we shall endeavor to penetrate into the secret chambers of consciousness, and elicit her testimony on the subject ; not by rack and torture, but by calm questionings and patient and silent waiting for her deliberate answers. As far as the limits which we have prescribed to ourselves will permit, we shall endeavor to trace the windings of human thought and feeling on the page of the historian, in the song of the poet, in the harangue of the orator, in the mazes of mythology, and in the sacred books of the Hebrew and the Christian. We shall endeavor to catch the still small voice of humanity amid the rage and din of fanaticism, and to distinguish the pure gushings of religious emotion amidst the muddy waters of superstition. We shall not be very particular to inquire what have been the *musings* of theological dreamers, or what the *theories* of cold speculatists, who would endeavor, by square and rule, to frame a system of the universe suited to the scale of their own narrow views. But the question is, How does the common mind *feel* amidst the great spectacle of nature ? How does the great soul of humanity respond to the impression made upon it by the universe in which it moves ?

The Reality of Spiritual Existences.

In attempting to investigate the wants and tendencies of human nature, the mind is at once struck with the uniformity with which man, in all ages, has pushed his hopes and his fears beyond the visible and the finite, and has sought for objects to satisfy the longings of his soul, for a sphere for the exercise of his powers, in the mysterious unseen and future. In other words, man has ever recognized the unsatisfactory nature of a mere world of sense, and has sought relief for the unsatisfied aspirations of his nature, in his *belief* in an unseen world of spiritual existences. The mind is not satisfied with merely being able to imagine such a world and such beings. It must *believe* in them, and live in reference to them, in order to feel that it lives worthily. Upon this belief, and acting with reference to it, rest the true happiness, the real dignity of man. This last point might be substantiated by an extensive appeal to facts. But the reader's own observation and experience will bear ample testimony to its truth. Is there, then, no spiritual world ? Are there no higher existences than man ? Is there no nobler destiny for

him than to pine through life with unsatisfied longings, and then to rot in everlasting forgetfulness? Is the vital food of the soul a lie?—a lie, too, which, if its real nature were discovered, would prove its death poison? Does a tolerably comfortable existence in this life, depend upon the mind's being able to impose upon itself all sorts of mockeries and delusions? Or have we here, in analogy with the whole range of animated existence beside, the instincts of nature aspiring toward their real objects, toward the true destiny of man? This must be admitted, or Natural History is no longer a science.

Thus the existence of the spiritual instincts of human nature, proves the existence of the spiritual objects toward which they move. To determine the direction and scope of these instincts, is to determine the nature of the spiritual world to which man stands related, the character of those spiritual beings to whom he is allied, and his relations to them. This is the task upon which we now enter.

The Being of a God.

Man finds himself in the midst of powers over which he exercises no control. He is borne along by a current, which he can neither curb nor direct. In other words, man is compelled to feel that he is a dependent being;—the sport of chance,—a prey to malignant powers,—or the child of rational, omnipotent Beneficence. The latter conviction is that alone in which the mind can rest and feel satisfied. The existence of an omnipotent, benevolent Deity, is a want of the human soul. Hence, at the first sober glance at this subject, the idea of a God rises in awful sublimity before the mind, as the *one thought* which has ruled the destinies of mankind from the earliest records of fabulous antiquity down to the present moment. If our design were limited to the demonstration of the existence of a God we might stop here, and rest our argument upon an appeal to the universal conviction and feelings of the human race. We might show, that the only rational account of these convictions is found in the admission of the Divine Existence. But we propose to give the Natural History of the idea and belief of a God; to trace them from their first dawning in the infant mind to their full splendor in the maturity of reason, to show that the mind is so constituted that in the midst of the great spectacle of the universe it necessarily finds a God.

What then is the origin and history of this idea and belief? The first step towards answering this question consists of an analysis of the idea. Our true notions of a Deity consist not in the conception of any sensible form, though this may incidentally arise in most minds in connexion with the name of God. The idea of a God and the belief in his existence, recognize the attribute of infinite power, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc., as embodied in the nature and character of an invisible being. How then does this idea spring up in the mind? The idea must have a foundation for its existence in nature, otherwise it could not exist. This foundation must consist of the phenomena of the world without and the world within conspiring together to engender the idea. A belief in a corresponding reality is forced upon the mind, together with the idea. This will appear evident if we consider, that the idea of a God is made up of elements, which have arisen in the mind in its converse with the world; and that these elementary ideas have been forced upon the mind, together with a belief in their corresponding realities. It is impossible for the ideas of power, wisdom, or goodness, ever to arise in the mind apart from the belief that power, wisdom, and goodness, are realities. The reality, therefore, of the divine attributes is forced upon our belief. But the embodying of these attributes into a person, that is, the forming of an idea of God, must have a foundation in nature. What, then, is this foundation? Is it to be found in the wayward sports of a truant fancy, or in the combining power of the mind, under the strong direction of impelling principles, which will not let it rest short of the idea of a God and belief in his existence? The universality of the idea and the belief does not countenance the notion that they spring from the caprices of a prurient fancy. We are left then to the conclusion, that the idea of a God and belief in his existence are the results of the action of the mind amid the circumstances of this world. The attributes of Deity are forced upon the mind as realities. The mind is impelled by its very constitution to combine these attributes into the idea of a God, and to repose its faith on that idea, as the representative of a reality. Hence, it follows, that the *idea* of a God, and *belief* in his existence, rest upon the same foundation; viz. the spontaneous workings of the human mind amid the spectacle of the universe. It is, moreover, proper to remark, that some, if not all of the attributes specified above, are *personal* attributes, and cannot be conceived of apart from a

person. Hence the reality of the attribute necessarily carries along with it the reality of the person to whom it belongs.

But we come to inquire a little more specifically into the origin in the human mind of the idea of a God and belief of his existence. Observe, that we are not inquiring how the being of a God may be demonstrated, but how the human mind in the process of its unfolding actually arrives at those convictions on the subject which it carries through life.

Some have endeavored to trace the origin of the idea of a God to our feeling of dependence: which feeling, as they suppose, has stimulated the mind to create for itself, in the notion of Deity, an object on which it may repose its own weakness with trustful reliance. Our feeling of dependence, it may be remarked, recognizes the fact, that we have an interest in a power above us, which is not subject to our control. This feeling rather proves, that we already have some idea of Deity, than constitutes the medium through which we arrive at the idea. Indeed, this feeling is the basis of Cousin's *à priori* argument for the being of a God. But the expression may be changed; and it may be alleged, that our feeling of *want* originates the idea of a God. Hunger never originated the idea of food. It *does*, however, constitute that state of the physical sensibilities, which renders food necessary to animal enjoyment and health. Food is first recognized as such, when it actually satisfies hunger. The conscious wants of the human soul constitute that state of the moral sensibilities, which renders the recognized existence of an omnipotent, benevolent Deity necessary to spiritual enjoyment and health. But mere want is blind. The mind must seek beyond itself for the objects which can satisfy its desires. Man can never find in the sterile waste of his own unsatisfied longings the objects toward which the soul aspires. Hence the mind can never arrive at a recognition of Deity, unless a God is made known in nature, or by direct revelation. The constitutional wants and appetences of the mind may lead to the recognition of a Deity, when one is presented to it by impressions from without upon the inner consciousness of the soul.

Again, it has been supposed that the idea of a God originates in a process of *à posteriori* reasoning. It is true that the *existence* of a God may be proved by such a process of reasoning. But let it be remembered, that this process of reasoning must always start with the *idea* of a God. Hence the *idea* must have

had some other origin. What other origin can it have, than the spontaneous, intuitive, or instinctive recognition of Deity through nature? This we believe to be the origin of the idea; and shall now proceed to offer some proof of the truth of this hypothesis.

The mind, we say then, is not obliged to go through the argument from effect to cause, from design to a designer, in order to arrive at the idea of a God. The mind *feels*, if we may so express ourselves, the presence and operation of the divine attributes in the midst of the grand and moving spectacles of nature. There is not a phenomenon in nature, which is capable of exciting an emotion of beauty, grandeur, or sublimity, that does not breathe with the divine presence, and dispose the mind as it were to worship.

On this point, let the appeal be made to consciousness.

* * * * "When lightning fires
The arch of heaven, and thunders rock the ground;
When furious whirlwinds rend the howling air,
And Ocean, groaning from his lowest bed,
Heaves his tempestuous billows to the skies,"

is it the mere flitting and dancing of images across the retina of the eye, or the striking of the aerial undulations upon the organ of hearing, that rouses the mind to the loftiest emotion of sublimity, or is it the spiritual recognition of vast power, not residing in nature, but above nature, and controlling its course? When nature presents herself in her more gentle and winning aspects, it is not the simple distribution of light and shade that chains the soul in silent, sweet admiration, as it contemplates, but the conscious presence of the *spirit of beauty* pervading and harmonizing the scene. But this point will be better illustrated by bringing forward a few examples familiar to the experience of all.

Go forth and bury yourself in the bosom of the lonely forest, or skirt along its borders, in one of those rare moments of the hushed silence of nature, which frequently precedes the most frightful storms of thunder. Not a sound breaks upon the solemn stillness. Not a breath of air is in motion. "Not a leaf has leave to stir." Look and listen. There is no motion, but it is not the stillness of death. There is no audible sound. Yet listen again. Silence itself has found a voice, which seems to steal upon the ear, as it were a tone from the spirit-land, awak-

ening in the soul responsive echoes, undying longings and aspirations. In scenes like this, the soul does not feel itself alone. It recognizes a living presence and power in the scene, before which it stands in silent adoration. This thought is beautifully expressed in the following sublimest passage ever written by Lord Byron, descriptive of a night scene near Geneva Lake :

“ All heaven and earth are still, though not in sleep,
But breathless as we grow, when feeling most,
And silent as we stand in thoughts too deep :—
All heaven and earth are still. From the high host
Of stars, to the lulled lake and mountain coast,
All is concentrated in a life intense,
Where not a beam, nor air, nor leaf is lost,
But hath a part of being and a sense
Of that, which is of all Creator and defence !”

These are the genuine breathings of a poetic soul, giving utterance to the deep responses of the inner spirit to the spirit of nature. Such, in some degree, are the feelings of every uncorrupted child of nature, when holding communion with her in her deep solitudes.

“ Then stirs the *feeling infinite*, so felt
In solitude, where we are *least alone*.”

But let us contemplate the same scene, as its “concentrated life intense” awakes into perceptible voice and action. Hark !

“ There seems a floating whisper on the hill.”

List yet again, and feel your soul pervaded with the deep voice of the night-wind, as with booming swell and solemn cadence it breathes through the dark forest. Is it a slight tremor of the tympanum of the ear, or the recognition of a living, spiritual presence, which fills the soul with such unutterable sublimity on an occasion like this ? Go forth on some calm sunny morning, when the stern visage and rough voice of winter are just giving place to the kindly greetings of spring. As your mind

“ drinks at every pore
The spirit of the season,”

nature will seem pervaded with the spirit of beneficence, and to respond in gentle sympathy to your own grateful emotions. You will feel that

“ There is a blessing in the air
That seems a sense of joy to yield
To the bare trees, and mountains bare,
And grass in the green field.”

Go, stand upon the trembling verge of the mighty cataract of Niagara, and contemplate it in all its mingled elements of sublimity and beauty,—its deep, awful plunge,—its robe of glittering spray,—its rainbow diadem,—its “voice of many waters”—and you will feel that you are in the presence—nay, within the grasp of a power that is the pervading, ruling, and harmonizing spirit of the scene.

It is not to be supposed that this appeal to the inner consciousness will be appreciated by those in whom the frosts of selfishness

“Have frozen the genial current of the soul,”

and severed the continuity of their existence, cutting them off from sympathy with those emotions which this appeal is designed to recall. And yet, if the cold worldling could only live again in the memory of childhood, he too would know what it is to sympathize with the unseen power that rules in nature. He too could say,

“There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream,
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.”

Childhood is the period when sympathy with nature is the quickest and freshest,—when the light of the Invisible beams purest upon the soul. Said a child six years old, on starting for a place of worship one pleasant Sabbath morning, “It seems as if the wind knew that it was Sabbath day, and that that is why it blows so gently.” Childhood is the birth-time of sublime thoughts, which reason in its mature strength can never improve.

It is not claimed that the mind, in its converse with nature, is always impressed with a distinct notion of Deity. It is, however, maintained, that communion with nature gives rise to those impressions and awakens those feelings, which are essential elements in the idea of a God, and necessarily grow up into such an idea very early in the history of the mind. The mind may *feel* the presence of Deity in nature, without forming a distinct notion of an objective reality corresponding to the feeling.

2. That such is the feeling of the mind in its intercourse with nature we argue, in the second place, from the existence in all languages of the rhetorical figure of personification. The philosophic rhetorician supposes this figure of speech to have origi-

nated in the mind's fondness for life and animated beings, in preference to inanimate objects. But a mere *fondness* for conscious life can never produce the feeling of its presence in the world around us. Mere fondness for a thing does not impel us to call other things by its name, unless there be something in the latter calculated to suggest the former to the mind. Fondness for life cannot induce the mind to invest inanimate objects with life, if there be not in the objects themselves that which awakens a *feeling* of the presence of conscious life. Grant that the mind *feels* a living presence in all those objects and scenes which deeply interest its emotions, and we have a rational basis for the figure of personification. The language of personification gives utterance to this feeling, and is prompted by it. This figure of speech, however, would be the barest absurdity, and would excite disgust, rather than pleasure, did not the mind spontaneously invest with conscious life the things personified. Is this feeling a pleasant delusion merely, or the response of the spirit of man to the all-pervading, living Spirit of the universe?

Dr. Blair supposes that the heathen divinities may have originated in "that impression of life which is made upon us by the more magnificent and striking objects of nature." True it is, that, in polytheistic nations, every object and every scene capable of exciting the emotions has its ruling deity. The ardent-minded Greek had placed every mountain, island, and stream, under the protection of some guardian divinity. He could listen to the voice of the deity of the waters in the dull roar of the ocean, and hear the chanting of the wood-nymphs in the sigh of the midnight gale. Polytheism seems to be the bringing out into distinct conceptions those feelings and impressions which are dimly shadowed forth in personification.

3. In the third place, it may be argued, that the mind naturally finds for itself a Deity in its converse with nature, from the expressions of poets and orators on the subject, and the universal response of the human mind to those expressions. The passage already quoted from Byron is strongly illustrative of this point. And how much more sublime the idea there presented, of an omnipresent Deity, the Creator and defence of all, than any conception of him merely as the God of the storm, though we view him riding upon the whirlwind over Alpine heights, his red right hand armed with the lightnings of heaven, while in his train

"far along
From peak to peak the rattling crags among
Leaps the live thunder."

The mind views Deity here in but one aspect, and is agitated, but not filled—thrilled, but not satisfied. God, in all the majesty and sublimity of his attributes, is not in the "great and strong wind, though it rend the mountains, and break in pieces the rocks. Neither is he in the earthquake nor in the fire." But he speaks to the soul in a "still small voice" drawn from the harmonies of nature.

The following passage from Byron recognizes the fact which we are endeavoring to illustrate:

"There is a pleasure in the pathless woods,
There is a rapture in the lonely shore,
There is society where none intrudes
By the deep sea, and music in its roar."

Yes, there is *society*. The mind does not feel alone in the midst of scenes like these. A living, spiritual presence meets the true poet, wherever he walks the fields of nature. And whenever and wherever he gives utterance to the feelings thus inspired, millions of hearts respond, and throb in unison to the strain.

None will suspect Byron of too strong a religious bias to be trusted on this point. Much less is Shelley liable to this suspicion. And yet poor Shelley, atheist as he was, could not but cling to the fond *feeling* (we do not say *belief*) that his destiny was ruled by an omnipresent being, who could respond to his ardent aspirations, and sympathize with his struggles and trials. The personification which runs through his "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" is without meaning, unless it be interpreted as the outflow of such a feeling. In the first lines of that production, we have this remarkable expression:

"The awful shadow of some unseen power
Floats, though unseen, among us."

Here, as frequently elsewhere, he does homage to the God whom he denies, while he gives utterance to those feelings and aspirations of the human heart, which are only satisfied in the realization of an omnipotent, omnipresent, sympathizing Deity.

All the poets that deserve the name, both ancient and modern, might be successfully appealed to on this point. But we have preferred to limit our references to a few of the most

unpromising cases, leaving it to be inferred that, if these sustain our views, our point is gained.

The ancient dramatic poets and the ancient orators, those masters of the human heart, never failed, on all suitable occasions, to appeal to the universal belief in a Deity. They might not themselves theoretically believe in the existence of a God. But they knew what would move their hearers. The skeptic will certainly allow us to appeal to the writings of the Hebrew bards and seers, as expressions of human thought and feeling with regard to a God. It is unnecessary to quote from the Bible on this point. It is full of Deity, and if not a revelation from God, it is at least a revelation of the undying aspirations of the human soul after a supposed divinity, to which it may cling and be satisfied. It is at least a revelation of what is in man, and what will satisfy the cravings of his nature.

We are now prepared to state a little more specifically our view of the origin of the idea of a God, and the belief in his existence. The mind is so constituted, that when it is in harmony with itself it is in harmony with external nature. In our intercourse with nature, we spontaneously recognize in it unfathomable wisdom and unwearied beneficence. The idea and belief of an all-embracing benevolence seems to rise in the mind of childhood, in view of the milder aspects of nature, as spontaneously as the maternal smile awakens a responsive emotion in the bosom of infancy. These manifestations of power, wisdom, and benevolence, are perceived, or rather *felt*, to harmonize together in the system of nature, and are instinctively attributed to a living, conscious being, who is believed to rule the universe. Thus a God is distinctly recognized.

This recognition of a God seems to be a *feeling* rather than a *belief*, an *intuition* rather than a *demonstrative conviction*. The belief in the existence of a God is therefore inevitable. Even atheists unconsciously recognize the existence of a God, as may be shown by a philosophical analysis of their writings. Does it then require a process of argumentation to prove that a God exists? The design of a demonstration is to bring the mind to a necessary unalterable conviction. Such a necessary unalterable conviction of the existence of a God arises spontaneously in the mind of every rational being. Here then we rest. The existence of a God is bound up in our own existence and that of external nature. We need no arguments to prove it, and skepticism cannot invalidate the conviction. Skepticism

may indeed bewilder the mind by confusing the language in which we unfold and express our ideas of Deity. Yet even atheism itself recognizes the existence of an overruling, omnipotent, omniscient benevolence, in its personifications of Nature, Destiny, and the "Divine Laws of human nature." We may be said, therefore, to have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of a God.

We have foreseen an objection, which will be likely to arise in the minds of some of our readers, to the view which we have taken of the origin of the idea of a God. It may be alleged that this view is imperfect, inasmuch as it leaves out of the question the influence of tradition, the force of custom, the power of education, in giving currency to these very ideas, which we have attempted to derive from the pure instincts of human nature. A traditionary belief in the existence of a God is admitted, then, to exist. How did the ideas embodied in the tradition originate? They must have originated in an especial revelation, or in the manner we have described. But those who urge this objection are the same that deny the existence of an especial revelation. This denial being admitted, we must account for the original rise of the tradition in the manner in which we have attempted to account for the origin of the belief in a God, in each individual mind. If then the idea of a God must, on the skeptic's own principles, have first originated in the manner we have attempted to unfold, may it not, in the case of each individual, spring up in the same way? Indeed, it is inconceivable how God *could* reveal himself in any other way than the one which we have endeavored to trace. "No man hath seen God at any time." All that can be known of him are the attributes which he may choose to disclose to the human mind. The name of God is only a general term for all that we know of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and the other divine attributes as belonging to an invisible being. Without such a display of the divine attributes, all language designed to reveal a God would be unintelligible. When the child first begins to lisp the oft repeated inquiry, "Who made?"—and receives for answer, "God"—that mysterious word conveys to his mind no new revelation; but only supplies him with a name by which he may designate and personify the power, wisdom, and goodness, which already fill his little soul with wonder and reverence. The name may be useful in enabling the child to acquire a consistent notion

of Deity, by assisting him to generalize, systematize, and reduce to unity the successive revelations of nature. But, apart from the display of the divine attributes in the works and providence of God, language could never reveal him to man. No more can a miracle reveal a God, if nature be silent on the subject. A miracle can be nothing more than an extraordinary manifestation of the same attributes, which find a more appropriate and harmonious expression in the undisturbed order of nature. The parent in endeavoring to impress the idea of a God upon the mind of his child is forced continually to appeal to the manifestation of Deity in nature. If the mind were not so constituted as to receive the idea of a Supreme Being from nature, it is impossible to conceive how language could be so framed as to suggest it. The mind must, in a certain sense, be brought into the attitude of worship in order to be prepared to comprehend the language of a verbal revelation of Deity.—“Whom ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you—the God that made the heavens and the earth.” It must be admitted, then, that the universal recognition of a Supreme Being by the human race, is the spontaneous growth of human nature, warmed into life, unfolded, and matured, by the radiance of truth beaming in upon the soul from the vast universe in which it moves. It is the response of the *divine* in man to the *divine* in nature.

If we have succeeded in proving that man intuitively recognizes the existence of a Supreme Being, no further proof of that existence is needed. That intuitive recognition is the last point to which every argument for the existence of a God aims to bring the mind. It may not be inappropriate, however, to apply to this case, by way of analogy, the principle which we have deduced from Natural History. We say, then, there exist objects to supply every want of every sentient being. Man is a dependent being. His nature demands a God, whom he may adore, and in whom he may repose with confidence and trust. Nature reveals such a Being. Therefore, a God must exist as a correlate to the wants, aspirations, and convictions of the human mind.

At this point an interesting inquiry naturally arises, with regard to the testimony of human nature on the subject of Pantheism. Do the wants of the human soul demand a Universe-God—the God of the pantheist—or a personal, conscious, sympathizing Deity? It is sufficient to remark, here, that the structure of all languages, the universal prevalence of the rhetorical

figure of personification, the language of Polytheism, the universal cravings of human sympathy, all testify that a living personal Deity alone can satisfy the wants of human nature. Even the Pantheist, in his frequent application of personification to Deity, shows that his *feelings* are with the rest of mankind, though at variance with his intellect. Pantheism is the offspring of philosophical refinement, and not the genuine expression of the spontaneous convictions of the human mind. "For a very long time," says Coleridge,* "I could not reconcile personality with infinity; and my *head* was with Spinoza, though my *whole heart* remained with Paul and John." So it is. However the *head* may become bewildered by delusive theories, the *heart* ever clings to a conscious, sympathizing Deity. The *head* may be allured into the swamps of error, by the ignes fatui of false philosophy that dance along their slimy surface, but vice alone can turn away the heart from the pole-star of its affection, and seduce it from its attachment to the idea of a living, personal God. But vice even cannot efface such an idea from the mind, though it may clothe it with terror, and thus create a motive to seek refuge in Pantheism or Atheism.

Thus we have endeavored to show that the belief in a God is necessary as a harmonizing principle of the human mind,—that the soul can only rest satisfied in the recognition of a living, personal Deity. We have attempted to sketch the manner in which the mind actually arrives at the recognition of a God, not by an *à posteriori* process of reasoning, but by the involuntary response of the reason of man to the display of the divine attributes in nature and providence. This mode of recognition constantly presents Deity in an attitude to claim our adoration, a state of mind in which we rest from our questionings with regard to the divine nature, and an obtrusive curiosity is awed into silence before that majesty which it cannot fully comprehend. The common *à posteriori* argument, on the contrary, is necessarily microscopic, and for the time narrows our view from the general to particulars, and presents Deity before the mind rather as a skilful workman, than as the "high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." The maker of the eye, the artificer of the ear, the mere architect, may excite our *admiration*, but the omnipotent, all-sustaining, all-harmonizing Spirit alone can claim our *worship*. A mind that truly worships and adores

* *Biographia Literaria*, chap. x.

is not liable to puzzle itself in search of the *last link* in the chain of causation, or to lose itself in the mazes of an infinite series. It is not in tracing minute and delicate mechanical adjustments, that the mind is disposed to that reverential awe in which all inquiries with regard to Deity should end, but in contemplating the divine attributes as displayed on a scale of inconceivable vastness and magnificence.

Having shown that the recognition of the existence of a Supreme Being is one of the primary intuitions of reason, it follows that the existence cannot be denied without unsettling the foundations of all belief, and plunging the mind into the gulf of universal skepticism. Admitting, then, the existence of a God, the order of nature becomes but the expression of his will. He it is who has adjusted the relations of all sentient beings. He has endowed the animal creation with instincts and capacities, which bind each individual species to its appropriate sphere of life. He has subjected sentient beings to wants; and his bounteous goodness is pledged to supply those wants. This is the great law of God's providence toward the beings which he has created: "Thou openest thine hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing." Whatever real wants, therefore, of human nature may be proved to exist, we may consider the divine goodness pledged for their supply.

In the subsequent course of this discussion, we shall consider the moral condition of the human race, the wants and aspirations of the soul, the hopes and the fears which alternately illumine and darken its prospects; and from these data we shall attempt to derive a solution of the relations and destiny of man. This course of inquiry will lead us to investigate the question of an especial revelation. In this investigation we hope to place the Bible upon the sure foundation of faith, on which it rests in the minds of all true Christians.

ARTICLE V.

EXTREMES OF CREDULITY AND SKEPTICISM IN HISTORY.

By E. D. SANBORN, Professor of the Latin Language and Literature, Dartmouth College, N. H.

EARLY historians believed too much. They seldom knew a doubt. Tradition was to them a god, whose oracles it was their duty to record with reverence. It was their privilege to seek the response, not to question its truth. They recorded, with unhesitating confidence, both what they *saw* and what they *heard*. They could not discredit the evidence of their own senses, and they saw no reason why they should question what others asserted. This credulity resulted from their artless simplicity of character and from a superstitious veneration for the marvels of an early age. In modern times historians are passing to the extreme of unbelief. They question every thing old. In their view the antiquity of a writer is presumptive evidence against him. If he comes from a region of darkness he is, of course, incompetent to testify in a court of modern illumination. Living upon the confines of a fabulous age, he must himself partake of its characteristics. Not only do the records of antiquity become fables, poems, or myths, in the hands of these erudite critics, but the writers themselves are converted into allegories or poetical creations. Philosophers are always prone to believe too little or too much. They must differ from other men, else they gain no celebrity. Pride of opinion or love of novelty often gives birth to new theories and new systems of philosophy and criticism. An opinion would not excite attention unless it were *new* or *extravagant*. With some men *doubting* is a proof of *wisdom*. If a man with great gravity affects to dissent from the multitude, he is at once presumed to have good reasons for so doing. He is admired for his independence and revered for the deep mystery which shrouds his speculations. "What one can see and cannot see over," says a distinguished writer, "is as good as infinite." But few individuals have the time or ability to seek out the sources of historic truth for themselves. They must receive the declarations of others on trust. It is an easy matter, therefore, for a man of profound

learning to disturb the fountains of human belief. Thus a few leading minds will sometimes give direction to the popular faith of the age. Hence we have revolutions in history and philosophy as well as in politics. Epochs of doubt and confidence alternate. In some ages it is fashionable to believe, and historic faith becomes a common characteristic of the times; in others it is equally fashionable to doubt, and men by general consent become skeptical. There is also an obvious and intimate connexion between religious and historic faith. When men begin to doubt they lose their reverence for things sacred. The Bible becomes, to the doubting critic of ancient history, only a collection of myths, legends, and allegories. When once the human mind swings from its moorings and abandons the only true chart of human belief, it is tossed "by every wind of doctrine" upon the shoreless sea of infidelity. Human passions are ever ready to lead the popular will when the restraints of education and religion are removed. It was so at the Reformation, when the human mind broke the shackles of ignorance and superstition and asserted its independence; it was so on the restoration of Charles II. to his throne, after the checks which Puritanism had laid upon licentiousness and skepticism were removed; it was so in France after the death of Louis XIV. "This monarch, in his old age," says Macaulay, "became religious, and determined that his subjects should be religious too—shrugged his shoulders and knitted his brows if he observed, at his levee or near his dinner-table, any gentleman who neglected the duties enjoined by the church, and rewarded piety with blue ribands, invitations to Marli, governments, pensions, and regiments. Forthwith Versailles became, in every thing but dress, a convent. The pulpits and confessionals were surrounded by swords and embroidery; the marshals of France were much in prayer; and there was hardly one among the dukes and peers who did not carry good little books in his pocket, fast during Lent, and communicate at Easter. Madame de Maintenon, who had a great share in the blessed work, boasted that devotion had become quite the fashion. A fashion, indeed, it was, and like a fashion it passed away. No sooner had the old king been carried to St. Denis than the whole court unmasked; every man hastened to indemnify himself, by the excess of licentiousness and impudence, for years of mortification. The same persons who, a few months before, with meek voices and demure looks, had consulted divines about the state of their souls, now

surrounded the midnight table, where, amidst the bounding of champagne corks, a drunken prince, enthroned between Dubois and Madame de Parabère, hiccupped out atheistical arguments and obscene jests." Similar scenes were enacted in England during the reign of Charles II. They had their origin in similar causes. Baxter, speaking of that period, says, "The impieties and shameless debaucheries of the court spread through all orders of society. Drunkenness and impiety were the honored badges of loyalty. Not only seriousness, but even temperance and chastity were signs of nonconformity and prognostics of rebellion; and the nation, in spite of God's judgments, seemed ripening for the doom of Sodom." If the opinions of a particular age are so intimately connected with the morals and prosperity of the people, it becomes the duty of the philanthropist and patriot to regulate public opinion, if possible, and prevent excesses. Misbelief is as bad as unbelief, and hypocrisy is worse than either. The hypocritical courtiers of Louis XIV. added to their secret crimes the guilt of open deception. In our own times men are exceedingly fond of *new opinions*. There is a tendency in the public mind to entertain them. But few men now "stand in the ways and ask for the old paths." In history, philosophy, politics, and religion, men are disposed to "heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears." The united testimony of ages weighs not against the bold speculations of the hour. Reason is deified, while History and Revelation are dishonored. The human mind seems now to be near the aphelion of its revolution. It has wandered from the true source of light into the cold and cheerless regions of doubt. In history it is better to believe *too much* than *too little*—to believe every thing rather than nothing. I have said that the early historians were credulous. This credulity is certainly more lovely than skepticism. They were unsuspecting; they had not learned that critical art which plucks the grave-clothes from the buried past, and leaves it an object of universal disgust and abhorrence. They venerated even the incredible wonders of hoary antiquity. From early traditions they selected their materials without discrimination, and, giving loose rein to fancy, they drew beautiful pictures of living men and society, marked with all the playfulness and simplicity of childhood. Such were the historians who preceded Herodotus, whose works are now lost. They were the connecting links between fable and history, between poetry and prose. Their works possessed the

characteristics of both. Herodotus is supposed to have been indebted to them for some portions of his own delightful narrative. Though he is the acknowledged "father of history," yet he is the child of a poetic age. He wears his swaddling-clothes even in the meridian of life. He ever loves the marvels of childhood. "He reminds us," says an eminent critic, "of a delightful child. His animation, his simple-hearted tenderness, his wonderful talent for description and dialogue, and the pure, sweet flow of his language, place him at the head of narrators. There is a grace beyond the reach of affectation in his awkwardness, a malice in his innocence, an intelligence in his nonsense, an insinuating eloquence in his lisp. We know of no writer who makes such an interest for himself and his book in the heart of the reader. He has written an incomparable book." If we consider the strange medley of materials from which he derived his information; the character of the age, and the people for whom he wrote, we shall rather admire the *truthfulness* of his history than carp at its *blemishes*. He wrote for a people lively, fickle, inquisitive, and fond of novelty. He adapted his history to the wants of his age, and very fortunately chose a style of narrative so true to nature, so artless, and pleasing, that it is suited to any age or people. To be sure he has not rejected all the marvels of the hoary past. The infancy of society abounded in wild adventure, in hercic exploits, and fabled monsters. Tradition exaggerated the deeds of the fathers, and poetry flung her veil of many hues about them. It was impossible for the most acute mind to separate truth from falsehood. Herodotus, the child of a new epoch, looking with filial reverence upon all that was old, did not desire to do it. He looked upon men as they lived and moved about him. He listened to their narratives and recorded them; he consulted the records and traditions of earlier days, and wrote down the responses they uttered. He recorded many things which to us seem improbable and unnatural. To him they undoubtedly wore the aspect of truth. They accorded with the common faith of those for whom he wrote. They corresponded with the general current of traditions which had come down from early times. While he recorded these pleasing fables, he believed. His contemporaries were equally confiding. He seemed to them to speak under the guidance and inspiration of the Muses. They honored him as the herald of their nation's glory. It does not appear that they questioned any of his "specious wonders." By bring-

ing the hoarded treasures of the world's history to the Greeks he became their benefactor, and as such they loved and honored him. At a subsequent period men began to doubt and to censure. Strabo accuses him of recording trifles and corrupting history with incredible tales. Plutarch accuses him of malicious misrepresentations respecting his countrymen, the Bæotians; but such censures were soon forgotten; the authors of them were regarded as *prejudiced* critics, and their voice was drowned in the acclamations of praise which confiding ages raised to the memory of "the father of history." The same is substantially true of Livy, the most illustrious of Roman historians. His authority was little questioned till a comparatively recent age. While the Romish church bore undisputed sway throughout Christendom, historical faith was as sound and unvarying as religious faith. Men who could credit the saintly legends and pretended miracles of monkish biography were prepared to believe the less marvellous stories of Greek and Roman history. Historical criticism was unknown. For some time after the revival of literature in Europe so extravagant was the admiration—I might say, perhaps, *veneration*—of scholars for the learning of antiquity, that no one thought of questioning the credibility of an ancient historian any more than the authority of the church. Ancient authors ruled the *understandings*, the church the *consciences*, of men. Had any reckless critic presumed to question the infallibility of either, the attempt would have been regarded as an act of atrocious presumption. The object of compilers was to combine what was written into one whole, notwithstanding discrepancies and contradictions, and to yield an unhesitating faith to all its integral parts though they virtually neutralized each other. Hence, in the circle of ancient history, every thing was *believed* and nothing *certainly known*. Fable was not distinguished from fact, nor truth from falsehood. Credulity, however, declined as the Reformation advanced. When the right of private judgment began to be advocated, and to some extent acknowledged in religion, it was also boldly maintained in history. Men passed suddenly from the extreme of mental dependence to mental freedom, and they soon became as ready to doubt and disbelieve as they were before to trust and obey. The Jesuits also contributed not a little to the general skepticism by their attacks upon the fidelity and correctness of existing records. This arose in part from their hostility to other religious orders, particularly the Benedictines, who were much

employed in chronicling the history of the dark ages. The Jesuits examined with critical acumen their numerous productions, exposed their errors and puerile inventions, and in this way aided in destroying the public confidence in all written records. However, they meant it not so: they intended to promote their own private plans and the advancement of the church. But the weapons they put into the hands of the people for the destruction of their personal enemies were soon turned against themselves. They summoned a spirit to their aid which would not down at their bidding. The most reckless of these innovators was the Jesuit, Hardouin, born in 1646, whose literary career is very aptly described in the following epitaph, written by Jacob Vernet of Geneva:—

Hic jacet hominum paradoxotatos,
Orbis literati portentum,
Venerandæ antiquitatis cultor et depredator,
Docte febricitans,
Somnia et inaudita commenta vigilans edidit,
Scepticism pie egit,
Credulitate puer,
Audacia juvenis,
Deliriis senex.

He maintained the extraordinary paradox that most of the Greek and Roman classics were spurious productions of the thirteenth century. He excepted the works of Cicero and Pliny with some portions of the works ascribed to Horace and Virgil. He attempts to prove the spuriousness of the *Æneid* with arguments so ingenious as to shake the faith of the unlearned and afford a very agreeable recreation to the scholar. He maintains that Horace and Virgil are allegorical writers, representing Christianity and its founders under assumed names. These acute and learned speculations may afford a salutary admonition to those who are disposed to yield an unhesitating confidence to more recent sophists. When a sober contemporary reproached Hardouin for his devotion to absurd hypotheses, he answered suddenly, "Do you suppose, my good friend, that I rise every morning, both in summer and winter, to write common-place remarks?" This love of notoriety may be one of the secret sources of many of the paradoxical theories and systems of more recent times. The Germans have been most active in breaking up the old foundations of popular belief and destroying the confi-

dence of men in the truth of all past history.* Every ancient author is subjected to the fiery ordeal of philosophic criticism. All writers both sacred and profane are treated with the same severity. Not content with guarding the entrance to the temple of truth, they have entered her inmost sanctuary and demolished many an idol which pious hands had set up. Some of these historical reformers fall appropriately under the appellation of *destructives*. In their esteem, the world has been one vast theatre of literary delusion. What is denominated history is a base fabrication. Writers have conspired to cheat posterity by false records. History must be re-written and made what it ought to be, and what it would have been had it not been composed by quacks and impostors. Their appropriate motto would be :

“Of old things all are over old,
Of new things none are new enough ;
We'll show them, we can help to frame
A world of other stuff.”

In the absence of all written records, these “rapt seers” pour forth improvisatory effusions concerning the past, and, by a species of *ex post facto* inspiration, form a poetic history of forgotten eras. Like the student of comparative anatomy, who is enabled from the existence of a single bone to describe the form, size, and habits of the animal, these reproducers of ancient records, from the existence of a few poetic fragments, are enabled to restore the lost history of a people. When old writers are submitted to their examination, they can decide intuitively upon their credibility. When authorities clash, their merits are weighed, and their respective claims are decided by judicial sentence. The rejected author is thereby presumed to be annihilated. When old writers doubt, they dogmatize. Thus by their inventions, dijudications, dogmatisms, and alterations, they create a new history, and from their oracular records the world learns what it ought to have been, and what, according to philosophic criticism, it *probably* has been. During the last century, England gave birth to one of these literary reformers. John Richardson

* Menzel speaking of the historical skepticism of the Germans says: “What they did not understand they denied away. The celebrated historical skepticism which was brought into fashion by Schlözer, Rühls, and others, went so far as to reject as stupid fable every thing which did not appear rational and natural to their comprehension.”

prefixed to a dictionary of Persian, Arabic, and English, an elaborate dissertation upon Persian history, in which he attempts to prove the utter falsity of all that Herodotus has written respecting that nation. The history of the war between Persia and Greece is, in his view, a work of pure fancy. No such war ever occurred. This is evident to him from a comparison of the existing histories of Persia, written by natives, with the fictions of Herodotus. In the former, we find no Cyrus, no Cræsus, no Cambyses, nor any of the numerous monarchs and heroes that figure in the romance of the "father of history." "Not a vestige," says he, "is to be discovered of the famous battles of Marathon, Plataea, Thermopylae, Salamis, and Mycale; nor of that prodigious force of Xerxes, led out of the Persian empire to overwhelm the states of Greece." In fine, the whole history of the Persian wars is a fable from beginning to end, because the Persians themselves know of no such events. He goes into a labored argument to show that they must have been familiar with these wars, had they ever occurred, from the fact that they are exceedingly careful in preserving all existing records and perpetuating traditions. But one fact, which is essential to the right decision of this question, this veracious critic forgot to mention. It is said that all Persian history was carefully destroyed by the Arabs when they overran that country, and that whatever history they now possess has been written since the eighth century. Moreover, the frequent changes that have taken place in the government and inhabitants of that country since the days of Herodotus, must have disturbed the current of tradition so as to render this a very uncertain test of truth. Such special pleading respecting an old writer is exceedingly unfair, if not disingenuous. The authority of Herodotus has been often attacked, but never destroyed. Indeed, it seems now in the ascendant. The recent discoveries in Egypt, from the interpretation of the hieroglyphics, have given new and undoubted confirmation to his history of that country. An accurate comparison of the works of Wilkinson and Rosellini* with the account Herodotus has given of the

* The researches of archæologists also prove that the "Homeric poems" described real men and manners. "Professor Rosellini said that he looked upon Homer as the most correct of historians, and that it was the tombs of Egypt which had taught him to think so." *Tour to the Sepulchres of Etruria*, p. 358.

manners and customs of the Egyptians, will show that he has fewer errors by far, than modern English travellers who describe American manners and customs, and that he is far less prejudiced and envious. It is true he is sometimes mistaken and sometimes imposed upon by artful men. Sometimes he is led from motives of vanity or patriotism to exalt his countrymen and their deeds above their real deserts. It is possible that the power of Xerxes and the number of his army may have been exaggerated for the same reason. It is possible that Mount Athos was never cut through to make a passage for his ships, or the Hellespont bridged for the convenience of his army: Still neither of these exploits is incredible, and it is impossible, at this late day, for critics to determine what was or was not done by the Persian monarch. The fact that no traces of the canal through the mountain are now visible, is no proof that the work was not executed. We might as well deny that the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea, because none of Pharaoh's chariot wheels are found upon its bottom or shores. It cannot be supposed that Herodotus, living so near the time of the events he describes, could fill his narrative with gross fictions and palm them upon an intelligent people for truth. The Persian war must have been a reality, however much the circumstances attending it may have been embellished by the poetic fancy, the vanity, or patriotism of the historian. When these modern critics leave the field of authentic history and pass into the domains of tradition and poetry, their contests become more fierce and protracted. Their zeal increases as the importance of their subjects diminishes. Homer has been made, by different commentators, every thing, any thing, and nothing, by turns. The Greeks disputed about the true import of the religious machinery of his poems, but they did not presume to question the existence of the poet or the facts he recorded. In the age of Herodotus, full credence was given to the theology of Homer. He is supposed, by that historian, to have given form and consistency to the popular belief respecting the gods. At a subsequent period, when atheists began to scoff at the creations of the poets, and to blaspheme the great gods because they were but deified men, the hierophants of heathen worship were obliged to give the narratives of Homer a moral or physical interpretation. They gave the poetic theology a symbolic meaning, and the inhabitants of Olympus were converted into elements, as fire, air, water, etc., or into moral virtues or attributes. After

the priests came the philosophers, who attempted to turn these poetic fictions into allegories. Anaxagoras found in the mythology of Homer a perfect system of ethics. Heraclides Ponticus made of the same fables a system of physics; Proclus regarded them as a collection of physical, ethical, and spiritual allegories. Other philosophers rejected them entirely, as mere creations of the poet, derogatory to the dignity and purity of celestial beings. On this account Plato excludes Homer from his ideal republic. He thinks that his exposure of the frailties of the inhabitants of Olympus, would give the youth low and unworthy ideas of the gods. In more recent times, men have turned from *the fables to the facts*. Learned treatises have been written, not only to show that Troy and the war of Troy are fictions, but that "the blind old bard," who for ages was thought to have sung of these sublime themes, *never had a being*. Jacob Bryant and Le Bossu, with an array of erudition and authorities which might frighten an ordinary scholar from the field, have attempted to prove that the whole story of the Trojan war is a fable, without the least support from facts. Learned treatises have been written by Mr. Wakefield, Mr. Dallaway, and M. Chevalier, in reply. A second Trojan war has been waged, prosecuted, and *ended*. The sound of the contest has extended to the very ends of the earth. The heroes have been covered with "no inglorious dust," and the matter which caused the dispute, has been left *precisely as it was*. The plains of Ilium have not been identified, and yet men still cling to the notion, that "Troy was." In speaking of this controversy, Dr. Good remarks: "When a man of erudition once entertains an opinion different from that of the world at large, it is curious to observe, with what facility he can muster up the whole phalanx of his learning, in demonstration of the fancy for which he means to contend." Nothing could be more appropriate than this criticism to the learned Doctor's own favorite "fancy," in defending the character and doctrines of Epicurus. This he has done at large in his edition of Lucretius, and his "Book of Nature." In the 17th century, an eminent English scholar, Joshua Barnes, published an edition of Homer; and, as an appropriate accompaniment, a long English poem, in which he ascribes the Iliad and Odyssey to the pen of Solomon, with a view, it has been suspected, to induce his wife to assist the more willingly in defraying the expense of the publication." *The identity of Homer and Solomon*, is argued from

the similarity of the letters composing the two names. Homeros read backwards is Soremo ; exchanging r for l, we have Solemo, which, by a slight creative effort of the imagination, becomes Solomon. Here we have the author's name in disguise prefixed to the poem. Whether this was a mere *ruse*, to impose upon the credulity of his wife, who admired both the wisdom of Solomon and the learning of her husband, or the result of sober conviction, we cannot tell. But it is affirmed that a similar hypothesis has been recently propounded, with all sincerity and earnestness, by the Rev. John Williams, Archdeacon of Cardigan, England. He regards the Iliad and Odyssey as translations of Jewish works written by Moses. Agamemnon is made the representative of Joshua ; Helen, of Rahab ; Nestor, of Abraham ; and Penelope, of Sarah. All the characters of Homer find their prototypes in the Pentateuch. Although the whole range of universal history does not furnish two nations so completely dissimilar as the Hebrews and Greeks, yet this scholar and divine attempts to draw a perfect parallel between them. Certainly, he must have confirmed his faith by the celebrated apothegm of one of the early fathers of the church : "Credo quia impossibile est." In proving the existence or non-existence of Homer, different theorists have referred to the significance of his name, for very different purposes. At one time it is an *epithet* descriptive of the man. "*Ομηρος*, in some connexions, means "blind ;" hence the name of the poet : in other connexions, it means "joined together," or perhaps one who joins together ; hence, "a compiler" or collector. In this sense it is used to prove the *non-existence of the poet*, though it might have been the appellation of a man. At another time, as we have seen above, it has been spelled backwards, like a wizard's incantation, to evoke some mighty spirit from the shades. If such interpretation of names be allowed, any absurdity may be proved. Shakspeare may have been only a skilful joust~~er~~ at the tournament, whose chief glory it was to brandish the spear. The name of the Hebrew lawgiver may be made the symbol of the Nile's fertility, or the representative of an Egyptian deity ; for both the slime which fertilizes their soil, and the crocodile which they worshipped, might, with the utmost propriety, be said to be "drawn out of the water." Occasionally we meet with a critic of a confiding temper, who uses such absurd illustrations and etymologies, as the Catholic priests do their pious frauds, to promote a good cause. They enter the

lists as the champions of orthodox opinions. They intend to support truth. Regarding divine revelation as the source of all truth, they seek to find all history as well as theology in the Bible. Every tradition, name, and fable, of the heathen world must be traced to its source. They are all mere corruptions or perversions of genuine truths and real names. With them, Noah and his descendants seem not only to have been lords of the land, but to have taken undisputed possession of the empire of fancy and fiction. Jacob Bryant is the great hierophant of this school of critics. The ark is made the centre and source of all the mythologies of the old world. The vocabularies of oriental and occidental nations, were enriched by numerous terms relating to the ark and the persons preserved in it. Noah and his sons are made the prototypes of all the most important deities of the whole idolatrous world. Noah was regarded as a god, and the ark as a goddess, the common parent of all things. Hence, says this sagacious critic, originated the fable of Venus rising from the flood; hence she acquired the name of *Διμήτηρ*, or, according to the Chaldeans, Da-Mater, "the Mother" of gods and men; hence, again, the worship of Isis and Osiris, and the ceremony among the Egyptians of the mystic enshrinement of the latter, a mere personification of Noah, in an ark or vessel, which was carried in solemn procession through the streets, amid the adorations of the multitude; hence, too, the Xuth or Zuth of the Babylonians, and the Dagon of the Canaanites, were represented with the body of a man and the tail of a fish. The form of the ark was also revered. Every crescent-shaped object was sacred. Hence the worship of the moon, of cows and bulls, from the crescent curvature of their horns. The element also, on which the ark floated, became an object of worship. Hence, the worship of the Nile and Ganges, and the river-gods of Greece and Rome. In a word, this critic can find the ark any where he chooses. The same is true of Noah and his sons. The Greek word, *Navs*, the proper name "Da-Naus," and the Latin *Navis*, is but the name of the patriarch misspelled. The existence of one or two letters in the name of a place or a god, in common with one of the names of the survivors of the deluge, is sufficient to determine its etymological descent, and prove its legitimate origin. If the name of a particular god do not correspond with that of the deified restorer of our race, the true relationship may be discovered in his offices. "Noah, among the Chaldeans,

passes under the appellation of Thoth, Theut, or Theuth; or, as written by Herodotus, Xuth. Hence, Theut, or Tuisto, is a father or progenitor in old German to the present day; hence, the Taautus of Phœnicia, and the Tentates of the Celts. Noah, thus deified, became the chief divinity of Greece and Rome: from Theuth or Xuth, they obtained Zeus, or Jupiter; from Thoth, Theos, Dios and Deus: from Zeus, Zea, which was a title of Venus, or Aphrodite Demeter, under the character of Diana." Noah is also made the prototype of Chronos or Saturn, Prometheus, Deucalion, and many others. But it is in vain to pursue this subject further. We cannot enumerate all the wonderful discoveries of this profound critic, without copying his entire work. It is full of learning, and full of absurdities. No attempt to systematize the various mythologies of different ages and nations ever has or ever will prove successful. They cannot be traced to a single source. They are as heterogeneous and diverse as lawless fancy could make them. We might as well attempt to reduce the ravings of bedlam to a system, or extract the principles of universal grammar from the confused voices of Babel, as to seek for the golden thread of unity which will combine, in one harmonious whole, the various systems of idolatry which men, who "did not like to retain God in their knowledge," have invented. Some of these fables or myths are undoubtedly perverted truths, detached from the real history of the human race. Some of them are perhaps the distorted representatives of the truths of a primitive revelation, or of Scripture history, exaggerated by tradition, embellished by poetry, or altered by designing priests. In mythological traditions, where there are no settled principles of interpretation, and where certain knowledge is impossible, it matters little what theories are proposed, or what opinions advocated. The same questions are ever recurring, but the answers must always vary with the tastes and opinions of authors. In history it is not so. He who corrects the errors of history, is the world's benefactor; but he who disturbs these fountains of human belief, from motives of vanity, or love of learned display, commits a grievous wrong. When a distinguished scholar has re-written the history of a particular period or nation, after a careful examination of existing records and monuments, the presumption is, that he has corrected the errors of his predecessors, and presented to the world plain facts, upon which they may rely. But if he has covertly inserted his own opinions, instead of facts, or

colored by his prejudices or partisan views, what would otherwise be a plain and simple narrative, who shall arraign the critic, convict him of misrepresentation, and expose him to the public scorn? Who will dare to impugn his motives, or charge him with treason to truth? Not one in a thousand, perhaps, possesses the same means of investigation, or the accurate knowledge and habits of research, which the writer possessed. He may have devoted a whole life of labor to the work. How can one decide upon its merits, upon a cursory examination? Most men would prefer to *seem* learned and agree with the author rather than hazard their reputation by ill-timed objections. History cannot be learned without great labor. It requires extended research and profound study. It is easier to take the dicta of learned men than to attempt original investigation ourselves; for

—— “there are secrets which who knows not now
Must, ere he reach them, climb the heapy Alps
Of science; and devote seven years to toil.”

Thucydides complained that “the search after truth was considered by many people as an intolerable labor, and that, therefore, they adopted such accounts as were at hand, merely to save themselves trouble.” If a writer is reputed honest, the presumption is always in his favor. If he makes marked alterations in received traditions, and gives an entirely new account of old institutions, he is supposed to have good reasons for so doing. The public will tolerate his innovations, if his talents and research command their respect. They see no motives for his falsifying old records; of course they admit his conclusions. It becomes a grave question, therefore, how much indulgence shall be granted to learned men in these matters. They certainly are not infallible. They are not free from the common sympathies and antipathies to which other men are subject. The inference is plain. *They must be watched.* When love of novelty is the passion of the age, it will not answer to take any man's opinions on trust. Every new theory must be subjected to careful criticism; truth is not safe without it. But it will be asked, Who is competent to the task? Who will presume to speak, authoritatively, of the conclusions of Niebuhr, who devoted all the energies of his gigantic intellect, for a whole life, to history? No man can fully appreciate his emendations of the received traditions unless he resorts to the original

sources of evidence, from which he drew his materials ; and but few men possess such keen discernment, nice discrimination, and intuitive perception of historic truth as he. Not one in a thousand possesses a memory like his, and but few exhibit such enthusiasm in any pursuit. Those who have neither the time nor requisite qualifications for original investigation, must be content to judge of his work by such tests as are available to them. We have "Roman history," as it has been re-written and re-constructed by the learned critic, and we have most of the authors whose authority he has so confidently destroyed. A modicum of common sense will enable us to form a tolerably correct estimate of their respective merits. That he possessed qualifications which eminently fitted him for the work he assumed is universally admitted. The powers of his memory were almost miraculous. It is said of him, that he was enabled to restore from memory whole pages of a bank ledger, which had been injured by carelessness or fraud. He was acquainted with twenty different languages, many of them he could speak and write with ease. His history furnishes the strongest internal evidence of his eminent qualifications for historical investigation and analysis. 1. It shows *profound research*. Every page is replete with proofs of it. His reading was extensive. Every ancient author, whose works might be supposed to throw any light upon Roman manners and institutions, was consulted. Every existing monument and relic of the past was examined. Writing from Rome to a friend, he remarks: "Doubt not that I have constantly in view my most sacred vocation—my history. During all my journey, I have studied with great attention, and made numberless inquiries about the country—the various scenes, the customs, the usages, and constantly confirmed my opinion that most travellers trouble themselves little about things of the greatest importance, and see and hear little better than nothing. Terni has been to me peculiarly interesting and instructive. In this city I have found at least fifty old Roman houses unaltered. I have found the old art of the division of land still in practical operation ; the ancient mode of preparing wine, so exactly surviving, that it is quite clear to me. I would undertake fully to explain the whole mystery of Roman wines." Thus interested, excited, and devoted to his work, he could not fail to acquire the information he needed. 2. His work shows *that he possessed an extensive and minute acquaintance with the political institutions of the world.* So accu-

rate was his knowledge of European politics, that he actually predicted many of the most important political events in France and Germany before they occurred. The horrors of the French revolution did not surprise him, because he had anticipated such developments. He saw in prospect and mourned over the terrible calamities which attended Napoleon's career, long before they fell upon the nations. He exhibited equal sagacity in estimating the institutions of nations that have long since disappeared from the earth. He has revived the history of many almost forgotten tribes that inhabited Italy before the "eternal city" had a name. He has gathered all the scattered rays of tradition and history which fall upon the buried Etrurians, and has, to a considerable extent, restored their government, laws, and manners, and presented them to the reading world, as a great, powerful, and independent people. In the course of his investigations he constantly compares the municipal, senatorial, judicial, and executive functions and relations of ancient and modern governments, and points out the peculiarities and differences of each with the technical accuracy of a philosophic statesman. He lays the whole world, ancient and modern, under contribution, to furnish materials for the confirmation of his opinions. 3. His history shows *that he well understood the Roman constitution and laws*. His elucidation of the relation of patron and client; his account of the origin of the senate, the rise of the plebeians, the true character of the agrarian laws, and the progress of liberty in Rome, are, by all, admitted to be decided *improvements* upon existing records. Some of his deductions carry with them an irresistible conviction of their correctness. Our judgment at once acquits the writer of wrong doing. The qualities which we have thus far noticed, commend the historian to our esteem and confidence. Let us now inquire whether there is any thing in the character of the author, or in his work, to which we may reasonably object.

1. *In early life his mind was deeply imbued with the skeptical tendencies of his age and nation.* He says in one of his letters, "My intellectual tendency was altogether skeptical, inclined to the real and historical, eager to comprehend and to get to the bottom of every thing." He brought this spirit to the study of the Sacred Scriptures. He read them entirely in a *critical spirit*, as he would a portion of profane history. He recognized *no prophecies* in the Old Testament, and thought himself able "to explain away all the cited texts" in the New Testament.

It must be admitted, however, that he afterwards acquired a more confiding spirit, and, at least, admitted the historical value and accuracy of the Bible. But such a doubting temper is not a safe guide in estimating ancient records. When the mind loses its reverence for history, *especially for inspired history*, it is apt to become *too independent* in its judgments, and to decide capriciously upon the merits of ancient authors. Our historian never doubts his ability to decide any question respecting the past, and he seems not to expect that any one will presume to question his verdicts. Self-distrust was not a fault of his. In relation to some unfriendly reviews of his work, which appeared in Germany, he writes to a friend, "They do not touch my history; its truth and soundness will remain unshaken, though you all turn your backs upon me. If it were possible that an ancient Roman should rise from the dead, to give his testimony, he would swear to its soundness." In this spirit of self-confidence, he arraigns the ancients, one by one, before his bar, and condemns and approves just what and whom he pleases. He has no favorites, and tolerates no rivals. "He will allow no brother near the throne." He gives the *results* of his own investigations, but omits the *processes*. The reader may receive or reject them at his pleasure; but if he rejects them he must do it at the hazard of his reputation for sound judgment and enlightened criticism. He is conscious of the dignity of his mission. He looks upon himself as an agent of Providence, raised up for this very purpose. Like Mohammed, he alone is commissioned to a divine work, and he gives himself no rest till it is performed. Knowing these traits in his character, we are not surprised at the many arbitrary decisions and arrogant assumptions which disfigure his history. This leads me to another objection.

2. *His work exhibits great dogmatism.* He assumes the right of judging of the character of ancient writers without calling in witnesses. Whatever seems to him *probable* is pronounced *true*, the remainder is rejected. Can we judge, at this remote period, what might have happened in ancient Rome even before its written history commences? When early writers disagree, can we determine confidently, from internal evidence, which is right? If we may reject history because it is contradictory, because authors differ in their narratives, or because the same author is sometimes inconsistent with himself, we may as well renounce all confidence in written records at once, and depend

on learned men to reconstruct the world's true history. In receiving human testimony, slight discrepancies are thought to confirm the veracity of the witnesses. They show an absence of collusion on the part of those who testify. The judge arrives at the true state of the case, by a comparison of conflicting testimony, and not by rejecting that which contradicts his preconceived opinion. So should the critic decide. But our author treats the ancients with the utmost contempt. "It is not worth while," says he, "to speak of the rhetorician Dionysius as a critical investigating historian. *I may, at once, reject Livy as authority* for the views taken, on account of his inconsistencies and contradictions which are so frequently censured in this history." He styles Appian, "an author of very little weight; spiritless, ignorant, and superficial, to whom we should, in general, only then have recourse, when necessity impels us to gather roots and herbs to satisfy our hunger." He does not regard Tacitus as "an authority on which we can credit what is extremely improbable," though he does not tell us how it is possible to determine, with certainty, what would be considered "extremely improbable," in an age so remote, and under an order of civilization so different from our own. However much critics may have questioned the genius or doubted the talents of Tacitus, few have had the hardihood to accuse him of dishonesty; for, as Montaigne remarks, "*He was a great man, upright and bold.*" In his ability to estimate the character and weigh the motives of men, he is *unrivalled*. It is not probable that any of the ancient historians studied archæology with the zeal and critical acumen of a German antiquary. Still, considering that they lived much nearer the times which they describe than we do, and possessed sources of information which are now closed, their authority should not be lightly rejected. Niebuhr speaks also of the "weak judgment" and "scanty information" of Plutarch, as though these were commonly admitted defects of that author. "The invalidity of Plutarch's information," says Niebuhr, "is discoverable on mere examination; of which indeed the ignorance of a Greek sophist is scarcely deserving." In ordinary writers such a sweeping condemnation of respectable authorities would be regarded as the dictate of presumptuous arrogance, and even in the "learned Dane" they seem to be little better than a species of "erudite effrontery."

3. The reconstructed history of Rome shows that the author

was fond of paradoxes and violent innovations. Whatever opposes his hypothesis is pronounced *spurious*. He frequently resorts to conjectural emendations of ancient authors in order to secure their testimony. Unfavorable passages are often rejected as interpolations. If such liberties be allowed with the text of old authors, any hypothesis may be proved or disproved at pleasure. Our author frequently appeals to the etymology of words to confirm his opinions. Such evidence must be acknowledged to be very suspicious, to say the least; and so it is regarded by the critic himself, when old writers appeal to it. "Names of countries," says he, "were always formed in antiquity, as by the Germans afterward, from the name of the people; and Italia means nothing else than the land of the Itali. Nor is it to be explained, except from that unspeakable spirit of absurdity which always came over even the most sagacious Greeks and Romans the moment they meddled with etymology, how any one could stumble on the notion of interpreting that name immediately out of itself, because, in the Tyrrhenian or ancient Greek, '*italos*,' or '*itulos*,' meant an ox." Thus it seems he regards the resort to etymological evidence as a prerogative entirely his own. He uses it without compunction, whenever it accords with his purpose to do so. That portion of this modern "History of Rome," which some men most admire as the strongest proof of the critical skill and acumen of the author, is by others regarded as the greatest paradox of all. He represents the entire history of the kings as a *poem*, or at least highly *poetical*. He often speaks of "the purely epic times of the kings," and of the "poetical and unhistorical accounts" of their reigns. Some of these kings he regards as purely mythological persons, and others he admits may have had a real existence. How he could determine, with so much confidence, which of the kings were once living, substantial beings, and which mere phantoms, he does not inform us; nor has he given us any other proof of the existence of a large amount of national ballads, songs, and epics, in early Rome, whence the history of Livy was derived, than the well known fact that the infancy of every people abounds in rude poetry.

Primitive history was *oral*. The early history of all uncultivated nations is necessarily *oral*. The deeds of the fathers are transmitted by tradition. A thousand varying influences modify these simple stories of a childlike age. Among them, poetry appears to adorn and embellish the deeds of the fathers. In

this way facts are converted into fable, tradition into mythology. Some mythological narratives have a foundation in facts ; others are the creation of the poet's fancy. Such are those which relate to the actions and attributes of the gods. Historical myths, such as relate to the origin of nations, the founding of colonies, the building of cities, and the wars of the primitive inhabitants of a country, should not be rashly rejected as utterly worthless. Besides mythological narratives and historical legends, there are other important sources of early history, such as genealogical tables, pontifical annals, chronicles of royal births and deaths, and catalogues of kings. Existing monuments and inscriptions commemorative of past events, and in ruder ages, mounds of earth, heaps of stones, altars, religious rites and festivals, all furnish to the historian collateral evidence respecting the occurrence of past events and the origin of early institutions. These sources of information, with many others now unknown, were certainly open to the great writers of Roman history, even if we admit that the public records were destroyed by the Gauls three hundred and sixty years after the date ordinarily assigned for the foundation of the city. But if the war of Porsena be a mere poetic flourish, having but slight support from facts, why may we not pronounce the invasion of the Gauls, under Brennus, a myth or an epic fragment, and thus, by a stroke of the pen, save the public records of Rome ? Since the publication of Niebuhr's Roman History, it has become fashionable among scholars to talk of *the poetic character of the early Roman history*. It seems to be taken for granted that a vast amount of poetry, songs, lays, ballads, and epics existed in early Rome. Though these poems are now lost, and are admitted to have been lost in Livy's time, yet these sagacious critics know precisely what they contained, and are as familiar with their contents as though they were now lying upon their tables for reference. They can run over the pages of Livy and Dionysius, and select with the utmost confidence every "lay," "ballad," and fragment of epic poetry, which these historians carelessly incorporated with their facts. Macaulay, who has given us more genuine poetry, in his "Lays of ancient Rome," than was ever known in ancient Rome itself, remarks as follows : "The early history of Rome is indeed far more poetical than any thing else in Latin literature. The loves of the Vestal and the God of War, the cradle laid among the reeds of Tiber, the fig tree, the she wolf, the shepherd's cabin, the recognition, the

fratricide, the rape of the Sabines, the death of Tarpeia, the fall of Hostius Hostilius, the struggle of Mettius Curtius through the marsh, the women rushing with torn raiment and dishevelled hair between their fathers and their husbands, the nightly meetings of Numa and the Nymph by the well in the sacred grove, the fight of the three Romans and the three Albans, the purchase of the Sybilline books, the crime of Tullia, the simulated madness of Brutus, the ambiguous reply of the Delphian oracle to the Tarquins, the wrongs of Lucretia, the heroic actions of Horatius Cocles, of Scævola, and Clœlia, the battle of Regillus, won by the aid of Castor and Pollux, the fall of Cremera, the touching story of Coriolanus, the still more touching story of Virginia, the wild legend about the draining of the Alban lake,* the combat between Valerius Corvus and the gigantic Gaul, are among the many instances which will at once suggest themselves to every reader." It must be admitted that these events would furnish admirable themes for the poet. But the poetic character of these narratives does not prove the actors in them to have been "mere mythological personages," nor that the events themselves had no real existence. If we make suitable allowance for those blemishes and inaccuracies which are common to the best writers; ——"maculis, quas aut incuria fudit; Aut humana cavit natura;" if we take into consideration the influence of superstition and exaggerated traditions in corrupting the early history of all ancient nations, we shall rather wonder that Livy has incorporated so few incredible stories in his history, and admire its general verisimilitude, than charge him with gross negligence and unpardonable credulity and ignorance. The assertion that "the early history of Greece and Rome is deserving of no credit whatever," proves too much. Early poetry must have contained historic truth to give it currency. The fact that events were celebrated in song, does not rob them entirely of reality. The

* "There is a tunnel through the hill on which Castel Gandolfo stands, two miles in length, made by the Romans, but the architecture is Etruscan, and not unlike the Cloaca Maxima at Rome. It has never been repaired since the days of Camillus, and perfectly attained its end. It is more than one hundred feet below the ancient level of the lake; and since it was finished, the lake of Alba has never reached the sea." Tour to the Sepulchres of Etruria, p. 113. See also Livy, B. 5: 15, where this "*wild legend*" is recorded.

early history of every nation is poetic to a considerable extent. What is true of Greece and Rome is equally true of England and Germany, and, with a few unimportant exceptions, there is as much reason for asserting the fictitious character of Anglo-Saxon as of Roman history. No one supposes that the story of the miraculous birth and deification of Romulus, or the intercourse of Numa with the nymph Egeria, is true history. These incredible appendages of Roman tradition only prove the superstitious character of the age in which they originated. They do not necessarily prove that Romulus and Numa are "mere mythological personages," any more than the fictions of "the round table" prove the non-existence of Arthur, or the ten thousand fictions of the monkish chroniclers of the dark ages prove that the distinguished actors in those stirring times never existed. Niebuhr admits "that there is no rational ground for doubting the personal existence of Tullus Hostilius;" and "that the lay of Tullus Hostilius is followed by the narrative of a course of events *without any marvellous circumstances or poetic coloring.*" And what proof is there of all this but his assertion? We have the same authority for believing in the personal existence of Romulus as of Tullus Hostilius. And we have no reason for believing that the history of the one is *wholly true* and of the other *wholly false*, but the unqualified declaration of the critic. Rome certainly had a beginning, and Roman institutions were originated by some designer. The founder of Rome may, for aught we know, have been called Romulus; and since tradition uniformly asserts the existence of such a man, there is no absurdity in presuming that the city took its name from him. If we deny the truth of the formerly received traditions, we only cast ourselves upon the boundless ocean of conjecture. We have gained nothing by our skepticism. The origin of Rome and its institutions remains an everlasting enigma, whose solution must be given up to heartless skeptics and theorizing critics. It may not be improper here to ask for the evidence of the existence of a large mass of poetic productions in early Rome. The Romans were an agricultural and warlike people; they were a stately, unbending, dignified people. They were rather *practical* than speculative in their habits of thinking. They possessed little of the gracefulness and vivacity of the Greeks. They were, in general, unimaginative, and, of course, unpoetic. In the palmy days of their literature they were little more than imitators and translators of the Greeks. Even Macaulay, who

finds so much poetry, *lost poetry too*, in the early ages of Rome, finds no *original literature* in the Augustan age. "The Latin literature," says he, "consists almost exclusively of works fashioned on Greek models. The Latin metres, heroic, elegaic, lyric, and dramatic, are of Greek origin. The best Latin epic poetry is the feeble echo of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The best Latin eclogues are imitations of Theocritus. The plan of the most finished didactic poem in the Latin tongue was taken from Hesiod. The Latin tragedies are bad copies of the masterpieces of Sophocles and Euripides. The Latin comedies are free translations of Demophilus, Menander, and Apollodorus. The Latin philosophy was borrowed, without alteration, from the Portico and the Academy; and the great Latin orators constantly proposed to themselves, as patterns, the speeches of Demosthenes and Lysias." Still this same author, in accordance with the views of Niebuhr, confidently believes that this borrowing, imitating, translating, dependent people, notwithstanding their utter destitution of poetic spirit and the power of invention, once possessed numerous national ballads, lays, and songs, nay more, "a grand and complete *Epopée*, commencing with the accession of Tarquinius Priscus, and ending with the battle of Regillus." And what astonishes us still more, all these compositions were lost at a comparatively early period of Roman history. Why should they have been lost? How could they have been lost? Did the bards and writers all die? Did this love of poetry, this marvellous devotion to fiction, suddenly disappear, and leave the people a stiff, stern, unimaginative race, as we find them in the fourth and fifth centuries of their existence? Critics, who have a theory to support, tell us that "the Homeric poems," as they are now called, (since Homer is no more,) existed for centuries before the art of writing was known in Greece. They were preserved, like oral traditions, by recitation and frequent repetition. Why could not Roman epics and lays have been preserved in the same way? A mother would as soon forget her nursing child as a youthful people forget the songs that celebrate the heroic deeds of their ancestors and the origin of their race. For the first four centuries of Rome, we have no evidence of the existence of any thing like an extensive body of poetic compositions. The history of Roman literature refers us to the existence of a few rude songs, such as the hymn sung by the "*Fratres Arvales*," a college of priests instituted by Romulus, of the "*Saturnian verses*" prescribed by Nu-

ma, to be chanted by Salian priests, of the unpolished Fescennine verses, which grew out of the extempore doggerels of peasants at their "harvest homes." "There were also songs of triumph, in rude measure, which were sung by the soldiers at the ovations of their leaders." Beyond these rude attempts at poetry, there is nothing certain. The proof of the existence of "ballads," "lays," and "epics," lies chiefly in the imagination of critics. Even the first books of Livy's History, which are supposed to embody the substance of these poems, are the least interesting portions of the whole work. Either the description of the bloodless victory of the Samnites at the Candine forks, or the capture and burning of the Carthaginian camp, or Hannibal's passage of the Alps, has more graphic description, more of the genuine poetic spirit, the true "*vivida vis animi*" of the inspired bard, more real Homeric fire, than can be found in the whole history of the first four hundred years of Rome. It must be admitted that the first books of Livy furnish many delightful pictures, many poetic themes and characters, but in general the narrative is highly *prosaic*. It possesses less animation of style and fewer picturesque and striking descriptions than other portions of his history. This may be called mere assertion. But this I believe is admitted, that students are always less interested in reading the first books of Livy than in *many other* portions of the same author. The early history of Rome is, without doubt, uncertain, and, to some extent, *fabulous*. So is the history of most of the nations of the earth. We must be contented not to know some things, and to gain but an imperfect knowledge of others. To reject the history of the past, because it is in some respects contradictory or improbable, is to shut ourselves out from the benefit of the world's experience. The history of our own ancestors cannot be relied on, if we adopt such a test. An English historian, speaking of the early history of his own country, remarks, "The resemblance is very striking between the heroic age of Greece and the early Anglo-Saxon period of Britain. In both, the form of government is regal and confined to particular families, *who derived their lineage from the deities worshipped by the people*; for if the Grecian Basileus traced his pedigree up to Zeus, the Saxon king drew his down from Woden, (Odin,) the monarch of the northern heaven. The same qualities of mind and body were required in the sovereigns of both people. The king was the source of law and the administrator of justice, in Britain and in

Greece; and if in one country he was aided by a *Bulé*, or senate, composed of the nobles and chieftains of his realm, the same appearance is presented by the other in its *Witena-gemot*, or great council." What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? Whom shall we trust, ancient historians or modern critics? Both have their prejudices and partialities, and both abound in paradoxes. Is it not better to leave Roman history where Tacitus left the old German traditions, when he says, "*quæ neque confirmare argumentis, neque refellere in animo est: ex ingenio suo quisque demat, vel addat fidem*"? Or shall we yield an undoubting confidence to the bold assertions of Niebuhr? Is there no danger that men of feeble vision may be blinded by excess of light? or that timid minds may be overawed by authority? It must be remembered that we have had already two recensions of Niebuhr's Roman History, the second containing important *alterations and emendations*; and, if the writer had lived, we might have had a succession of splendid hypotheses respecting the mythic and poetic age of "the eternal city." When we read the strong affirmations and cumulative arguments of this profound scholar, we would fain yield assent to all his theory; but when we turn from the written record, "a strange suspicion haunts us that all is not right." We wonder that the whole course of Roman history should have gone wrong for hundreds, yea, thousands of years, and yet a critic in the nineteenth century, detect the grand mistake. Our understanding revolts from the supposition. We seek for the causes which have given birth to this theory. We inquire whether the spirit of the age does not harmonize with the spirit of the critic. We find that this is not a solitary instance of historic skepticism. The learned public have grown familiar with *doubt*. Every thing old is suspected. It is popular to talk of *myths, legends, lays, ballads, epics, and fables*. It is considered *scholarlike and wise* to renounce old authorities and exercise an independent judgment. Some men even doubt their own existence, and like Des Cartes attempt to prove themselves alive by logic, and though the philosopher's enthymeme, "*cogito, ergo sum*," proves their own existence, it renders nothing certain prior to their own advent upon the earth. The past history of nations must be reviewed, dissected, and reconstructed. The early his-

* *Germania*, III.

torians were children, enthusiasts, bigots. They believed every thing. They never attained to the sublime heights of Pyrrhonism. They knew nothing of the pleasures of this ethereal state. They lived in the reign of superstition and "old night." Their credulity has corrupted every page of the world's history. The early records must be expurgated or *re-written*. Livy, in the esteem of modern savans, was dreamy, poetic, and credulous. He collected old epics, absurd legends, and fabulous traditions, and gave to them the signature of truth. He lacked discrimination and research. He overlooked existing materials which lay within his reach, and chose, instead, the wild and fantastic fictions of a fabulous age. He must be rejected as *authority*, says the autocrat of modern criticism. Shall we do it? When we reflect upon the fate of this friend of our childhood, we do not thank the learned professor for this literary assassination. We love the "milky sweetness" of the good, gentle, and artless Livy. We cannot willingly consent to his death till we weigh the evidence and ask after the fate of his companions. Dionysius, Plutarch, Appian, and Tacitus have all fallen under the same condemnation. And what says "the spirit of the age" to the authority of the pleasing, story-telling Herodotus? Oh, he is a tolerable narrator of what he *saw*, but he does not know men. He dreams; he doats; he knows nothing certainly. He is loquacious, and his loquacity betrays him into folly and error;

"For who talks much, must talk in vain."

He is credulous, too; he listens and believes. He follows quacks and impostors, and writes down their shallow fabrications. He has little judgment and less acumen. He cannot distinguish an Egyptian god from a crocodile. Hieroglyphics he could not interpret. It is a wonder he had not passed the pyramids unnoticed, or mistaken lake Mœris for a frog-pond. He cannot be trusted. He falsifies his own records to please his countrymen. He multiplies the numbers and exploits of their foes, in order to magnify Grecian prowess and glory. In a word his history is mere romance. Let us turn to Homer. What says modern criticism of

"The blind old bard of Scio's rocky isle"?

What reply comes from the sacred tripod? The return is, "non est inventus." He never had a being. His very name is a lie. His honors are all fraudulently obtained. A hundred birds of

song have plucked away his borrowed plumage, and left him the object of universal scorn. This phantom has ruled on Parnassus too long. He must be cast down to the world of shades. He has deceived the nations almost as long as Apollyon. Let him now be bound for a thousand years, and we shall then have a literary millennium. But there remains one historian still more ancient, whose authority must now pass the ordeal of criticism. It is he who recorded events which occurred before Jove took his seat upon Olympus; before Neptune raised his trident in the Ægean, or Orpheus charmed the grisly monsters of Pluto's realm. It is he who wrote of themes of lofty import—of creation's birth—of man's disobedience—of a coming Saviour. What says modern criticism to his claims? Ah! he too is an impostor;—he is the child of fable; perhaps himself a mythological personage, or, at best, but the representative of a creed or system. The authority of Moses is no better than that of Herodotus or Livy. Such is the goal to which modern skepticism tends. It is in vain to deny the connexion between historic and religious doubts. They are both the offspring of the spirit of the times. They are the legitimate offspring of that widely extended system of German rationalism which retains the names and forms of religious faith, and yet denies its power and substance. A personal God is merged in a blind energy of nature, and becomes a mere *anima mundi*, or, what is still more refined, "the ever streaming immanence of the spirit in matter." The incarnation of the Son of God is but the manifestation of this universal principle in Jesus, the Jewish moralist, and *in every man*, in an endless succession. The soul's immortality is the immortality of the race; individuals die, the race never. Thus the Old Testament becomes, in the hands of historical reformers, a collection of myths, songs, and apothegms, and the evangelical history a mere allegory or fable, till, at length, the full-fledged philosopher "knows no other God than him who, in the human race, is constantly becoming man. He knows no Christ but the Jewish rabbi, who made his confession of sin to John the Baptist, and no Heaven but that which speculative philosophy reveals for our enjoyment, on the little planet we now inhabit."

ARTICLE VI.

EXPOSITION OF MATTHEW 7: 6.

By the Rev. E. BALLENTINE, Prince Edward, Virginia.

Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine: lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.

THESE words of Christ contain a practical precept—a rule of conduct for his Church. The passage is a metaphor:—its terms have therefore a literal and a metaphoric signification; and the whole has a literal meaning, which is, however, only the envelope of the higher and the true. What is the precept? what does Christ forbid his Church to do?

We will examine the terms of the text in detail, and then endeavor to elicit its meaning.

By "*that which is holy*" (τὸ ἅγιον), said of something which might be thrown to the dogs, a Jewish hearer would naturally have understood something which had been consecrated and offered to God, and which also could be eaten.* Every thing offered to God was *holy* (ἅγιον, קדוש), and he that violated the sacredness of a holy thing was by the law guilty in the sight of God.

Now, by this term, the Saviour, when addressing his disciples and his Church, must intend something which belongs to the Gospel, which is holy, and which may in some way or other be "given" and (figuratively) "cast" to men. We cannot as yet be more definite than this. If that is holy which is connected with God's name, honor, cause, worship, and will; then the Gospel itself, the Church, its doctrines and instructions, its worship and ordinances, citizenship in its community, its rights and privileges, and its eternal blessings, are all holy.

"*Pearls*" are very valuable, and therefore have always been

* I pass over without remark the interpretation *ear-ring*, as being based upon a baseless hypothesis, now acknowledged to be such. See Tholuck, *Bergpredigt*, on the text.

the symbol of that which is very costly and precious. So Job 28: 18. The Gospel with every thing that belongs to it is also *precious*. The Saviour, in Matt. 13: 45, 46, applies the term to himself and the blessings of his kingdom. As before, we must stop for the present at the general idea. We must survey all the parts of the text before we can judge in what way they are connected with each other.

The dispositions and habits of "*swine*" have made them to be always and every where the symbol of the morally polluted and vile of men.

"Dogs" are rabid animals, and may attack and tear. They were (and are) numerous in Eastern cities, roving about without masters, hungry, howling, ravenous. In this character perhaps they are figuratively introduced in that interesting passage Ps. 22: 16, 20, to represent the enemies and murderers of Christ.

But dogs, like swine, have been universally made rather *the symbol of the morally polluted and unclean*. (See Gesenius's Hebrew Lexicon, Article *כֶּלֶב*; Robinson's Lexicon of the New Testament, Art. *Kύων*; and especially Winer's Realwörterbuch, Art. *Hund*.) They were unclean by the law, were held in disgust and abhorrence, and well deserve from their dispositions and habits to be the type of the wicked and abominable. The Jewish name of foreigners, "Gentile dogs," David's calling himself "a dead dog" in reference to Saul, and Hazael's words, "Is thy servant a dog?" are illustrations of this usage.

Thus dogs and swine are used, as symbols, quite alike—and they are often united. Peter cites the proverb, "The dog has returned to his own vomit again, and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." Instances from the classics may be seen in Tholuck, *Bergpredigt*, p. 475.

Yet we must remember that both dogs and swine, especially in a half-wild state, are fierce and dangerous as well as filthy and abominable. * And their fierceness is an element of their vileness. They are fierce in their filthiness—dangerous in their abomination. To gratify their vile propensities, they will assail whatever promises gratification or stands in their way. This then is probably the very mode in which they are metaphorically employed in the text. Even in Ps. 22: 16, 20, this may be the idea.

We must endeavor now to fix as definitely as possible the moral meaning and application of these terms in the passage

under consideration. As the love and enjoyment of what is low and filthy is the point of comparison between the animals and the men in question, those who have the characteristic doubtless have also the name. If so, a large class is designated by these terms; they comprehend *all those who*, whatever may have been their past, and whatever may be their future character, *have and indulge, at present, unholy and impure propensities, and who do this with deliberate preference and headstrong purpose. Let us remember, then, that the reign of worldly, wicked, vicious propensities in the heart and life*, is the characteristic of those who are called by these names.

A few words here on the construction of the whole sentence. If, as we have seen, swine are fierce and dangerous as well as dogs, it will not be necessary to consider the passage as a case of the *ἐνάστροφος* or *ιστρέφους*, or, to use the words of Jebb, Horne, and Barnes, of the Introverted Parallelism.* In the New Testament—in prose—in a practical discourse—in a rule for conduct, we should not expect a rhetorical and poetic construction which belonged, so far at least as Matthew knew any thing of it, to the Hebrew language, and which even in that is rare in the highest kinds of prose and even in poetry. If then this construction is not necessary, if it is not absolutely certain, it is not to be adopted. But the natural construction which would refer the last two clauses to the swine is favored by the circumstances of the case. It is more than doubtful, indeed, whether the word *στροφέντες* (turning again) can be taken here as expressing the swine's method of attack. The peculiar manner of a boar in dealing a blow by a sudden side-movement is often noticed in classic writers, and is in Greek expressed by this very word (see Poli Synopsis and Tholuck's Bergpredigt on the place); but here it seems rather to express the simple idea of a turning from trampling to assailing. The circumstances to my mind in favor of the natural construction are, first, the style of composition to which the passage belongs;

* These terms indicate a construction by which the fourth clause would be connected in sense with the first, and the third with the second; as if it were written, Give not that which is holy to the dogs, lest they turn again and rend you; and cast not your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet.

secondly, that the assailing *may*, as we have seen, be as properly understood of the swine as of the dogs; and thirdly, that as the "holy thing" supposed to be thrown to the dogs is apparently something edible and relished by them, while the pearls thrown to the swine only disappoint and provoke them, we should expect the swine and not the dogs to turn and rend their tantalizers.

The only leading terms of the precept itself which remain are "give" and "cast" (δότε, βάλλετε). We shall find, I think, that the whole meaning and bearing of the passage turns upon them. We shall first mention a particular interpretation of them and examine the meaning of the passage which results from it, and then turn directly to the investigation of the import of the terms and to the search after the true sense of the text.

These words "give," "cast," have almost universally, and apparently without hesitation or reflexion, been understood in the sense of *exhibiting, making known, offering*. One meaning of the passage which results from this explanation is as follows: *There are men so wicked and depraved, that the truths and offers of the Gospel, if laid before them and urged upon their acceptance, would only provoke their contempt and excite their hostility:—therefore, out of regard to the sacredness and preciousness of the Gospel, and the safety of its preachers and friends, Christ commands that to such the Gospel is not to be presented, but that it is to be carefully protected from their observation and contact.** This is the common interpretation.

Some in ancient times went so far as to think that the whole Gospel was to be withheld from *all* unbelievers. Tholuck, in his note on the passage, quotes from an ancient book, in which a Christian, on being asked whether he is a Christian, is made to answer, Yes; but when asked what Christianity is, replies, "To say that I am a servant of Christ is my duty; but to tell you what Christianity is, is unsafe till I know who he is who asks the question, lest I be giving that which is holy to the dogs, and casting my pearls before swine." Others of the ancients imitated the heathen in making some of the *doctrines* and

* Barnes gives the meaning thus: "Do not offer your doctrine to those violent and abusive men, who would growl and curse you; nor to those peculiarly debased and profligate, who would not perceive its value, would trample it down and abuse you."

ordinances of the Gospel, as they termed them, *sacred mysteries*, a sort of freemasonry, which was not to be divulged to the world. By some moderns, the *spiritual precepts* of the Gospel have been supposed to be the holy and precious things which were not to be made known to the wicked; by others, the *spiritual meaning* of the Bible; and by others still, the doctrines of *atonement for sin* and *pardon* through Christ; i. e., the very kernel of the Gospel itself. Grotius, Vitringa, Olshausen, are among these. See Tholuck.

Now, if any one of all these interpretations expresses the meaning of the Saviour, we have here a most singular injunction. Our remarks apply directly to the interpretation first given. The others either fall with it or of themselves.

1. The Saviour has not elsewhere manifested such an anxiety to save his Gospel from reproach and contempt. Ezekiel was commanded to deliver his message to the people, "whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear." Is the Gospel message to be pressed less earnestly? Let Paul answer: "We preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks *foolishness*, but to them that are saved, Christ the wisdom of God and the power of God." They "mocked" him at Athens, yet he preached Jesus and the resurrection (Acts 17: 18, 19). Christ preached in the midst of revilers, John 7th; and the last words which the disciples were to utter, when leaving a city which rejected them, were, "Notwithstanding, be ye sure of this, that the kingdom of God is come nigh unto you." But here I am forbidden to expose the Gospel to the contempt of scoffers and blasphemers!

2. The Saviour has not elsewhere commanded his followers to be so careful of their own safety. "Lest they turn again and rend you." When he sent out his disciples to preach the Gospel, commanding them to publish it as widely as possible, and foretelling the dangers they would incur, he adds (Matt. 10: 28), "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell." And the Apostles understood and obeyed their Master. Look at Peter and John and Stephen before the Sanhedrim (Acts 4 and 6 and 7), and Paul at Lystra (Acts 14: 19), and before the enraged Jews (Acts 22). Peter and John doubtless express the true principle (Acts 4: 19, 20): "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye; for we cannot but speak the

things which we have seen and heard." The prayer of the Apostles (v. 29) was doubtless acceptable: "And now, Lord, behold their threatenings; and grant unto thy servants, that with all boldness they may speak thy word." No, Stephen did not do wrong when he preached to the maddened Sanhedrim, nor Paul when he plead so eloquently before the taunting Festus and Agrippa and the supine Felix; nor the martyrs, from these men and their companions down to the apostolic Williams, when exposing and sacrificing their lives for the Gospel's sake. But if the text has the sense now under review it would be hard to justify them.

3. Christ has not enabled nor elsewhere commanded his people and his ministers to decide who will and who will not be benefited by the Gospel. To presume to do so, is to assume a fearful responsibility. It is a judging of others which may be erroneous, and therefore wicked. See v. 1 of the chapter. How can I decide that such a one, my fellow-creature, is beyond repentance and mercy? Shall I not be liable to measure God's mercy by my severity, his grace by my indifference, his love by my prejudice or hatred, and his power by my weakness? Do I feel as Paul did (1 Tim. 1: 15, 16), that since God has had mercy on me, the worst sinners may perhaps be saved? How then can I act upon this sense of the text in reference to a particular individual?

It is in this very application of the text that its abuse consists. And the abuse of this text is the practical every-day sin of the Church and of Christians. We conceal our light—we lay aside or cover up our piety—we make no efforts for the salvation of those around us—and then we quote this text by way of making the Saviour justify us. We make our neighbors and friends and every-day associates dogs and swine, for whom the Gospel is too holy and too precious.

4. The difficulty in the way of these interpretations is increased by the fact that thousands out of the very worst and most hopeless classes of men have been hopefully converted and finally saved. And many of these cases have been the result of a blessing on the use of means. At the head of this multitude we may place that woman "who was a sinner" (Luke 7: 36-50), who, the Pharisee thought, should have been rejected by the Saviour:—then the thief on the cross—and Saul the persecutor—and, as the representative of the whole class, the prodigal son. Ancient tradition tells us of an abandoned apostate and

robber, who was sought out in the mountains, and reclaimed by the beloved disciple in his extreme old age. The conversion of the miners under Whitefield, of thousands of wicked sailors and beastly drunkards, of Hottentots, Bechwanas, Karens, and South Sea Islanders—a work, by the blessing of God, going on with new power and demonstration every day—serves to show the falsity and peril of this explanation of our passage in continually stronger light. O, how many there are now in heaven who once seemed vessels of wrath fitted for destruction! John Newton is another striking example of our remark. “God’s thoughts are not as our thoughts, neither are his ways our ways.” “He is able to do exceeding abundantly, above all that we ask or think.” The hardest case, by the Saviour’s own showing, is that of a rich man (Luke 18: 24–25): and yet salvation came to the house of the rich Zaccheus—for, says the Saviour, “The things that are impossible with men are possible with God.” May we not then at least use the means, in hope that *some* of the wicked may be saved?

5. And with these *facts* agree the general and special *commands* and *directions* given by Christ to his ministers. But before we quote these, let us look closely at the real character of the doctrine we are opposing. No one, even tolerably orthodox, would think of offering the blessing of the Gospel to any unconverted men as they are, but only on the condition of repentance: much less would he offer them to the openly wicked and profane without this condition. The only offers then which we need speak of *are all conditional*—are made to men upon the condition of repentance. Then, according to the interpretation under review, Christ in the text says that to some the offers of the Gospel are not to be made; *that is*, as we see, *even on the condition of their repenting and believing*. The meaning is, Invite them not to repentance;—Do not even say, as John did to the generation of vipers in his day, “Bring forth fruits meet for repentance, and, so flee from the wrath to come.” But does the Saviour mean to say such a thing? Let us look at what he does say: “Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature.” “What I tell you in darkness that speak ye in light, and what ye hear in the ear that preach ye upon the housetops.” “I came not to *call* the righteous, but *sinner*s to repentance.” “Go ye therefore into the highways, and as many as ye shall find bid to the marriage.” The Gospel is *tidings*—the glad tidings—the good *news*, which may not

stop till it has reached every ear. He misunderstands and violates the very genius of the Gospel who thinks that it is to be withheld from any.

All will not indeed receive the Gospel—to some it will remain “hid,” though a Paul preach it, and they will be “lost.” Yet he who faithfully presents and urges the Gospel is “to God a sweet savor of Christ, both in them that are saved and in them that perish.” The Gospel preached to many shall be only “a testimony against them.” There is danger then, every way, in refraining, lest we limit the Holy One of Israel, and be unfaithful “stewards of the *manifold grace* of God! There is infinitely more danger of stopping short of our duty than of going too far. When we see the sword coming we *must* give warning, lest the blood of souls be required at our hands. But, if there are some men so wicked that the Saviour forbids me to offer the Gospel to them, I know not how I can safely distribute Bibles and tracts among the outcasts of society, or even continue to preach the Gospel to my congregation—for, alas, some there are among my hearers who have long treated my message with contempt. Must I refrain from beseeching such to be reconciled to God, hardened as they seem to be? I know there are some ministers and Christians who thus apply this and other parts of Scripture and Scripture doctrine—some to whom all “aggressive movements” of Christian effort upon the lost of this lost world are an offence; but it is matter of joy that there are those who cherish different views and act on different principles.

Great and good men have felt the difficulties which have been mentioned. Well understanding the genius, and largely partaking of the spirit of the Gospel, they could not adopt a view which so far shut the door which Christ had opened, and restricted so fearfully their commission to preach the Gospel. Yet, taking the same general view of the text as those already noticed, they have felt it necessary to find *some place* for the prohibition—*some* men to whom it would be wrong to offer the Gospel:—that is, they agree to give the rule place, being a rule of Christ, and yet they have tried to give it as *small* a place as possible—to assign it an exceedingly narrow sphere of operation. Zuingli, Luther, Calvin, Tholuck, and Henry, agree substantially in explaining the meaning of Christ thus: “It cannot indeed be known beforehand, even of the most abandoned, that they belong to the dogs and swine in Christ’s sense of those terms; for from the depths of the most abandoned soul, the prayer, Lord, re-

member me, may be breathed, as was the case with the dying thief. *The manner in which men treat the Gospel when offered to them*, must show whether divine truths are to be *further imparted*; or whether the impenitent and hardened wretches are to be given up to judicial blindness." In illustration of such cases they refer to Matt. 10: 12-14, Acts 13: 46, Tit. 3: 10, 11.

This is far better—as it opens the door wider, and *almost* as wide as it can be opened, for offering the Gospel. But,

1. As to the cases referred to in Matthew and Acts, we must remember that the Apostles were inspired men, and specially commissioned by the Saviour to proceed as they did; and, that those thus dealt with were Jews, to many, perhaps the most of whom, the coming of "the Son" was the last offer of mercy from God, the rejection of which was the filling up of their measure of iniquity. Ministers now do not and dare not imitate the Apostles in this course. The case in Titus supports a very different interpretation of the passage—it certainly has nothing to do with the *offering* of the Gospel.

2. It seems clear to me that the Saviour in the text and these interpreters in their explanation are speaking about different things. For, first, by "dogs" and "swine" *they* mean the finally hardened, those given up of God; whereas in Bible usage, and also, we have no reason to doubt, in the text, they represent all those who are devoted to sin and vice. Second, the *reasons* given by the Saviour are not the reasons why these men would refrain from offering the Gospel even to such. Not concern for the sacredness of the Gospel or for their own safety would deter them, but the simple fact that the wretches will not hear. The Saviour's reasons have little or no pertinency to the case—the cases then and the reasons being different, the rules themselves are different.

3. The very observance of the rule thus interpreted, will not prevent but *produce* the evils against which it designs to guard us. "The manner in which men treat the Gospel *when offered to them*, must show whether it is to be *further imparted*." Says Henry, "We must not condemn any as dogs and swine *till after trial and upon full evidence*. . . . We must take heed of calling the bad desperate." So then we must go on subjecting the Gospel to continual profanation, and ourselves to repeated "rendings," until we get "full evidence" that the subjects of our efforts will *always* profane the Gospel and injure us. Then at length we must desist. But,

4. It will be impossible to apply the rule; for I have shown that from among the worst some are saved. There are brands plucked out of the fire—eleventh hour converts. Of whom, or what particular man, would such men as Tholuck and Barnes say that God has certainly given them up, and that Christ had forbidden them in the text to present the Gospel to them any more. If a man under the gallows or on his death-bed should spend his latest breath in horrid blasphemies, they might indeed be still, filled with awe and horror. But,

5. For these few and extreme cases I think I may without impropriety say, the rule is unnecessary. Without it a Christian minister would feel quite justified in maintaining silence. The irrelevancy of the Saviour's reasons to these cases is glaring.

We have then examined the rule as thus explained. We have found it to run counter to the whole tenor and spirit of the Gospel. Even in the strongest cases, and within the very narrowest possible sphere of operation, we see that it would be defective, wrong, and useless. We feel warranted in rejecting this interpretation as erroneous.*

If now, in our embarrassment, we turn to the text itself, we shall see that Christ does not speak of *showing* or *offering* the holy things and the pearls to the dogs and swine, which they are to receive *if* they lay aside their peculiar character, and become, for instance, lambs:—but he speaks of *throwing them down to them as they are*, and in such a manner that the pearls and holy things *are in their power, are in fact theirs, and are treated by them as they please, and as dogs and swine are sure to do*. There is no contemplation, in the supposed act, of a change in the animals, but the very reverse. The case supposed by the Saviour, is that of a man's throwing pearls and sacrifices to dogs and swine, *as such*. The interpretations we have been opposing, then, are not only wrong otherwise, but they cannot be derived from the text. They disagree with the metaphor in two respects. First, they make the "*giving*" to be only an "*offering*;" and second, even this *offering* contemplates a change of the character of the persons addressed, before it be carried out. Now, our Saviour's figures and illustrations are characterized by

* I have dwelt the longer on these views of the text, because they are so common, and because of the importance of the practical points which they involve.

a strictness of propriety, nay, by a *severity* of appropriateness, which have made them to be the admiration of the world. The true interpretation of the metaphor must then have these two features: First, the giving must be absolute; and second, it must be carried out and completed upon the men in question, *remaining as they are*, in their wickedness and vileness. Let us now put the words together:—"Confer not the holy and precious things of my kingdom upon unholy and vicious men"—*Make not wicked and unworthy men sharers with you in the blessings and privileges of the Gospel.*

I understand the rule as applying, *first*, to the *visible church*. *The Saviour in these words forbids his ministers and his people to receive into membership in his church those who live devoted to indulgence of their carnal and unholy appetites.* He commands not to place these among the children—not to bestow upon them the children's privileges. The church is no place for the unholy and impure.

We have, then, in the text, the criterion laid down by Christ, of fitness, or rather of unfitness, for membership in his church. We have *his rule of admission*. Every rule and principle of admission inconsistent with this is condemned. Consequently, every church organization and all church practice, which interposes no bar in fact to the reception of the worldly and the wicked, is contrary to the rule before us.

But the words of Christ have also a more extended meaning. The visible church is a type of the invisible. Its high vocation is to represent the invisible church before the world. It *ought* to represent it exactly—to be identical with it. It is frequently spoken of therefore in the Bible as actually identical with it. Professing Christians are addressed as real Christians—as filling the place, doing the duties, and having before them the blessed destiny of real Christians. "How shall we who are dead to sin live any longer therein?" "Ye are the light of the world . . . the salt of the earth." "Know ye not that ye are the temple of the living God?" "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular"—(i. e. *individually*, Robinson Lex.) There is "one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and *in you all*." The intimate connexion between the visible and the invisible church is the foundation of this kind of language. It follows, therefore, that reception into the visible church is *the type of reception into the invisible*. Nor is it merely a type. If done as Christ commands, and on proper

grounds, it is the external representation of the invisible *reality*. "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven." "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Now, in the exercise of this power of reception into the visible church, which is typical and declarative of reception into the invisible, Christ in the text forbids his people to make unholy and wicked men typically and declaratively members of the invisible church. Such practice involves the error that such men are meet for heaven, and, without a change, in fact are or may be members of the kingdom of Christ. It is therefore wrong. Then this error itself, and every form of doctrine which involves it—universalism, and antinomianism of all kinds—are condemned in the words before us.

Such we take to be the bearing and scope of the Saviour's words. But we must subject our interpretation to a rigid testing. The results of such a testing, as far as I am able to make it, are as follows:

1. This interpretation gives their natural and proper force to the figurative acts of "giving" and "casting" in the text. It was these words which in fact first suggested the explanation. On this point enough has been said already.

2. It assigns to the "dogs" and "swine" their true symbolic meaning as found in Bible usage. It makes them, namely, to represent the actually depraved and vicious. Nor does it suppose or contemplate a change in the persons thus designated before the "holy" and "precious" things are given; but their receiving and possessing them as they are, unholy and vicious still. It neither warps nor narrows down the sense of these metaphorical terms, but gives them their broad and natural application.

3. The same may be said in regard to the symbolic "holy things" and "pearls." They are made to designate, in general, those sacred and precious things, both typical and spiritual, temporal and eternal, to which none but true believers have a title, and which ultimately none but true believers shall possess. There is here no violence, no arbitrary limitation or application of the terms to some single thing.*

* It cannot with any justice be said that by this interpretation the "holy thing" and "the pearls" are in fact made to mean nothing but the Lord's Supper. That ordinance may indeed appear to the carnal eye to be the only privilege ex-

4. By this interpretation of the rule, the reasons annexed to it by the Saviour acquire a striking and peculiar force. 'Make not wicked men sharers with you in the privileges and blessings

clusively enjoyed by church members. But this is to take a very narrow view indeed of the church and a place in it. Can it be a member of the church who knows so little what is comprehended in his citizenship? But suppose that participation in the Lord's Supper be the privilege primarily intended. What does the Lord's Supper mean? and what does partaking of it mean? The actual blessings of the kingdom of Heaven, and the sharing in them. Our application of these terms, then, is not a narrow one.

I will extend this note in order to set aside another possible mistake. It might occur to some one, that if the "giving" and "casting" are rightly understood of absolute conferring, inasmuch as there is no gift conferrible by men so entirely absolute and irrevocable as imparted *knowledge*, church-membership at least necessarily yielding to it in this quality; therefore the holy things and pearls might well be interpreted of *instruction in Gospel truth*, whence a meaning of the whole would result in amount the same as that first considered. Gospel truth has certainly both sacredness and value. Besides, as Tholuck observes, p. 477, instructions and discourses and books considered specially valuable are in the East very commonly denominated pearls. See d'Herbelot's *Bibliothèque Orientale* (Paris, 1597), Articles *Loulou* and *Moroug*. Tholuck's remark might have been extended to the West—witness the quaint titles to many of the devotional works of a century or two since. But I reply that the knowledge of the Gospel cannot be intended by the "holy thing" and the "pearls" of the text for two reasons: 1. The doctrine of the text would then be, that to the wicked Gospel truth may not be imparted: a doctrine which would imply the absurdity that Christ means and expects bad men to become good before the very means of reformation which he has appointed are used. Now it is as clear as day that Christ's "words of grace" may be carried where he went, among publicans and sinners. "The whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." 2. The knowledge of Gospel truths is only the *apprehension* of them by the mind, the *understanding* of the offers made by the Gospel to men on the conditions of repentance and faith:—so that this supposed *absolute* gift of knowledge is only the perception of the offers of the Gospel after all. This explanation, therefore, resolves itself

of my kingdom :’ for (1.) *They will trample them under their feet*, and (2.) *They will turn again and rend you*.

No other words could in so short a compass so *truly* and so *fully* describe the evils of a disregard of this rule. That we may see and feel this, let us refer to history.

The rule has been almost universally disregarded by those who, for eighteen hundred years, have had the administration of the church. To a great extent the world has been let into the church in mass. Whole nations of heathen have been baptized at once without instruction. The church has been brought into unholy alliance with the state, and has received every citizen and subject as a member. Men have been *born* members of the church ; and pastors have been bound to administer to them the holiest rites, at the peril of a suit at law, and even of their offices and lives. Or, some little restraint of outward indecencies at certain seasons has been made a requisite ; or perhaps external morality. In some churches, again, some understanding of the doctrines of religion is required, for which, however, the bare repetition of the Commandments, the Creed, and perhaps the Catechism, is extensively substituted. Some seriousness of character is often required, but satisfactory evidence of piety is the acknowledged standard of admission in few churches, and in those how negligently applied ! Thus the net of the church has indeed gathered of every kind. In proportion to the laxness of principle in this respect, has been the degree in which foolish virgins have been mingled with the wise in the community of professed disciples. Have now the evils which the Saviour points out in the text been experienced, and are they now felt ?

If the foreknowledge and infallibility of the Saviour are tried by this test, the result is most decisive. Never were truer words spoken—never was prophecy more strikingly fulfilled.

into the one already rejected, and falls with it. This remark also clears up another matter. Bibles and Tracts are absolutely given—the paper and ink are absolute gifts ; but these are only the means of *presenting* and *proposing* to the mind the truths and offers of the Bible : and this, as we have proved, is abundantly commanded, but forbidden neither in this text nor any where else. There is, no doubt, a sacredness and preciousness in the volume of the Scriptures itself ; but the Saviour has not seen it necessary to give any special rules for its protection.

History offers illustrations to an indefinite extent. We shall refer to a few only.

The Roman church has, since the days of the first degeneracy, violated the rule of Christ. What a congregation of wicked men (with doubtless many good) has that communion always exhibited! Think of the mass of the Irish, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italians, as members in full communion of the Church of Christ! Does any one know of a man whose moral character is too bad for membership in that church? She who claims to be keeper of the keys of heaven itself, has not scrupled to admit into it the vilest of mankind without the least evidence of genuine repentance. She sells salvation for money! The first consequence is profanation—the worship of God has been transferred to a woman, the Lord's Supper has been half of it cut away, and the rest substituted for the "one" offering of Christ; and what was left of holy and sacred has been overrun and trodden by the polluted and profane. The second is the rending of the church—the good and pious within the pale or within reach of that communion have been regularly and systematically persecuted for centuries; inquisitorial power and art and secrecy, holding commission from Rome, have been plying their instruments of torture and of death, and thousands who feared God more than man have been butchered in cold blood. If we look at the established *Protestant* churches, all which, as a matter of course, violate the rule, we shall also see that "profanation" of the church and "rending" of its members have gone hand in hand. The systematic persecutions and oppressions of Nonconformists in England and Scotland for two hundred years, together with the worldliness and godlessness, and open, infamous vice of many of those in office and power in the church, afford, again, abundant illustration of our Saviour's words. And the late "rending" of the Scotch church finds its whole (genetic) history embodied in this oracular text.

But to come nearer home.—In those "free churches," which profess to receive members on principles in accordance with the command, we can still find, with the sin, the words of Christ as to the results of the sin amply verified. There may be found also in these churches men who, though morally blameless, give no evidence in their lives of vital piety—*worldly men*, whose "portions" and whose hearts are "in this life,"—*gay and giddy youth*, whose principle it is never to be serious—*enemies of the cross of Christ*, lovers of fashion and "conformed to the world"—

Sabbath-breakers, who cannot spare to God and their own souls one day in seven—*liars*, habitually taking the advantage of others in their business—nay, even such as are *profane* and *slaves of vice*. What are the consequences?—Why, is it not a profanation when such men, with hearts and hands defiled with sin not repented of, engage as the people of God, nay, perhaps as ministers of the Gospel, in the holy duties and the holy ordinances of religion?—when such bear the name and represent the cause and honor of Christ before the world? And “whence come wars and fightings among you?” Who, coming in “unawares,” embrace false doctrine and bring in “damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them?”—Witness the history of the New England churches for the last thirty or forty years; and the rending asunder of the churches of the Pilgrims. Whose character and life lie as an incubus upon the piety of a church? Read the history of Edwards and the Northampton church. Who are the tempters of the unstable, and stumbling-blocks to the world? And who are Achans in the camp, causing God to be displeased and Israel to fall before his enemies? The answer is plain. It is unconverted, worldly, ungodly, and vicious church-members. Could the Saviour have told more solemn truths, or found truer and stronger language than he has used here?

For these evils there is no complete antidote in this world of imperfection. The church has always suffered from them, and always will suffer. Regular discipline can reach only flagrant cases, like that mentioned Tit. 3: 10, 11. It is unwieldy, and, when the evil has obtained ascendancy, impracticable. Unconstitutional exclusion is, or ought to be, out of the question. To retire, as our Scotch brethren have done, is often the sad but only alternative for throwing off the responsibility of that which cannot be remedied.

Therefore, says the great Head and Lawgiver of the church, when about to set it up upon the Corner-Stone of Calvary, and causing his words, by being here recorded, to sound down the long line of the future generations of his people—“**GUARD THE ENTRANCE OF MY HOUSE—RECEIVE NOT THE UNHOLY AND IMPURE.**” Could command and reasons be more mutually appropriate?

We think that all the terms and all the parts of the text find, in this interpretation of it, a simple and natural signification, a pertinency and a mutual fitness which strongly support its claims as the true one.

But if this be the meaning of the text, it will have no connexion with the preceding verses. True; and the next verse will have no connexion with this, interpret as you may. Why may not v. 6 be the commencement of a new subject as well as v. 7? Neither of them has a connecting particle. Calvin and Tholuck both remark that this part of the Sermon on the Mount, is made up of miscellaneous instructions and directions. Those who suppose a connexion, and understand by the "holy thing" and "pearls" *reproofs*, slide insensibly into the interpretation *offers* before they are done.

But why has not this exposition, if in fact so simple, natural, and true, been discovered before? I answer, Henry and Scott both give it, though only incidentally and in a single sentence, while the rest of their remarks are of a different character. They appear to have seen the truth by a sort of intuition, (and this is a good proof of its correctness,) though indistinctly, and without perceiving its claims and reasons, or its inconsistency with the exposition which they make their own. Henry says, "The rule here given is applicable to the distinguishing sealing ordinances of the Gospel; which must not be prostituted to those who are openly wicked and profane, lest holy things be thereby rendered contemptible, and unholy persons be thereby hardened. It is not meet (says he) to take the children's bread and to cast it to dogs." Scott remarks that this precept has been much and grievously violated by the admission of ungodly persons into the Christian church, and the Christian ministry.* I have not met with this interpretation elsewhere, and have not the means of an extensive search. Neither Poli Synopsis nor the extended commentary of Tholuck, so often referred to, contains a hint of it; unless indeed the slight historical notice by the latter of those ancients who made *mysteries* out of the Lord's Supper be such a hint. Doubtless, however, it has been held and is held by many. But a very good and plain reason I think can be given why this text has been so long and so gen-

* This last hint of the "judicious Scott," deserves to have been made more prominent in the preceding remarks. Let me just say here, that of all the evils brought upon the church by ungodly members, by far the most awful profanations, and the most dreadful renderings have been perpetrated by ungodly ministers. But on this important part of the subject, I can now say no more.

erally misunderstood : The actual administration of the church has, in all ages, presented such a glaring violation of the precept. Individuals may have seen and may have felt the right ; but the mass have acted, and so have interpreted, differently. The true interpretation was too high and holy for actual application : another meaning was sought, and, though opposed as we have seen to the very spirit of the Gospel, was embraced, established, and stereotyped. The wrong administration and the wrong interpretation became old, venerable, and *right* together ; and thus the latter forced itself even upon the good, and has remained unquestioned even while its sister evil has by the blessing of God experienced some little check and correction. A Calvin, a Scott, and a Tholuck, may deplore the corrupt state of their respective churches, and still, by the unconscious influence of the existing state of things, fail to see the means appointed by the Head of the Church for a partial prevention of the evil.

A few miscellaneous remarks and we shall be done.

Unless we are entirely mistaken, we have relieved one of the most precious doctrines of the Gospel, as well as one of the first duties of Christians, from the pressure and restraint of a misinterpreted text. The words of Christ, if we understand them, have nothing to do with the offering of the Gospel ; but leave this, as the grace of God has fixed it, with the widest, freest scope, limited only by the number and the wants of souls. "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And *whosoever will*, let him come and take of the water of life freely." Yes, such is the freeness of the Gospel offer. The Bible does not and man must not limit or alter it. Let us then beware of limiting this freeness of the Gospel—1. By our doctrines and interpretations of Scripture ; and 2. In practice, by neglecting to press its truths and blessings upon our fellow-men. We must love *all* men—we must love their souls—desire their salvation, pray and labor for their eternal good.

But is there, then, no limit to the duty of presenting and urging religious truth upon others ? Is it my duty to do it at all times and in all circumstances ? Common sense and warm Christian faith and feeling, guided by the word of God, will easily give a right answer to this question. "Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your Father." "Holding forth the word of life." See

also 1 Pet. 3: 1, 2. The influence of the example should be perpetual wherever a Christian is; and words might far oftener be employed with blessed effect than they are. See Matt. 10: 16, Eccl. 8: 5, Prov. 15: 23.

But, if we have taken away the choice phylactery from the cloak of the heartless and inactive Christian, leaving him no Scripture-phrased excuse for his neglect of duty, we have also gained a text, a "*locus classicus*," an *express rule* from Christ himself, for a most important part of the administration of the church. Of the type it may also be said as well as of the heavenly antitype, "There shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie; but they that are written in the Lamb's book of life."

We see, also, that it is a solemn thing to be a church member. The church is holy ground. "Holiness becometh thine house, O Lord, for ever." "We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat who serve the tabernacle." "If any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man's work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire; for the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is."

We see the importance, difficulty, and responsibility of their office who receive members into the church. To them directly the rule of the text is given. Nay, on them in part will rest the guilt of profanation.

Lastly, we see that the church has most to fear from those within itself. When she began, small, without human countenance, nay, opposed, persecuted, familiar with confiscations, imprisonment, torture, exile, and martyrdom, but comparatively pure within, she grew and spread herself over the world. But then, grown powerful, she was sought unto by the worldly and unholy; she admitted their advances; was corrupted, profaned, weakened, rent, and deprived to a great extent of all spiritual life; and to that extent became a putrid carcass, intolerable to men and offensive to God.

ARTICLE VII.

COLERIDGE'S VIEW OF ATONEMENT.

By Rev. LEMUEL GOSWENON.

By those who have denied the divinity of our Lord, the doctrine of a vicarious atonement has been very generally denied. But on the other hand, those who admit the divinity of Christ almost universally admit the truth of this doctrine; and admit it too, we think, with the same consistency as those reject it who deny his divinity. Yet there are some who admit the divinity of Christ, who nevertheless deny the doctrine of vicarious atonement. Such are *some* of the followers of Coleridge; though we are bound to say that we believe the *majority* of the disciples of this philosopher differ from him in his views on this particular subject. Having sometimes disputed with the "most straitest" sort of Coleridgians, about the *orthodoxy* of these views, we have been led also to converse with Socinians on the subject; and have always found them ready to assent to the views of Coleridge, so far as they relate to the question of the vicariousness of the sacrifice, and the objects of the death of Christ.

It is our design now to show—

1st. That, so far as relates to the question of vicariousness, the doctrine of Atonement as held by Coleridge is consistent with the Socinian view of the same doctrine.

2d. That the doctrine of Atonement as held by Coleridge is absurd.

3d. That it is inconsistent with itself.

4th. That it is inconsistent with the Bible.

1st. *It is consistent with Socinianism.*

In affirming that the doctrine of Coleridge is Socinian, we by no means affirm that his whole scheme is consistent with that of the Socinians. The Socinian view of Atonement, like their whole scheme of religious doctrines, is, we think, consistent *with itself*, while that of Coleridge is not so, as we are hereafter to endeavor to show. The Socinian first denies the divinity of Christ, and then he denies the necessity of any sacrifice to compensate for the violation of God's law; for the very good reason, among a great many poor ones, that the denial of Christ's divinity leaves no possible provision for a sacrifice sufficient to expiate the sins of a world. So he denies the person-

ality of the Holy Ghost, and then denies the necessity of any special influences of the Holy Ghost, for the very good reason that he has "not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." The Socinian doctrines hang together like the links of a chain cable; break one—tenth or ten thousandth—and you break the whole chain. And the same may be said of the doctrines of the Atheistical Materialist; but it cannot be said of the doctrines of Coleridge; and when we say that Coleridge's view of atonement is consistent with that of the Socinians, we only mean that it is so, so far as relates to the question of the *vicariousness* (i. e., in our mind, the *genuineness*) of the atonement.

Coleridge insists that there was no such thing as a literal *atonement* or *sacrifice* made to satisfy the demands of God's law. He says these words are mere *metaphors*, and complains that Christians understand them literally, and "infer the identity of the causes from a resemblance in the effects," and adds, that he believes the view or scheme of redemption founded on these metaphors to be altogether unscriptural—i. e., the scheme which represents the sacrifice of Christ as a literal sacrifice for sin, and made to satisfy the demands of the law, is altogether unscriptural.

Now every one who is conversant with Socinian writings knows that they construe these passages in the same way. Yet Coleridge and the Socinians all admit that *somehow*, on account of Christ's death, our sins are forgiven.

One of the ablest Socinian writers upon the Atonement (Worcester) says, "I wish it to be understood that I freely admit that the Messiah actually suffered for sinners, and for the purpose of saving them from sin and misery." Again he says, "A great object of the atoning sacrifice was to reconcile sinners with God." And again: "If by Christ's suffering as a substitute for sinners, were meant no more than that he actually suffered to save us from sin and suffering, I should readily acquiesce."

Another Socinian writer (Chr. Exam. Vol. I.) says, "If it were only required to believe and hold what Dr. Murdock has very justly said to be sufficient for salvation, that we know and believe firmly the Scripture truth that there is forgiveness with God for the penitent believer on account of something which Christ has done or suffered, there would not be a dissenting voice." And Coleridge, in equally plain language, admits that

the *consequences* of Christ's death are the same as those of the sacrificial atonement made by the priest for the transgressor of the Mosaic law—to wit, the forgiveness of sins.

Coleridge says, "The causative act (i. e., the act which procured man's redemption, to wit, Christ's death) is a spiritual and transcendent mystery, which passeth all understanding." It was not a real sacrifice or atonement, but a mystery. We confess our inability to comprehend just how much or how little Coleridge intends to express by the formula of words above quoted—but we do understand perfectly that he does not mean to say that Christ died in man's stead. Worcester has a parallel passage. "I am willing," he says, "to admit that the atoning sacrifice may have influence on salvation in ways which are not revealed, and which are of course unknown," and if this influence be not revealed, but unknown, it is, if it exist at all, a *mysterious* influence.

Again, Coleridge urges the old threadbare objection of Socinians against the *justice* of a vicarious sacrifice. Speaking of the words *debt*, *satisfaction*, etc., he says, "As your whole theory is founded on a notion of justice, I ask you, is this justice a *moral* attribute? I may with all right and reason put the case as between man and man. For if it be found irreconcilable with the justice which the light of reason, made law in the conscience, dictates to *man*, how much more must it be incongruous with the all-perfect justice of God!"

We shall doubtless be willingly spared by the reader the labor of transcribing a parallel passage from Worcester or any other Socinian writer.

Coleridge proceeds to illustrate the *insufficiency* of a substitute in moral cases by supposing one James to be the profligate son of a most worthy and affectionate mother—but a generous friend, named Matthew, interferes, and performs all the duties of the neglectful son. "Will this," asks Coleridge, "satisfy the mother's claims on James?" "If, indeed," he afterwards adds, "by the force of Matthew's *example*, by *persuasion*, or by additional and more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency compatible with the existence of a personal will, James should be *led to repent*; if through admiration and love of this great goodness, gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his benefactor, he should in his own person become a dutiful and grateful child, then doubtless the mother would be wholly satisfied."

This illustration is Socinian in all its parts. Coleridge seems to forget the dignity of the Redeemer, and makes Matthew, a mere man, stand in the place of Jesus Christ—a man no better than James he makes the substitute for James—the obedience of Matthew equivalent to the obedience of Christ. The illustration seems to show also that Coleridge's views of the *requirements* of God's law are such as Socinians maintain. The *repentance* of the sinner seems to be all that he considers necessary. James must become a dutiful son for the future, by Matthew's example, persuasion, or mysterious influence, and then the mother will be fully satisfied.

Throughout Coleridge's whole discussion, there is no consideration of the necessity of maintaining the holiness and justice of God's moral government, by demanding reparation for past breaches of his law, or any intimation that in the sacrifice of Christ, God's attribute of *justice* was at all displayed. But we think we have shown that the Coleridgian and Socinian schemes sail along harmoniously together, like two ships under the same convoy and propelled by the same breeze.

2. *Coleridge's view of Atonement is absurd.*

He argues that all the different terms used in Scripture on the subject of redemption (such as atonement, sacrifice, sin-offering, ransom, redemption, etc.) are mere *metaphors*, used, not to express realities themselves, but the consequences of some reality unexpressed, for which, of course, we must look elsewhere. When the Bible speaks of sacrifice, atonement, etc., it does not mean sacrifice, etc., but something else. We must then give up nearly the whole of the epistle to the Hebrews as a metaphor, and many passages in almost every book of the Bible. When the Jews offered sacrifices for their sins they offered metaphors, for the purpose of foreshadowing that greater metaphor which was offered for the sins of the world. Or, if Coleridge allows that the Jewish sacrifices were *real* sacrifices, then they offered real sacrifices to foreshadow a metaphor yet to come. We have not yet come to the reality; we are floating on a sea of rhetorical figures, and cannot touch bottom. We have submitted ourselves to the pilotage of the philosopher, and must go where he guides. He offers us at last a resting-place in the third chapter of John. Here at length then is the long sought *reality*. He says that "John the beloved disciple enunciates the *fact itself*, to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, *simply*, and without

any metaphor, by identifying it in kind, with a fact of hourly occurrence. It is *regeneration*—a birth, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved." Here then we have the meaning of all these metaphors, "sacrifice, atonement, propitiation," etc.—and that meaning is *regeneration*! "Christ gave himself a *regeneration* for our sins." "This man, after he had offered one *regeneration* for sins, for ever sat down at the right hand of God." It follows, then, that when Christ gave himself for the world, the world was regenerated, and the atonement means, "simply and without any metaphor," the regeneration of all men. "John enunciates the fact simply, and without any *metaphor*!" Is not the word regeneration, *born again*, a metaphor? [We maintain that John uses the metaphor *born again* only to express the *consequences* of the redemptive act, just as Coleridge says all other Scripture writers use all other terms.] So after all we have not yet come to the reality. The ground we thought we had touched proves a quicksand, and we are again afloat on the rhetorical billows. We have only discovered that the Scripture writers use a great variety of metaphors to illustrate another metaphor, which needs illustration more than all the others. With notions like these on the subject of metaphors, we marvel not that Coleridge complained of confusion. If the word *sacrifice* be a metaphor, we see no reason why we should consider *Jesus* a reality—if one be a metaphor, so is the other.

3. *Coleridge's view of Atonement is inconsistent with itself.*

"Respecting the redemptive act," says Coleridge, "we know from revelation that it was necessary that the Eternal Word should be made flesh, and so suffer and so die for us, as in dying to conquer death for as many as should receive him."

Here Coleridge starts with a truly scriptural proposition. It *was* necessary, as he says, that God should take our nature and die for us. But we ask, and we have a right to ask, why this necessity? Revelation tells us so, says Coleridge. And we admit the full force of the reason. When revelation tells us any thing, and gives us no reason, we will receive it with all humility, and believe and cherish it. But revelation always gives us a reason for every thing which is comprehensible by human reason. There are no mysteries in the Bible, except such as must be mysteries from the nature of the human mind. When revelation tells us that God and man became united in one person, it does not tell us *how* it was done, because we could not compre-

bend it. When it tells us God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, evil as well as good, it does not go on to tell us how he could do so consistently with our notions of "justice, as between man and man," because his reason is above our reason, and we cannot judge God by ourselves. But when, for instance, it tells us God will laugh at the calamity of the sinner and mock when his fear cometh, it gives us a *reason*, because we *can* comprehend it. And when it tells us God could be just, and the justifier of the believer in Jesus, it tells us also the simple, plain way; and reason instantly assents and responds to its grandeur and beauty. And surely there are mysteries enough in our holy religion, without zealously searching for more. It is an impeachment of God's goodness to say that he has given us the Bible to puzzle our brains with mysteries. Let us not shut the blinds, and drop the curtains, and resolutely close our eyes or draw over them the veil of mysticism, when God's bright sun is warming the whole world without, and striving to pour its cheering rays into the windows of our hearts.

We come back again, then, and demand why this "necessity" that God should take our nature and die? Why would not Paul or an angel answer the same purpose? Coleridge gives us no reply, save that revelation says so. Then if revelation had told us that a condemned *thief* or a *bullock* must die for us, the answer would have been equally satisfactory. Tell us why revelation did *not* tell us that a *lamb*, and that too not without spot or blemish, but the miserable starveling of the flock, would suffice to take away the sins of the world. Is this a "*mystery*" also? The *Socinian* denies the existence of the Eternal Word, or that any such person ever came here and died, and common sense tells him that *no man could* compensate for the sins of a world—and therefore he denies, *consistently*, that any such compensation has been made. But Coleridge maintains the *necessity* that the Eternal Word should come and die, but can give us no reason, because he denies that Christ suffered as a substitute for the world, or offered any satisfaction for injury done to the law of God. Is not Socinianism much more self-consistent?

But Coleridge says again, "Nevertheless the fact having been assured to us by revelation, (viz., that Christ's death procures our salvation,) it is not impossible, by steadfast meditation, for the mind to satisfy itself that the redemptive act supposes, and that our redemption is negatively conceivable only on the supposition of an agent who can at once act on the will as an exciting

cause"—(i. e., in plain English, our redemption is conceivable only on the supposition of a Redeemer who is Divine.) Here is sound doctrine, but held, we think, most inconsistently. We are obliged again to ask the *reason* why the Redeemer must be *divine*. It may be from sheer, asinine stupidity on our part, but we must confess that after some "meditation" on the subject, we are just as much in the dark as ever.

We appeal to the reader. Suppose I were to tell you that in order to the forgiveness of your sins, and the sins of a world of sinners like you, it was necessary that some one should suffer *in your stead*. You ask my reason for the assertion, and I tell you revelation says so. You ask, who it is that must suffer in your place, and I reply that is "a mystery that passeth all understanding." You then try to imagine who there is of sufficient dignity and worth to enable him to take away the sins of a world by suffering in the world's stead. You can think of no one on earth, and in your distress you look to heaven. You can conceive, perhaps, that if Christ were to take our nature and die, he might be a sufficient sacrifice, but revelation gives you no intimation that he will come, or rather it tells you distinctly he will not come, to die in your stead. Yet some one must come, or you are eternally ruined. What sort of satisfaction would my information give you? How distressful your uncertainty! How low your opinion of the fulness and worth of that revelation! The dreadful sentence hangs over your head by a hair, but you know not how to avert it. But just so much satisfaction can I obtain from all that Coleridge tells me. I see the holiness and justice of God's law, in which I read that the soul that sinneth it shall die. I see no way in which I can escape the penalty due to me as a sinner, unless some being, able and willing, "pay the rigid satisfaction, death for death." I see clearly that God could be just and justify me through the sacrifice of Jesus, but I can see no other plan by which he could maintain the holiness and justice of his law, and yet pardon my sins. But Coleridge tells me I can have no hope from that quarter—Jesus will not die in my stead, or suffer one pang of the suffering due to me. I imagine myself at Calvary, and the dreadful tragedy enacted there passes before my eyes. I ask the bystanders (Coleridge among the rest) the *reason* of all this. I ask if he is dying in my stead. No—he is *not* bearing my sins in his own body on that tree. All this inexplicable agony he endures, yet he has made no provision to *satisfy* the demands of that outstanding law against me. I de-

mand, why not bring up your bloated drunkard and crucify him? Why not bring a bullock already chained for the slaughter, and spare this innocent victim? and they only tell me they do not know why—it is “a transcendent mystery that passeth all understanding,” but more *meditation* on the subject may convince me that this Divine sacrifice is necessary!

4. *Coleridge's view of Atonement is inconsistent with the Bible.*

Coleridge was quite right, as we have said before, when he maintained, though without giving us any reason, that it was necessary that the eternal Son of God should die for us. Revelation assures us of the fact, but it also gives us a *reason* free from all metaphysical subtlety, involved in no mystical mist of words; a reason which a child may comprehend and feel. It is the reason given in the third chapter of Romans, twenty-sixth verse. God could not be *just* and justify the believer in Jesus, unless Jesus had been set forth as a *propitiation* for the remission of sins that are past. A *propitiation* means something that shall cause the judge to accept it as a sufficient ground for the pardon of the offender. The *sufficiency* of a sacrifice for such a purpose depends of course entirely on the inherent value of the sacrifice. And what must be the inherent value of a sacrifice, to render it sufficient to atone for the sins of a world against an infinite and holy God? Who *could* compensate, by the shedding of his blood, for the violations of God's holy law? Who but he, who having offered himself once for all a sacrifice for sin, shall come once more without sin to judge us all? But we are told that the sacrifice of Christ was not a *literal* sacrifice for sin. What was it then? If you tell us it was no sacrifice, but a mystery, you leave no more impression on our mind than if you were to repeat to us those incredible tales of Eastern genii and fairies. Tell us plainly that he died only as a martyr to the truth, or as an example to others, and then we can understand, though we may not believe.

If the sacrifice of Jesus was not a real sacrifice, why so much efficacy attributed to his *blood*? Blood is no metaphor, but the very essence of the atonement. “Without blood there is no remission,” says the Apostle. But he says, also, that it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin. This then must signify that *some* blood could take it away, or the Apostle was speaking at random—if he did not mean that *some* blood could take away sin, his remark about the blood of

bulls and goats was just as sensible and forcible as if we were gravely to assure you that a glass of water could not suffice to cleanse the Augean stables. Some blood could take away sin, or else there is no remission, no forgiveness, and so all men are hopelessly lost. But whose blood could take it away? Could not David's—the man after God's own heart? He was a *sinner*, and to pardon sin by accepting the sacrifice of a sinner, could have no effect to show forth the holiness and justice of God and God's law;—or had David been entirely spotless, his sacrifice could only be an equivalent for one man, like himself—his blood could not expiate the guilt of millions dead, of millions yet unborn. But could not the angel Gabriel, who never sinned, have taken our nature, and suffered and died, “the just for the unjust?” No. Gabriel is a mere creature, the insect of a day. And though the whole glorious host of angels had offered themselves as one grand holocaust, (and doubtless those who now rejoice over one sinner that repenteth, would willingly have died for the millions that needed repentance,) had they all come and suffered, it would have been unavailing—for no number of finites can equal an infinite, and nothing less than an infinite was worth a world. The blood of *Jesus Christ* alone cleanseth from all sin. Not a mere man, not an angel, not ten thousands of angels, but *a God*.

Yet by his illustration, the philosopher would convince me that *this* sacrifice would be no compensation to God for my violations of his law. Matthew's obedience, he says, could be no compensation for James's disobedience. He would have me believe that *my* repentance is of more value in God's sight than the obedience unto death of God's own Son!

For the class of readers whom I now address, it is unnecessary here to go into the commonly urged and never answered arguments from Scripture, in proof of a vicarious atonement, but I desire to use one arrow from the quiver of the enemy. In war, men often find the captured guns of the enemy more serviceable than their own. The lawyer rightly esteems it a great advantage when he can turn the testimony of an opposing witness in his own favor, for such testimony weighs more in his behalf, than a cloud of witnesses brought to the stand by himself.

We proceed to show the course which has been sometimes taken to be rid of the doctrine of vicarious atonement. The book of Hebrews is so full and clear on this subject, that the

writer of an article in the *Christian Examiner* (Review of Stuart on Hebrews) endeavors to do away its force by maintaining that neither Paul nor any other apostle was its author, and that it is not canonical. He handles the writer to the Hebrews "without gloves." If he could make out that the writer was what he calls him, "a man whose imaginary conceptions are blended with his opinions,"—a man, "the conceptions of whose fancy are presented with so much vividness and with such an air of reality that they are likely to be mistaken for his distinct apprehensions of what he believes to be the truth"—if he could make out all this, we say, with a few other things equally feasible, then indeed he had turned the hard and high-walled field of the "Hebrews" into an open common, and thus cleared his way into the other epistles and the gospels, where he might throw out the troublesome rocks of sound doctrine at his leisure, and raise a rank crop of cockle and tares amidst the wheat and barley of God's truth.

"There seems to have been," he says, "in the mind of the writer (to the Hebrews) an obscure and mysterious grandeur thrown around the conception of Jesus Christ as a high priest, which he was unwilling to dispel. His imaginations appear to have become in some measure blended with his belief. He seems to have gazed on the glorious image before him, till his eyes were dazzled and his sight unsteady, and he could not distinguish clearly between realities and figures."*

He proceeds—"The writer to the Hebrews taking advantage of the obvious metaphor of a sacrifice, institutes an elaborate comparison between the death of our Lord and the Levitical sacrifices. He insists on this mode of representation as something essential to his purpose. In representing the death of Christ as a sacrifice, the writer to the Hebrews, for the most part, though not always, conceives of it as a sin-offering. In following out this conception, he represents it, to the imagination at least, as having in consequence an intrinsic efficacy to remove the sins of the people. His representation is, likewise,

* Verily, the contrast is striking between the weak, visionary, and rhapsodical author of Hebrews, and the *solid* craniological formation of the author of this article in the *Christian Examiner*. "How stupid that *lion* looks, and how short he wears his ears!" said the ass to the bear. "He wears his teeth middling *long* though," replied Bruin.

that by this great and only necessary sacrifice, the use of all other sacrifices was taken away."

He says, moreover, that "the writer's representations are those into which he was led by his earnestness to discover analogies between the old and new dispensations, and to represent Christianity as the sublime antitype of Judaism."

We have no occasion to attempt any improvement upon the very decisive language of this Socinian writer, as to the bearing which the epistle to the Hebrews has on the priesthood of Christ, the literalness of the sacrifice, its immense importance, and the analogy between the vicarious sacrifices of the old dispensation and "the *great and only necessary*" sacrifice of the new.

In quoting from this writer, let it not be inferred that we would charge Coleridge with holding such views as to the authorship of the epistle, or the meaning of the contents. We adduce it merely as showing the belief of one Socinian, at least, as to the real consequences of receiving this epistle as inspired.

In conclusion, we would say that our objection to Coleridge's view of atonement is not so much on account of any bad influence which it had on his own mind, as on account of the effect it *may* have on others. The philosopher was, no doubt, a Christian. Indeed, passages in his writings on *other* subjects, would seem to contradict some of his positions and illustrations upon this subject of atonement. But if he really held that Christ's death had any connexion with the *justice* of God, it is certainly not brought out in the chapter which seems intended to be a full exposition of his views upon the subject of atonement—on the contrary, he explicitly denies it. We have studied the views in this chapter, and have endeavored to give our opinions upon them plainly and with perfect fairness. To learn his views of the Atonement, one must, of course, take the views presented in the portion of his writings where that subject is treated of specifically and fully. It is no part of a reader's business to search *elsewhere*, to strive to discover passages which might possibly modify or even contradict his plain statements and arguments as they stand in the place where he intends to bring them out fully. One might take a Socinian book and select detached passages which would prove the writer orthodox on all the Bible doctrines; and we deny not that many a sound orthodox work may be proved to be Socinian in the same way. We must consider the writer's main object.

Coleridge, we understand to maintain, that God could be just and the justifier of the believer in Jesus, without any propitiatory sacrifice to the demands of God's law, simply on the repentance of the sinner. When he says redemption is a mystery, he does not mean simply that it is a mystery *how* God could be just, and still justify the believer in consequence of the sacrifice of Christ; but he means that God could be just and do this *without* any such sacrifice. He does not mean to say that it is a mystery *how* this combination of justice and mercy in the Atonement works our redemption, ~~but~~ he denies that there *is* any such combination in the mystery of redemption—herein joining issue with the apostle, as we think. To our mind, the word *mystery*, as he uses it, has no signification whatever. We can see very clearly what he does *not* mean by the word;—but what he does mean is—a mystery.

After thus animadverting upon Coleridge's view of atonement, we take the liberty to express our gratitude for the benefit we have received from his writings. The prejudice we imbibed against him from *hearsay* evidence, we have found melting away as our personal acquaintance with him has increased. We have entirely recovered from the alarm we experienced on first beholding an outlandish and barbarous jargon of "words, words, words,"—and we do believe that if many who are now strongly prejudiced against him, would seriously study, and *try* to comprehend him, they would acknowledge him to be an original thinker, and a "myriad minded" man; and would sometimes, amidst a mass of strange speculations, and under what seems a hard and useless crust of words, find a diamond of exquisite purity and value.

ARTICLE VIII.

AN ESSAY ON THE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES, MORAL ACTION, AND MORAL CHARACTER.*

THE word *moral* is used in its broadest sense, to signify that which is influenced to activity by motives. Thus the physical and moral world are contrasted, the one being moved to activity by physical causes, and the other by motives. In a more limited sense, the word *moral* has reference to mental action as either right or wrong. It is in this restricted sense, that we speak of the *moral susceptibilities* or *moral sense*; and in this article it is proposed to discuss the question as to what right and wrong is, and what are the constitutional susceptibilities which influence or move intelligent minds to do right and avoid wrong.

It is needful, first, to settle the question as to the meaning of the terms *right* and *wrong*.

The term *right* in its most generic sense signifies *that which is fitted to accomplish the object of a design*. Thus a watch is right when it shows the time of the day, a medicine is the right one when it tends to cure; and thus whatever tends to secure the object of a design, either in matter or mind, is called right, and the opposite is called wrong.

In an inquiry, then, respecting the right moral action of mind, it is manifest that it cannot be settled until we first ascertain *the object which mind is created to secure*; for when we have gained this, any volition is right which tends to secure it, and wrong when it tends to contravene it.

In seeking the answer to this inquiry, we appeal first to reason, and then to revelation. The principle from which we reason is, that *the nature of a contrivance shows what is the design of its author*. It will, therefore, be first shown, that the object of the Creator, in the formation of mind, is the production of the *greatest amount of happiness*.

In attempting this, it is needful to show, not merely that mind is designed for the production of happiness in certain degrees, more or less, so that if any degree is attained the end is accomplished, but that it was designed to secure the *greatest amount* of happiness.

* The author's name is withheld for special reasons.

To illustrate this, we may mention certain examples.

If a physician is prescribing to secure health, his object is not gained till entire and perfect health is attained. If a mariner is aiming to shun a certain shoal and reach a certain port, his object is not attained by *nearly* shunning one and *nearly* reaching the other. If a man is seeking to produce great speed of motion, his aim is not secured while impediments remain that can readily be removed. If, therefore, we can prove that the object of creating mind is to produce happiness, we do in fact prove that the object is to promote the *greatest amount* of it. Otherwise the absurdity is involved of supposing a designer to plan a thing, and then to put in, as a part, impediments and hinderances to the accomplishment of this plan, or to leave out certain particulars needful to secure it. We can make only two suppositions. Allowing that the design of creation is the production of happiness; one is, that the Creator planned to secure the greatest amount, the other is, that he planned happiness as the grand aim of all his contrivances, and then put in certain particulars to mar and diminish the result which he aimed to secure. This is absurd; we therefore assume that proving that God designed happiness by creating minds, is, in fact, proving that he designed the *greatest amount* of happiness.

We proceed now to present some of the evidence to prove that the object of the creation of mind is the production of the greatest amount of happiness.

We shall attempt this, by showing the nature of mind, the nature of the circumstances in which it is placed, and the declarations of the Creator of mind on the subject.

The first particular in the nature of mind which indicates its design is, that never ceasing desire for happiness and fear of all that destroys it, which are the main principles of all mental activity. A mind that is in its natural state, never will act, except to make some happiness, or to escape some evil. Of course its author designed that it should act for this end. We can conceive that a mind might be so constituted as to act always to produce only pain to itself and to others; in this case, we should justly infer that the object of its Creator was to produce pain.

Another particular is, that the simple exercise of those powers of mind which are involuntary, and result solely from its constitution, is a cause of happiness. The succession of concep-

tions and emotions according to the laws of association, and the new combinations of the imagination, are both sources of enjoyment. Still more so are those acts of mind which are indirectly controlled by volition, such as the exercise of mind in acquiring knowledge; in combining, contriving, and arranging; and the various exercises of taste, the exercise of the reasoning powers, and the exercise of physical power: these are all enjoyments secured by constitutional powers of mind.

Nor is evidence of the same design less manifest in the constitution of mind in its relation to other minds. The highest and purest happiness results from these *mutual relations*. From this springs the pleasure found in the discovery of noble intellectual and moral traits in other minds, from the power of giving and receiving affection, from sympathy, and from the practice of benevolence towards others. And it is interesting to discover that our minds are so constituted, that what one mind desires and enjoys, it is a source of happiness in another to bestow: thus, while one is pleased with the discovery of traits of worth and loveliness, the other is as much gratified at being understood and appreciated; while one seeks affection, the other rejoices to bestow it; while one seeks to gratify curiosity, the other delights to impart information; while one rejoices to bestow good, the other is delighted to receive it; while one delights to exercise and exhibit virtue, the other is delighted in beholding it. What bursts of rapturous applause have followed the exhibition of virtuous self-sacrifice, from bosoms that rejoice in this display, as they would in the exercise of this goodness!

But it is that peculiar constitution of man referred to as his *moral nature* or *moral susceptibilities*, which especially exhibit the design of the Creator in forming mind, and therefore these will be more distinctly exhibited. By the moral nature of man, we intend those constitutional principles, which operate as *motives* or *moving powers*, in influencing him to choose what is right; that is, to act not for personal gratification, but for the *greatest general happiness*. The following are presented as the principal ones.

The first is, a susceptibility of pleasure at being the cause of good, and of pain at being the cause of evil, either voluntary or involuntary. All mankind, both young and old, are pleased when they are told that they have done some great good to others, even when they had no idea or intention of accomplish-

ing it. Thus if, by mere accident, without any thought of the result, an act is done which saves the valuable life of the father of a helpless family, no spectator can enjoy what is felt by the author of this act. So, also, if by accident a person kill or wound another, however unintentional the evil, the author suffers far more distress than any other person. But the pain and pleasure are greatly enhanced if the good or evil are *voluntary* acts. The emotions of remorse for the commission of voluntary crimes are probably more agonizing than any other the mind can endure; while the enjoyment resulting from the voluntary creation of happiness is unsurpassed by any other.

A second susceptibility, is that which is excited to desire evil to the cause of evil, and good to the cause of good, whether voluntary or involuntary. This principle is exhibited in the youngest child, who bites or strikes whatever gives it pain, without regard to whether it is intentional or not. It is as marked in many adults, who, following their impulses, inflict blows on animals or persons who have perpetrated some accidental and unintentional mischief. So the involuntary cause of good is regarded with complacency, and the impulse of the mind is to make compensating returns. But in cases where the good and evil have resulted from voluntary agency, with premeditated design, these impulses are not only called forth more powerfully, but they become perpetuated principles of action. Where the evil done is involuntary and unintentional, the impulse to retaliate often is changed to pity for the unfortunate author of the evil. But the author of voluntary and intentional evil is followed by the continued execration of all who suffer or witness it; and it is sometimes the case, that the desire for retributive inflictions becomes so strong in a community as to amount almost to a mania.

And so, in reference to the voluntary author of great good, the impulse to reward is not transient, but perpetuated. This is seen often in the enthusiasm of delight which greets a public benefactor, and the abundant rewards so joyfully bestowed.

The next moral susceptibility, is that which demands a certain relative proportion in the rewards and penalties for good and evil actions. This principle can be seen in very young children, who instinctively revolt at the infliction of severe punishment for some trifling act of forgetfulness, but who are satisfied if the same penalty is awarded for some heinous act of injury. It is still more clearly developed in the mature mind, which demands

still more accuracy in the appropriate adjustment of rewards and penalties. This is the principle which ordinarily is named *the sense of justice*.

The next susceptibility is, that which is pained by seeing intentional evil inflicted on a benefactor, or even the want of indication of grateful emotions in the recipient of favors. If we ourselves have conferred benefits, the return of evil for the good inflicts a much severer pang than if no such favors had been bestowed. And ingratitude witnessed toward other benefactors, often awakens intense feelings of indignation and disgust; while demonstrations of gratitude are always regarded with complacency.

The next susceptibility is, that which is pained by seeing the comfort and enjoyment of one person sacrificed to increase the enjoyment of others. If one who has power robs the feeble of his earnings to spend them on increasing his own luxuries, every mind revolts from the deed. If one class of persons conspire to strip another class of their possessions to increase their own indulgences, still greater indignation is felt. The system of slavery is a flagrant and well known violation of this moral sentiment.

Another of the moral susceptibilities is, that which demands that laws enforced by penalties be applied only where there is the power of obedience. To require a man to see when he has no eyes, or to walk when he has no feet, or to love what is disgusting to his natural taste, or to perform any act which he has no power to perform, and then to punish him for not obeying, is what every mind revolts from as cruel and unjust.

So, also it is demanded that a *knowledge of the law and penalties, and an understanding of the evil perpetrated*, should be taken into account in modifying penalties. In family government, a child is not to be punished with reference merely to the extent of the mischief done. The breaking of a splendid and expensive machine, and the destruction of a cheap article of crockery may both result from an act of equal heedlessness in two children, and if the parent punish solely with reference to the value, and let one escape with a slight reproof and inflict protracted and painful retribution on the other, who was unconscious of the value of what he destroyed, this principle of the mind revolts from such conduct as manifest injustice. In cases, too, where evils are done through ignorance, the penalties are to be modified by the question as to the nature of this

ignorance, as innocent and unavoidable, or voluntary and consequent on wilful neglect. When the evil results from ignorance that is blamable, a penalty is felt to be right, from which this principle of mind would revolt, if the ignorance was unavoidable.

The next susceptibility is, that which is pained by a *violation of confidence*.

If a stranger go to the hut of a savage, and in confidence commit himself unarmed to repose, this confidence appeals to the most barbarous of minds, and imposes obligations not felt, when no such confidence is exhibited. Confidence in a man's word, or in his honesty, imposes a similar obligation; and the violation of such confidence always revolts the moral sense of mankind.

Another susceptibility is, that which requires that the generation of a certain relative amount of incidental evil shall not be allowed to prevent the accomplishment of a certain relative amount of good. Mind is so constituted that it instinctively weighs or compares good and evil, so that a given amount of good is considered as compensating for a given amount of evil. Whenever this balance is struck, and there is a decidedly additional amount of good to be gained, this principle demands that the good be secured, even if it involve the incident evil. Thus, in the case of a surgical operation on a young child. The parent knows that the comfort of a whole life will be secured by this operation, and yet that it will involve momentary agony to the child. And every mind demands that this good be secured to the child, whether he consent or not, and in spite of the involved evil. So a man, in deciding to enter the family state, foresees that many evils will inevitably arise that would not exist if he remained single. And yet the anticipated benefits to all concerned, he sees to be so great, as to satisfy his moral sense in calling such inevitable evils into existence.

So, in forming laws for a state. It is foreseen that in many cases these laws will bear heavily on individuals, and cause great suffering, but the good to be gained is deemed so great as to compensate for the incident evils. In some of these cases, the incident evil not only secures great good, but saves from greater evils. In the case of the man who decides to rear a family, he cannot suppose that he is preventing greater evils, so that his remaining without a family will cause as much suffering to himself as will be endured by all whom he may call

into existence. He merely foresees that the good gained, together with the evils escaped, will compensate for all the incident evils involved.

The next moral susceptibility is one which is pleased when, to avert greater suffering from others, another person *voluntarily* undergoes a less amount of suffering, but which equally revolts from any *compulsory* sacrifice of this kind. For example, we read in history of the self-sacrifice of Regulus, of Quintus Curtius, for the salvation of their country; and every person who has read these stories, has admired this patriotic devotion. But had their fellow-citizens taken them against their will and forced them to the sacrifice, every mind would revolt from the deed.

Another susceptibility to be noticed is, that which is affected by the acknowledgment of a fault, and the feeling and expression of contrition. This course of conduct and feeling affects both the offender and the one injured. The injured party is placated, and the desire of retaliation is abated. The guilty person, to a certain extent, is relieved from the pangs of remorse. Still more is this the case if full reparation is made. And every mind feels complacency in a person who has the magnanimity to acknowledge a fault, and to try to repair it.

Another susceptibility to be observed is, that which is affected by the infliction of penalties on one who has done evil. This is perhaps included as a specific case under another more general head, but deserves to be distinctively considered. In all the history of our guilty race, we find that the author of evil feels that he deserves punishment, and that when it is inflicted, his remorse to a certain extent is relieved. Thus, those who have gone through a long course of suffering, at the close of life not unfrequently found their hope of future happiness on these sufferings, as available to save them from penalties for the sins of a past life. So strong is this principle in some minds that, under its influence, a criminal will voluntarily give himself up to justice, that, by suffering appropriate penalties, he may lessen the pangs of remorse. This susceptibility is affected also in persons who witness evil perpetrated by others, or who are themselves injured by others. When a penalty is inflicted on the offender commensurate with his crime, this principle is satisfied, and the desire for farther retribution ceases. It is the supposed existence of this principle in God, and in the heathen deities, which has given rise to sacri-

fices and the self-infliction of penalties. There is an universal belief in all nations, that there are invisible beings who have power over human happiness, and that opposing their will involves a liability to their wrathful inflictions.

To avert this wrath, costly offerings are sometimes made, and, in other cases, where men are cruel and brutified, and frame gods like themselves, they strive to pacify them by cruelties inflicted on prisoners, or helpless children offered in sacrifice. In cases where the mind is tormented with a sense of guilt, others will cut and mangle their own bodies to pacify the malignant gods they imagine they have offended. The Old Testament ritual, which requires so many peace-offerings and sacrifices, has reference to this principle. It was a system of external forms, accommodated to this principle of mind, and designed to keep constantly before every worshipper of the true God, the fact that the invisible Lawgiver and Judge of that nation, was a Being displeased with sin, and one who would inflict retributive justice upon all the guilty. It also involved the principle of *vicarious atonement*, which will be referred to at another time and place.

The last susceptibility to be noticed is, that which is pleased with a course of voluntary action for the promotion of the *greatest* general happiness, and is displeased by the opposite course. And the approbation is proportioned to the good generated or evil averted, and also to the degree of self-sacrifice involved in securing it.

This is the basis of the maxim of democratic governments, which legislate to secure the greatest amount of good to the greatest number of persons. This also is the principle which secures all those domestic and civil regulations that involve the sacrifice of individual convenience, for the general welfare of the family or state.

This is the only moral susceptibility which seems to depend on the exercise of reason. All the others seem to be instinctive, and never to be based on any calculation of general tendencies or future results. And it is a principle which is as much violated, when, from any temporary and immediate gratification, we do what tends to destroy our own highest good, as it is when we sacrifice the general good for selfish enjoyment. No man can take a course which destroys his own prospects of happiness, or which is contrary to the general welfare, without violating this principle of his moral nature.

The pleasure which results from obedience to this principle, is proportioned to the degree of good to be gained or evil escaped, and also to the amount of self-denial involved in this course of obedience. The man who regulates all his appetites and propensities by the law of reason, so as never to sacrifice his best good to the impulses of passion, has a source of elevated enjoyment in the self-respect and self-approbation which result from this principle. While he who sinks by vicious indulgences to the character of the brutes, suffers the pangs which the violation of this principle of his mind never fails to inflict.

In promoting the general welfare of others, too, the degree of reward received from the estimation of others and from the approbation of our own mind is proportionate to the self-denial involved in the effort. A benefactor who undergoes great personal sacrifices to purchase benefit for others, awakens far higher emotions of gratitude and admiration than one who, in bestowing benefits, practises no such self-denial. The highest conceivable idea of goodness and benevolence is involved in the voluntary sacrifice of life to purchase benefits for others, or to save them from suffering.

The proof of the existence of this principle, as an *universal* attribute of our race, is found in the fact that, in all ages, and among all nations, acts of self-denial for one's own highest good, and acts of self-sacrifice for the general good, are admired and applauded, and are called *good*, *virtuous*, and *right*. So the sacrifice of our own highest good to passion, and the sacrifice of the general good for selfish gratification, is called *base*, *evil*, and *wrong*.

Thus we perceive that the moral nature of man consists of susceptibilities, which make it agreeable to do what the welfare of all demands, and painful to take a contrary course. It is plain that it is for the general welfare that every mind should act to make happiness, and not to destroy it; that punishment should be inflicted on evil doers, to deter them and others from repeating the wrong; that reward should be given for promoting happiness, in order to stimulate all to do it; that these retributive returns should be proportioned to the good and evil done; that gratitude should be manifested and ingratitude repressed; that the robbery of some to increase the enjoyment of others should not be practised; that penalties and laws should have reference to ability to obey and opportunities of knowledge; that confidence should not be violated,—that self-denial should be practised for our own good, and self-sacrifice for the good of others; that repentance, confession, and reparation should

alleviate remorse, and lessen the desire of retributive inflictions; that punishment, also, should have a similar influence; and finally, that every mind should act for the *greatest* good of the whole. And it thus appears that, while the Creator formed mind so that it can only act from the desire of happiness and the fear of pain, he has given susceptibilities that make it painful to do what tends to destroy the general good, and pleasurable to promote it. What higher proof could be imagined that the design of the Creator in forming mind is the production of happiness?

Our susceptibilities of suffering are not the least indication that mind was formed for happiness; for it is the fear of suffering which is the most powerful restraint in deterring one mind from destroying the happiness of others. There are no contrivances, either in matter or mind, the sole aim of which is to cause pain, while almost all sources of pain are found to be indispensable methods for preserving the general welfare of all. Were mind so formed that no evil would result to itself from destroying the happiness of others, the experience of the world, in cases where no penalties follow crimes, shows that all kinds of evils would be perpetrated. Mind, therefore, is formed with susceptibilities of pain, and so placed that destroying the happiness of others will cause pain to the author of the evil. Thus our susceptibilities of pain are made the means of preserving happiness.

The circumstances in which mind is placed, the constitution of the body, and the surrounding material world, are another manifestation of the same design. In examining the body we inhabit, so nicely adjusted, so perfectly adapted to our necessities, so beautifully and harmoniously arranged, so "fearfully and wonderfully made," it is almost beyond the power of numbers, to express the multiplied contrivances for convenience, comfort and delight. We daily pursue our business and pleasure, thoughtless of the thousand operations which are going on within, and the busy mechanism employed in securing the objects we desire. The warm and life-giving current, flowing from the centre to the extremities, and then returning to be again purified and sent forth; the myriads of branching nerves, those sensitive discerners of good and ill; the numerous muscles and tendons, which are contracting and expanding in all parts of our frame; the curiously adjusted joints, and bands, and ligaments, which direct and support; the perpetual contraction

and expansion of the vital organ; the thousand hidden processes of assimilation and expulsion, which are quietly and safely engendering comfort and strength;—all these are ceaselessly administering enjoyment to the conscious spirit dwelling within.

Nor is the outer world less busy in performing its part of the great Creator's design. The light of suns and stars is traversing the ethereal expanse, in search of those for whom it was created; and for them it gilds the scenes of earth, and is reflected in ten thousand forms of beauty and of skill. The trembling air is waiting to minister its aid, fanning with cool breezes, or yielding the warmth of spring; sustaining the functions of life, and bearing on its light wing the breathings of affection from mind to mind. For this design, the earth is sending forth her exuberance, the waters are yielding their stores, and the clouds pouring forth their treasures. All nature is busy with its offerings of fruits and flowers, its wandering incense, its garnished beauty, and its varied songs. Within, without, above, beneath, and around, the same Almighty Beneficence has scattered the evidences of his design to promote the happiness of the minds, which he formed forever to desire and pursue this boon.

No position is capable of higher proof, by a course of reasoning, than the truth that the object of the Creator in forming mind was the promotion of happiness. This deduction of reason is as plainly established in the revelation of His will. In examining those sacred pages, we ever find the language of Jehovah that of a Being intensely interested in the happiness of his creatures; who sees their powers perverted to sin, and consequent suffering, with sympathy and pity; and who sincerely desires, and constantly is seeking their highest happiness. If we examine that brief, but comprehensive expression which he has given as *his law*, requiring supreme love to the Creator and impartial love to all his creatures, and all the more minute directions of the Gospel, which are but expansions of this law, we shall discover that perfect obedience to it by all our race, would secure every mode of enjoyment of which mind is capable, and exclude almost every kind of suffering. The details exhibiting this cannot here be presented, but it is believed that this position could be fully sustained; so that it may be claimed, that the full intent of this requisition of God to his creatures is truly exhibited in this paraphrase, "Be ye happy." Thus, the nature of mind, the circumstances in which it is placed, and

the revealed word of its Creator, all go to establish the position that the object designed in the formation of mind is the production of happiness.

We now return to the question as to the meaning of the terms right and wrong, when applied to the moral action, or the volitions of mind. If it is conceded that the object of the creation of mind is the production of the greatest *amount* of happiness, then any volition is right which tends to promote the highest general good, and wrong when it has the contrary tendency.

But in reference to voluntary actions, a very important distinction is needful, between actions viewed only in reference to their operation on the general happiness, or viewed only in relation to the *design or intention* of the agent. The *design, motive, or ultimate aim* of a volition is, that object of desire which is sought *for itself*, and not as *the means* for securing another object. For example, when money is given to relieve suffering, and for no other purpose, then the relief of suffering is the object of desire, or ultimate aim, or motive. But when the money is given to relieve suffering in order to gain applause and admiration, or to secure some favor from another in return, then the ultimate aim is not to relieve suffering, but to secure some enjoyment for self. When a *cause* is asked for any volition, the meaning is, what was the *ultimate aim* of the volition?

It has been shown that the moral constitution is such, as clearly to indicate the *design and intention* of the Creator in forming mind. Mankind, therefore, cannot help perceiving and feeling this design. They understand the law, which, as the Apostle says, is "written in their hearts," and whatever violates it is felt to be *wrong*; that is, contrary to the design and intention of their nature, and contrary to the will of the Creator.

Whenever, therefore, it is perceived that the attainment of any object will violate any of these moral feelings, all men understand and feel that it is wrong to seek it. And when the attainment of an object is seen to be consistent with these principles, they feel that it is right to secure it.

No one will maintain that it is right for any mind to act contrary to its own moral convictions, and do what is believed to be wrong. Yet it has been shown, that it is one of these moral principles that the lesser good of individuals should be given

up to serve the greater good of the whole community, of which the individual is a part. And it might be shown, were this the time and place, that such is the constitution of things, that acting for the general good does in fact always, in the end, secure the highest individual good of every mind which thus acts. So that the law and providence of the Creator never demand that one being should really sacrifice his own permanent well-being to promote the higher general welfare. But it is often the case, that the judgment of men as to what is good for themselves or good for the community is incorrect, so that an action may in fact be wrong in the abstract, as tending to produce more evil than good, and yet be regarded as right by the person performing it. In this case, there are two relations in which the action is to be judged. In one relation it is wrong, and in another right—wrong as tending to destroy the general good, and right as conformed to the judgment and moral sense of the agent. It is very important to bear this distinction in mind in all moral questions, or else there is constant confusion.

In regard to actions whose character is decided abstractly, without reference to the motive of the agent, it is important to recognize three general classes.

First, actions are right in the abstract, as tending to promote happiness, which merely secure present gratification and have no connexion with future results. These are right, because they produce certain degrees of happiness, and involve no consequent evil. Thus, it is right to inhale perfume, to gaze at the beauties of nature, or to gratify any taste or propensity, provided no evil is involved, and no greater good sacrificed.

Another class of actions, are those which secure some immediate good, and, so far as can be seen, involve no evil to any one directly, yet are violations of a *general rule*, which the general happiness requires every mind to regard as inviolable. For example, there are cases when a man can take the property of another, where it would not be used or missed, and when he might use it to do good. Still the action would be wrong, for it violates the rule requiring us never to use the property of others without evidence of their willingness. So, too, there are cases when lying or deceit will secure benefits, and save from evils, without seeming to do any immediate harm to any one. And yet nothing is more important to the general welfare, than sustaining the rule that men are *never* to lie or deceive in order to secure any benefits to themselves or to others. And the

temporary good gained by giving up this rule to meet specific cases, never would compensate for the vast inroads of evil that would result from leaving the law of honesty and veracity to be regulated by the private judgment and limited views of each individual.

Another class of actions are those which, in themselves considered, and as practised by individuals, do some good and no perceptible harm; and yet experience shows that they can never be *generally* indulged in without leading to evils and excesses which make the public evil much greater than the individual good. For example, a man finds that he can indulge himself and his family in certain practices which, with his own habits of self-control and his strong family discipline, secure much enjoyment to them without any evil. But he perceives that his neighbors have less self-control and less ability to govern their children, and that his example leads them into excesses which engender vice, and waste, and disorder. In such a case as this, an action, which, were it not connected with probabilities of perversion by others, would be right, becomes wrong on account of its tendencies. A large portion of actions that men differ about in regard to their moral character, are of this description. The traffic in ardent spirits, and the patronage of certain amusements, are specific examples of this class.

If these distinctions were clearly borne in mind in questions of right and wrong, much needless discussion would be saved. For it not unfrequently happens, that on one side the act is called right in relation to the motives of the actors, in which relation it is right; while on the other side it is called wrong in reference to its general influence on the public welfare, in which relation it is wrong. So, also, a practice is judged of, on one side, solely with reference to the individual, or to immediate results; while, on the other side, reference is had to general rules, or to the general tendencies of such actions, if universally practised. And for want of such distinctions many discussions are needlessly protracted.

These views enable us to discern the causes of the difficulties which embarrass most writers on ethical science. Such writers may be thus classed. The first class consists of those who are the most vague and indiscriminating in their use of definitions. They indeed attempt to define the terms right and wrong, but it is in such sort of modes as these: *Right* is that

which is fit; *right* is that which conforms to the nature of things; *right* is that which excites a sympathetic moral feeling. This is about as discriminating as to say, that a chronometer is something on board a ship; or a bird is something that has a head.

Another class teach that "*right* is that which is conformed to the will of God." It is true that whatever is right is conformed to the will of God, for God wills the right action of all his creatures. But this agreement is not the distinctive peculiarity which makes an action right. For if God should now choose to have any one of his creatures act malignantly and selfishly, the agreement of the action with his will would not make it right. If two men were both sent to London, and were both in the road to London, and it were said that one was right because he was going the same way as the other, it would be a parallel case of *non causa pro causa*. If his companion is right, his agreement with him shows that he is right, *but* it is not the reason why he is so.

Another class (among whom are Butler, Stewart, and Wayland) maintain that right is a simple idea, which can be defined only by mentioning the circumstances in which it occurs to the mind. Thus, when a son abuses a kind parent, every mind feels that this action has a certain quality, and to this quality the name *wrong* is given. So, when a man sacrifices his private interest for the public good, there is a quality to this action which all agree in calling *right* or *virtuous*. According to these philosophers, there is no rule for deciding what actions are right or wrong but this instinctive judgment of mankind. And when they are pressed with the fact that this judgment is conflicting, some men calling an action right which others call wrong, they resort to the fact that the moral sense of mankind often is perverted, so that what is right is felt to be wrong, and *vice versa*. But if it is the instinctive judgment of men which decides what actions are right and what are wrong, and these judgments contradict each other, how shall it be decided which is the true, and which the perverted judgment? And in all those cases where the character of actions is decided, not by individual experience, but by their *general tendencies* as exhibited in communities, how could an argument be held by these philosophers, to prove that an action was right or wrong? In all such cases, they are obliged to concede that whatever tends to the greatest general good is right, and whatever interferes

with it is wrong, and that there is no other test for determining the character of actions. For the moral sense of mankind can be no guide until the experiment is made, and men learn what are the tendencies or effects of given practices. Such often refer to revelation as the guide for deciding; but revelation does not decide many very important specific questions of right and wrong.

Another class, of whom Bentham is the representative, teach that *right* is that which tends to promote the greatest general happiness, and so far they seem to be correct. But they seem to inculcate the principle, that in every case a man is to inquire whether the *specific act* will do most good or harm, and trust entirely to his own judgment for the answer. The facts, that certain general rules must be sustained, and that on many questions the Bible alone is the only sure standard of right and wrong, are not properly recognized.

Another class maintain, that *right* is that which tends to promote the greatest general happiness, and that the Revealed Will of God furnishes general rules which are the only sure guide as to what actions will secure it. But this class have often embarrassed themselves by not recognizing the fact, that the moral sense is, in some degree, a guide to decide what is right and what is wrong. They have endeavored to sustain the position that *in all cases* an action is felt to be wrong because it *is perceived* that such actions tend to injure the public welfare. Thus, when young children hear the tale of the Babes in the Wood, and shed tears of joy when they learn that the wicked uncle was punished, such will maintain that it is perceiving that the general good requires that such cruelty should be punished, which causes these expressions of pleasure. They have embarrassed their position by not recognizing the fact, that mind is so constituted as to revolt from certain actions as wrong, without any perception of their general tendencies, or consideration of the general good.

The defects of these various ethical writers may be illustrated by the case of a watch when the question is asked, Why is a watch right? or, What do we mean when we say a watch is right? The class of vague definers reply it is right, "because it is fit," or "because it agrees with the nature of mechanical contrivances," or "because mankind sympathize together in feeling it to be right." Another class say it is right, "because it conforms to the nature of watches." Another class, like

Paley, say it is right, "because it is conformed to the will or design of the maker." Another class, like Stewart and Wayland, say it is right, "because men in general *feel* that it is right, and when they differ in opinion, one or the other have perverted feelings on the subject, and we must go to the watch-maker to know which is right."

Bentham would say, the watch was right because it conformed to its design and pointed out the real time of day, and yet that each man must judge for himself, without sun or star to guide, whether the watch was correct or not.

The preceding portion of this article relates to the question of right and wrong in reference to the character of certain *actions* of mind. But it also involves the question of the *moral character of mind itself*.

Character, in its widest sense, is that, in matter or mind, which is the foundation for calculation as to future phenomena. Thus, in regard to material bodies, such for example as fire and water, their character consists of those particulars which enable us to anticipate what their future actions will be. Water, in past experience, has run down hill, and fire has consumed combustibles, and therefore it is the character of one to flow and the other to burn. So, in regard to mind, we have learned by experience how it will act in given circumstances, and this is the foundation of our calculations for the future, and is what is called its character.

The *moral character* of mind is, all those peculiarities which experience has afforded as the ground of calculation in regard to the nature of its future *volitions*. The grand distinction between matter and mind is, that matter, in given circumstances, *invariably* presents the same phenomena, so that in those circumstances, it has power to act only in one way, and no power to refrain from thus acting. On the contrary, mind, in given circumstances, has power to choose in either of two ways. And the nature of mind is such that it never can, like matter, be *twice* placed in precisely similar circumstances. For it is always gaining new experience, new knowledge of nature, and new force of habit, so that there is no such invariableness of antecedence and sequence in the action of mind as there is in material phenomena.

Still, experience has led to the discovery of certain general laws, in regard to volition, which will be pointed out at another time and place, which are in some cases the foundation of al-

most as much certainty as to the future, as we ever feel in regard to the future action of matter. But there are many cases, in which the future volitions of mind can be predicted only by approximation, or by a calculation of probabilities. To exhibit this, it is needful to refer to one important phenomenon of mind. It is found that whenever a strong desire is excited for some good, which is seen to be inconsistent with our moral sense, there is a mental struggle similar to the effort made when we exert our muscles to overcome an opposing force. And the stronger the desire, and the more decided the opposition of our moral nature to it, the more painful and difficult is the struggle. In describing this, we use the same terms as we employ in regard to physical efforts. We say that it is "hard," or that it is "difficult" to decide, and we understand the terms thus employed, as readily as we do when we say it is hard or difficult to lift a weight. In both cases the terms express a simple idea, which can be gained only by experience. We must feel the difficulty of lifting a weight, or of opposing conscience to desire, before we can understand what "hard and difficult" mean in either use. A certain volition, then, is easy or difficult just in proportion to the struggle between conflicting principles of mind. And the probabilities in regard to future volitions depend very much upon circumstances which decide how severe this struggle shall be.

Moral character, it has been said, consists of all those particulars afforded by experience as grounds of calculation in regard to the nature of future volitions. We must then appeal to past experience to learn what are the *causes of volition*, or the *reasons* why volitions are one way and not another. In the sense of *efficient cause*, mind itself is the only cause of its own volitions. Motives are therefore considered as *occasional* and not as *efficient causes*. There are only four particulars which are ever called the *causes* or *reasons* why volitions are one way and not another.

The first is, some constitutional susceptibility existing or wanting. To illustrate: take the case of two men presented with intoxicating liquor, where neither supposes it injurious; the one has a constitutional love, and the other a constitutional aversion to it. In this case the cause, or reason, why one chooses to drink and the other does not, is the nature of their constitutional susceptibilities. And these, when known, are the data for predicting their future volitions in such cases.

The next particular is, the existence of some habit, or else the want of it. Suppose a similar case to the above, except that both the persons are very fond of the liquor, and both believe it injurious. But one has formed habits of temperance and self-control, and the other has not. In this case, the cause or reason why one chooses to drink and the other does not, is the existence or non-existence of a habit, and this is the ground for predicting their future volitions in similar circumstances.

The next particular is, the *knowledge of motives*. Suppose the same offer made to two persons of precisely similar tastes and habits, and the only difference is, that one knows the evils that result from such drinks and the other does not. The reason why one chooses to drink and the other chooses not to do so, is the knowledge or want of knowledge of motive; and this is data for predicting their future volitions.

The last particular is, the existence of a *generic governing purpose or choice*. Suppose in the above case the two men both are fond of the drink, both know its evil effects, and both are alike as to habits of self-control. But one of them has formed the purpose never to taste such drink in any circumstances, or the still more general purpose, always to do *what is right*; and the other has formed no such purpose. Then the reason why one drinks, and the other does not, is the existence or non-existence of a governing volition or principle; and when this is known, it is the ground for predicting future volitions.

Of all these four general causes of volition it may be remarked, that they are *permanent* principles of action. A man's susceptibilities, his habits of mind, the knowledge he has gained, which operates as motive, and the determinations or principles of action he has formed, are fixed and abiding causes of mental action, and furnish data for calculating his future volitions, as much so as do the powers and principles of matter in predicting its future phenomena. Not that the causes which control mind are *necessary* causes, which make it impossible for mind to choose otherwise, but they are causes which make it *certain*, in some cases, that volitions will be one way and not another. By *certain* is here signified that which *will* be, but not a *necessary* certainty.

It may also be remarked, that these are the *only* causes which are ever assigned by man or by God as the reasons why a volition is one way and not another. If a cause or reason is asked for any voluntary course of conduct, the answer is, either be-

cause the person had such and such *tastes or susceptibilities*, or because he had such and such *habits*, or because he had the *knowledge* of such and such motives, or because he had formed such and such *principles or determinations*. It is true that the more *remote* causes are often spoken of as producing voluntary action. Thus, parents are said to make their children choose in a certain direction, and one man makes another choose a certain course, and God "worketh in us to will and to do." But when it is asked *how* these more remote causes operate, it is always the case that the reply is, that it is either by affecting the susceptibilities, or by forming the habits, or by communicating a knowledge of motives that will secure a given specific volition, or originate some generic governing purpose or principle. Neither God nor man is ever spoken of as causing volitions by any other methods, nor can we conceive of any other modes of securing a given volition to be one way rather than another.

It has previously been shown that the *probabilities* of a given volition or course of action are calculated by taking into view all those things which make such a volition or course of action "hard or difficult." If a man has very strong susceptibilities to anger, it is more difficult and therefore less probable that he will be meek under provocation than if he possessed a phlegmatic temperament. If a man has formed habits of self-control, it is as much easier to govern his temper, and more probable that he will do it, than if he had formed no such habits. If a man, by reading and intercourse with men, has gained a knowledge of the evils of angry ebullitions, and the shame and other ill results that come from it, it is much easier to govern himself than if no such knowledge of motives were gained. And if a man has made a firm determination always to suppress the manifestations of this passion, it is easier to do it, and therefore more probable that he will do it, than if no such purpose had been formed.

We find that mankind always *estimate character* by the *probabilities* resulting from the existence of these causes. Why is a man said to have a character for honesty? Because experience has shown that he possesses such susceptibilities, habits, opinions, and purposes, that in all ordinary circumstances of temptation he acts honestly, and from this it is inferred that he will continue to do so.

And there are different standards of honesty, and characters of all degrees of conformity to these standards. So also in regard

to veracity, to industry, to temperance, and all the practical virtues of life, men are regarded as having some fixed characters, according as experience develops their susceptibilities, habits, opinions, and purposes of action. And these are the data for predicting their future volitions, in circumstances of temptation.

And in all respects where character is to be observed, we find there are all degrees and shades of difference, from the highest to the lowest degree of conformity to the highest or lowest standards. And yet mankind are always dividing their fellow creatures into two opposing classes or characters; as the honest and dishonest, the truthful and the mendacious, the temperate and the intemperate, the industrious and the indolent, the virtuous and the vicious. And Revelation does the same. In it we find all divided into two classes, the righteous and the wicked, the good and the evil, the holy and the unholy, the saints and the sinners, the children of the world and the children of God, the heirs of Heaven and the children of perdition.

We are now prepared for the inquiry, What is *the character* which will secure the object for which mind was created?—or, What is the *right* character, that is, what is the character which will *act* to secure the greatest amount of happiness? It has been maintained that mind is not like matter, in being acted on by causes that are *necessary*, so that a certainty of future voluntary action is made by having mind placed in such circumstances that it has *no power* to choose except in one direction. For this destroys the idea of *free agency* or *voluntary action*, which consists in the power of choosing either to gratify or not to gratify any given desire; or, in other words, in the power to yield or not to yield to any particular motives. The moment this power does not exist in a mind, it is *no longer a mind*; it has lost the distinctive peculiarity which constitutes mind. Of course, the certainty of the right future action of mind, is not made by causes which take away the power to act wrong. As there is always, therefore, a power to act wrong in all minds, what is the foundation for predicting with certainty, that any mind will *continue* in a perpetuated course of *voluntary* right action? For, of the causes which constitute character, one is a *generic governing purpose* or *volition*, and this *can* be changed, and therefore it *may* be at some future time.

We therefore reply that, from the nature of the case, there can, to finite minds, be no certainty of future character, except

what is gained from Him who sees the end from the beginning ; who has power over our susceptibilities, and power to regulate all circumstances of temptation, and can thus foresee all future results. Has he then pointed out *what character* will secure the object for which mind is created ? It is claimed that he has done this, in the Revelation of his will.

But to ascertain what this character is, we must bear in mind that the Bible is not a collection of *metaphysical* writings, but that it is addressed to common people, and is written in the popular language of common life. The main law of interpretation is, therefore, to be adopted, viz., "language is to have that meaning given to it, which the speaker or writer knew was the sense in which it would be received by those to whom it is addressed." We therefore take this rule for our guide in going to the Bible ; and in investigating this subject, we find, first, that the terms *death, destruction, loss of the soul, sin, the carnal mind, eternal banishment from God*, are (with other similar expressions) used interchangeably to express the great general truth, that those whose *characters* are sinful, wicked, or unholy, will live for ever in dreadful misery ; and that those who are righteous or holy characters, will live for ever in perfect happiness. And we find that Jesus Christ came into this world to save mankind from this death, and to secure this life to them. And this is the declaration of the mode whereby we are to be thus saved : "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved"—and, "he that believeth not shall be damned." What then is intended by the faith in Jesus Christ, which is indispensable to salvation ? Directed by the above rule, we inquire, what in the ordinary use of language do the common people understand by believing on, or having faith in, a person ? In regard to mere *theories* which have no bearing on personal enjoyment or general welfare, all the evidence of faith or belief is an internal conviction produced by evidence, which is known only by *introspection* or *testimony*. But in practical matters, where belief will affect feelings and actions, it is the exhibition of the feelings and conduct, which is the main evidence of faith or belief. In the case of Paul in the shipwreck, he charged all not to get into the boats, but to remain with the ship, and they would be saved. Now, whatever professions of faith in Paul might be made by the crew, if a part went into the boats, and a part remained with the ship, all common men would decide alike, as to which were those who be-

lieved in Paul, or had faith in him. Let a man declare that he does not believe in witches or ghosts, and yet let him carefully keep a horse-shoe nailed to his door-sill, and seem troubled when it is removed; let him also show by his looks and actions that he fears the appearance of departed spirits; and all common men would say he believed in witches and ghosts. So let a dreadful pestilence appear, and a physician comes along and offers to cure all who will come to him and obey his prescriptions. A man and his family are seized with the disorder, and he either does not send for him, or neglects all his prescriptions when obtained. All would say he had no faith in him. Another, in similar circumstances, gets his prescriptions, which perhaps are multiplied and difficult to obey, so that he sometimes forgets, and sometimes makes mistakes, and sometimes yields to indolence, yet in the main he diligently strives to obey all the directions he receives, and is sorry whenever he fails. All would say he has faith in this physician; and the degree of his faith would be measured by the diligence and faithfulness of his obedience, and his trouble and regret whenever he forgot or made mistakes. According then to popular use, the terms to *have faith in*, or to *believe in*, include the following particulars:—First, such a knowledge of evidence as secures intellectual conviction of a truth. Thus the man, in order to go to the physician, must first have evidence that he is sick of a dangerous disorder, and that the physician has power to cure him. Next, he must form a determination, or generic volition, to get his prescriptions, and to obey them. Next, and in consequence of this evidence and this determination, he feels confidence in him, affection toward him, gratitude, and hope of a cure. Lastly, he carries out his determination by all the specific acts of obedience to his directions. The last is the only satisfactory proof or evidence of his faith. For, if he profess to trust in him, get his prescriptions, and determine to obey them, and yet never does follow his orders, no one would say he had faith in him.

According to this, we can readily ascertain what is meant by the inspired declaration addressed to all men, and in the common language of life: "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." It involves the following particulars: first, an intellectual conviction or belief, produced by evidence, of our danger, and of the truth that Christ can save us, if we follow his directions. Next, receiving his directions as contained in the Gospel, and forming a generic purpose or determina-

tion to obey them all. Next, and as the natural result of the preceding acts, are feelings of trust, confidence, gratitude, and love. Lastly, actual obedience to his directions in the specific duties required. These are the four particulars which constitute that faith in Jesus Christ, which saves the soul from eternal misery and secures eternal happiness. And the Bible teaches, in the most decided terms, that all who have this faith at death, will be for ever happy ; and those who do not, will be for ever miserable. But it may here be objected, that the directions of Jesus Christ include *perfect obedience* to all the rules of rectitude ; that he requires of us, " Be ye perfect, even as your Father who is in heaven is perfect." Does faith include *perfect obedience* to all his commands, as the indispensable ground of salvation ? Who then can be saved ?

In reply to this, we again refer to the common use of language, and the illustration employed above. Suppose, in the case of the pestilence, the prescriptions of the physician required forethought, self-denial, industry, perseverance, and a long round of daily observances. Now, according to the common use of language, is it necessary for a patient to be absolutely *perfect* in obedience to every specific direction, in order to have it said that he has faith in him ? No ; it only requires that the patient should determine to obey the physician in all things, and set himself about it in earnest, with the sincere purpose to do exactly as he directs ; and if this is the case, he will in the main accomplish what he aims at. The fact that he sometimes misreads his directions, or, from other cares, sometimes forgets ; or, from occasional indolence or passion, sometimes disobeys ; does not prove that he has not faith in the physician, so long as his purpose to obey him continues, and ordinarily is carried out in action. And the degree of his faith is always measured by the earnestness with which he strives to obey, and the regret manifested when he forgets or disobeys.

And the faith described as saving the Old Testament saints, is precisely of the same character as that required in the Gospel. In the chapter on faith, in Hebrews, they are described as " looking for a city whose builder and maker is God," as " seeing the promises afar off, and were persuaded of them and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims upon earth." And they " declared plainly," that they sought " a better country, even a heavenly one," " wherefore God was not ashamed to be called their God." And in the

narration of what was wrought by faith, we perceive that the Scriptural use is exactly the popular use of the term. Christ, when he appeared visibly to the patriarchs, instructed them in his will, and taught them that they must "live as seeing Him who is invisible;" that they must obey him, even when it involved the loss of all things; and that they must look forward to a heavenly country for their reward. They believed his teachings, and determined to live according to his directions; and though many of them did wrong things, in the main they did obey him, and lived for eternity and not for time. All these are said to have obeyed Christ, to have had faith in Christ, and to have been saved by Christ, because the Being who instructed, guided, and saved them, was the Messenger of the Covenant, the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus, it is said that Moses "esteemed the *reproach of Christ* greater than all the treasures of Egypt;" and of Him who led the Israelites, it is said, "and that Rock was Christ."

There is no point which is urged by the Apostles with more earnestness, than the fact that mankind are to be saved, not by an exact and strict obedience to every precept of law, but by faith in Jesus Christ. If we could secure eternal happiness only by exact and strict conformity to all the rules Christ has laid down as our duty, no hope would exist for any of our sinful race. Instead of this, we are taught that the sincere and earnest purpose to obey all the commands of Christ, carried out into every-day practice, will, by means of the motives made known by the Saviour, and by the supernatural assistance promised to all who thus engage, eventually secure eternal life. This is the distinction between being *saved by faith* and being *saved by works*, so much insisted on by Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.

But it may be inquired, If faith in Jesus Christ include *intellectual belief* of evidence, which must necessarily be in different degrees according to evidence presented; and *certain emotions*, which depend on the views presented to the intellect; and on a *generic purpose or determination*, which also must be induced by the motives presented to the intellect; and on *specific acts of obedience*, which also depend on the generic purpose and on additional constantly recurring motives; then there must be very different degrees of faith in Jesus Christ: is there any rule to enable us to decide how far short we can fall, and yet be saved? It is in vain to go to the Bible for any such

information. Jesus Christ and his Apostles lay down the strict rules of self-denying benevolence, and set before us the motives that appeal to fear, hope, love, and gratitude; and then we are told: "He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned;" and there the matter is left.

It can readily be perceived that the topics here discussed, involve many of the most important points, both of ethics and theology. When we ascertain what is the object of a design, then we have data for deciding when its *action* is right, what its *character* is, whether it is *perfect* or *imperfect*, in order or *depraved*.

If, therefore, we have, in these pages, established the position, that the object of the Creator in forming mind, was *the production of the greatest amount of happiness*, then we have data for deciding the following questions: What is a perfect mind? In what particulars is the mind of man imperfect? What is a *totally* depraved mind? What is the nature of the change, from a depraved to a perfect mind? Is this change progressive or instantaneous; or is it complex—a part being progressive, and a part instantaneous? What are the agents or causes of this change? How do these causes or agents operate? What influence has education in securing the object for which mind is created?

These questions are presented for the consideration of those who may read this article, with the hope that, if it is correct, they may trace out the results that naturally flow from it; and if not, that its mistakes may be pointed out.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE AMERICAN COLPORTEUR SYSTEM.

By Prof. J. M. STURTEVANT, Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.

THE Western American States are certainly attracting to themselves a very flattering share of the attention of the civilized world. Not only are their vast unappropriated resources alluring the unfortunate, the destitute, and the adventurous of every clime and language, but it is here, also, that nearly every system, whether of government or religion, to be found in the

civilized world, is anticipating a soil favorable to its growth, and an ample field for its expansion. The fact is, to a considerable extent, appreciated by the thinking minds of the age, to whatever moral or political system attached, that an empire may here be founded in a single generation, of sufficient moral power to render it a preponderating weight in the scale of human destiny. There are, on the Mississippi and its branches, physical resources enough to sustain nearly the whole present population of Europe. The remotest portions of this vast region may be reached by the tax-burdened, half starving population of Europe, or by the bold and aspiring adventurer of either hemisphere, in a period of from one to two months, and at a cost comparatively trifling. And yet, its present population does not much exceed 7,000,000. What wonder, then, if reflecting minds all over Christendom look with absorbing interest to the question, What is to be the political, social, and religious character of this growing empire? What are to be the systems of religion and government here established, and under which these countless millions are to exist for time, and to form their character for eternity? What wonder, if the old and decaying secular despotisms of Europe look to the great valley of the West with mingled fear and hope—fear, lest a power should be evolved from the heart of this gigantic empire, to hasten their downfall and seal their doom—with hope, that the means may here be discovered of renewing their age, and repairing their decaying vigor? What wonder, if the old papal tyranny feels a fresh revival of hope, as it sees its faithful minions entering by millions into the possession of this mighty inheritance, and begins again to exult in the prospect of regaining the undisputed supremacy which it enjoyed in by-gone ages of darkness? What wonder, too, if the friends and advocates of civil and religious freedom, and the pure doctrines of the cross of Christ, sometimes indulge the thought, that perhaps their warfare is nearly accomplished—that the time is near when the “meek shall inherit the earth”—and that the mighty West is to be the inheritance of freedom and evangelical truth? And what wonder, if all these various systems should be seen making efforts for the moral empire of this vast region, corresponding with the magnitude of the prize to be lost or won, and with a zeal such as the vital question only can arouse? Such is the spectacle which the “great valley” actually presents to the reflecting mind at the present moment. And, though it

be ever true, as asserted by our Saviour, that "the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light," it is yet matter of devout gratitude to God, that in this instance the friends of the Redeemer are not wholly blind to the magnitude of the question which is about to be decided on these fertile plains, not only for our country, but for the world.

But while it is pretty generally acknowledged and felt by evangelical Christians throughout the nation, that a great effort is demanded, and that speedily, to fill the new States and Territories of the West with Christian institutions and Christian sentiments, is it not still true, that there may have been in some instances considerable failure in the choice of wise and appropriate means for the securing of so great an end? Even now, would it not be quite reasonable to inquire, whether our system of religious effort for the destitute in our own land, is one which can at all points be defended, as judicious, wise, and economical? Has it been formed by a careful analysis of our existing intellectual and moral condition, and a thorough examination of all the circumstances which must modify its results? Is it at all points founded on principles, which are clearly seen, and may be easily defended? Is it *symmetrical*, bearing every where the indications of the handy-work of a wise master-builder? Has it not rather been often constructed hastily and impulsively, with little of that careful and patient study of character, which is needful in order rightly to estimate the resistance of the medium, in which our moral machinery is to act? Have not our efforts for the West, particularly, often been the result of a blind impulse—a vivid feeling that we *must* do something, while, had we confessed to ourselves the truth, we should have been distinctly conscious, that we knew not what to do? And are not our efforts in this great and good cause still marked, to a considerable extent, by the same impulsive character? We trust, therefore, that our readers will bear with us patiently, while we proceed to examine the position at present occupied by that portion of the American Tract Society's operations, commonly called the "Colporteur System."

This branch of benevolent effort is at present attracting to itself no small share of the sympathy, the confidence, and the contributions of the Christian public. It is, therefore, highly important that the views and principles upon which it proceeds, should be thoroughly understood in the light of a careful and candid examination. To such an examination all our systems

of benevolent effort ought to be most freely subjected. They ought, all of them, and at all times, to be "ready to give an answer to every man that asketh them a reason of the hope that is in them, with meekness and fear." If their principles are sound, and their views just, such an examination can only result in giving them a stronger hold of the confidence and the affections of the pious; but if they are founded on false principles, it surely can never be unsuitable or unseasonable to expose the error. We think our various associations for religious and benevolent purposes, have perhaps sometimes been more averse to this sort of examination of their principles and claims, than they should have been. There is, indeed, sacredness in the great end at which they all aim—the evangelization of the world; but that sacredness does not necessarily attach to every particular system of means which may have been adopted for gaining that end. Such a system of means can have no claim to respect, any further than it can be shown to have been wisely chosen, and to be necessary to the attainment of the result desired. We should, therefore, encourage our brethren to approach the question, whether this or that specific plan of doing good is wisely laid, with the utmost freedom of inquiry. It is thus only that our system of benevolent effort can be expected permanently to enjoy the confidence of the Christian public.

The nature and design of the "American Colporteur system" are so well understood by the reading public, that little need be said by us in explanation. It is an effort of the American Tract Society, to "supply" the "destitute" portions of our country with its publications, by the labors of a class of men called "Colporteurs." It is expected of this class of laborers, that they direct their efforts mainly to two points, viz. First, to the circulation of the publications of the Society, by sale where there is ability to purchase, or by gratuitous distribution where individuals or families are found unable to buy them; and, second, to engage in personal efforts, where opportunity presents itself, to bring men of every grade and description to Christ. They are the travelling booksellers of the Society—and yet not confining their attention to the sale or distribution of books, but making it a prominent object of their labors, to induce people to read the books, and to embrace the Saviour whom they are intended to set forth.

Fortunately for our present inquiry, there are certain points of the subject about which there is no danger of any controversy. Such are the following, viz. :

1. The general excellence of the publications of the American Tract Society. It cannot but be matter of devout gratitude to God, in the estimation of every intelligent Christian, not only that there is in our mother tongue so rich a religious literature as is found in these publications—rich both in evangelical sentiment and in the gifted genius with which God has endowed his servants, to set forth those sentiments to the men of their day and generation—but also, that that literature is embodied in a form at once cheap and attractive.

2. The desirableness of giving a wide circulation to this religious literature, in order to bring it in contact, as widely as possible, with the national mind and heart, and the propriety of employing, within proper limits and with a due regard to the habits and circumstances of society, a class of agents to labor for its circulation.

3. Just as little may we doubt the utility of personal effort in public and in private, with individuals and from house to house, in the highways, in the streets and in the market places, to impress the truths of religion upon the mind, the conscience, and the heart. We repeat it, these are not matters of controversy. Neither are we slow to feel or reluctant to acknowledge the disinterested zeal, the fervent charity, the unfeigned piety, with which the American Tract Society is prosecuting this work for the whole country, and especially for the comparatively destitute West and South.

Still, there are questions which may be propounded in reference to this enterprise, which seem to us not well understood, and therefore to require further investigation. Such questions are the following:—Is not the Colporteur system made to occupy a place relatively too prominent in our system of evangelical effort for the West? Are not the public encouraged to expect from it results which it can never produce? Are not advantages claimed for it over other modes of benevolent action at the West which it does not possess, and which it cannot be supposed to possess without leading to serious practical error? Is it not so exhibited as to disparage those other instrumentalities—the organized Church, and the educated and pious ministry, which ever must be the very pillars of Protestant Christian Society? In order to set these questions in a clear light, we shall exhibit the claims of the system in the language of the Society's own publications, and endeavour, with whatever of candor we are able, to examine their validity.

We have before us a pamphlet published by the American

Tract Society, entitled the "AMERICAN COLPORTEUR SYSTEM;" the design of which is to set forth to the public the claims and advantages of this mode of effort. We have examined it with some care, and shall use it freely in the pages which follow, as well as the report of the Society for 1843. One of the most definite impressions made on the mind by examining these documents is, that there is supposed to be at the present time a great "emergency" in our moral and religious condition, which this system is almost exclusively adapted to meet. Neither Home Missions nor our educational efforts can meet it—they are too slow—while the eye rests on them, the heart sickens with despondency—but as we turn to Colportage, hope revives. Here we are taught to look for an agency adequate to meet the fearful crisis, and raise us from impending ruin. That we may not be suspected of misstatement, we shall here quote a few passages in proof of these assertions, from the pamphlet above referred to :

* * * "Oh, how does the heart tremble and bleed, as all the interests, temporal and eternal, of the millions of foreigners on our shores come like ocean surges over the intelligent, observing mind! And when searching in vain, among the accustomed agencies for diffusing the gospel, for those that are adequate to the present and prospective emergency, the mind turns, with gratitude to God, to this system, combining as it does the chief instrumentalities at present available, on any considerable scale, for this vast and neglected population."—Page 12, Am. Col. Sys.

* * * "The heart that has been ready to faint, as cloud after cloud has arisen on our political horizon—as the elements of national ruin gain strength by foreign immigration—as the designs of popery are more and more developed, and as the insufficiency of present means of evangelization are painfully apparent—may take courage in the hope and confidence, that a system which, in its infancy, could spread the gospel over all Europe in spite of popes, emperors, and kings, has elements of power, which, if fully developed in subserviency to, and co-operation with, all other legitimate means of evangelization, may, under God, avert threatened dangers and scatter untold blessings, by giving timely ubiquity to that Gospel which alone saves men and nations."—Page 20, Am. Col. System.

We have not failed to notice the fact, that in the passage last extracted, there is an admission that the Colporteur System should be "in subserviency to, and co-operation with, all other legitimate means of evangelization." But what are the other legitimate means of evangelization here available? Not the regular ministry; for it is contended that this is impossible to be extended to meet the wants of our growing population.

* * * There is no homogeneousness, and no possibility of sustaining the ministry of a particular order in the midst of prejudice or carelessness. Thousands and tens of thousands of families are thus circumstanced; and so long as millions of acres of cheap government-lands tempt the hardy pioneer to a western home, such must be the condition of multitudes of our fellow countrymen.

But shall these scattered families be left to grow up in ignorance of the great salvation, or degenerate into barbarism, because the favorite method of Gospel instruction cannot convey its blessings to them?"—Page 7, *Am. Col. Sys.*

On page 12 of the pamphlet already referred to, after a soul-stirring recital of the religious destitution of some portions of our country, among which is the fact, "that a district of country one hundred miles in breadth and five hundred miles in length, containing half a million of souls, has not a single educated preacher so far as is known; and that half of this population seldom if ever hear a sermon of any kind, and enjoy almost no other religious privileges," we find this inquiry: "Is there not a vast neglected field to be occupied for a season by the Colporteur, with his oral and printed messages, if occupied at all?"

In each of the passages here extracted, it is plain that the results of the system, if it produce any, must be independent of the labors of the stated ministry; for the destitution of the stated ministry, is urged, not as an argument for raising up and sustaining ministers, but for helping forward Colportage to take their place and do their work. Equally evident is it, that the results of this system are anticipated independently of the means of education.

"In this view the accumulation of means of instruction in a few favored states, to the neglect of the million, is sheer folly and madness; and the effects of this policy have led an ultra royalist historian of England, and an ultra democratic reviewer in America, to sneer at the idea of a people attempting to govern themselves, and to pronounce our government in this respect a failure. That such must be the issue with such a mass of ignorance as is indicated by our last census, (700,000 white persons over the age of twenty who cannot read,) and with the accumulation of foreign immigrants, and the increasing power of Rome, we have reason to fear, unless speedy and well adapted means are employed to carry light to the hitherto neglected classes. Primary schools must be every where established; colleges, academies, and seminaries of learning, must pour out knowledge; ministers must be multiplied; but all these require time—too much time, we fear, to be seasonable; and even if they were in operation, it would by no means supersede the necessity and desirableness of an agency that is truly republican—going as the Colporteur does,

to all the people, and first of all to those to whom no one else goes, with the means of light and salvation. If we would ignite a mass of anthracite, we must place the kindling at the bottom: if we would kindle the fire of knowledge and piety, we must commence at the lowest point of social being."—Page 8, *Am. Col. Sys.*

True, if you would ignite a mass of anthracite, you must place the kindling at the bottom. But does it hence follow, that if you would elevate and enlighten "700,000 white persons over the age of twenty who cannot read," you must begin by selling them books? So it seems; and that because it will take too much time to establish schools and teach them to read: you must therefore take a shorter road, send them an agent to sell them good books, and if they cannot or will not buy, why let him give them gratuitously.

Now we feel constrained to say, that this reasoning is to our minds utterly fallacious, and the expectations of happy results founded upon it, quite unreasonable and extravagant. What is this "emergency" for which we are called to provide? It is that of a mighty confederacy of nations rising up with a rapidity unparalleled in all the former history of colonization, composed of all the heterogeneous elements which can be drawn together from both hemispheres by the dread of despotism and the love of freedom, by the fear of starvation and the reasonable prospect of plenty and even affluence. From almost every portion of Christendom you here find the agriculturist in search of rich and cheap land—the mechanic, of high wages and plenty of work—the capitalist, of high interest or a profitable speculation—the lawyer, of clients—the physician, of patients—and the political aspirant, of rapid advancement to place and power. Here are the ministers of every religious creed in Christendom, not only seeking but actually finding disciples, and anticipating a harvest each for his own favorite system, as abundant as our virgin soil yields to the labors of the husbandman. Society of course we have none, but only the fermenting, effervescing materials of which it is to be composed. Those firm and compact masses of human beings, which we call societies, are not formed by the mere juxtaposition of individuals: whoever analyzes them will always find them crystalline in their structure, and that they are the result of the mutual action of heterogeneous elements. Such an experiment in moral chemistry is now going on in the newly settled portions of our country, on a scale the most magnificent ever witnessed by man. Incipient

religious organizations we have without number; but they are all intimately mingled in the effervescing mass, and it would defy the keenest sagacity to discover, in reference to each or any one of them, whether it is to be the nucleus of crystallization, or itself to yield, refractory as it may be, to the power of the solvent in which it is immersed, and to contribute its elements to those new and possibly better forms of society, which perchance are yet to be. Convictions of the importance of education we have; but systems of education we either have none at all, or else, for the want of homogeneity of prejudice or sentiment, those which we have are left, like many an architectural structure which meets the eye of the traveller, to decay in the weather without roof or clapboards. We have public funds amply sufficient to provide for the education of the whole people, at a trifling cost to the individual; and yet, for the want of wisdom and unity in our plans and efforts, those funds are producing little benefit to any, and children are growing up by tens of thousands without being able to read or write their mother tongue. And yet, to such a people is committed the sacred trust of republican liberty—the solemn legacy bequeathed to us by our fathers of the Revolution! On such a people is thrown the solemn responsibility of self-government. By the hardy pioneers of society in these critical and trying circumstances, are to be erected those social structures, beneath which a people, more numerous than the present swarming millions of Europe, are, at no distant day, to have their birth and exert their influence on the destiny of the great human family, and pass their own probation for eternity.

Such then is a mere glance at the emergency, especially as it presents itself in the new States of the West. And how is such an emergency to be met? First let us say that as we approach this question we seem to hear a voice saying to us, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy." There is something majestic and awful in these stately footsteps of Divine Providence. Here are grand movements of God, mighty moral causes, which, like the great laws of nature, man may yield to and obey, and by obeying find them subservient to his own moral and spiritual welfare; but which he cannot resist or control. And as in the natural so in the moral world; would we co-operate with God we must diligently and solemnly study the laws of action which he has prescribed. This is no time and no place for superficial views

of society—patent medicines for its diseases—the day dreams of perpetual motion to accomplish its moral results, or a bustling activity unguided by any wise discernment of the work we have to accomplish. Of these we have had enough, and more than enough, in the past history of benevolent effort for the West. Let the scattered fragments and bleaching skeletons of abortive schemes and abandoned enterprises of benevolence, admonish us to proceed with caution, and patiently examine the bearing of all those great moral causes which, originating in the providence of God, are beyond mortal control, and are yet bearing forward American, and especially Western society, toward some point which is perhaps distinctly laid down on the chart of no moral geographer. Let us so study the laws of moral climate, that we may not commit the folly of sowing in harvest with the vain hope of reaping at the dead of winter. Such laws there are—great designs which God has in view in the mighty movements of his providence, in reference to our country: we must approach them with reverence, and study them with candor and prayer.

What then is the system of effort which will meet such an emergency as we have described, and such as every intelligent man knows exists at the West? Can we flatter ourselves that Colportage can meet it, without deceiving ourselves and our readers? Western society is without religious organization. Can Colportage organize it, or be a substitute for such organization? It is deplorably destitute of an enlightened Christian ministry. Can Colportage provide such a ministry, or supply its place in its absence? It is destitute of schools and colleges. Can Colportage establish those schools and found those colleges, or produce a desirable state of society without them? Can the great emergency be in any sense met, while we are still deplorably destitute of all these great foundation-stones and main pillars of the social fabric? Is it right then in any sense to represent Colportage as peculiarly adapted to meet the present emergency? Is it not obvious that in *no sense* can it meet it? It can only be of any value as an humble auxiliary in the hands of a much more efficient agency. That agency is the organized Church with the regular ministry.

But we prefer to take a still broader view of the subject. Is it not obvious that no amount of the mere circulation of books, or the itinerant labors of men who form no part of the framework of society itself, can materially modify the character and

destiny of such a people as we have been describing? First, look at the probable influence of the books themselves. *Seven hundred thousand white adults cannot read them.* But this is but a small part of the difficulty. Of all those who, when asked if they can read, will answer in the affirmative, how few do read; or, if they read at all, read any thing more than a village newspaper? Probably there is not on the face of the earth, a people so intelligent as those of the Western States who read so little. If any one doubts this assertion, let him ask the booksellers of any of the Western cities, the state of the trade, and he will obtain an answer which will dissipate his doubts. The active, busy, migratory habits of Western people, the fewness and badness of their schools, and the universal prevalence of public speaking, or what may be called stump-oratory, as the chief means of affecting public opinion on all questions, whether secular or religious, are causes which have conspired to place Western character mainly under other influences than those of books. A Western audience will not listen to you while you *read* to them your own thoughts, much less will they be at the trouble of reading them themselves.

Nor is the scarcity of books the chief reason why Western people read so little. On the contrary, the fact that they read so little is the reason why they have so few books. You may find Lowell domestics, Havana coffee, and New Orleans sugar, in almost every cabin in the West; and if we were a reading people, we should find it equally easy for us to gratify our taste for books. Does then this feature of Western society point out the circulation of books as the readiest and most available mode of reaching Western mind, and forming Western religious character? We think not: we are sure that any expectations which may be entertained of a general movement in such a community, effected mainly by books, will prove utterly fallacious.

He who should infer from the views just presented that the population of our Western States are a stupid people, without ideas and without mental activity, would greatly err in his conclusions. The mental activity of the West is intense. In no part of our country are questions of trade, politics, and religion, more universally discussed, or with a more intense mental activity than at the West. Nowhere is eloquence more highly appreciated, or more sure to attract crowds of eager listeners. The popular declaimer on the currency or the tariff, on the

nature and mode of baptism, or any other of the great political or religious questions which agitate the public mind, will be sure to find himself followed by crowds of auditors wherever he goes. But the main instrument of calling forth this mental activity is, and for a long time must be, the *living speaker*. Politicians understand too well this trait of Western character, to trust the fate of the next election mainly to the printed page, however ably composed, or widely circulated. They know that the only moral force which can be relied on with safety is, the voice of the living speaker; and hence the candidate for popular favor must do his utmost to address with his own voice every voter. Again we ask, Can the circulation of books be the most available mode of reaching such a people?

But we take a still broader position. In *no case* is the press available as an instrument of agitation and reform, except on questions on which the public mind is already excited and deeply interested. The great mass of mankind will only read on questions in relation to which they already feel an interest. Hence, you may circulate the printed page to any conceivable extent, even though that printed page be the book of God, and unless there is that in the state of the public mind to awaken attention, and excite a disposition to read and study, no perceptible effect will be produced on society. In this respect we think serious errors have been committed by some good men in their reasonings about colportage.

"Here lies the secret of that amazing moral reformation, unprecedented for its rapidity and power. It was not that Luther and his compeers wrote so much and so ably, but that *a suitable instrumentality was employed for giving ubiquity* to their stirring appeals and overwhelming arguments, that enables the historian now to say, "The arrival of the doctor of Wittenberg's writings, every where forms the first page in the history of the Reformation." Page 1, Am. Col. Sys.

"A system which nearly revolutionized France, and the progress of which was stayed only by dragoons and fire and faggot, is revived there after the lapse of 300 years, in an age when the public sentiment of the world will not allow of its being suppressed by the *ultima ratio* of kings and popes." Page 2, Am. Col. Sys.

"The history of *colportage* on the continent of Europe within the past few years is familiar to the reader, and requires no further remark. It holds out almost the only ray of hope for

the millions who are held in the bondage of superstition, and under the control of a corrupt priesthood." Page 3, *Am. Col. Sys.*

Now we do not think it necessary for us to deny that colportage is "the secret of that amazing reformation." We hear much in our day about "men of one idea," and it really does seem to us that something of this sort is pretty clearly indicated in the passages which we have just presented to our readers. The real secret of that amazing reformation lay in the fact, that Europe had been groaning for a thousand years under the iron yoke of papal despotism, and the set time of her deliverance was come. And God raised up Luther and his associates to give utterance to those truths, which the discipline of his providence had prepared the nations to receive. They brought forth from the storehouse of God's word, that spiritual food for which millions felt that they were starving. Hence it was that the historian is enabled to say, that "the arrival of the doctor of Wittenberg's writings, every where forms the first page in the history of the Reformation." Let it be shown that a similar relation subsists between the state of mind now existing in the millions of our population, and the publications of the American Tract Society, to that which subsisted between the mind of Europe in the sixteenth century and the writings of Luther, and we will then admit that they are the great lever by which we are to act upon the nation—nay, then would there be no time for such admissions. There would be little need of colporteurs in that case. They would form an article of merchandise as universal as Merrimac prints or Havana coffee. Every steamboat and railroad car in the nation would be freighted with them. But while it continues true that those publications, excellent as they are, sustain no peculiar relation to the present cravings of the national mind, they cannot be available as leading instruments of popular movement and enlightenment.

It is not, to speak our mind in a word, Baxter's writings we mainly need; it is Baxter's *self*. There is no hope for us as a people, and peculiarly and pre-eminently for us at the West, but in the wise, learned, and holy men, whom God may permit to live, to write, to speak, to labor, and die with us, as the Baxters and Luthers of other times lived, and labored, and died with their respective generations. We want among us the men who can discern the signs of the times, who can appreciate the longings of the national mind, and draw forth from the deep and fervent

experience of their own soul, those utterances of God's truth, for the want of which our own age is perishing—holy men standing on their watchtower, and as the cry comes up in the midst of surrounding darkness, "Watchman, what of the night?" sending forth the welcome assurance that the morning cometh. The circumstances of our age and country are new and peculiar; it has its own errors, its own excitements, its own controversies. And it is not the writings of the men of another age, however evangelical, however resplendent with genius and learning, however glowing with pious fervor, than can meet our necessities as a people, and supply that intellectual and moral nutriment which as a nation we chiefly need. That work can only be done by the free, bold, untrammelled utterance of individual men, living in the midst of us, feeling, by constant sympathy, each pulsation of the national heart, and communing with God before this people, as Richard Baxter did before the men of his generation. To such men we may hope God will vouchsafe the utterance of those words of power, by which these dry bones shall live. And except such men abide among us, we may multiply Bibles and tracts, and works of devotion without a limit, and still this people cannot be saved.

But is it said the Society does not rely on books alone, but on the personal labors of its colporteurs? We readily grant that men of a truly Christian spirit may in this way do much good, in connexion with other means of grace, and occasionally carry the blessings of salvation to families, which were not likely soon to have been reached by the regular ministrations of the word. Is then this great work, for which the emergency calls, likely to be accomplished by the itinerant colporteur, having for his field of labor a "district of 50,000 or 75,000 inhabitants," and returning "on his track once in one, two, or three years?" Are men thus employed in the active labors of a travelling bookseller, even granting that they had in the outset all the intellectual furniture needed, likely to perform the mental labor required of the pioneers of religious society in our new States? It is no mean task these same pioneers have to perform, and they should be—they *must* be—men of learning, men of intense thought and laborious study. They should be men who combine, in an eminent degree, knowledge of men and knowledge of books, with profound original reflection. Is the colporteur system likely to bring such men into the field? Is it likely to cultivate such mental habits in the men whom it employs in its

labors? We leave it to the wise to answer such questions as these.

But again, if the colporteur carried with him all those intellectual and moral qualifications, which we have shown to be indispensable in meeting the emergency, still his position with reference to society would be a fatal barrier to his accomplishing the needed work. He *is* an itinerant. He *should be* a man at home, living among the people, and preparing them to be gathered to his fathers; identified with those permanent living fountains of influence, the organized church, or the literary or theological institution, and acting thus directly on the heart of society, and feeling all its pulsations. This the colporteur, or even the itinerant preacher, can never be. He is a stranger—a transient person. He is an ambassador representing to society the system that sends him, not himself sustaining a vital relation to the body politic. We must content ourselves with barely suggesting this thought, although it is one on which it would not be uninteresting to enlarge.

But it is claimed that these reasonings of ours are contradicted by facts. It is said that, in France, colportage is actually at this day the most efficient instrument of evangelization. We have looked with much interest on the struggle which seems to be coming on apace in that country between spiritual Christianity and the abominations of the papacy, and we have rejoiced much in the smiles of the Head of the Church on the labors of the colporteur. Still, colportage has not reformed France. For every Protestant at this day to be found in that kingdom, there are twenty Catholics. Out of 30,000,000 of her population only 1,500,000 are reckoned Protestants, and of these very many are Rationalists, Socinians, and Universalists. True, colportage is at present the most efficient instrument of evangelization. But why? Because it is the only mode of effort which is *free*. The church and the ministry—yes, the Protestant (?) church and the Protestant (?) ministry are the *creatures of the government*, and that too a government which, from policy and a consciousness of its own weakness, is notoriously subservient to the papacy. So far as they have done any thing in the shape of independence, it is only an empty name. The consistory, which is the controlling ecclesiastical influence in the Reformed Church of France, is a miserable *Ecclesiastical Aristocracy*, and worse still, an aristocracy founded on *wealth*. These assertions are made on the authority of the French correspondent of the New-

York Observer, M. De Felice. We reluctantly forbear transcribing in this place some passages from an article of his in the number of that paper for Feb. 10, 1844, entitled, "*Statistical details of Protestantism in France.*" We beg leave earnestly to solicit the attention of all our readers to the details of that article. They have filled our hearts with emotions which we have no power to describe, and we think they have a most important bearing on the point before us. Because French Protestants, with the church and the ministry under a vassalage to the State, such as the despotic genius of Napoleon could invent, when he would restore religion as an instrument of government—because, we say, with such a church and such a ministry as Napoleon would grant them, they can wield no more powerful instrument of evangelization than colportage; does it hence follow that this must be relied on as *our* main instrumentality in Republican America, with our *free* church and *free* ministry?

But France itself must have more powerful instruments—she must have God's own instruments, a free church and a free ministry, or she never will and never can be a reformed country. Her Protestantism must be rendered truly Protestant too—it must be divested of those ideas of "legal existence," of regulating all things by ecclesiastical power, and producing uniformity of belief and practice by a consolidated system of church courts, which seem to have taken so strong a hold of the very pious and generally intelligent writer just referred to; and go forth to the work trusting more in the word and Spirit of God, and less in human legislation, whether secular or ecclesiastical. Then a time will come when the Catholic priesthood will fear the influence of truly Protestant churches, and a truly Protestant ministry, more than they do that of the colporteur. Till that time does come, we predict France will be, in main, a Catholic country. And we think these are considerations of the utmost importance, to be borne in mind by American Christians, when they labor and pray for the evangelization of France.

The utter inadequacy of the colporteur system to meet the great emergency which has arisen in the new States, will perhaps appear more clearly in another point of view. The destitution of the ordinary and stated means of grace which exists, has been already alluded to, and to all those who wish to see it portrayed with truthfulness and power, we cordially recommend the eighteenth annual report of the American Tract

Society. What then is the extent of the remedy which the system under consideration proposes for these enormous and growing destitutions? It is, to employ one colporteur "for every district of 50,000 or 75,000 inhabitants," "to return on his track once in one, two, or three years, strengthen the things that remain," (if he can find any to strengthen,) "and meet the increasing population with the means of grace." Now, let it be borne in mind, that the question is not as to the utility of such a system, in connexion with the permanent institutions of religion, but as to its efficacy in *meeting our great emergency*—"in meeting the increasing population with the means of grace"? In this view of it, we too ask, "What is a single colporteur for a great State like North Carolina or Arkansas"? Nay, more, What is a single colporteur for a district containing 50,000 or 75,000 inhabitants, and doubling once in ten years? If any one has made himself believe that such a system can meet such a crisis, or by itself, without the aid of the great permanent institutions of a free Protestant community, materially modify the destiny of such a people as that which is springing up in the West, we are not surprised that he should have said of it that "*the colporteur enterprise is in morals what steam is in mechanics.*"* But we do wonder that the enlightened and pious men who guide the American Tract Society should have endorsed the sentiment. We think it a temporary outbreak of enthusiasm, which ill comports with the conservative sobriety of their general character. We take it for granted that these good brethren, after all, agree with us in the belief that the world is to be evangelized, not by the invention of new and more effective machinery, but by the application of the full power of Christian truth and love to moral machinery which was in full use in the days of Paul and Silas, and James and John; or at least that a new moving power in morals, like steam in mechanics, the world is never to know. Truth and love form the only possible moral force to be employed in the work of evangelization, and that force was fully evolved eighteen hundred years ago by Christ and his apostles.

In reply to all this, it is however claimed that other agencies—the school—the college—and the missionary, are too slow in their operations to be relied on to do the work which needs to

* American Colporteur System, page 21.

be done now. We are ready to admit that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light—that it is, indeed, heart-sickening to observe how slow the progress of moral and religious enterprises, when compared with those which have for their object the goods of earth. Still we must claim that in their action on forming society in this country, no mode of effort has been or can be productive of so much *immediate* good, independently of their remote bearings, as our efforts for education and Home Missions. Nor is it possible that the colporteur system can in this respect hold any reasonable comparison with them. The proof of this assertion lies, of course, in the considerations on which we have just been insisting. It may also be found in the actual forming efficacy of our missionary and educational enterprises, as attested by fact, under the personal observation of multitudes of living witnesses. The founding of a college, for example, looks indeed to ultimate and remote results of great magnitude and importance: but it is not therefore unproductive of immediate results. Personal delicacy would perhaps on such a point enjoin on us silence—but abundant personal observation impels us to speak freely. Such an enterprise forms a most attractive rallying point, around which enlightened piety and philanthropy are concentrated and organized—it awakens the popular mind to the interests of education—it calls the attention of the statesmen and men of influence to the intellectual wants of the people—it excites a strong desire for knowledge in the young, and calls forth thought, discussion, and enterprise, on the great subject of education, through a widely extended community. It places in prominent and influential stations men who have thought much on that great interest, as well as on the still higher interest of religion, and whose influence in the formation of society is felt in every member of the body politic—an influence, too, which is not remote and prospective, but immediate and obvious to the most superficial observer. It is felt, both in forming the present opinions and sentiments of the people, and in moulding the permanent institutions of society.

Neither are Home Missionary efforts mainly remote in their results, though they do aim at founding that institution of society, which has the promise of God that the gates of hell shall never prevail against it. Their results are *immediate*, both in converting sinners to God, and in modifying the entire religious condition of the people. The man who is fit to be a Home

Missionary, is a man whose influence cannot be hemmed in by the lines of his parish, or circumscribed, we will add, by any sectarian boundary. He is the present living ambassador of God to the people, "rightly dividing the word of truth" and giving to every one his portion in due season. His influence will be and is felt far and near, and by the adherents of every religious sect around him; almost equally by those who oppose as by those who favor his labors. He may preach to a church of some particular denomination, because he there finds a congregation who appreciate his views, and co-operate in his labors. He may be ecclesiastically connected with some religious denomination, and we learn from the documents before us that colporteurs are so also. But he feels that his field is the world, and his church the universal brotherhood of Christian faith and love. Regarding, as we ever have done, this as the truly catholic ground on which our Home Missionary and educational efforts stand, we were not exactly prepared to feel the force and propriety of language like the following: "The sole object of the Society's publications, and of the colporteurs who circulate them, being to exalt Christ and him crucified as the only hope of lost man, all that tends to excite sectarian prejudice or divide the church of God is left to other hands; and the simple Gospel message comes, as from the lips of the Saviour, directly to the conscience. While all men can be better addressed in this spirit, some men, and especially errorists, can be approached in none other. They are thus reached at their homes, not with a spirit of proselytism or partisanship, but by a spiritual Christian bearing a Gospel message *for them*, which must be received or rejected, on *its own merits*, and not because of prejudiced associations with it. The advantages possessed by this system, in this view, are immense. It combines some of the most powerful elements of influence known to the world, in a way so simple, direct, and effective, that it can make its way through the closed ranks of error and delusion, 'piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit.'" Page 5, Am. Col. Sys.

That there are "immense advantages" in prosecuting our religious enterprises in a "catholic spirit," we certainly admit, and much more than admit. The advantage lies chiefly in this: that religious enterprises so prosecuted are *Christian* enterprises; while those which are not so prosecuted are *not Christian at all*. They may carry along with them the forms of Christianity, but of its soul and essence they are destitute.

This is a principle which must be recognized by our entire system of evangelism, or it cannot be pleasing to God. But we are not aware that this advantage pertains, in any peculiar sense, to the American Tract Society, or to the colporteur system. Cannot the living minister of Christ be as catholic in his spirit as the colporteur? Must he necessarily go "with a spirit of proselytism and partisanship?" Cannot the living actions and the spoken discourses of the missionary of the cross be as unsectarian as his printed writings? Or cannot the living minister of Christ be as truly catholic in his spirit as Doddridge and Baxter? We go further still—we solemnly assert, that there are no possible circumstances in which a Christian can be placed, in these United States, which tend with so much power to fill his mind with an enlarged charity, and raise him far above the narrowness and exclusiveness of sect, as the condition of a missionary in our new settlements at the West. If he have an intelligent head and a Christian heart, (and if he has not, he is not fit for a missionary,) he will see and feel, at every step, that a sectarian spirit is the bane and the curse of the church of Christ; and watchfully and prayerfully avoid it, as he would avoid all the other works of the flesh. Indeed, we have sometimes thought that if the leaders of the church in the older States had served a sort of apprenticeship in this work, it would have been well for the peace of our American Zion. Wherein, therefore, consist the "immense advantages" of the colporteur system, on the score of a "*catholic spirit*," we are unable to see. We rejoice to believe that, in common with kindred religious efforts, it is prosecuted in such a spirit; and we reiterate the assertion, that if it or any other religious enterprise is prosecuted in any other spirit, it ceases to be Christian—Christ will no longer own it. The new States at least have no need of any aid from the old ones, in propagating a sectarian spirit, or in building up sectarian walls. We have enough, and more than enough, among ourselves, who are engaged in that work; and they have talent, learning, and other resources, quite sufficient for such an enterprise. If our brethren aid us at all, which we hope, let it be in a single-hearted effort to bring men to Christ. Any system of effort in which this principle is not *fundamental* can be of no real service to us.

But the claim is put forth that this system is peculiarly "republican"—"democratic"—and therefore peculiarly adapted to our country. In a passage, which we have already quoted, after

admitting the importance of schools, academies, and seminaries of learning, and the multiplication of ministers, we are told that "if all these were in operation it would by no means supersede the necessity and desirableness of an agency which is truly republican," etc. We may have, then, schools and colleges and churches in full operation, and yet an agency which is "truly republican" may remain a desideratum in our system. We were not prepared for this sentiment. We are not, even now, quite prepared to say to the missionary of the cross, with whatever sect connected, who has endured the toils and privations of a frontier life for the sake of preaching the Gospel to the poor, to those to whom "no one else goes," and planting in the wilderness the garden of God, You have done very well, to be sure, but it is a pity you had not some agency which is "truly republican." Nor are we quite sure that it is right to hold similar language to the men who have devoted their lives and their energies, both of mind and body, to founding the institutions of education on the borders of civilization, and opening that arterial system of a free community, through which the life blood of Christianized knowledge may flow to the remotest member of the body politic. We are of the opinion that both these classes of laborers are quite familiar with an "agency which is truly republican." You might as well represent the travelling pedler as more democratic than the regular merchant, as to talk of any thing peculiarly republican in the labors of the colporteur, as compared with other branches of Christian effort.

Indeed it is time we had done with so narrow a view of the subject. There is but one thing which is either respectable or permanent in modern democracy, and that it derives from the Christian religion. It is the grand peculiarity of the times of Christ that to the poor the Gospel is preached. Christianity is a system which cares for man *as man*—as an individual subject to the government of God; it cares therefore as much for the poor as for the rich—it has a heart of sympathy for human want and human woe, in whatever condition found. Out of this feature of the Gospel grows the great foundation-principle of democracy: and wherever the Christian religion goes in its purity, there will be a constant tendency to this true democracy. Away, then, with all pretended systems, whether of Christianity or democracy, which do not recognize and carry into practice this principle. However specious, they are but an empty

name. If any portion of our religious system is not in this only respectable sense truly republican, let us forthwith abandon it, for it is not of Christ. But if the various parts of our system of benevolent effort be founded on this great common principle of the Gospel and of republicanism, as their very life, then let not one part boast itself over another as being "truly republican." Enlightened Christianity is the life of true republicanism; and every system which tends to fill our land with that freedom wherewith Christ doth make his people free, is *truly republican*.

But again, it is claimed that this system is peculiarly—yes, *exclusively* adapted to meet the various classes of errorists, which are rapidly springing up and multiplying in our country. "But whatever view may be entertained of these statements, it is plain that by no other system can *prevailing errors and delusions* be dispelled, and the saving truths of the gospel be commended to their reception with the hope of their conversion to God."* We are aware that there are certain districts of our country, to which, for reasons in perfect harmony with all which we have thus far stated, this mode of labor is peculiarly adapted. Such are the foreign Catholic population of our cities. They are strangers among us—they know nothing of our religion or our people—they are ignorant of our language, and consequently unable to receive benefit from attending our places of worship, if they were not prejudiced against doing so. If, now, a man who speaks their own language—especially if he has once been a Catholic, and understands all their prejudices, sits down at their fireside, and enters into familiar religious conversation with them, he may remove their prejudices, and find an access to their hearts. If then he has a pious book in their own tongue to give them, he leaves them with a reasonable prospect of doing them good. If this visit can be repeated after a few days, to the same individual, and soon again renewed, it rapidly wins on the man's affections and his confidence. In such circumstances this is too promising a mode of doing good to these strangers and sojourners amongst us to be neglected by American Christians without guilt. But even here, if the same individual can receive such a visit only once in one, two, or three years, the prospect of much good will not be flattering.

* Am. Col. Sys. page 17.

Our soil is very rich, and produces weeds very luxuriantly. A Western garden wants a thorough hoeing out, oftener than once in "one, two, or three years." Such a field as this requires rather the labors of the city missionary, accompanied by a corps of lay-helpers who are full of the spirit that preaches the gospel to the poor, than such a system as colportage. Still, the colporteur system is capable of adapting itself to this sort of labor. How extensively then may circumstances analogous to these be found, calling for these reasons for the application of the system! We think our Eastern friends are sometimes greatly in error, in their ideas of the prevalence of Romanism at the West. They seem to imagine it is necessary for colporteurs to traverse the length and breadth of our valley, in constant close combat with "the beast." This is a great mistake. A man may travel hundreds of miles together, and never meet either a Catholic, or a foreigner, who cannot speak the English language. Foreigners are not spread over the surface of our country—they are grouped together in particular locations, of limited extent, chiefly in the vicinity of the large cities. The limits, therefore, to which the colporteur system is demanded, for these reasons are very narrow. We have lived fifteen years at the West, and travelled much, both by public and private conveyances, and we have never met but two Romish priests, and scarcely above a dozen Romanists in the whole time.

But as to errorists generally at the West, who speak the language of the country, and are daily mingling in the stream of conversation, and feeling all the excitements of the passing scene, we deny utterly that colportage has any special adaptation to meet their case. Indeed, to us, the idea of counteracting the almost innumerable forms of religious error, which are contending for the moral empire of the West, by such a system, seems exceedingly preposterous—almost too *unreasonable* to be reasoned with. If errorism in the West were old, decaying, and rotten—if the minds of its adherents were in that state of stupid inactivity, which characterizes a system of error after the fervor of that fanaticism which gave it birth has expired, there would be some reasonable hope, that even an itinerant colporteur, with his bundle of books, might throw a new element into the mass, and perhaps awaken the mind to a new and salutary thought. The passions of such a people are asleep on religious questions; and if the intellect and conscience can be called into action, the happiest results may follow. Such is, to some ex-

tent, the condition of our German Catholic population. But the religious systems which pervade the West are not in this condition. However old and spiritless they may have been in their native beds, when once transferred to our soil they speedily feel its stimulating influence, and manifest those tendencies to growth and expansion which characterize every thing Western. They imbibe the spirit of restless aggression and proselytism. Such must be the condition of Romanism itself in all classes of our population so soon as they are able to mingle freely in the current of American society. But the adherents of a proselyting system are always characterized by an intense mental activity. On such a population, we are certainly warranted in asserting that the itinerant colporteur can expect to exert little influence. If he discusses in his intercourse with them the merits of their favorite systems, he has little chance of telling them any thing new. If he does not, they feel little interest in what he says—and they will treat his books in like manner.

The religious systems of the West must be regarded as so many separate hosts in battle array and engaged in mortal conflict. It has often reminded us of Daniel's vision, in which the four winds of heaven were striving upon the great sea. That conflict must go on till truth triumphs and error is defeated—and its course or its ultimate issue is not likely to be much affected by the momentary presence of the passing stranger. It must also be borne in mind, that this conflict is not a succession of skirmishes in the open field. It is a war of fortresses. It is mostly waged in defence of what each party esteems to be the permanent institutions of society, and yet so as to draw into the conflict every great principle of the gospel. Now we appeal to any man of tolerable acquaintance with the state of religion at the West for the truth of this picture; and granting it to be true, we refer the question to the sober judgment of every reader, whether, in such circumstances, colportage is adapted to counteract and dispel the various forms of religious error. Must not our main reliance be on a regular soldiery, well equipped, and enlisted for life? Will not any other reliance lead to miserable disappointment? Need we suggest to the reader, in view of such a condition of society, that efficient effort in founding the permanent institutions of education and religion upon true principles, affords the only reasonable hope of our salvation.

But perhaps we shall hear it said, in reply to all this, that

colportage is the only available system, because it is the only one which, in our present circumstances, can be applied. We are told "there is no homogeneousness, and no possibility of sustaining the ministry of a particular order in the midst of prejudice or carelessness." Why may we not with just as much propriety say, "there is no homogeneousness, and no possibility of sustaining" a *colporteur*, &c. True, the American Tract Society may, if it has the means, sustain a *colporteur* "in the midst of prejudice or carelessness." And why not the Home missionary Society, if it has the means, equally well sustain a missionary? The one is just as practicable as the other; and the only question is, Which is the most economical expenditure of funds? if indeed we can have but one, as it seems to be here implied.

But it is said missionaries cannot be found in sufficient numbers. How is this known? Who will venture to assert, that if American Christians address themselves in good solemn earnest to the work of providing a preached gospel for our entire population, God will not pour out his Spirit on our churches and our seminaries of learning, and raise up a sufficient number of regular soldiers, enlisted for life, to occupy every post and man every fortress? "Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in my house, and prove me now herewith, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough to receive it." One thing at least is certain—the Church should support the missionaries she has, before she begins to doubt the willingness of God to raise up in answer to her prayers as many as she needs. While we see around us so many excellent ministers of Christ, struggling with the accumulated difficulties which grow out of inadequate support, without books and periodicals, and so harassed with worldly cares and perplexities as to have neither time nor mental energy for those studies which the real necessities of the people daily call for at their hands, we shall not think the time has yet come for us to despair of God's willingness to raise up as many missionaries as we are willing to support. Let the Church show, by her faithfulness to her missionaries, that the youth who devotes his life to the missionary work may depend on enjoying the privilege of wearing out in the appropriate labors of the Christian ministry, with such means of prosecuting religious study as the condition of society really demands of him, and it will then be time

enough to complain that missionaries cannot be found in sufficient numbers. For our own part, we should anticipate no difficulty of this sort.

But then the "economy of the system." What then is the comparative economy of the system? The average annual cost of a colporteur to the Tract Society is as follows, viz.: salary \$150; books, gratuitously distributed, average \$175; travelling expenses, which we estimate at \$75. These sums added together show the total annual average expense of a colporteur to the Society that employs him, to be about \$400. This is fully twice the annual average cost to the Home Missionary Society of each of its missionaries. Where then is the peculiar economy of this system? It seems to lie simply in this, that it costs as much to sustain one colporteur in the field as to sustain two missionaries. And even this result is on the assumption that the American Tract Society can obtain as valuable services for \$150 as the Home Missionary Society can for \$200, with the addition of whatever may be contributed by the people with whom the missionary labors. The question of economy, as compared with Home Missions, is therefore reduced to this—Is one colporteur worth two missionaries? To this question we think a satisfactory answer has already been given.

We have already extended our remarks to what will perhaps be considered a very unreasonable length. But there is yet another view of the subject, which we feel constrained to examine before we close. It is found in the following paragraph: "There is another respect in which the colporteur system has special adaptation to our country, viz., *the ease and rapidity with which it can be indefinitely extended*. The population, already numbering 18,000,000, is increasing with a rapidity which outstrips all present efforts to give it the Gospel. The supply of well qualified ministers is altogether inadequate; and even if the men and the means for their education were now provided, nearly one-half of the present generation would pass into eternity, and the character of the next generation be essentially moulded, and perhaps the destiny of the country forever decided, before they could be brought into effective service. But to rely alone on an educated ministry, leaving undeveloped and unemployed the energies of the followers of Christ—not merely in giving but in doing—not as a thing by the way, but, if need be, in an *exclusive* consecration of their time and talents to works of benevolence, is not only an error which may be fatal, but it is econom-

ically as unwise as it would be to leave a great battle to be fought by the *generals* in command on one side, against a mighty opposing force." Am. Col. Sys., p. 19.

We have never been of the number of those who are in favor of leaving the "battle to be fought by the generals in command on one side, against a mighty opposing force." If by *generals* be meant, as would seem from the connexion, educated ministers, the providence of God has placed this matter far beyond human control. A pious and intelligent layman was employed, in the year 1843, to inquire into the moral and religious condition of a district of country embracing some twenty counties, in one of the Northwestern States, and that a district in which there are probably as few "educated ministers" as in any other portion of the non-slaveholding States. In that district he found a minister of some sort, professing to preach the Gospel, for every three hundred souls, and about every fifth person, in a population of 112,000, a professor of religion. An examination equally thorough, we suppose, would disclose a very similar state of things in other portions of the West. Surely then there is no great danger that the whole battle will be left to "the generals." God has not (and we recognize the fact, we trust, with something of gratitude)—God has not left it dependent, either on the colporteur or the educated ministry, whether or not the great mass of our population shall in some sort have the Gospel. They have it, and they will have it. There is, indeed, a mighty work to be done, if we would fill the present and coming millions of our population with the knowledge of God, turn back the thick hosts of error and infidelity, and organize over all our vast territory a free, enlightened, and Christian community. So great indeed is this work, that we have long been accustomed to regard every true Christian, whose lot God has cast here, as being a *missionary*; as truly such as though he had been sent by the American Board to India or China. But God has in his good providence introduced into this work a division of labor. It is not needful to provide through our organized systems of effort, for sending a messenger to every cabin in the land, lest its inmates should never hear of a Saviour. God has provided instrumentalities which will with comparatively few exceptions carry the first lessons of the Gospel there before us. This is not the work to which our benevolent societies are mainly called. Their work is chiefly that of *religious enlightenment and religious organization*; to found those permanent

Christian institutions, which may be the fountains of religious knowledge, and the bulwarks of religious truth to a great and free people. In such a work we should undoubtedly aim mainly to employ the resources which God gives us, in thoroughly qualifying men for such a service, sustaining those who are thus qualified in the field, and furnishing them with all the munitions of moral warfare. Among these munitions, doubtless, religious books and tracts occupy an important place.

If it be objected that this system of effort is too slow, we answer, first, that if it is slow, the fault is not ours, but belongs to the providence of God; second, that it is more efficient in *immediate* results than any other which has been or can be devised; and third, that, taken in connexion with the other great moral causes with which it is to co-operate, the ubiquity of the Bible and of some sort of preaching, as well as of other kindred influences, and especially with the intense activity of the public mind on religious questions, *it will not be slow*, unless it is prosecuted without energy and without prayer. Never was a system better devised for speedily accomplishing a given moral result in given circumstances. We are well aware that it will effect no sudden revolutions, and that its results will be very hard to represent in statistical tables. But limited as our efforts have been through this system in times past, it is even now an every where present moral force, constantly bearing society upward in the scale of knowledge and piety. And he who supposes it possible to do any thing better for western society, than to place it on such an ascending inclined plane of progressive improvement, knows not whereof he affirms.

We are indeed tired of hearing and writing, as we have done in the foregoing pages, about the "emergency" and the "crisis." We deceive ourselves if we imagine that any such convulsive and superficial efforts for immediate effect, as the great Sabbath school effort of 1830 and 1831, or as the colporteur system in the attitude which it is now assuming, designed to save our country from impending ruin by a single skilful manœuvre, can ever succeed. They cannot; they are founded on erroneous views of our character and condition. In such a sense as they assume, *we never can be in a crisis or an emergency*. Our safety depends on great *permanent* moral causes, as unchangeable in their general course as the father of waters. And we can co-operate with God, in providing for the spiritual welfare of this people, only by a patient effort to render these established moral

currents subservient to the Gospel, by making them waft on their bosom the saving influences of evangelical truth.

As we admitted, in the outset of this discussion, the propriety, within certain limits, of a system of colportage, we may reasonably be asked to define what those limits are. In reply to such an inquiry we should say, let it cease entirely to talk of emergencies and crises. Let it cease to represent schools and seminaries of learning and an educated ministry as too slow in their operation to accomplish, *in season*, a deliverance for our country, which itself is adapted to work out *immediately*. Let it acknowledge that the only difficulty which hinders the establishment of schools and academies and seminaries of learning and an educated ministry *every where*, is precisely the same which hinders the American Tract Society from sending colporteurs "every where"—*the want of means*; and, therefore, that the question is not which of the two *can be done*, but which really meets, not the *emergency*, but the *great permanent wants of society*. Let it cease to urge the destitution of our country, of the permanent institutions of education and religion, not as an argument for founding them *immediately and every where*, but for a superficial and spasmodic effort, which can never supply their place, or do their work. We shall then cease to have any controversy with it: nay, we shall most cordially welcome it to a place in the great brotherhood of Christian benevolence. There is a noble field for it to occupy, in seeking out the neglected, the ignorant, and the ungodly; impressing on them the first lessons of Christian truth, leading the father and the mother to the long-neglected sanctuary, and their children to the day school and the Sabbath school, and calling the attention of the thoughtless, the worldling, and the skeptic, to the writings of those gifted servants of God, whether living or dead, who have been guided by the divine Spirit, to present the Christian argument with unwonted convincing power, or to pour forth the pure stream of evangelical devotion with unwonted purity and fervor.

We shall here submit the subject to the candid judgment of the Christian public. We have spoken plainly and freely, because we believe the principles involved in this discussion to be of infinite importance to our country. We have no personal acquaintance with the great and good men who guide the operations of the American Tract Society. But we have much respect and much kindly affection for them; and are sincerely sorry to dissent from their views. We entreat them, however,

not to indulge the thought, that any thing we have said can do a real injury to the cause in which we are all engaged. If our reasonings are fallacious, it will be easy to detect and expose the fallacy: if sound, it is surely time they were spread before the public.

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Gorgias of Plato, with Notes, by Theodore D. Woolsey, Professor of Greek in Yale College.* Boston: James Munroe & Co.

THIS beautiful edition, with its excellent notes, has tempted us to reperuse the *Gorgias*, and we cannot forbear a word in its praise. It is one of the most scholarlike editions of the Greek classics that has appeared in our country, whether we speak of the accuracy and learning of the notes, the precision and terseness of the style, or the elucidation of the text by a comparison of parallel passages. The editor has prepared himself for his task, with characteristic zeal and industry. He has compassed the whole circle of Greek literature, and read the entire works of Plato, with reference to the illustration of this dialogue. Plato is thus made to interpret himself. His meaning is often happily explained by a citation of kindred passages, collected with much care from the other dialogues. The advantages of this plan are obvious. Mutual light is cast by a comparison of parallel expressions. Especially is this true of a philosophical writer like Plato, who analyzes and defines with microscopic acuteness, and whose nice distinctions will often fail to be apprehended, unless explained by similar clauses in other connexions. Plato evinces remarkable power of discrimination between things that differ, and it is by this analytic definition that he continually detects the fallacy of his opponent.

The text of Stallbaum is the basis of this edition, with some emendations of the editor, adopted after a revision of the various readings, as given by Ast, and a comparison of the standard German editions. The introduction contains a lucid

and summary analysis and critique of the argument, which will materially conduce to the true understanding of the text, while it is not open to the objections of a translation. A body of notes is appended to the dialogue. They evince signal industry, learning and discrimination, and although exceedingly condensed, contain a great amount of valuable matter. They are no hasty gleanings from scholiasts and commentators. The editor has evidently kept pace with the rapid advances of German philology, and is at home in the higher range of classical studies. He has concentrated in these notes the product of much learning and study. His opinions are obviously the result of an extensive and protracted course of personal investigation. His exposition of the niceties of construction, and the peculiarities of idiom, will be appreciated by all who remember to what extent the Greek abounds in anomalous words and phrases, dialectic forms, and elliptical expressions. The grammatical principles of the language are illustrated by original remarks, and frequent references to Matthiae's and Sophocles's grammars—an admirable mode of familiarizing the student with the intricacies of the language. We have been highly pleased with the explanation of the meaning and use of the particles, especially their force in determining the signification of the different moods and tenses, and the structure of sentences. These particles, the use of which in Greek is very various and sometimes difficult, are often carelessly slurred over, as pleonastic, although they furnish the key to the beauty and expressiveness of the Greek classics, to the delicate shades of thought and nicer coloring of those Attic models of taste and purity of style. The import of whole clauses frequently turns upon their use, when they pass as redundant expletives without notice.

No classic needs a commentator more than Plato. The abstruseness of his subject, the occasional obscureness of his language, and the lofty rhythm and poetic cadences of his prose, are enough to perplex and dishearten the unaided learner. Plato blinds imagination with his reasoning; there is a frequent union of the poetic with the philosophic spirit, and at the same time an entire want of methodical arrangement, which renders it difficult to understand his principles and combine them in a consistent system. In making this imaginative philosopher accessible to students in so inviting a form, and with such admirable illustrations of the difficulties of the text, Professor Woolsey has rendered an eminent service to the cause of Greek literature in our country. Plato

has been but little studied in our colleges, partly on account of the want of good editions. We hope Professor Woolsey will supply this deficiency, and introduce the other works of Plato to the American public. They are especially worthy of attention at the present time. Plato has reappeared among the Germans, and, through them, to some extent among us. His philosophy contains the germ of Transcendentalism, which is undeniably becoming a prevalent and influential system in certain quarters. The enthusiasm with which it is beginning to be received by many ardent youth of our country, may be early explained by reference to the "spiritual" and "elevating" tone which "Critical Idealism" is made to assume, and the flattering dignity and "divinity" with which it professes to clothe the attributes of the human mind. Those who would intelligently oppose a system fraught with such alluring error, should be able to trace it to Platonism, its strong-hold and original source.

Of all the classics, Plato is now the centre of attraction with the higher order of scholars in Europe. The writings of no ancient author, probably, are exerting so wide and manifold an influence. Victor Cousin, who long made Plato his study, has recently translated his works into the French, with an introduction to each dialogue. A volume containing his life, and a complete exposition of his system, is promised from the same distinguished author. Schleiermacher, to whom the new ardor for the study of Plato is mainly owing, translated him into the German. Ast has since edited a superior edition with a new translation. Tenneman produced a masterly work on his life* and system of philosophy. But to mention the writers on Plato, would be only to enumerate some of the most distinguished scholars of Germany. His works are extensively read in the German, and familiarly studied in the original. Lectures are given in the universities upon his life and writings, especially by the learned Augustus Boeckh of Berlin, whose course appears to attract particular attention.

We only allude to a few facts of this sort, which are enough to suggest the contrast between us and the Germans, in regard to the study and appreciation of Plato, and to show the want of such an American edition as Professor Woolsey has commenced. We repeat our wish that he will go on in the work so happily begun. We should be especially pleased to see an edition of *Phaedo* from his hand.

* Tenneman's *Life of Plato* has been translated by Professor Edwards.

Plato deserves the attention of the scholar for the excellence of his moral sentiments, the purity and elevation of his principles. His argument for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which forms the noble conclusion of the *Gorgias*, and is fully developed in the *Phaedo*, is a monument of the highest reach of ancient philosophy on that subject. He advocates the belief in future rewards and punishments, which are urged with great force, as motives to right conduct. His views of the remedial efficacy of punishment, probably suggested the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian Fathers. Indeed, Platonism sustains an important relation to the early history of Christianity. Many of the Christian Fathers belonged to the school of Neo-Platonists, and engrafted the principles of their favorite system upon the doctrines of the New Religion. But it would require a distinct essay, to exhibit the claims of Plato upon the attention of the American scholar, and we will only add the testimony of Robert Hall, who, in the most active period of his ministry, devoted several hours in a day, for a number of years, to the study of the classics, and used to refer to Plato in terms of most fervid eulogy, and express his astonishment at the prevailing neglect of the writings of that philosopher.

- 2.—*Posthumous Sermons. By the Rev. Henry Blunt, A. M., late Rector of Streatham; and formerly Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge. First American Edition.* Philadelphia: Herman Hooker. 1844. pp. 190, 12mo.

Mr. Blunt, before his death, had instructed and delighted many a heart by his lectures on the *Pentateuch*, *Lives*, and *Sermons*, which were reprinted and widely circulated in this country; and we now have before us a beautiful posthumous memorial of the man.

We select a passage from the sermon on the text, "Go forward." "You, also, established Christians, have a duty to perform, and we say to you, 'Go forward,' gratefully, cheerfully, joyfully. Prove to those around you that religion is not the dull, and stagnant, and cheerless service which the worldling thinks it. Demonstrate that, while all your motives, and all your aims, and all your hopes are higher, infinitely higher, than his can ever be, your comforts, also, and your peace, your cheerfulness, and your resignation, and your happiness, are all of them equally above and superior to any which he can dream of. That as you advance in years, that period when the hope of the hypocrite fails, when the temper

of the mere worldling becomes too often irritable and querulous, your enjoyments are but heightening, your prospects becoming less clouded and more serene; that the glorious anticipation before you is throwing many a beam of light into nature's darkest hour and over her most wintry day; and that you are able, humbly yet confidently, seriously yet cheerfully, to go forward from strength to strength, assured that there is one, who, when your heart and your flesh fail, will be (because he has promised to be) 'the strength of your heart and your portion for ever.'"

After reading this, it will be apparent that the editor is not far wrong when he says, "These sermons are distinguished for their rich but simple eloquence, the brilliant but chastened imagination which pervades them, combined with a plain perspicuity of language that commends them to persons of all ranks and of all ages."

3.—*Lectures on the Acts of the Apostles.* By the late John Dick, D. D., Professor of Theology of the United Secession Church, Glasgow, Author of "*Lectures on Theology*," etc. *First American from the second Glasgow edition.* New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1844. pp. 407, 8vo.

We have been exceedingly interested in reading these Lectures. The passages selected as the ground of the remarks, are, in themselves, striking, most of them having respect to the Apostle Paul; the structure of the sentences is chaste and graceful; the topics treated are such as to secure attention and profit; and, indeed, the Lectures may serve as good models for this kind of preaching, which, by the way, we think one of the very best for the edification of the people.

Among other subjects, we have here—The Day of Pentecost—Ananias and Sapphira—The Institution of Deacons—The Martyrdom of Stephen—The Conversion of Paul—Herod and Peter—The Council of Jerusalem—Paul in Lystra, in Thessalonica, and Berea, in Athens, Corinth, Ephesus, Jerusalem; before the Council, before Felix, Festus, and Agrippa, etc. Passages of great beauty might be selected from many of these Lectures, but we rather refer our readers to the volume itself, not doubting that they will be richly repaid in the perusal, for the cost of the book, and the expenditure of time necessary.

- 4.—*The Christian Doctrines. By Rev. Hubbard Winslow, of Boston, author of "Young Man's Aid," "Woman as she should be," etc.* Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1844. pp. 360, 12mo.

Mr. Winslow is known as a good writer, and his previously published works have exerted a very wholesome influence. "Woman as she should be" ought to be in the hands of every woman who can read it understandingly; and the "Young Man's Aid" might save many a one from the assaults of the tempter, and guide him to the foot of the cross.

The present volume is well digested, lucidly written, and adapted, as designed, to do good. We must not forget now, in the demand for attention to the modes and forms of the church, that, after all, her doctrines are much the weightier matters. Unless the church be well indoctrinated, we shall suffer a multitude of evils: the enemy will come unawares and sow tares with an unsparing hand. We have, for a few years past, been reaping what we sowed—the unwholesome fruits of inattention to indoctrination of church members. We agree with the author, that the great "cause of the evils which we suffer in our Zion and our country, is the want of that intelligent, deep-toned, experimental piety, which results from early and intimate communion with the Christian doctrines. Let the minds of our children be brought under the power of these doctrines, and all our dearest interests will be ultimately saved: let them fail of this, and all will be ultimately lost."

We take pleasure in recommending the work, as a clear and satisfactory exhibition of the Christian doctrines.

- 5.—*The Prelatical Doctrine of the Apostolical Succession examined; with a Delineation of the High-Church System. By H. A. Boardman, Pastor of the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia.* Philadelphia: William S. Martien. New-York: Robert Carter. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1844. pp. 348, 18mo.

The day has certainly arrived, when it has become necessary for those who maintain the parity of the clergy and the validity of the ordinances administered by others than those whose heads have been touched by the hands of a prelatical bishop, to stand up in defence of their rights and of the truth. We, Presbyterians, have been so very charitable and unsectarian, that we have yielded almost every thing to harmony among the different branches of Zion; but, meanwhile, other sects have been taking advantage of our indifference to our own denominational interests, and have been building them-

selves up at our expense. We have sacrificed all: they, nothing. It ought not so to be. We rest on a basis of truth, and that we should strengthen.

The providence of God has, at length, aroused us from our slumbers, and bid us valiantly defend the citadel. Hence many are burnishing their weapons and preparing to meet the assaults of the enemy. The claims of the Episcopacy have become so intolerably arrogant in certain quarters, her assumptions and professions so *high*, that to permit them to pass unnoticed, were rather to desert the faith than to exercise the charity of the Gospel.

Mr. Boardman has, doubtless, so thought, and therefore felt it incumbent on him to prepare this manual. The work is written in a good spirit, and in a chaste style. It presents the Presbyterian, and, we think, the Scriptural view of the ministry and ordinances, and upsets the vain pretensions to apostolical succession and peculiar sanctity. Among others, the following topics are treated: The Argument from Scripture—The Historical Argument—The True Succession—The Church put in Christ's place—Intolerance of the System—Its Schismatical Tendency.

6.—*A Biblical Dictionary; being a comprehensive Digest of the History and Antiquities of the Jews and neighboring Nations; the Natural History, Geography, and Literature of the Sacred Writings: with Pronouncing and Chronological Appendices. By Rev. J. A. Bastow.* Bradford: B. Walker. London: W. Strange. 1844.

We are indebted to the politeness of the editor for the first three parts of this Dictionary, reaching from A to E. The work evinces learning and research, and will be found to be, when completed, we presume, one of the very best of Biblical Dictionaries. Frequent use has been made of the Biblical Repository, in the preparation of many of the articles. Under Baptism, we notice, that the author has acknowledged his indebtedness to our articles from the pen of Dr. E. Beecher, and has condensed and rearranged the argument of those articles.

It is intended to make the work a Digest of the literature of the Bible. It will illustrate thousands of difficult passages in Scripture, will furnish a complete index of those passages, and will contain a general introduction and a list of the authors referred to, together with their works. Thus will it offer a convenient hand-book to the Bible.

We like the plan, on the whole, and are pleased with the execution thus far.

- 7.—*The Obligations of the World to the Bible ; A Series of Lectures to Young Men.* By Gardiner Spring. New York : John S. Taylor & Co. 1844. pp. 404, 12mo.

We are glad to find that Mr. Taylor is encouraged to issue a new edition of this excellent book. It first appeared in 1839, and was then highly recommended by the press generally, and we hope extensively sold. Dr. Spring is one of our best and most useful authors, and this we consider one of his best works.

Young men and others, who will read these lectures, will find that the Bible is, indeed, a precious and peculiar book, and could have had no other than a divine origin.

The author, in fourteen lectures, exhibits the literary merit of the Scripture—obligations of law to the Bible—its friendliness to civil liberty—its influence upon social institutions—influence of the Bible upon human happiness, etc., etc.

- 8.—*The Ciceronian ; or the Prussian method of teaching the elements of the Latin Language. Adapted to the use of American Schools.* By B. Sears. Boston : Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1844. pp. 184, 12mo.

We have received from M. H. Newman, this excellent contribution to our classical school-books. Professor Sears is one of our ripest scholars ; and we scarcely know a work accomplished by him, more important than the preparation of this little volume. The only fear we have about it is, that it will not be appreciated, that teachers—ease-loving teachers—will still prefer the old way with which they are familiar. So very few instructors are willing to take pains and spend time with their scholars. The fact is, *very few* who hold the office, are at all fit for it. The method explained in the Ciceronian is unquestionably the very best method of making effective Latin scholars. Would that it were commenced and pursued in all our schools.

- 9.—*The Book that will Suit You ; or a Word for Every One.* By the Rev. James Smith. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1844. pp. 349.

At all events, the author was right in respect to ourselves. The book suits us well ; and, we think, will suit every Christian. See if this will not suit the afflicted saint : "The love of Jesus does not prevent sickness ; nay, sometimes it sends it. Lazarus was beloved, but Lazarus was sick. Sickness

may be sent for instruction : we often learn more during a short illness, than we do in months and years of health. Then we get nearer to our God, become more detached from the world, and enjoy divine things with a double relish. Surely this is love. Does the mother love her child the less, because she sees it necessary to give it bitter medicine ? Or does a father love his son the less, because he must chastise him to prevent his ruin ? Is it unkind to teach a pupil the most valuable and important lessons, even if it require confinement and close application for a time ? If so, Jesus is unkind in sending sickness ; but instead thereof, it is love and kindness that afflicts us."

- 10.—*A Pictorial History of the United States, with Notices of other portions of America.* By S. G. Goodrich, author of *Peter Parley's Tales.* For the use of Schools. Philadelphia : Samuel Agnew, H. Hooker. 1844. pp. 354, 12mo.

The embellishments of this volume are appropriate, and superior to those of the Pictorial History of France, by the same author. Of the latter, we heard a teacher say, that it was the only book he had ever put into the hands of a certain class of boys, in which they seemed to be absorbed. We think the present volume decidedly better than the other, in style and in interest ; and we entertain the opinion that, if instructors and heads of families were to make themselves acquainted with it, it would be preferred to any other history of the United States for children and youth. We gladly recommend it to the attention of School-Committees and Superintendents ; and as a good school-book on this subject is needed, we hope it will meet the acceptance to which its merits entitle it.

- 11.—*A Memoir of the Rev. Legh Richmond, A. M.* By the Rev. T. S. Grimshawe, A. M. *Seventh American, from the last London edition.* New York : M. W. Dodd. 1844. pp. 362, 12mo.

This is a re-issue, by Mr. Dodd, of a memoir which some years ago attracted the marked attention of the Christian community. We remember to have read it with great delight, and to have heard others speak of it as one of the most interesting memoirs ever written. Legh Richmond can never be forgotten ; and we gladly recommend the present volume to all who have not read it.

- 12.—*The Mothers of England ; their Influence and Responsibility.* By Mrs. Ellis. New York : D. Appleton & Co. Phil. : G. S. Appleton. 1844. pp. 226.

To say that Mrs. Ellis has written a book for Mothers, is sufficient to secure for it a reading. The works, addressed to her own sex, have been deservedly popular in this country. We consider them wholesome in their principles, and tending to the very highest improvement of woman, in all the relations of life. To mothers she gives some admirable lessons, and we can only wish that these lessons were read, and pondered, and practised.

- 13.—*Sermons, preached at Glasbury, Brecknockshire, and in St. James's Chapel, Clapham, Surrey.* By the Rev. Charles Bradley. *First American from the seventh London Edition.* New York : D. Appleton & Co. Phil. : George S. Appleton. 1844. pp. 232, large 8vo.

This is a beautiful book of sermons. It is printed in double column, on a fine, rich paper, and with good letter, evincing taste in the publishers, and confidence, on their part, in the taste of the reading public. These sermons have been highly commended by evangelical men in England, and well spoken of by such reviews as the Eclectic and Christian Observer. They are certainly well adapted to family-reading, being written in a plain, lucid, chaste style. The sentences are short and pithy, and the matter practical, judicious, and devout.

- 14.—*Prelacy and Parity, discussed in several Lectures : comprising a Review of Rev. Lloyd Windsor's argument on the Ministerial Commission.* By Rev. William C. Wisner, Bishop of the First Presbyterian Church, Lockport, N. Y. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. 1844. pp. 180, 12mo.

We think Mr. Wisner has here furnished his own and other churches, with a most excellent manual on Prelacy and Parity. The essential parts of the argument are here compressed into a small space, and presented in a lucid and forcible manner. We rather think the Rev. L. Windsor is pretty well shown up, and along with him, the high Episcopal argument. We have not space now to enter upon a more extended notice of the work, but cannot but hope that it will illuminate many minds.

- 15.—*The Family Expositor ; or a Paraphrase and Version of the New Testament ; with critical Notes, and a practical improvement to each section. By Philip Doddridge, D. D. American edition. With a Memoir of the author, by N. W. Fiske, Professor of Greek and Belles Lettres in Amherst College ; and an introductory essay, by Moses Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover. With a Portrait, engraved from an original picture in Wymondley House. Amherst : J. S. & C. Adams. 1844. pp. 1006, 8vo.*

This celebrated Family Expositor is offered to the public, by Messrs. Adams, in one volume, well bound, and at a cheap rate. The work is too well known, and too highly appreciated, to need any commendation from us. Whilst Philip Doddridge has immortalized himself by his "Rise and Progress," he has, also, illuminated many minds and refreshed many hearts by his Expositor of the New Testament. He was a man of good, perhaps of rare scholarship, for his day, and with leisure to pursue his studies, might have made one of the best critical expounders of the word of God ; but he chose rather to prepare a commentary for the family-circle, than for the critical student of the Bible. In this he has succeeded well, and, although sometimes rather verbose, is, on the whole, one of the very best of popular commentators. We commend the enterprise of the publishers.

- 16.—*An Original History of the Religious Denominations at present existing in the United States, containing authentic accounts of their rise, progress, statistics, and doctrines. Written expressly for the work, by eminent theological Professors, Ministers, and Lay-members, of the respective denominations. Projected, compiled, and arranged by J. David Rupp, of Lancaster, Pa., author of "Der Maertyrer Geschichte," etc. etc. Phil: J. S. Humphreys. Harrisburgh : Clyde & Williams. 1844. pp. 734, 8vo.*

We consider this a useful book, presenting in one volume the several histories of the various religious denominations in our country. The principle upon which the projector has proceeded is a good one—that of intrusting the history of each denomination to some prominent member of that branch of Zion. Still, its value will depend much on the qualifications of those selected, and their recognized authority to write for their several organizations. We presume the ability

of most of the writers of this volume would be granted, and probably most, if not all of the churches, would be satisfied with the representations made. We looked, very naturally, at the view of the Episcopal Church here given; and we confess that we ourselves are, on the whole, gratified to find that the article has abstained from those assumptions of superiority, which have been, of late, so manifest in some high dignitaries. No doubt, however, the article would have been more acceptable to some of the writer's own church, if he had represented it as *the church of the United States*, and not as the "Protestant Episcopal Church in these United States." He does, indeed, speak of the "doctrines of the church," but we presume he there intended the emphasis to be laid, not on *the church*, but on *doctrines*, meaning, by the church, that of which he had been speaking, and not it as the sole and only church.

The work is got up in a neat and substantial style.

- 17.—*Hyponoia: or Thoughts on a Spiritual Understanding (συννοια πνευματικη) of the Apocalypse, or Book of Revelation: with some Remarks upon the Parousia, or Second Coming of the Lord Jesus Christ: and an Appendix on the Man of Sin.* New-York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1844. pp. 707, 8vo.

This is a curious book, by a layman, as we presume.—Whoever the author may be—and we divine that his name is revealed on the blank side of the title page, "entered, etc., John R. Hurd"—he certainly evinces industry, and somewhat extended reading; but whether his reading and industry, as here developed, will be of much profit to the world, we very much question. We are glad that our friends, the publishers, seem not to have invested much of the "needful" in the issue of it. This responsibility appears to belong to the author; and we very much fear that he will not be greatly encouraged to publish more of like description, by the sale of the present work.

The writer announces, in his first sentence, "that a design is attributed to the book of Revelation essentially different from that usually ascribed to it." "It is taken to be an unveiling of the mysterious truths of Christian doctrine—an intellectual manifestation, corresponding with what is apprehended to be the Scripture purport of the *Second Coming of the Son of Man*."

Hence we find, from beginning to end, a system of spiritualizing equal, almost, to Origen's, the counterpart of the too great literalism of the present day. We confess that we have not the hyponoia to penetrate this "Hyponoia;" that we must have better microscopic eyes than those we now possess, be-

fore we can see all that our author sees in the words of this book. We expect for it an early death, and should regret that any of the ministerial brethren, who need to husband their resources, as most do, should be induced to expend for it the sum necessary to buy it.

18.—*A Narrative of the Expedition of Cyrus, the Younger, and of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand.* By Xenophon of Athens. Edited by Alpheus Crosby, Prof., etc. Boston: James Monroe & Co. 1844. pp. 282. 12mo.

19.—*A Grammar of the Greek Language. Part First. A Practical Grammar of the Attic and Common Dialects: with the elements of General Grammar.* By Alpheus Crosby, Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in Dartmouth College. Boston: James Monroe & Co. 1844. pp. 487, 12mo.

We have placed these books together, not so much because they are by the same author, as because they illustrate each other, and are intended to be companions. The edition of Xenophon is founded on that of Ludwig Dindorf, which is considered, by scholars, decidedly the best; although now, we think, Prof. Crosby may lay claim to have given the public a better than even Dindorf's. It comes from the Cambridge press, and is, of course, well executed; and we approve highly the style of typography in which the editor has directed it to be done. An Appendix points to the passages of the *Anabasis* illustrated in Prof. Crosby's Grammar, and thus presents the student with one of the very best of commentaries; one which he, in a measure, makes himself, and therefore will prize more highly, and will, consequently, be much more benefited.

The Editor is, also, preparing a "Companion to the *Anabasis*," which is to contain "a map, a life of the author, a vocabulary, notes, and exercises in translation from English into Greek." All of this we like, except the "vocabulary." This seems to us uncalled for in this case, and generally hurtful to scholars. If "notes" are given, we hope they will be few, and only such as will lead the student to investigate for himself, not labor-saving machinery, as they too frequently are. *Tantum sufficit.*

The "Grammar" of Professor Crosby is one of the best companions to his *Anabasis* he could have given us; and, at the same time, an admirable companion to all the rest of our Greek school-books. It exhibits good scholarship, discriminating philology, and deep research. We can cheerfully recommend it to all who desire a correct knowledge of Greek Orthography, Etymology, and Syntax.

ARTICLE XI.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

By the royal munificence of the King of Bavaria, the funds for sustaining the State Library of Munich have been increased to 23,000 florins.—Professor Schaffei's History of Portugal is nearly completed.—Dr. Herm. Lotze and Dr. Wilh. Roscher, have been appointed ordinary Professors of Philosophy at Göttingen.—W. A. Passow has published a volume of his father, F. Passow's Miscellaneous Writings.—A practical Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament, with practical and critical remarks, 3d vol.—Ezekiel, by F. W. Umbreit.—A new edition (the 4th) of Ewald's Hebrew Grammar is about to be issued.—Dr. F. K. Theiss has issued a "Vollständiges Wörterbuch zu Xenophons Anabasis, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Namen u. Sack-Erklärung."

Belgium.

Normal schools are to be instituted in all the districts of the kingdom.—An iron church is talked of in the common of Hornu.

France.

M. Thiers's "History of the Consulate and the Empire" is completed, for which he is to receive 500,000 francs. For his "History of the Revolution," he received 100,000 francs.—The French Government is publishing La Place's works.—Among the acquisitions with which M. Mynas has enriched the Bibliothèque Royale, is a manuscript copy of "Æsop's Fables," in Choliambics, written by Babbrias, containing several thousand lines unknown before. It is in the press of Didot.

Italy.

In 1843, there were 5807 volumes published, principally translations.—The Pope, in person, has consecrated as bishops, four of the cardinals; the first time in one hundred and fifty years.—Two letters from Henry IV. of France, to Clement VIII., with the replies, have been recently discovered. They relate to his submission to the holy see, and are dated Nov. 6th, 7th, 1595.

Great Britain.

Socrates's History of the Church, in seven books, translated from the Greek, with some account of his life and writings, has been recently published.—Mitchell's Philoctetes of Sophocles, with notes.—Dr. W. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. Parts V. and VI.—Historical and critical comments on the History of Herodotus. From the French of Larcher.

United States.

The second number of the "Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review," has appeared, containing valuable articles by some of our best scholars. The public will, ere long, be favored with Professor Stuart's work on the Apocalypse.

THE
AMERICAN
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

OCTOBER, 1844.

SECOND SERIES, NO. XXIV. WHOLE NO. LVI.

ARTICLE I.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESBYTERIANISM, AND REASONS FOR UPHOLD-
ING THEM.

By C. E. STOWE, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

NOTWITHSTANDING all the claims and assumptions of Romanism and high church prelacy, it still continues to be the opinion of the most profound and candid biblical scholars, that the Christian church at first was presbyterially organized. *Presbyterial* I mean in a large and liberal sense, as opposed to hierarchical despotism on the one hand and laic anarchy on the other, and not in that narrow and exclusive sense in which some explain the term; for as there is bigotry every where, as it is the vice of individual idiosyncrasy, and not the peculiarity of any particular sect, so there is no lack of it among some who belong to the great Presbyterian family. Indeed, I suppose that no existing church is now modelled exactly on the apostolic or scriptural pattern; nor do I suppose it necessary, or even desirable that this should be the case; for had it not been intended that forms of church order should, to some extent, have capacity to vary and adapt themselves to changes of circumstances, forms of

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government, climate, intellectual condition, etc., the model would have been as rigidly laid down in the New Testament as in the Old, which last was restricted to one territory, to one people, to one set of circumstances. Archbishop Whately shrewdly observes (*Essay on Omissions*), that there are some things which the writers of the New Testament were divinely inspired *not to record*, and among them are, a creed, a catechism, a form of church government, and a ritual for public worship, because it would be contrary to the genius and intentions of Christianity, for the whole world to be tied down to any one mode, in respect to these and similar points. (Compare Whately on *Kingdom of Christ*, Essay II. sec. 9.) The New Testament churches themselves, evidently, were not shut up to one unvarying order, but modified their forms as circumstances required, as we shall soon have occasion to show.

The most that I contend for in respect to Presbyterianism, the most that any intelligent Presbyterian contends for, so far as I know, is, that the Presbyterian model, in its essential features, on the whole approaches nearest to the Bible pattern ; and, generally considered, it is best adapted to the external circumstances and intellectual condition of the age and country in which Providence has placed us ; and in fact that some form of Presbyterian organization is best for all ages and all countries—it being, as to substance, the Bible organization, and therefore universally best.

The subject which I have selected for the present essay I shall proceed to discuss under the following divisions, namely :

I. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESBYTERIANISM.

II. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THOSE PRINCIPLES IN CONTRAST WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF OPPOSING SYSTEMS.

III. SOME SPECIAL REASONS WHY THOSE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE INSISTED ON AND PROPAGATED AT THIS TIME AND IN THIS COUNTRY.

As a preliminary, I must define what I understand, and what I suppose is generally understood, by the *principles of Presbyterianism*, or a *Presbyterian church*. By a Presbyterian church, I understand a church which, in its theology, is biblical, strict, and prevailingly Augustinian, or Calvinistic ; in its rites and modes of worship, scripturally simple, and unencumbered with long liturgies and minute rubrical formulas ; in its government, directed and assisted by a board of elders, or a committee, chosen from among its communicants ; and for purposes of order

and discipline, associated with neighboring churches in a body composed of ministers and elders or lay delegates, usually denominated a Presbytery, but sometimes a Synod, as in the Lutheran and Dutch churches, and sometimes a Council or Conso-ciation, as by the Congregationalists. To complete the theory of Presbyterianism, as now generally understood, this body must be permanently organized, and bounded by certain territorial limits, and not merely occasionally called together and without any reference to territorial boundaries. But this feature, though very convenient, is not essential to the Bible organization, as we shall soon see.

A Presbyterian church must be biblical, strict and Augustinian in its theology, in opposition to traditionary, loose, and Pelagian views; it must be scripturally simple in its rites, in opposition to burdensome ceremonies of human invention; and it must have a lay representation in its government, in opposition to the assumptions of a hierarchical priesthood.

The theology of Presbyterianism is contained in the original creeds of all the reformed churches of Europe, among which we may specify particularly the Augsburg Confession of the Lutheran church, and the doctrinal part of the XXXIX Articles of the Anglican church. As to the Augsburg Confession, Calvin declares, "I willingly and gladly subscribe to it;" and he gave his cordial assent to the articles of the English church, making exceptions only to certain things in their modes of worship, which he denominates *tolerabiles ineptias*, or "fooleries that may be borne with." (*Das Leben Calvins von Henry*, II. 376, 505. *Koellner's Symbolik*, I. 241.) The Presbyterian theology, as received by the Scotch and American Presbyterians, is embodied in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly.

The fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, I contend and shall endeavor to prove, are most in accordance with the Scriptures, nearest to the views and practices of the primitive church, and best adapted to promote all the highest interests of man, both as an individual and a member of society, especially at the present age and in this country. The proof will be exhibited under the heads already indicated.

I. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESBYTERIANISM.

1. *In the Apostolic times, or the Scriptural view.*

ORGANIZATION. According to the New Testament, when a

church was organized, a board of elders was appointed to superintend its spiritual concerns; and these officers are called indifferently, *elders* or *bishops*, no difference at all being made between these two appellations. Thus, according to Acts 20: 17, 28, Paul sent from Miletus to Ephesus, and called the *elders* (*πρεσβυτερος*) of the church, and in addressing these *elders* he says, 'take heed to the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you *bishops*' (*ἐπισκοπος*). The same interchangeable use of these terms is found in Titus 1: 5, 7, and also in 1 Peter 5: 1, 2, in the original Greek, for King James's Episcopal translators were not always careful to preserve in the English the exact shade of meaning of the original terms. If the early Christians had two distinct offices, it is strange indeed that having two names they should so utterly confound them, instead of applying the one name to the one office, and the other to the other. In military offices, is the general ever confounded with the colonel? or in civil affairs, the judge with the sheriff? King and sovereign are ever interchangeable, because they both indicate the same office, and so, for the same reason, chairman and moderator; but who ever thinks of confounding admiral with commodore? or chancellor with barrister? Where a new office is created, an old name is sometimes given to it, as in the Latin term *imperator*; but where the names and the office are from the beginning contemporaneous this is never done, and it would be a gross solecism in language to do it.

These elders took the charge both of teaching and discipline, dividing the work according to individual capacity, without as yet, so far as appears, making any *official* distinction between the two classes of duties. 1 Tim. 5: 17. After a while, when it became necessary that the preaching elders should devote all their time to the duties of their office, and be supported by the church, which was never the case with the ruling elders, then probably the official distinction was definitely made; but we have no account in the Bible of any such transaction.

Besides the board of elders, another board of deacons was appointed to take care of the poor, and generally to manage the temporal affairs of the church. Acts 6: 1-7. With these two boards the organization of a church was complete; and the churches are addressed indifferently through their *bishops* and *deacons*, or *elders* and *deacons*, as in Phil. 1: 1; 1 Tim. 3: 18; but no church in the Bible is ever alluded to as having a *bishop*, *elders*, and *deacons*; the three orders under these names are never found in the New Testament.

These church officers administered the ordinances, Acts 10: 48; 8: 36-38, compared with 6: 5; also 1 Cor. 1: 17. They were chosen by the people and inducted into office by the apostles or missionaries. Acts 6: 3-6; 14: 23; 15: 24, 25; 1: 21-26, 2 Cor. 8: 19. The Greek word χειροτονέω, used in some of the passages above cited, indicates a popular election by raising the hand.

That the apostles were not diocesan bishops, and that modern diocesan bishops cannot be their successors, is manifest in every part of the New Testament. Christ prohibited among them all distinctions of rank. Matt. 20: 25-28. They themselves disclaim episcopal authority. Rom. 1: 11-13; 1 Cor. 3: 5, 14, 15; 11: 13, 16. They were travelling missionaries, not confined to any particular province or country, Rom. 15: 18-28. In no respect can we trace in the New Testament a shadow of semblance between the apostles and modern diocesan bishops. But the Puseyites have discovered one proof of the identity between the diocesan bishops and the apostles, which a casual observer would scarcely suspect. They speak of "the sufferings of the bishops" as "the second mark of their being our living apostles." (*Oxford Tracts*, X. 5.) The *sufferings of the bishops*, the English bishops and the Roman Catholic bishops of Europe, a proof of their identity with the apostles! We have had opportunities of witnessing something of the *sufferings of the diocesan bishops* in England and on the continent of Europe, and contrasting them with the *apostolic sufferings*, as described in such passages as the following, which we beg you carefully to read: 2 Cor. 11: 23-33; 6: 8-10; 1 Cor. 4: 10-13. Grinding poverty and hard work, incessant itinerating and unceasing cares, stripes and imprisonments, hunger and cold, persecution and contempt, these were the *apostolic sufferings*; and how do they compare with *modern prelatial sufferings* in England and on the continent of Europe? A princely income and princely honors are not exactly like poverty, persecution, and contempt; an easy coach, and an army of servants, and costly robes, are not like shipwreck, and destitution, and nakedness; a regal palace, and savory meats, and strong wines, though they do afflict prelatial humanity with gout and stone, are not exactly like loathsome prisons and public whippings, and the feet fast in the stocks, and being stoned through the streets. Acts 16: 22-24; 14: 19. At least the resemblance

between the two classes of *sufferings* is not so striking as to establish identity.

In the apostolic age, a single individual appears sometimes to have had the presidency of a church, or to be chief minister in it, as in Rev. 1: 20, 2: 1, 12, 18, etc.; but that these were not authoritative bishops, but ministering servants, is manifest from the contents of the epistles themselves, which are addressed principally to the members of the churches, and not to the minister. Read the following passages: Rev. 2: 5, 10, 12, 29; 3: 6, 13, 22, and compare 1: 4, 11; 22: 16, 21.

In places where, by the customs of society, females were secluded from the public, and no men except their own relatives were allowed to visit them, female deacons were appointed to take charge of the female members of the church, Rom. 16: 1; but there is no evidence that this office was ever filled except where the customs of society rendered it necessary—an instance of the variety admitted in the apostolic organization.

There were the officers of each particular church; but besides these there were others not attached permanently to particular congregations, such as missionaries, called apostles and evangelists, also prophets or exhorters, and some others, not fixed, but varying as circumstances required. 1 Cor. 12: 28; Eph. 4: 11.

We read in the New Testament of no permanent judicatory above the eldership of a particular church; of no territorial presbytery or synod meeting at regular intervals; but as occasion demanded, councils, or occasional synods were called together, in which the missionaries or apostles, the elders, the brethren, and the whole church, assisted. Acts 15: 2, 4, 6, 22, 23.

Discipline seems to have been administered by the whole church, and questions respecting it to have been decided by the majority. 1 Cor. 5: 3-5, 11. Paul says respecting this excommunicated person, *Sufficient to such a man is this punishment, which was inflicted (ὁπὸ τῶν πλειόνων) by the majority*, 2 Cor. 2: 6.

WORSHIP. As to public worship, the Bible Christians had no churches to meet in, but they came together in each other's houses, Acts 12: 12; Rom. 16: 5, 23; 1 Cor. 16: 19; or in some large convenient room, Acts 1: 13; where they prayed, sung, read the Scriptures, exhorted and comforted each other, administered the ordinances, all without pomp or parade, with-

out rubric or prayer-book or canonical vestments, in the simplest manner imaginable. Acts 2: 46; 4: 24-30; 1 Cor. 14: 16, 26; Eph. 5: 19; Col. 3: 16; 1 Tim. 2: 1; Rev. 5: 9-14; 15: 3.

THEOLOGY. That this was strict and prevailingly Augustinian, rather than loose or Pelagian, the epistle to the Romans, the chief theological work of the period, affords ample proof, particularly chapters 5-10.

I affirm, then, that the Bible church was Presbyterian in its organization, inasmuch as it was popular, with an eldership, and without a sacerdotal caste or episcopal hierarchy—that it was Presbyterian in its mode of worship, inasmuch as it was simple, without rubric or formal liturgy, or ceremonious parade—and that it was Presbyterian in its theology, inasmuch as the chief theological production of the age, the epistle to the Romans, according to my view of it, brings out prominently some of the most offensive points of Calvinism. But of this each one will judge for himself.

2. *In the times of the early Fathers, or the Patristic view.*

ORGANIZATION. As to the organization of the church in the times immediately succeeding the apostles, during the second and a good part of the third century, we have the most positive testimony, that it still continued presbyterial, in the sense which has already been explained. The only change seems to be, that some one teaching elder in each church had acquired an acknowledged preponderancy over the other elders, and was generally addressed as the bishop, or pastor, of the church. This appears from the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch, who suffered martyrdom at Rome about A. D. 110. These epistles, however, are acknowledged to be so corrupted and interpolated, that very little confidence can be placed in testimony derived solely from them, unless corroborated from other sources. In general, we may remark, that the patristic writings were so long in the hands of those who made use of every means, fair and foul, to sustain a hierarchy—not hesitating to corrupt, and even forge, writings for this purpose,—that we may implicitly rely on the genuineness of whatever remains that makes strongly against a hierarchy, while we may justly regard with some suspicion, all that goes very strongly to favor one. Ignatius, as his epistles now stand, exhorts those to whom he writes to render obedience to the *bishop* and *eldership* and *deacons* of their respective

churches; but both his contemporaries, Clement of Rome, and Polycarp of Smyrna, still retain the apostolic style, and speak of the *bishops* and *deacons*, or the *elders and deacons*, indifferently, but never of the three orders. I cannot but consider these two witnesses worthy of more credence than Ignatius, for no suspicion of interpolation or corruption rests on their writings. Clement was the personal friend of the apostle Paul (Phil. 4: 3), and Polycarp was the disciple of the apostle John, and was inducted by him into the eldership of the church at Smyrna. (*Gieseler, Kirchengeschichte*, I. 112. *Coleman on Prim. Ch.* pp. 164–168.)

But let us come to testimony more direct and explicit. Among the writings of Ambrose, bishop of Milan, who died A. D. 397, there is a very ancient commentary on the epistles of Paul, which is generally ascribed to Hilary, a deacon in the church at Rome, who died about A. D. 380. Whether these commentaries be the work of Hilary or not, they are at least as ancient as the days of Ambrose, and in their time were regarded as orthodox and excellent writings. On Eph. 4, 11 (“*and he gave some apostles, and some prophets*”) the writer thus expresses himself: “At first all taught and all baptized on whatever days and times there was occasion; for Philip did not seek a particular time or day, in which he should baptize the eunuch, nor did he interpose a fast.

“In order, therefore, that the people might increase and be multiplied, in the beginning it was allowed to all both to evangelize and baptize, and to expound the Scriptures in the church. But when the church embraced all places, congregations were established, and rulers and certain officers were ordained in the churches, that no one of the clergy (*de clericis, church officers*), who had not been ordained, might presume to exercise a function which he did not know had been intrusted or conceded to him.

“And the church began to be governed by another kind of order and care; because, if all were competent to do the same things, it would be irrational, and seem a vulgar and most mean affair. Hence, therefore, it is that now neither deacons preach among the people, nor clergy nor laity baptize, nor are believers baptized on any day indifferently, unless they are sick. Therefore the things here written by the Apostle, do not in all respects agree with the order which now exists in the church, for these things were written under the original order (*inter primordia*).”

Now if these be the expressions of Hilary, they may be taken with some grains of allowance; for Hilary was rather displeased with the clergy of his times, because, in his view, they were not sufficiently strict in their orthodoxy, nor severe enough against the error of Arius. But whether the statements be Hilary's or not, and with whatever allowance we may receive them, it is certain they must be founded in fact, for they were early published in the writings of that most dignified and strenuous of the ancient bishops, Ambrose of Milan, and gained currency as his. They are not mere opinions, but testimony to matters of fact.

But we have a witness to this point, even less exceptionable, the celebrated Jerome, the author of the vulgate translation of the Bible—the most laborious and most learned man of his age; orthodox above suspicion, and devotedly attached to the hierarchy as in his day established. He was born A. D. 340, and died 420. He had every opportunity of knowing, for he was perfectly familiar with all the book-learning of his time, and had travelled extensively among the most distinguished churches, having spent several years in Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, and Jerusalem. In his commentary on Titus 1: 1, he gives the following explicit and unequivocal testimony to the point under discussion: “Among the ancients, bishops and elders were the same; for the former is the title of dignity, the latter of age.—The elder is the same as the bishop; and before that there arose, by the instigation of the devil, dissensions in religion, and it began to be said among the people, ‘I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas,’ the churches were governed by a common council of elders. But afterwards, each one imagined that all whom he baptized belonged to himself and not to Christ; then it was decreed in the whole world, that one chosen from among the elders should be appointed over the rest, to whom the care of the whole church should pertain, and the seeds of schism be taken away. Should any one suppose that it is not the sense of Scripture, but our opinion only, that bishop and elder are the same, the one the title of age, the other of office, let him read the words of the Apostle to the Philippians, saying, ‘*Paul and Timothy, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons.*’ Philippi is a single city of Macedonia; and certainly in a single city there could not be several bishops, as they are now styled; but as they, at that time, called the very same

persons bishops whom they called elders, the Apostle has spoken without distinction of the elders as bishops. Should this matter yet appear doubtful to any one, unless it be proved by additional testimony, it is written in the Acts of the Apostles, that when Paul had come to Miletus, he sent to Ephesus, and called the elders of that church, and among other things said to them, '*take heed to yourselves, and to all the flock in which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops.*' Take particular notice, that calling the *elders* of the single city of Ephesus, he afterwards names the same persons *bishops*.

"These things we say, in order that we may show that, among the ancients, bishops and elders were the same; but gradually (*paulatim*), in order that the plants of dissensions might be rooted up, all the power was conferred on one. Thus, therefore, the elders know that they are subject to him who is appointed over them, by the custom of the church; and so, bishops should know that they are superior to the elders, rather by custom, than by any truth of divine arrangement; and they ought to rule the church in common."

What shall be said to this? Did not Jerome know? Had he any motive to falsify? Was he ever contradicted? No! For ages the point was conceded; and as late as the year 1091, Pope Urban II. himself made the same statement; and the most eminent Papal canonists admitted it. Says Pope Urban, "The sacred orders, are the deaconate and eldership; we read that the primitive church had these alone; in respect to these only, have we apostolic precept." The Papal canonist Bernaldus remarks: "When therefore it is read that elders and bishops were the same anciently, it is not to be doubted that they had the same power of binding and loosing, and other things now confined to the bishops. But after the elders were excluded from episcopal dignity, those things began to be unlawful for them which had before been lawful, viz., what ecclesiastical authority had delegated to be performed by Pontiffs alone." (*Gieseler*, I. 96.)

A popular argument in favor of episcopacy is sometimes urged in terms like the following: "It is acknowledged that the church was episcopal, universally or nearly so, as early as the fourth century; no one pretends to tell when it began to be episcopal; therefore the church was always episcopal." This argument is much like the following: "It is acknowledged that Gen. Jackson was an old man in 1840: no one pretends

to tell when he began to be old ; therefore Gen. Jackson was always an old man." Now we have credible evidence that Gen. Jackson was once a young man ; we acknowledge that he is now an old man ; we pretend not to say when he first became old, for as old age does not come at once, but steals on a man *by little and little*, the precise time of its entrance it is impossible to define.

Just so we have now exhibited credible evidence that the church in the apostolic and early patristic age was presbyterial. We acknowledge that in the fourth century it was episcopal : we pretend not to say when it became episcopal ; for episcopacy came on, just as old age steals on man, *by little and little*, so that the precise time of its entrance it is impossible to define. And this is exactly what Jerome testifies in the passage already quoted.

So far as testimony can settle any thing, the point I think is clear, that the patristic church, as well as the apostolic, was presbyterially organized.

WORSHIP. The earliest account we have of Christian worship, out of the Bible, is by the Roman magistrate, Pliny the younger, who was governor of Pontus and Bithynia under the Emperor Trajan, and died in the year 103. There were many Christians in those provinces, as we learn from the Acts and the Epistles ; and in the time of the persecution they were accused before Pliny, who tried by every method to ascertain their practices, and, according to the barbarous policy of the Romans, put to the torture two female slaves, who were deaconesses in the church. The result of all his inquiries he gives to the emperor in the following terms (*Plin. Epist. Lib. X. Ep. 97*) : "They affirm that the whole of their guilt or error was, that they were accustomed to assemble on a certain day, before light, and to sing a hymn among themselves to Christ as God ; binding themselves by a solemn oath, not to any thing wicked, but never to be guilty of fraud, theft, or adultery ; never to falsify their word ; never to deny a trust when called upon to deliver it up : after which it was their custom to separate, and then to reassemble and to take food together and without harm."

The next witness is Justin Martyr, a convert from Samaria, who was born A. D. 90, and suffered martyrdom at Rome A. D. 164 or 168. Near the close of his "Apology for the Christians," which he presented to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, A. D. 150, he thus describes the Christian worship, as he him-

self witnessed it in Palestine : " On the day which is called Sunday, all, whether dwelling in the towns or villages, hold meetings ; and the memoirs of the Apostles and the writings of the Prophets are read as much as the time will permit. Then the reader closing, the president, in a speech exhorts and incites to an imitation of those excellent examples ; then we all rise and pour forth united prayers ; and when we close our prayer, as was before said, bread is brought forward, and wine and water ; and the president utters prayers and thanksgiving, according to his ability, and the people respond by saying amen (1 Cor. 14 : 16) ; and a distribution and participation of the things blessed takes place to each one present, and to those absent it is sent by the deacons. And those who are prosperous and willing give what they choose, each according to his own pleasure ; and what is collected is deposited with the president : and he carefully relieves the orphans and widows, and those who, from sickness and other causes, are needy, and also those that are in prison, and the strangers that are residing with us, and, in short, all that have need of help. We all commonly hold our assemblies on Sunday, because it is the first day on which God converted the darkness and matter, and framed the world ; and Jesus Christ our Saviour rose the same day from the dead." (*Murdock's Mosheim*, I. p. 135.)

Another testimony respecting the early Christian worship is that of John Chrysostom, the justly celebrated bishop of Constantinople, who was born A. D. 347, and died 407. In his time public worship had assumed great splendor and parade ; but he gives explicit testimony to the simplicity and fervor of the early worship. He gives a minute description of the services of the Lord's day, not differing essentially from that by Justin Martyr.

" Early on Saturday," he says, " it was their practice to accomplish the duties of their households, and fulfil the necessary demands of their business, so that no secular care might disturb the enjoyment of the sacred day, or impede the current of their spiritual affections : and severe indeed was the illness, remote the situation, imperious the cause, that detained any from the scenes and occupations which the first day of the week brought along with it."

Besides the services of the Lord's day, Chrysostom says that, " under a conviction that social meetings held at the close and commencement of every day would prove an admirable preparation for the duties and trials of ordinary life, they adopted the

practice of having morning and evening service daily. The hours were so fixed as not to interfere with the routine of ordinary business. Long before daylight they assembled and opened their meeting with the 63d Psalm (*O God, thou art my God ; early will I seek thee*). They then united in prayer, the burden of which was, a supplication for the divine blessing and favor on the members of the household of faith, and for the extension of the Redeemer's kingdom. This was followed by the reading of a short and appropriate passage of Scripture, after which they sang the 90th Psalm (*Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place*), so pathetically descriptive of the frailty and uncertainty of life ; and then embodied their sentiments on this subject in a second prayer, in which they expressed the sense of their dependence on the care of the Almighty, and their gratitude for their common preservation during the previous night. Another portion of the divine word being read, the whole service, scarcely if ever exceeding an hour, was brought to a close by singing the 51st Psalm (*Have mercy upon me, O God*), and a corresponding prayer, in both which they implored the divine mercy to pardon the sins of their past life, and the divine grace to help them amid the exigencies of their future course. The evening meeting was conducted on the same plan as that of the morning, only diversified by a set of Psalms and a strain of devotional sentiment appropriate to the change of time and circumstances. It began with the 141st Psalm (*Lord, I cry unto thee*) and a prayer, in which, like the corresponding one in the morning, the divine love was supplicated on the brethren ; an extract from the Gospels or the Epistles was read, and after this, as the evening meeting generally took place about the time of lighting candles, they sang a hymn in which they gave thanks both for natural and spiritual light, and then prayed a second time for a continuance of the bounty and grace of the Lord." (*Coleman's Antiq.* pp. 247-50.)

Now, this respect and love for the holy Christian Sabbath, so beautifully described by Chrysostom as the characteristic of the early Christians, this delight in the appropriate duties of the Lord's day, these frequent prayer meetings early in the morning and at night, the constant Bible readings, prayings, singings, and exhortings, all look to me exceedingly like active, earnest, wide-awake new school Presbyterianism, and other Sabbath-keeping, revival-moving forms of Christianity.

That the patristic churches had neither liturgy nor prayer-

book, is manifest from a variety of testimony. "We pray (says Tertullian, *Apol.* c. 30) without a monitor, because from the heart—with the eyes raised toward heaven and the hands spread out." How could they look on a book with their eyes raised toward heaven, or hold a book with their hands spread out? We are told by Eusebius (*Vit. Cons.* IV. 36), that Constantine sent Bibles to the churches for use in public worship, but we have no account of their being furnished with prayer-books. These were the invention of a later age, the fifth and sixth centuries, when the clergy became too ignorant and prayerless to be trusted with the devotions of congregations. (*Coleman on Prim. Church*, p. 337-50.) The patristic worship was simple, unencumbered with ritual observances, Presbyterian.

THEOLOGY. During this period there were many loose and visionary theological speculations, and a variety of discussions on different topics in divinity by Origen, Lactantius, Tertullian, Augustine, and others; but no complete system of theology was ever written by an uninspired pen till the monk John of Damascus, in the eighth century, undertook the task. During this period the leading theologian was the Apostle Paul, as he had been during the period immediately preceding, and next in influence to Paul was Augustine.

In the early patristic age, therefore, Presbyterian principles, in respect to organization, worship, and theology, were the prevailing principles.

3. *The revival of Presbyterianism, after the dark ages, by the Reformers in the sixteenth century.*

The world was not yet prepared to receive the liberty of the gospel. The people at large were ignorant and debased; the monarchical principle every where prevailed in civil governments; no one thought that the people were capable of managing their own governmental affairs; there were few schools, few books, and no printing; and Paganism, though apparently dead, still exerted a great influence over the minds of men. Gradually, therefore, and by steps that can easily be traced in the writings of the fathers themselves, the republicanism of presbyterial organization gave way to the despotism of episcopal authority; the simplicity of primitive worship, to a burdensome mass of ceremonial observances, borrowed from paganism and Judaism, but slightly modified by Christianity; and the severe Pauline theology to a conglomeration of loose, cor-

rupt and corrupting traditions, and shadowy, indefinite speculations, called the theology of the fathers.

Traces of the primitive purity were preserved in little isolated communities during the whole of this dark period; but Papal Rome ruled over Christendom with a rod of iron, and the saints hid themselves *in mountains and caves, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, of whom the world was not worthy*. The reformers of the sixteenth century made it their great object to restore the Scriptures, the scriptural organization, worship, and theology, to the church. But the power of Rome filled the earth like a huge mountain, a mountain of brass, and seemed to bid defiance to all human effort, and to be impervious even to the Spirit of God himself. The intrepid Luther fixed his fearless eye on this brazen rock, he raised his brawny arm, and with the hammer of God's word gave it a tremendous blow. It shook and rumbled, as if with an earthquake, and threatened to roll its whole weight upon the audacious assailant. But nothing daunted, he gathered his whole strength and smote again, harder than before, and it cracked through and through; then blow followed blow with lightning rapidity, and at every stroke the fragments flew in all directions, and men waked up and wondered what had become of it all; and from that day to this, Popery has been employed in gathering up the pieces, and trying to put them together again.

The task of reconstruction fell to the calmer and clearer, the less poetical and more philosophical, intellect of Calvin. He rediscovered and developed with admirable completeness and clearness the presbyterial organization of the apostolic church; and he finished it and polished it, just as he did his theology, to a systematic niceness and accuracy which the Bible never aimed at. Luther looked on and admired, and heartily wished he could introduce such a system of church organization into Germany; but he found the people were not prepared for it, and were as yet incapable of any system of self-government. "I fear," said he, "that anarchy would come of it, for we Germans are a wild, rough, roaring set, with whom it is scarcely safe to attempt any innovation, even when the most urgent necessity demands it." (*Henry's Calvin*, II. 134.) Very soon, however, the presbyterial organization was introduced into Germany, and even in a more popular form than Calvin had ventured upon in Geneva, and has ever since prevailed throughout the Lutheran church.

The theory of Calvin, like every thing else on which he

speculated, was very perfect ; but there were practical difficulties in the way of carrying it out in the Genevan commonwealth. The elders were appointed by the government, instead of being elected by the people ; so were the pastors ; though on the pastoral appointments, the congregations had a veto : the synods, also, were directly under the control of the magistrates, and the government had very great influence in all cases of discipline. Calvin, in his zeal to prevent clerical domination, brought the church into too close subjection to the state, and in all church courts, as established by him, there were two lay delegates to one clerical. (*Henry's Calvin*, II. pp. 79, 120.) The system of Calvin, essentially, was adopted in Holland ; in France the theory was carried out into practice with great completeness and the most happy results, as it was also in Scotland, from which last country it was transferred to the United States.

The Puritan churches of New England, formed by emigrants from Old England, who belonged to the national church, were presbyterially organized, and with a more rigid adherence to the scriptural model, than even the churches of Geneva or Scotland. There is no church constitution more essentially scriptural than the "Cambridge Platform," as originally published in 1648. Each church had its pastor and teacher, its board of elders and deacons, chosen by the people ; and instead of a permanent, territorial church court, above the church sessions, the practice mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles was adopted, viz., that of calling together an occasional synod or council, when circumstances required it.

Of all these churches the worship is very simple, and according to the Scriptures ; consisting of prayer, singing, reading the word, preaching, administering the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper, without pomp or unscriptural or extra-scriptural parade.

The theology of all these churches, too, and of the church of England, as expressed in their authorized creeds, is essentially the same ; biblical, strict, and prevailingly Calvinistic. In regard to the doctrine of the divine decrees, which is supposed to be one of the harshest features of Calvinism, the seventeenth article of the church of England is quite as high as any of the original Calvinistic creeds ; and Lutheranism differs only by admitting the divine prerecognition of faith and good works in the elect, which Calvinism denies.

The Lutheran churches admit rather more ceremony in their

public worship, than the Calvinistic, though the difference is not generally very observable; but unhappily the church of England, in its organization, rites, and modes of worship, has retained so much of the Papal element, as always to nourish within her bosom a large party entirely opposed to the strictly Protestant and Augustinian spirit of her doctrinal articles. These articles were the work of Cranmer and of Parker, but the ritual was in accordance with the taste of Henry and his daughter Elizabeth, whose object seemed to be, as a shrewd writer has observed, 'to transfer the full cup of Rome to their own hands, and spill as little by the way as possible.'

The orthodox Baptist churches are organized on the principles of the strictest independency; they are strongly anti-prelatical, very simple in their worship, and strictly Calvinistic in their theology. The Wesleyan Methodists, derived directly from the church of England, discard the doctrinal Calvinism of the "thirty-nine articles," while they retain the monarchical element in their organization; though they very properly and most emphatically disclaim all idea of the divine right of episcopacy. On this point, they sympathize entirely with us, and not at all with Rome or Oxford; and the same is true, to a considerable extent, of a large portion of the Episcopalians. The Baptists, the Methodists, and the evangelical Episcopalians are also with us on another most vital point, viz., the paramount authority of the word of God, in respect to all matters of faith and practice in the Christian church. With the religious people of these three classes, we desire to have no controversy, and need have none; we regard them as our brethren in Christ, and freely concede to them the same liberty which we take for ourselves, of choosing the form of church organization, and the mode of worship, which pleases them best.

After this brief historical sketch, I proceed, as was proposed, to give,

II. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADVANTAGES OF PRESBYTERIAN PRINCIPLES, IN CONTRAST WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF OPPOSING SYSTEMS.

1. *Advantages in respect to polity.*

When Christianity was introduced, the despotic form of civil polity was universal, and the church was the only republic then in existence; but the despotic spirit soon found its way into the church, and after the incorporating of the church into the state, by Constantine, the same despotism reigned in both, and the

emperor became head of the church, as he had been before, of the state. Though bishops, for a while, still continued to be elected by popular suffrage, according to primitive usage, as is evident from the election of Ambrose of Milan (as given by Gibbon in the 27th chapter of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,") and various other examples of the same kind; yet no bishop could retain the charge of his flock without the assent or confirmation of the civil power. After a while the government itself began to appoint to the important sees, and when the imperial power fell before the northern barbarians, the Bishop of Rome perpetuated the ecclesiastical despotism which the Emperor of Rome had begun. Hence, in the book of Revelation (chapter xvii.,) Papal Rome is justly represented as being but the resuscitation of old Pagan Rome, in a form somewhat modified.

I do not intend to say that despotism possesses no advantages over freedom, or that liberty of itself is the greatest of human blessings. Intelligence, and true piety are the greatest blessings which man can enjoy; and, in my judgment, an intelligent and truly pious subject is a happier, and a far more dignified man, than an ignorant and ungodly citizen of the freest republic that ever existed. The martyr, in his dungeon, has a far better lot than the maniac at large; and the most oppressed slave is not unfrequently a less miserable man than his master.

But despotism is always wrong in this: it checks and suppresses the growth of the individual man; it is a foe to the development of the species. Freedom puts no constraint on nature; it allows each individual to develop himself according to the powers which God has given him, and thus prevents monstrous inequalities. But despotism does violence to nature; it swells a few into bloated, unhealthful, unfeeling giants, and dwarfs all the rest to sickly pigmies. It is like some process, by which all the trees of our forests might be reduced to shrubs, except now and then an enormous, hollow, cumbering sycamore, attaining to three or four times its natural size. What would be the use of such an arrangement? Is not God's way the best?

Wherever the despotic principle prevails, and in exact proportion to the extent of its prevalence, this is the effect produced: it does violence to nature, it dwarfs the human race. It imparts to a few a disproportionate and unhealthful growth, at the expense of what properly belongs to the many. Look at

the great mass of the Roman Catholic laity, and see what mere children they are in religious knowledge, compared with an equal proportion of the members of any evangelical Protestant church : for example, contrast the Roman Catholics of Ireland, in this respect, with the Presbyterians of Scotland. Man is naturally indolent, and not inclined to exert himself when he finds every thing done to his hand ; and without exertion there is neither growth nor strength. Let all church matters be left to the priesthood, and the lay members will think and care, and of course know, very little respecting them. But when the people are habituated to act and direct, then they will labor and inform themselves. The different effects of ecclesiastical despotism and ecclesiastical freedom are immediately seen on contrasting any two countries where they respectively exist. Compare Austria with Prussia, or Italy with New England, or Mexico with our Middle States, or any prelatic community with any Presbyterian community, and judge from the intellectual condition of the great mass of the people, which has the best effect, in awakening, and invigorating, and informing the mind.

2. Advantages in respect to ritual and worship.

A cumbrous and ceremonious ritual overlays the intellectual powers and checks their exercise ; it engenders and perpetuates that kind of superstition which substitutes the means for the end, and offers to God the exercises of the body instead of the emotions of the soul. The same is the effect of a formal liturgy constantly used in all acts of worship. To a liturgy for some parts of public worship, such as is used in many of the evangelical churches of Germany, there can be no reasonable objection ; we can pray from a book, as well as sing from a book ; but the real objection is, to confining *all*, or even the greater part of the devotional exercises of the sanctuary to the words of a book, and leaving no room for the mind to expand itself according to the ever varying exigencies of times and circumstances. Liturgies embracing all the parts of worship owe their origin to an ignorant priesthood, unfit to be intrusted with the devotions of a congregation ; and they were at first enforced on all, by those who regarded uniformity in external rites as of more importance than intelligent devotion. To supply what the ignorance of the clergy would not allow them to furnish, the church of England formerly set forth books of homilies, that is, sermons, which those ignorant preachers were required to read from their pulpits, because they were not capable of making

sermons themselves. (*Coleman on Prim. Ch.*, p. 348-50 and 358.)

Supposing a party should arise in the Episcopal church, who should affirm that ministers have no right to preach sermons of their own composition, but are bound to confine themselves to the reading over and over again of these same homilies to their people, with the occasional supply of a new sermon from the ordinary, or bishop, when circumstances render it absolutely necessary ; what *should* we think of such a movement ? It would be every whit as rational and as Scriptural as the sentiments of those who affirm that the liturgy must all be read in public worship, and no other prayer ever introduced, except by the authority of the bishop. Why should not the mind and heart of the eloquent and gifted preacher be allowed to exert their powers for the edification of the people in prayer, as well as in preaching ? It is true, I have sometimes heard men pray, when I wished from my heart they had been compelled to use a liturgy, in order that they might be obliged to pray decently ; but I have oftener seen men employ the whole time appropriated to devotion, in reading from a book, when the devotions of the congregation would have been vastly improved, if, instead of the words of the book, they had poured forth the effusions of their own cultivated intellect and pious feeling, in a form adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the assembly. Liturgies may help the weak, but they embarrass the strong. A go-cart may help the child when he is learning to walk, but it would be an odd appendage to a full-grown man, with strong limbs and muscles well developed. If grave and respectable men should choose always to walk the streets in go-carts, we should have no right to object ; but if, not content with this, they should pour contempt on those who chose to make use of their own unincumbered limbs ; if they were even to affirm that it was impossible for a man to walk at all, or at least to walk gracefully, unless he made use of "*our excellent go-cart*," we might be allowed to smile at what must seem to us such a piece of absurdity.

A liturgy, embracing the Scriptural and more ancient and venerable forms of devotion, partly chanted and partly read, not slavishly imposed, and leaving always ample room for other devotional exercises, might be very useful in public worship, and aid in forming a chastened and correct style of public prayer ; but a long and formal liturgy, absorbing all the time,

is worse than none, and tenfold more productive of abuse, than the worst kind of extempore prayer that ever flowed from pious lips.

The best form of devotion is that which unites variety with simplicity, and fervor with Scriptural chasteness; which leads the soul directly to God, and enables it to lay before his throne the ever varying but constantly recurring joys and thanksgivings, wants and woes, of this our pilgrimage; and this is the theory of Presbyterian worship.

3. *Advantages in respect to theology.*

The presbyterial theology is a Biblical theology, as opposed to that which is traditional. It takes the Bible as its only infallible standard, and requires each man to examine it with the best means of information in his power, and draw his own doctrinal conclusions from it. In opposition to such views, we are told that this is a very arrogant and self-confident way of theologizing; that the private interpretation of Scripture, for the settlement of doctrinal questions, is not allowable; that we must hear the voice of the church; that the fathers of the first six, or at least of the first three centuries of the Christian era, in the best and purest ages of the church, are for us authoritative interpreters of Scripture, and their statements binding in respect to doctrinal conclusions; that this is the only safe method of theologizing, the only sure path to Scriptural truth.

It seems to me that people who talk in this strain have never read the fathers, or if they have read them, it must have been with an everlasting farewell to all common sense. The fathers were most of them good men, many of them for their times were great men; but they were all of them more or less tainted with the errors and prejudices of the age in which they lived: many of them had been trained in pagan vices and follies, were converted late in life, and were never any more fit to be teachers of Biblical interpretation or theology than a converted Brahmin or Mohammedan of the present day. As to all matters of fact which fell under their own observation, or which they had other means of knowing, they are perfectly competent to give testimony; but as to their opinions—their speculations—their exegetical and theological views, they are among the weakest and least profitable of Christian writers. A few specimens of exegesis and theology from the best of them, must, I think, set this matter in a light perfectly clear.

Jerome was a man of great talent and industry, the best Biblical scholar of his time, and his translation of the Bible is now held by the Roman Catholic church to be of paramount, and even of divine authority. His contemporary Vigilantius had objected to praying to the saints, upon the ground that they could not be omnipresent, and therefore might fail to hear our prayers. To this Jerome, with great energy, replies (*adv. Vigilantium*), "Wilt thou give laws to God? Wilt thou put chains on the Apostles, that they shall be held in custody till the day of judgment, and not be with their Lord, when it is written concerning them, '*they follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth*?' If the Lamb be every where, then they who are with the Lamb must also be believed to be every where." So then, according to this most eminent Biblical scholar among the fathers, the text, Rev. 14 : 4, refers not to a moral obedience to Christ, but to a physical presence with him, and is an unanswerable argument in proof of the omnipresence of all and each one of the saints.

Ambrose, bishop of Milan, was contemporary with Jerome. He was an energetic; dignified man, of great courage and consistency. He debarred the emperor Theodosius the Great from the communion on account of his offences; and made him confess his sins and beg pardon before the whole congregation, like the meanest penitent. He was the spiritual father of that greatest of patristic theologians, Augustine, and the author of that most beautiful piece of church music, the original "*Te Deum Laudamus*." But how will it do to take Ambrose as an authoritative interpreter of Scripture? He is arguing (Epist. 42) that Mary the mother of Jesus was always a virgin, and had no children after the birth of Jesus; and for this purpose he quotes Ezek. 44 : 2, "This (the east) gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall enter in by it; because the Lord, the God of Israel, hath entered in by it, therefore it shall be shut;" and thus he reasons upon it: "Is not Mary this gate by whom the Redeemer entered this world, concerning whom it is written, the Lord entered in by her, and she shall be shut after his birth?" The learned Jerome chimes in with the same tone of argument and says (*adv. Pelag. Lib. II.*), "Christ alone opened the closed portals of the virgin's womb, which nevertheless remained continually closed. This is the closed eastern gate by which the High Priest went in and out, and nevertheless it was always shut." (*Gieseler* I. 508, 516.) It

has often been matter of wonder to me whether Dr. Pusey, and Bishop Onderdonk, and Bishop Purcell, and other dignified gentlemen of the same class, do really open their mouths and swallow all this, and call it good. These are not select gems; the fathers are covered *a rostro ad unguem* with diamonds of the same water. It would be easy to multiply quotations of this sort from the greatest and best of them—Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, the Gregories, Ephrem the Syrian, etc. etc.

But Bishop Brownell of Connecticut, living in the land of the Puritans, is more modest in his claims, and confines his patristic authority to the first two centuries of the Christian era. According to Bishop Brownell's advice, then, we will go back to the second century, and even to the first. Old father Papias had been a disciple of the Apostle John himself, and so far as *tradition* is concerned is as well qualified as any body to be our teacher. Let us give one specimen of his exegesis and theology as presented to us by Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* c. 33), who had himself been personally acquainted with Polycarp and other personal friends of the Apostle John. The testimony of Papias is this: "The elders remember, who had seen John the disciple of the Lord, to have heard from him in what manner the Lord taught concerning those times (that is, the millennium), and said, 'The days will come in which vines will grow, every vine having ten thousands stalks, and every stalk having ten thousand branches, and every branch having ten thousand stems, and every stem having ten thousand clusters, and every cluster having ten thousand grapes, and every grape, when pressed, will give three hundred gallons (*twenty-five metretas*) of wine: and when any one of the saints takes hold on one cluster, another will cry out, I am a better cluster; here take me, and by me bless the Lord.' In like manner every grain of wheat will yield ten thousand stalks, and every stalk will bear ten thousand grains, and every grain will give ten pounds of superfine flour," *similæ claræ mundæ.* (*Routh's Relig. Sac.*, I. pp. 9, 10.) Alas! what will the temperance societies do in the millennium? When every grain of wheat produces ten thousand stalks of straw, when there are to be so many grapes, and every single grape to yield three hundred gallons of wine, the old advertisement will indeed be realized: "*Dead drunk for a penny, and straw for nothing.*"

This is what Irenæus testifies that Papias said, that John said, that the Lord Jesus said; as fair and as well authenticated an

example of tradition as can be found in all Christian antiquity. Now just compare it with the New Testament, with the gospel of John in particular, and judge for yourselves whether patristic tradition is a safe guide, yea, the only safe guide, in Biblical interpretation. Indeed, one of the most convincing proofs of the divine inspiration and authority of the Bible, is found in the immense falling off in every quality fitted to inspire respect and confidence, which the reader feels in passing from the last books of the New Testament to the first books written by Christians immediately succeeding, and who had themselves been personally acquainted with the Apostles.

But if Papias was a good man, how came he to tell such a story? It is evident that Papias had never been a strong man; and in his old age he was probably weaker than ever, and acquired that species of memory which manifests itself in recollecting things that never happened. From the lusciousness of the picture he draws, I should imagine that he must have told the above story when hospitably entertained by some Christian family, after having eaten a much better dinner than he was usually wont to find, and washing it down with plenty of good mellow wine. I commend father Papias to the special attention of those who interpret Scripture by tradition, and oppose temperance societies.

In reference to the absurdity of attempting to interpret such a book as the New Testament by such traditions as these, I cannot help quoting a characteristic passage from that glorious old Puritan, John Milton. It is found in his tract on Prelatical Episcopacy, and reads as follows: "We do injuriously in thinking to taste better the pure evangelic manna, by seasoning our mouths with the tainted scraps and fragments of an unknown table, and searching among the venomous and polluted rags dropped overworn from the toiling shoulders of time, with these deformedly to quilt and interlace the entire, the spotless and undecaying robe of truth, the daughter, not of time, but of heaven."

But say the traditionists, it is not the individual opinion of the fathers that we rely upon, it is their *unanimous consent*. The great maxim is that so well stated by Vincentius Lirinensis (*Commonit.* ch. 3): "In the Catholic church itself, this principally is to be cared for: that we hold to that which has been believed every where, always, and by all." I ask, then, what that is which "has been believed *every where, always, and by*

all?' The fathers differed from each other, on all questions of doctrine and practice quite as much as any equal number of modern evangelical theologians have done, as can easily be proved by extracts from their writings. In what particulars did this so-called unanimous consent ever obtain, except in regard to the simple statements of the oldest creed that has been preserved (*I believe in God the Father Almighty,*) and the divine inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, the very points on which there is now, and always has been, unanimous consent, among all evangelical theologians and Christians? Beyond these points there is no unanimous consent, and to pretend to carry it any further is merely hoodwinking the ignorant.

The fathers themselves were far enough from pretending to unanimity, even on points of doctrine which they considered essential; nor did they admit, even into their thoughts, any of the arrogant claims which have since been urged in their behalf. They uniformly deferred to the authority of Scripture, and acknowledged their own liability to error; and, in truth, when they were at swords-points against each other, they must have known that they could not all be right.

Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, contend most earnestly for an earthly millennium, of physical as well as spiritual delight; which opinion is sharply and even bitterly opposed and ridiculed by Jerome and Gregory Nazianzen, and Dionysius Alexandrinus. Jerome affirmed that the dispute between Peter and Paul mentioned in the epistle to the Galatians, was all a sham, got up by agreement between the two Apostles, for popular effect; at which Augustine gets quite angry, and asserts that Paul rebuked Peter in real and sober earnest. Tertullian and Augustine maintained that the soul was propagated from father to son, like the body; Jerome ridiculed this idea, and asserted that the soul is created by God, and united to the body. The age of Christ, the duration of his ministry, the baptism of heretics, the celebration of Easter, occasioned violent disputes, in which fathers of undoubted orthodoxy fought against fathers equally orthodox. Cyril said that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son: Theodoret retorted that this was an impious and blasphemous doctrine. The council of Chalcedon made Constantinople the sovereign episcopate; the council of Sardica decreed the sovereignty to Rome. These are but specimens—

there is no end to their disputes. (*Daille on the Fathers*, II. 112—125.)

In further confirmation of the truth of what we have stated, we make the following quotation from the fathers themselves. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* 4): "For nothing at all ought to be delivered concerning the divine and holy mysteries of faith, without the Holy Scriptures; nor ought we to be at all influenced by probabilities or prepared arguments; nor should you in any wise believe me that say these things to you, unless you take the demonstration of the things that are declared out of the Holy Scriptures. Basil, (*Moral XXVI.* 1): "Every word and action ought to be confirmed by the testimony of the divinely inspired Scriptures, to the full confirmation of the good and the confusion of the evil."

Theophilus (*Pasch.* 2): "It is an instinct of the Devil to follow the sophisms of the human mind, and to think any thing divine without the authority of the Scriptures."

Ambrose (*Op. Lib. VII. Ep. 47*): "I take it for a favor when any one that readeth my writings giveth me an account of what doubts he there meeteth with; first, because I may be deceived even in those things which I know; moreover, many things escape one, and many, sound differently to different persons."

Jerome (*con. Helvid.*): "As we do not deny those things which are written, so we reject those things which are not written."

(*Com. in Hab.*): "Thus have I delivered unto you my exposition of this book; but if any one produce that which is more exact and true, take his exposition rather than mine."

(*Com. in Zach.*): "This I have delivered according to the utmost of my poor ability, yet if any man can give a better or a truer account of these things, I shall gladly acquiesce in it."

Jerome speaks as freely of the other fathers as he does of himself. He says, "Cyprian scarcely touched the Scripture at all; Victorinus was not able to express his own thoughts; Lactantius is not so happy in his endeavors to prove our religion, as he is in overthrowing that of others; Arnobius is very uneven and confused, and too luxurious; Hilary is too swelling, and incumbered with too long periods."

Augustine (*Liter. Petil. Lib. III. c. 6*): "I say not, if we, but if an angel from heaven shall tell us any thing beside that

you have received in the Scriptures, legal and evangelical, let him be accursed."

(*Epist. to Jerome*) : "I owe only to those books of Scripture, which are called canonical, such reverence and honor as to believe steadfastly that none of their authors ever committed any error in their writings. But as for all other writers, how eminent soever they may be, either for sanctity or learning, I read them so as not immediately to conclude that whatever I there find is true, because they have said it, but only because they convince me, either out of the books of the said canonical Scripture, or else by some probable reason that what they say is true." (*Daille on the Fathers*, II. 11-40, and *Cary's Testimony of the Fathers*, pp 108-112.)

Such quotations express the true Presbyterian principle on this subject : they might be multiplied to any extent. They are genuine, and cannot be gainsaid. Now if any one can produce opposing quotations from these same fathers, quotations asserting unanimity or infallibility, or an authority co-ordinate with that of Scripture, such quotations would strengthen my position immeasurably ; for they would show that the fathers had no unanimous consent even with themselves in maintaining either truth or error. But I believe the fathers, fairly interpreted, will not be found to be much at variance on this point ; that there was among them a unanimous consent in respect to their own fallibility, and the infallibility and sufficiency of the canonical Scriptures alone. Their unanimous consent was confined to a very few articles, and these are the articles in regard to which all evangelical Christians of every name have always been agreed ; and in respect to all other things they differed and disputed as much as fallible men have ever done, in any age since.

A theology received on human authority, whether that authority be fathers or councils, popes or bishops—a theology depending for its proof on the assertions of men, and not on the authority of God's word or the force of argument, is tame, spiritless, and of very little use. A living, authoritative expounder of God's will, whose words were all to be received as oracles, and who was to infuse religious knowledge into us without study or responsibility of our own, would be a curse instead of a blessing. It would affect us morally and mentally, as it would physically, if God were to appoint a set of men to bring all our food to our mouths, and put all our clothing upon our bodies, without forethought or labor of our own. Either

arrangement would soon reduce us to a state of idiocy ; for without the necessity of exercise the powers are never developed. Such arrangements are contrary to the whole analogy of God's dealings with man ; they are hostile to all human improvement. The Creator of man has never made any such arrangements ; they are all the fictions of would-be tyrants, laboring to chain down the souls which God has made for freedom. It is easy for a man to believe passively the statements of another, but such a belief is not worth the having ; it does the soul no good. The injunction, *Prove all things, hold fast that which is good*, is not addressed to bishops and ecclesiastics merely, but to all Christians of every rank, who are all and equally kings and priests unto God, and under equal responsibilities and obligations to use their own powers and opportunities to investigate truth for themselves ; and to this responsibility they will all be holden at the great day of judgment, and no man can surrender his conscience to the keeping of his priest without imminent peril to his soul. The very labor necessary to investigate the Bible and examine the other sources of knowledge which God has given us, is as valuable to us as the truth itself which is obtained by it ; and the last is of but little use without the first. The exercise which the laboring man gets is as important to him as his wages, and without it he would have neither strength nor health. What but lifting the hammer gives such a muscle to the blacksmith's arm ? and what but the habit of reading the Bible for himself, makes the hated Presbyterian peasant so different a being from the Italian Romanist of the same class ? To secure uniformity in faith by taking away a man's power or right to investigate truth, is like preventing a soldier's running away in battle by cutting off his legs. It is true he can no longer retreat, but neither can he advance ; if he has lost the power to be a deserter, he has at the same time lost the power to be a soldier.

While man is limited in knowledge and imperfect in holiness, wherever there is freedom of investigation, there will be difference of opinion and some bitterness of controversy ; and perfect uniformity of opinion and entire quietness in the public mind, is to be secured only by an entire sacrifice of all the higher qualities of intellect and heart. In the papal church itself, wherever thought has been permitted, there has always been controversy ; and controversy has been suppressed only when it began to encroach on the ecclesiastical power. *Think*

as you please, but only hear the church, has always been the language of ecclesiastical despotism, to the mind disposed to think for itself; and in the prelatic vocabulary, *church* is synonymous with *hierarchy*. Yet papists vaunt their uniformity and reproach us with our divisions, as if this were an unanswerable argument in their favor, and against us. As well might the graveyard boast its own quiet, and reproach the busy mart with its bustle and noise. On all the great doctrines of the gospel there is essential unanimity among evangelical Protestants of every name; and any unanimity beyond this in the papal or prelatic church, is produced by intellectual palsy or death. The security which the rigid papist enjoys against sectarianism, is very much like the security which the man half dead with paralysis has against convulsions.

Freedom in religion, as well as in other matters, has its responsibilities and dangers, its trials and inconveniences; but yet without freedom there is no life. The living man must sometimes feel pain; it is the dead only who never smart. The celibate priest, by the efforts of his own ingenuity, makes an automaton, and by pressing its springs, he can cause it to move a little, and utter a few specified words which it was formed to utter. The married minister, according to God's ordinance, begets a living child, endued with spontaneity, sense, and reason. "Pshaw," says the priest, "your child cries, it is noisy, it makes trouble, it gets sick, it is exposed to danger, it gives you great anxiety; but here, see my child, that does not cry, is never noisy, makes but little trouble, is never sick, seldom runs into danger, gives me almost no anxiety." "All true," replies the minister; "still I am well contented to be the father of a living immortal man, if he does cost me some anxiety and labor, rather than the maker of a mere machine, however ingenious or amusing it may be." Here is just the difference between the two systems.

The Presbyterian theology is also strict and Augustinian, or rather I would say, Pauline, in opposition to loose and Pelagian views. There may be much of religious emotion and many lovely traits of character, even under the influence of an indefinite or Pelagian theology; but a doctrinal tendency of this kind is always injurious to the solidity and firmness of the Christian character. Though much is sometimes said, theoretically, of the necessarily immoral tendency of the strict Presbyterian theology, yet, in practice, it has always been found that, in com-

munities where this rigid theology prevails, there the morality is uniformly more strict and pure than in communities of an opposite theological tendency.

I am now to give, according to the plan indicated,

III. SOME SPECIAL REASONS WHY THESE PRINCIPLES OF PRESBYTERIANISM SHOULD BE INSISTED UPON AND PROPAGATED AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND IN THIS COUNTRY.

1. *These principles are best adapted to the present political condition and tendencies of our country.*

Our political institutions are democratic, and the tendencies are to a continued increase of the democratic development. This tendency must go on, for it is the tendency of the age, and not of an isolated nation. The old world is much faster verging towards democracy than the new world is towards monarchy. The church, in all countries, is the great educational seminary for the people at large; and as they are educated in the church, so will they act in the state. All the democratic elements in the British constitution, all the republicanism now in existence, owes its origin to a republican church organization; and had there been *no church without a bishop*, there would at this day have been *no state without a king*. Says that bitter hater of the Puritans and Presbyterians, David Hume, "The precious spark of liberty had been kindled and was preserved by the Puritans, * * and * * to this sect * * * the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution." And again, "The noble principles of liberty took root, and, spreading themselves under the shelter of puritanical absurdities, became fashionable among the people." (*Hist. of England*, V. 183, 469.)

Yet some strangely think, at least they affect to think, for they actually say it, that a monarchical church organization, so far from being unfavorable to civil liberty, actually promotes it, gives people a relish for it, and an ability to secure it. By what strange process of reasoning they arrive at such a conclusion, I cannot tell; but they remind me of the reasoning of an old gentleman who was lamenting the fact, that all his sons became drunkards. "Why they should get into such a way," said he, "of going to the tavern and drinking and getting drunk, I cannot see; for I never kept them from spirits when they were young: I always bought my rum by the barrel and let them help themselves whenever they wanted. I am sure if they are drunkards it is not my fault." The old gentleman seemed

very sincerely to entertain the idea, that keeping children from rum was the very way to make them drunkards, and giving it to them was the way to make them sober ; and it must be by some analogous process of reasoning, that some people persuade themselves that a despotic church is favorable to a republican state. I know that some men may be sincere and hearty republicans, notwithstanding their connexion with a despotic church, as some men may be temperate notwithstanding a childhood accustomed to alcohol ; but that there is any essential tendency in the early use of alcohol to make men temperate, or in church despotism to make them freemen, is what I have never yet been able to see. So far as abstract reasoning or the observation of facts may go to justify a conclusion, it is directly the reverse of that which those people assume.

Again, popular education, the education of the masses, is essential to the existence of republics ; and where has there ever been provision made, under prelatic rule, for this kind of education ? Prelacy I know has made magnificent endowments for the higher branches of education, the education of the few ; but search the annals of education through and through, and where will you find a liberal system of common schools which did not originate with a popular church organization ? Presbyterian Scotland, Congregational New England, and Lutheran Germany, have been the great introducers and sustainers of common-school instruction, both in the old world and the new ; and in all those countries, the introduction of the common-school system immediately followed the presbyterial church organization. The reason is obvious : prelatic despotism seeks to control by direct authority, by a sacerdotal caste ; but presbyterial parity depends on the power of argument and persuasive reasonings. To the efficiency of the latter, intelligence is essential ; to that of the former, it is generally a most formidable obstacle. The education of our people, therefore, to the views and habits essential to the maintenance of republican institutions, both in the common school and out of it, depends mainly on the churches of our land which are presbyterially or independently organized. I do not say that individuals of other organizations will not take deep interest in this matter and effect great good ; but I say the main dependence, the chief reliance, must be on the churches which are democratically organized.

2. These principles are best adapted to the physical condition and necessities of our country.

To bring our soil under cultivation, to civilize our country, to rear within it the structure of society on a solid and permanent foundation, we need a sturdy, self-relying, unflinching yeomanry, intelligent and of strict morality, with heads to plan and hands to execute the most arduous labors; and this is just the sort of population which a Presbyterian church is likely to produce, and which it always has produced. Look into all the branches of the Presbyterian household, and these are always the characteristics of her sons. If some other forms of religion may boast of more elegance, refinement, and taste; if others still are wont to exhibit more emotion, or the flame of a more showy zeal; none can show greater knowledge of the useful, more skill in the adapting of means to ends, a more determined perseverance, a more patient continuance in well-doing, an energy more unflagging, a zeal more lasting, a courage more steady, an intelligence more enlightened, a morality more strict, a success more certain.

The activity and enterprise, the thrift and shrewdness, the intelligence and good morals, of the Scotch and the Yankees, have passed into a proverb: none are more cordially welcomed than they, into any new place which is to be built up by industry and good management; and for very many of their most valuable qualities they are obviously indebted to the education which they have received from their ecclesiastical institutions, their churches and their common schools, their Bibles and their psalm-books. What kind of a civilization would have existed in this new world without them? if the Spanish or French, who first got footing here, had succeeded in holding on upon the soil? Mexico and South America now graphically portray the civilization that might be expected here, if Popery and Prelacy, instead of Presbyterianism and Independency, had had the training of our infant institutions.

The same causes that made these churches useful at first render their services necessary still. The same causes that have made them such a blessing to the nation already, would make the same principles which actuated and informed them, still more generally useful if more widely diffused. These are the principles to make the wilderness blossom as the rose, and the desert and the solitary place to be glad. Having tried their efficacy, having witnessed their fruits, having already reaped from them an abundant harvest of good, we trust our countrymen will not turn from them to try other and opposing princi-

ples, the operation of which has already turned many a fruitful field into a desert, but seldom, as yet, a desert into a fruitful field.

3. These principles are best adapted to the moral state and wants of our country.

No religion can be efficacious with us, unless it can make its appeals to the understanding, and through the understanding address itself to the emotions and the conscience. No state authority here enforces ecclesiastical decrees; there is no veneration for ancient usages that can stand in the place of an enlightened and tender conscience. A religion of the imagination, or a religion of emotion merely, cannot exert a permanent influence amid institutions such as ours. All the religion of high church prelacy, whether papal or Puseyite, is a religion of the imagination only. Its efficacy consists in a mysterious power communicated to the sacraments in consequence of their being administered by certain persons who have been ordained in a certain line of succession. Now there is no shadow of a proof of the communication or even of the existence of any such power. It makes no manifestation of its presence in those who claim it. The influence of the doctrines and precepts of the New Testament is not at all increased by it, in those who are said to receive it; nay, a reliance upon it seems uniformly to have a tendency to weaken this influence. According to all the sources of evidence to which we can have access, Isaac Watts and David Brainerd were as good men and as useful ministers as they could have been if all the bishops of the church of England had laid their hands on their heads; and the celebrated Talleyrand was not in the least like Jesus Christ, or even like Paul or Peter, though he himself wore a mitre, and was said to be charged with this mysterious power as a Leyden jar is charged with electricity.

What has the understanding to do with a system which supposes that baptism or the Lord's Supper, when administered by Talleyrand, secures, at least for the time, the favor of God and the salvation of the soul; but when administered by Payson, are in the sight of God of no avail whatever? a theory which makes Jonathan Swift a true minister of Jesus Christ and Jonathan Edwards an intruder and an impostor? What is this mysterious power that produces no effect appreciable by any of the powers of perception which God has given us? Which cannot be known by the intellect nor appreciated by the senses, which

can neither be seen, nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelled, nor touched, and which produces no effects that can ever be witnessed by a human being? He that has it is not conscious of possessing it; he that receives it knows nothing of the matter; it may be lost or found, and the owner be equally unconscious of the loss or the acquisition.

A power which exhibits no evidence of its existence, except the mere assertion of a class of men interested to perpetuate a delusion, can have no strong hold on a people like ours. Some express declaration of God's word, or some obvious miracle, must attest the existence of such a power before it can generally be believed; and as we have long waited in vain to witness such declarations or such a miracle, we pronounce the whole thing a *humbug*. A religion resting only on the imagination requires physical power for its support; and such aid it always seeks. Prelacy, full grown, always resorts to persecution; it can rely on nothing else. And where the civil arm is beyond its reach, it next resorts to the money power, and seeks to intrench itself by holding every particle of church property within the sacerdotal grasp. But the republicanism of the New Testament seeks no such aids. Its property is cheerfully intrusted with the laity, and it asks nothing of Cæsar but to be let alone.

Nor will a religion of mere emotion hold our people. A system producing great revivals, which sweep two hundred or three hundred into the church in two or three weeks, of whom in less than a year there are scarcely twenty or thirty remaining, all the rest returning like dogs to their vomit, being ten-fold more the children of hell than before,—a system which produces such results has something in it radically defective; its defects are clearly perceptible to every sane mind, and weaken the public confidence in its efficacy.

Nor will a religion without emotion succeed any better than a religion which is all emotion. It fails to meet the soul in its most pressing necessities, and compels it to look elsewhere for relief. Neither dead orthodoxy nor self-conceited rationalism can hold the soul that has once become alive to its own wants: rather than be held in bondage by them it will rush to the wildest fanaticism; and indeed, dead orthodoxy first, and rationalism in the second place, are the two great feeders of all religious partisans.

The religion which our country needs is one which fully re-

cognizes all the spiritual wants of man and furnishes a supply for them. It is one which convinces the understanding before it appeals to the feelings—which rests for its support on the convictions of the mind, and the decisions of an enlightened conscience—which recognizes no authoritative voice but the voice of God, and whose only ultimate appeal is the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, in its original shape, in the languages in which God first gave it to man—which believes neither in inspired translations, nor inspired traditions, nor inspired creeds or catechisms, or confessions of faith—and which therefore requires all its religious teachers to understand the original languages of the Bible, and to make the original Scriptures their only authoritative standard in all matters of faith and practice.

Such is the theory of all the churches presbyterially organized; it is the true theory—the only true theory, and needs but to be put in practice to cause its life-giving and soul-saving efficacy to be known and read of all men.

Brethren, bishops, elders, and members of the Constitutional Presbyterian Church, as I believe that Presbyterianism, as I have explained the term, is the primitive and best form of Christianity, so I believe that our form of Presbyterianism is, for our circumstances, the best form. If I did not believe this, I would not remain in your communion a day. If I knew any other church among us nearer to the mind of Christ, I would at once, as I value the salvation of your soul and the souls of others, seek connexion with it. If then we have the Christian religion in its purity, it remains for us to show it in our lives, and that our lives be devoted to its advancement.

Two things principally have corrupted our purity and hindered our efficiency as a church. In the old world orthodox churches have generally been corrupted by entangling alliances with the state, which require them to connive at iniquity in certain cases; and in our own country there is a civil institution, which has well nigh sucked out the life's blood of the church, and introduced into its veins a vicious, festering, loathsome circulation, that has broke out in sores and blotches all over the surface. Who that looks at the matter with a common sense view can doubt or hesitate to say that American slavery, as it actually exists in theory and practice, is the most fruitful source of evil, social, physical, and moral, which exists in the United

States ? that it lies at the foundation of almost all our embarrassments and disgraces, political, pecuniary, and religious ?

Yet, because influential men are making money by it ; because interesting and respectable people are involved in it and find it inconvenient to get rid of it ; because we have slave-holding members, slave-holding elders, and even slave-holding bishops, the church has been required to overlook this enormity, to be silent respecting its evils, to get along with it as quietly and easily as she can ; and some of her ministers even argue that it is not inconsistent with a Bible Christianity. This course has deadened the moral sense of a large portion of the church, and driven a small part into the extravagancies of a wild and reckless fanaticism. A portion of the body it has reduced to death and rottenness, and another portion it has driven into convulsion-fits. As well might you introduce the virus of small pox into the circulation of the human body, and expect the man still to have strong, robust limbs, a comely, wholesome face, as allow the virus of slavery to remain unmedicated in the church, and still expect its moral influence to be healthful and beautifying. There is no blinking this thing out of sight. It must be met calmly, considerably, and with a Christian spirit. We would oppose every rash, ill-advised, or harsh measure ; we would not immediately amputate a limb, because it has received a wound, nor would we refuse to dress the wound at all, and allow it to gangrene and mortify, because touching it, however tenderly, makes it smart. Boldly yet humanely would we apply the proper remedies, and give them ample time to prove their efficacy. We are told that our church came together, from the north and the south, on the principles of compromise, and this compact of compromise must never be violated. Look at the action of our General Assembly on slavery, during the first twenty-five years of the existence of the General Assembly, when this compromise must have been made, if it was ever made, and abide by the declarations then given out as the solemn decisions of the church north and south on this subject, and we have nothing more to ask. (See Assembly's Digest).

The other cause that has corrupted our purity and hindered our efficiency, is the unhappy controversy and division which we have experienced. There was never any need of this division. The great body of the church, in both branches, was and still remains sound and right. There were some extrava-

gant spirits on both sides, and from them alone the agitation and mischief originated. On the one hand there were a few stiff and bigoted antinomians, and on the other a few loose and hot-headed revivalists; and some of the most zealous and efficient of the former class were apostates fresh from the latter. It was those who had themselves professed to be converted over some half dozen times within a half a dozen years, that accused their brethren of Pelagianism; it was those who had themselves clapped their hands and shouted glory at Methodist meetings, that accused their brethren of getting up Methodist revivals; it was those who themselves violated every rule of Presbyterian discipline by their revolutionary measures, that accused their brethren of a neglect of Presbyterian order. But these things are now past. They need no longer hinder our efforts. The great body of Christians, in both branches, feel right toward each other—the great body of ministers, in both branches, are sound, self-denying, right-minded men. But bigots and fanatics will be bigots and fanatics still: for *though you bray a fool with a pestle in a mortar among wheat, yet will not his folly depart from him—and a fool is wiser in his own conceit, than seven men that can render a reason.*

Says Jesus Christ, the only head of the church whom we acknowledge—*the kingdom of God cometh not with outward show, and, my kingdom is not of this world.* What then is the church? Just what the reformer, John Huss, said it is: *totus numerus predestinatorum—the whole number of the elect*—that is the church. Where is the church? Just where the father Irenæus said it is: *ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi est ecclesia—et ubi ecclesia ibi est Spiritus Dei, where the Spirit of God is, there is the church,—and where the church is, there is the Spirit of God.* Out of this church there is indeed no salvation, and in it there is no damnation; and the connexion with this church is not that of a dead joist morticed and tenoned into a dead beam, but that of the living branch, growing out of the living vine, and bearing fruit constantly, abundantly. Much fruit,—much fruit is the only test of membership here; for, says our Saviour, *Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples.*

ARTICLE II.

EVIDENCE FROM NATURE FOR THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

By Rev. T. M. Post, Professor in Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.

Is the soul immortal? By soul we mean that within man, whatever it is, which *thinks and feels*, which is susceptible of reason, emotion, and conscience. Will it continue to think and feel FOREVER? We raise no question of materialism or immaterialism. That question we think has no relevancy to the point at issue.

We shall premise here that, as far as our reasoning can reach, this question is equivalent to that of *another life*. The anxious inquiry of the man of Uz, "If a man die, shall he live again?" involves the whole. We know of nothing deadlier than death. If the soul passes unextinguished through what we call death, we can imagine no more terrible foe beyond, likely to annihilate it. The question then stands, What evidence does nature furnish that that which now thinks, reasons, and feels within us, will continue to do so beyond what we call death? that is, What are the natural grounds of our hope of a future life?

In consequence of the wrong direction usually given to this argument, and the resulting unsatisfactoriness, it has, we apprehend, passed into an undeserved and injurious neglect. Relying on the explicit declaration of Christianity for the immortality of the soul, the Church has come to disregard, and even to decry, the testimony of Nature as ambiguous, or no longer needed, and seems to have thought, that to call her in as a witness enfeebled the argument and dishonored Revelation. In so doing, we think wrong has been done to the voice of Nature, and the harmony between natural and revealed religion been broken; the authority of Revelation itself has suffered in consequence, and the question been put in an attitude, which the spirit of our age will not permit it long to occupy, without consequences still more disastrous to religious faith. There are, we think then, important reasons for taking up the argument

from Nature at this time, not because we are left to it, and, it failing, our hope of immortality fails, but because,

First, it can be shown that Nature clearly conspires with Revelation; and it is grateful to the human mind to find these two witnesses unequivocally attesting the same mighty truth, while it cannot fail to distress and embarrass it, to find a break in the general correspondency between the natural and revealed systems of God, on a doctrine of such vast moment and universal reach.

And secondly, the *necessity of a Revelation* for the establishing of this doctrine, will appear from the grounds on which all valid arguments from nature, on this subject, must rest. All such argument being based, as we shall attempt to show, on a right idea of God, manifests the necessity of a new Revelation of Him in a world where that idea has been clouded, and will inspire us with additional gratitude to Christ as both the revealer of God, and the bringer of "Life and Immortality to light."

Again, it is important to put this argument in a right position, because it is the only ground on which you can meet the deniers of Revelation; and though little hope may be entertained that they will be brought to soundness of mind by any argument of this kind, if they reject the evidence of Revelation, still it may prepare them to receive that more favorably—to find nature attesting, through the essential laws of the human mind, its sublime, solemn, and unextinguishable prophecy of that great verity which the Bible explicitly reveals. Sceptic madness may pause when it finds that, even the Bible being thrown away, still the same retributive, everlasting destiny awaits it, treasured up in its moral immortality.

Again, in the conduct of this argument, as it seems to us, issue has almost universally been joined on wrong ground, and in consequence, in the first place, all conclusions have been marked by a painful hesitancy, till the argument from Nature seems almost to have been tacitly yielded. Nature, though interrogated for ages by the human soul of its immortality, in an agony of interest, seemed dark as a sybil. We think it was because she required right questioning, and that she ought, if possible, to be vindicated from the charge of ambiguity. Yielding to this charge, as it seems to us, cannot fail to be disastrous to all religious belief. For, that a fact so all-commanding, and possessing necessarily such universal relations to the present life, should not, like other parts of the revealed system, be pre-

indicated by Nature, but that on it she should mumble darkly in delphic enigmas, would go far to stagger faith in Revelation itself, and to drive the mind to universal skepticism. And in the second place, the grounds on which this argument has commonly been made to rest, have been such as to put Christianity and free science in a position of seeming antagonism to each other, a position always pernicious to both. Revelation clearly teaching the immortality of the soul, and this doctrine being supposed necessarily to rest on certain theories of the *substance of the soul*, all attacks or seeming attacks on those *theories* have been resisted and resented as assaults on Revelation itself. Thus phrenology and cognate speculations with reference to the connexion between the mental action and cerebral organization are often impugned, not on account of intrinsic absurdity or unprovableness, but as tending to *materialize mind*. Such a mode of opposing any scientific speculation is injurious both to science and religion—to science, as it tends to overawe, not convince, the human mind, and to put it out of the true course of inquiry into truth or falsehood—and to Revelation, because it exhibits her as an obstacle to free inquiry, and liable to be brought in conflict with the philosophy of natural facts, and exposed to a triumph of her enemies over her, at every new fact which, in their view, makes against the immateriality of the soul.

It was thus, in a great measure, the French Naturalists and Encyclopediasts of the last age intrinched infidelity, as they thought, in natural science, and it is for this reason, we apprehend, that so many skeptics are found among the medical men of the present day. Now we are no materialist, but we think it unfortunate that the advocates of the immortality of the soul have felt compelled to identify their cause with opposition to materialism. We think so, because we believe there is no necessary relevancy between the two, and it has been an attempt to prove a more evident by a less, and the mind has been diverted from the true course of argument to one that must be ever unsatisfactory.

Let us here premise, then, certain arguments which we do not rely on, but which are commonly urged. We discard all reasonings from the *physics* of the soul, i. e. *inferences from its supposed substance and its natural phenomena*. It is common to argue, from these sources, a natural and necessary immortality. The usual course of reasoning has been, "The soul

is indivisible, it cannot therefore be dissolved. But what we call death is a dissolution; the soul therefore cannot die; it is *necessarily* immortal." Or, "The soul is immaterial, and therefore cannot be annihilated by the dissolution of a material body." Or, "The soul is of the nature of God—something divine, and therefore cannot perish," etc. Now it will be perceived, these are merely forms of begging the question by the assumptions in the premises. They are reasoning from theories incapable of proof, and from unwarrantable analogies, attempted between the death of the body and the soul, which may amuse, but can mean nothing.

But it was on grounds of this kind, though they hint at others, that all the ancient philosophers except Socrates made issue. He alone, here as every where else, standing out prominent from the ancient world, based his argument mainly on *moral*, not physical, grounds. The different schools assert or deny the immortality of the soul, according to their assumed theories of the substance or physical nature of the soul. The Epicurean assumed it to be a congeries of atoms, and therefore dissoluble and mortal. The Pythagorean that it was a monad, a numeric unity, and therefore incapable of dissolution and death. The Stoic assumed it to be of a substance partly perishable, but that a part would be absorbed with the essence of God. The Peripatetic assumed that it was an emanation from God, and would return to him after death. The moderns, to a great extent, have done little more than present different forms of the physical argument. Different theories of the substance of the soul have been contested as if involving in them its life and death.

Now it is evident that all reasoning of this kind must be forever barren—no uniform decision has been, or can be, rendered on premises like these, but it must vary with the caprice of the reasoner in assuming. The issues are *impracticable* or *irrelevant*—impracticable, because they are on points we can never determine. We do not know the substance of the soul—pursue it as far we please, until it hides in the subtlest forms of matter, still we only detect its agents and instrumentalities. We can no more confound thought and conscience with the phenomena of electricity and galvanism, than we can with bones and muscles. The soul still ever eludes our analysis.

Again, the issue is irrelevant, because the substance of the soul does not decide its immortality. Materiality does not preclude, or immateriality ensure it. The question still rests with

God, who in the one case will not be compelled, nor in the other forbidden, to make it immortal at His pleasure. The necessary immortality of a created being is an absurdity. God alone hath it, and all other beings are, or are not, as He wills. Nor can we regard physical phenomena occurring just before death, as any experimental evidence of the state of the soul beyond it. For, in the first place, these phenomena are variable, and inferences from them, if warrantable, must be conflicting. If in some cases the soul seems to flash out triumphant over corporeal dissolution, in others it seems to die even before the body. Again, the *final result is in all cases uniform*—all mental manifestation perishes. However superior the soul may seem for a time over the mortal agony—though in full-orbed brightness it seems to sink far into the death-shade—it does at last, in all cases, to mortal seeming *go out*, and all that remains to us of the man lies before us a cold, dark, insensate, mindless clod. The soul may have struggled mightily, but death in every instance has been too strong for it.

The argument from *physical phenomena*—I use the term “physical” here as opposed to *moral*, and as relating to *substance and natural life*—can only rebut adverse presumptions, attempted to be drawn from the same source. To such presumptions it may be replied, “The soul *may* have such a substance as to be indestructible by death;” “it retains its vitality through a part of the dissolution of the body, it *may* survive the whole.” There we must stop.

We can then bring no positive testimony from experience; for apart from Revelation we have none. The question is of “that undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveller returns.” Shutting the Bible, and discarding tales of spiritual visitation which, true or false, are incapable of proof to mankind at large, the world of death is without an echo. For ages hope and fear and love have waited listening at the head of the dark valley, but no whisper has come from its silent confines.

We cannot, then, reach the height of this question by physical reasoning in any form. Its scope is necessarily limited by the physical and sensible world—on the brink of this its walk stops at once and forever—there its line of cause and sequence breaks off—beyond, it looks down upon clueless chaos and old night. To span the world-wide chasm between the visible and invisible world, philosophy must lay hold of relations which must stretch unbroken through every world—imperishable as Being itself: its chain of necessity must be a moral one.

Driven from all arguments for the necessary or natural immortality of the soul, our only recourse is to Him who alone hath immortality. WE GROUND THE WHOLE ARGUMENT IN GOD. That "in Him we live, move, and have being," will be as true of us millions of ages hence, as at this moment. Immortality is the gift of God, immortally given. The whole question then is, What is God's will? In His breast alone rests the mighty secret. Can we extract it thence by the key of Nature? This is the problem now to be solved. We believe we can, and that the immortality of the soul can be established to a moral certainty from a principle universally and necessarily admitted in all reasoning—the truthfulness of our intellectual and moral intuitions—that it can be shown that, to deny the immortality of the soul, implies the denial of primary beliefs and feelings, which however we may theorize, we are compelled to act on, and the contradiction of which makes our whole nature and being a falsehood, and loses us the present as well as the future life.

What then does nature testify of the will of God with regard to the destiny of the human soul? But before entering on this question, it may be urged, as we are reasoning apart from Revelation, we have no right to assume the existence of a God and his ability to eternize the existence of the soul, and must prove these before asking for his will. We are not reasoning with Atheists, nor are we here designing to enter on a treatise of Natural Theology; and we should feel warranted in assuming the existence, power, benevolence, and justice of God. But to avoid all cavil, we will embrace these among things to be proven, and in proof of all these points, as well as of God's will in regard to the destiny of the soul, we shall appeal to no testimony of third persons, nor to facts nor inferences requiring proof, but directly to the consciousness of the soul itself as it regards its own nature, and to its immediate, irresistible inferences, which that nature compels it to make from itself to its God.

First, then, the mind, as soon as it comes to reflect, intuitively infers the existence of God from its own. "I am, I was not; my own being is an effect which, by the very constitution of my nature, refers me to an adequate cause—a Creator; and the Power that has created, and thus far sustained my being, I cannot but regard as able to perpetuate it. Thus I am constrained to infer that God is, and is able, *if He wills*, to make me live hereafter as he has done here."

His will, then, how shall we learn that? No revelation, no direct voice or vision, by the conditions of the question, may we look for. Still God does speak in the ear of nature—indeed he must primarily do so, or revelation would have no significance or interpretation. God speaks by the constitution of the nature he has given us—by the laws of intellectual and moral belief he has ordained. Whatever the constitution of our minds irresistibly leads us to believe, has the warrant of the God who has ordained it thus to speak, that it is true, and what we in like manner are compelled to expect, has the testimony of our Maker that it shall be. What he thus utters could not have his veracity pledged more irrevocably, if it were written by lightnings on the sky, or pealed forth in the thunders of heaven. But we contend that in this way he has promised a future life to the soul of man, through the revelation of himself to the human consciousness, with attributes that compel us to look for a world beyond the present. For the soul thus naturally continues the argument from its own consciousness: “As God, through the laws of belief he has established within me, assures me through my own existence of his being and power, so by the same constitution of my nature which compels me to reason from myself to my God—from the made to the Maker—he tells me he is reasonable and just, and benevolent and true; and all these attributes necessitate the soul’s immortality, or, rather, their revelation to me is God’s declaration of his will to this effect; for that he has so made me that I naturally and irresistibly reason from the thing created to the Creator, from myself to my Maker, shows that it was his *intention* I should so reason, and this binds his veracity to the conclusions thus reached. I am so made, I cannot help regarding the implanter of my reason as himself reasonable; I cannot conceive he should have created in me a faculty which would condemn himself. I cannot help regarding the Author of my conscience as himself just, and feeling that he who has made me to approve benevolence and condemn malevolence, must himself be benevolent. It seems absurd to me to suppose he would have established in the minds he has created, laws of moral feeling that would lead them to disapprove and abhor himself. As I am led naturally to ask, ‘He that formed the eye, shall he not see? he that planted the ear shall he not hear? he that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?’ so my nature, constituted by

God, compels me to feel that the God of reason is reasonable—the God of the conscience is just—the God of my moral nature must be love.”

This is a spontaneous feeling of the human mind when the idea of God its *Maker* is presented. Respecting a God outward and foreign to itself—God the architect and wielder of external nature and the arbiter of external destinies—it may doubt and speculate as to his character; but about God its *author*, the *ordainer* of conscience, and *fountain* of its moral nature, never.

A signal proof that this declaration for God is an original and inextinguishable utterance of the human soul, is found in the midst of ages and nations that have long perverted the original idea of God. The Greek and the Roman, while in popular fable ascribing all manner of injustice to their gods, still appealed to them by prayer and oath as avengers of injustice. Themselves perjured, adulterers, murderers, are still invoked as vindicators of purity and faith, and punishers of the very crimes of which they were fabled to be guilty. What is this but a proof that so strong are the convictions, that God is just and good, wrought into the soul of man, that ages of false education, and false worship, and false philosophy, and of guilty passion and practice, could not stifle them? Now a supposition that falsifies this original and inextinguishable declaration of the human soul conflicts with a first principle of reasoning; it violates a universal and irresistible conviction of the human mind. It then runs into a moral absurdity, which informs us as indubitably as a mathematical, that the course of our reasoning is false. But the denial of the soul's immortality must involve the denial of the attributes of reasonableness, and justice, and benevolence of the Deity, and in so doing contradict the primary laws of belief and the moral intuitions of the human soul. It must therefore be absurd and false.

First, then, God has assured to the soul another life, inasmuch as he has assured it he is reasonable—the perfection of reason. He has declared this to it by giving it a reason—one which irresistibly requires and expects order and congruity in the universe—a correspondency of ends to means—and then demands an adequate end for the human soul. “And he has also told me,” the soul might say, “that he is reasonable, by placing me in the midst of a universe compacted throughout of adaptations the most intricate and perfect and benign and beautiful, from the flower and insect at my feet to the galaxy in galaxies

inorbed of systems of worlds above me : he has thus taught me to expect a fitting destiny for the soul of man. He has created here a capacity for endless progress—an intellect susceptible of infinite enlargement—a moral nature capable of Godlike virtue and glory—of sympathies and emotions that can embrace the unseen and everlasting, and by a discipline of threescore years and ten he has been educating these faculties to higher excellence and power ; by a life of struggle with pain and hardship and grief and temptation, he has been schooling the soul to habits of patience and courage and self-mastery and faith, and subduing it to gentleness, meekness, and love ; and by the expansion and excitation of its faculties, has been waking in it the feeling infinite, that reaches through the dark frontier of the visible after the divine and everlasting.” Do not all these indicate aptitudes that reach into another world—or has he through this process plumed and renewed the soul for a higher flight, and wider sphere, and angelic rapidity of progress, merely that in mid career, with eye and pinion strained towards immortal destinies, it should drop at once sheer down the steep of everlasting nothing ?

Does the human mind recognize this as a *reasonable* end of such faculties and capacities, thus created and disciplined ? Can it ascribe to its Maker a course of conduct that would disgrace a human machinist ? Is it the fitting end of a wondrous and powerful piece of mechanism to be dashed in pieces just as, with much pains and expense, it has been constructed ? The more exquisite and labored and powerful its construction, the greater is the absurdity. But such a mechanism we may consider the soul of man at death. Life is to it but a period of discipline and accumulation of power for future action and enjoyment. Whatever it may have enjoyed or suffered in life, at death it is the mightiest means, the most vast preparation of powers it has ever been, and, with a voice louder than ever before, still demands an *end*. And has not God promised to the human soul such an end ? Has he not so constituted and taught it that it irresistibly looks for fitting adaptation in all parts of the universe ? Does it not *know*, in gazing on the minutest organism of the animalcule or the plant, the antennæ of the insect or the filament of the flower, as well as on the glittering systems of night, that they all have a corresponding end in the universe of God ? It turns from these to itself and hears the voice of God assuring it that the same all-pervading law of

adaptation and fitness embraces itself. If it does not, then its own being is not only the mightiest, but the only absurdity it can discover amid the works of God. The eye implies the light, the fin the water, and the wing the air, and, taught of God, it inquires what does the soul of man imply? Where shall it find its end? In its own earthly life? In powers accumulated to be destroyed? Virtues disciplined to annihilation? Capacities for active enjoyment expanded for eternal blasting? An eye created and opened on God's sun to be quenched in eternal darkness? A wing of a seraph, nerved and plumed and taught to scale the celestial height, merely to sink fluttering in vain mid eternal chaos and night?

Or does the soul find an adequate end of itself in the progress of society? But what is society on this hypothesis but an endless series of abortive souls—each advancing series rising higher for a mightier fall, and to utter more loudly in its fall the absurdity and opprobrium of the almighty Siva—creating but to destroy?

What adequate end does the common reason of mankind find in this life for the soul of the New Hollander's angelic capacities, according to this theory, blasted in the unopened germ—much more for the souls of a Newton, a Bacon, a Socrates, a Paul, and the like, with their Godlike aptitudes, intellectual and moral, while reaching from time's link into the eternal for their end, toppling over into the yawning chasm of annihilation? Verily, if the soul of man is mortal, then almighty Unreason sits on the throne of the universe! His most glorious work beneath the stars a tremendous abortion! Himself, the Father of the Reason, is guilty of the most monstrous violation of it in the universe! But such a conclusion the human soul feels, yea, *knows* to be absurd. From the harmonies of the universe, the chain of correspondencies binding all being—from each organic life or mote of matter or rolling world—from the depths of its own nature, comes an indignant and universal "no." It hears, through all, the voice of God assuring it he is reasonable, and thereby promising that the accumulation of powers and discipline of virtues, often carried forward in the human soul till it disappears from time, shall find an appropriate end in eternity.

Again, the human mind may be assured that God wills the soul's immortality because *he is benevolent*. "He has told me," it might say, "that *he is love*. He has told me so by the moral nature he has given me, which irresistibly compels me to ap-

prove benevolence and hate its opposite. He has told me so by a similar constitution of all moral natures I know of. To find a mind that hates benevolence *because it is benevolent*, I must go beyond the reach of all moral laws I am acquainted with—I must plunge to a deeper hell than I ever dreamed of. But, in assuring me that he delights in happiness, he has assured me that it is his will that the mighty capacity for happiness often developed by the human soul just before death, which by a life of intellectual and moral enlargement, by the disciplining of the passions, and the perfecting of the virtues, has attained an angelic vastness, shall not be quenched forever in the grave. Surely a God delighting in happiness would not wantonly annihilate such an infinitude of happiness as was prepared for in the mind of a dying Newton or Paul.

Moreover, God has assured me of a future life by the natural and moral evil I see around me, for many forms of which I can find no other solution under the reign of supreme Benevolence. Why do I see virtue often walking through this world under a cloud—her path one of pain and darkness and tears—her name accursed—her life persecuted even to the grave? Why these inflictions? If they are penal, why do they avoid the guiltier heads, to fall with such terrible tempest on the comparatively innocent? Is it urged that this is discipline? To what? Annihilation? Or to a life where “these afflictions, which are but for a moment, shall work out a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory?” A benevolent God utters in my ear but one answer.

In this way the human soul might reason by the light of nature in case of countless instances of natural and moral evil. Now it is not necessary for us to attempt any nicely adjusted balance of the goods and ills of the present life, or to argue that existence here is not upon the whole a blessing. It is sufficient to show, as we have done, that the annihilation of the soul at death is, in some cases, a vast annihilation of happiness, and that in many cases the evils of the present life admit of no solution under a God of love, except as preparatory to another. If it is said these proofs only indicate immortality to some, our reply is, first, that a single case breaks the charmed circle of death, bursts the barriers of the invisible world, and pioneers the way for the race; and secondly, that justice, the ground of our next argument—if indeed we can consider it other than another aspect of benevolence—will claim other cases, and open still

wider the portal of another life ; and thirdly, if there are any souls whom neither justice nor benevolence requires to live hereafter, we do not feel bound to make any provisions for them in this argument, as our aim and argument are moral ones.

For the present purpose a single case is enough, and the earth furnishes millions. Go where the hero of goodness, the martyr of virtue, is passing out of life in abandonment, agony, and shame. He has walked in darkness and tears all his days ; his life has been one conflict with penury, and scorn, and toil, and disease, and grief. He has seen repaid cruelty for kindness, curse for blessing, hate for love. And now, his body racked with anguish, and infamy gathering over his name, he is looking his last on the sun. But that soul within—by its life of conflict and trial, chastened, purified, and disciplined to glorious beauty and strength, with its Godlike capacities for excellence and happiness—whither is it going ? A benevolent God looking down from on high, seeing and having seen all, and now allotting it its destiny, whither will its next step be ? Into stark naught ? or to a higher being ? Has nature more than one answer ? Why such a life ? For discipline ? Unto what ? For this life ? Why then such a death ? Why the continuance of the discipline when there is no future on which it could take effect ? Is it for a lesson to mankind ? A lesson for what ? The solution but multiplies the difficulty. Why lesson with such painful instructions a world of abortive souls, whose discipline is as objectless as that they are witnessing ? Would a benevolent God discipline at such expense but to destroy ? Would he school to slay ? Human nature says “No. If that death of anguish and shame is the last appearance of that soul in this universe, then there sits a Moloch above. The soul has made a happy escape into annihilation from such a God.” But we cannot doubt God’s benevolence, and no more can we doubt that those glorious powers for enjoyment and action, thus painfully trained, are a promise to man of an existence where they shall find their scope.

Again, the human soul might insist, “God has promised me immortality by informing me he is just. He has thus informed me by placing in me a conscience, and the laws of my nature compel me to regard the God and father of my conscience as just. I am constrained to believe that he regards right and wrong with the same emotions that he has constituted me to feel ; that there is in his mind the same feeling of indignation

at wrong, and of the fitness of punishment as its natural complement, and the same painful sentiment of violated moral order till retribution overtakes impenitent guilt, and happiness and honor crown suffering virtue. And as he has the power to secure this result, my moral sense becomes to me his declaration that somewhere, and at some time, all wrongs shall be righted, all moral acts meet a due reward, and moral order be vindicated. In earnest expectation of this vindication "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain until now." Yet it comes not now, nor here. But the voice of God within me, assuring me it shall come, points me to another life for its consummation.

But if there be no other life, then there is no Supreme Justice in the universe. It is idle, amid the testimony of history and our own vision, to talk of full and certain retribution in a world like this—a world where vice often passes off the stage in triumph, while virtue dies under a cloud of wrongs. Take a single class of cases amid the millions that are presented. Go where the martyr of truth and love, the victim of falsehood and hate, is trampled, scourged, tortured, gibbeted, hooted and cursed out of earthly history—see the gentle, the lovely, the heroic and the pious, in sunless cells, pierced only by the eye of God—whose dialect of shrieks and groans reaches not the blessed light of the upper world—impaled alive—broken on the wheel—consumed over slow fires—stretched on the rack till limb is torn from limb—no friendly voice to cheer or eye to witness—no spectators to applaud or chronicle—no kind hand to wipe the sweat of the death-agony from the brow—but forms of brutal ferocity around, and looks of fanatic hate glaring on the meek sufferer, and words of cursing and mockery and abhorrence vexing the dying ear, and pushing the soul down the dark death-shade. Such has often been the earthly end of virtue. Is it its fitting *final* end? Human nature, God-taught, answers "No—if there is a God above there is a world beyond."

Or go and witness the last earthly end of prosperous sin; in the full income of wealth, and pleasure, and power, and fame—in the whirl of pleasurable excitement too intense to admit of reflexion or remorse—the bitter dregs of the cup of sin not yet reached—its brim of sparkling delights just quaffed—the perpetrator of a thousand crimes passes easily and quickly away, with blood on his hands, and adultery in his heart, and perjury on his lips—trampling on the wrecks of ruined fortunes and

slain virtue and broken hearts—the appliances of luxury around, the acclaim of the world in his ears, and the incense of adulation in his nostrils, with no bands in his death, he goes in a moment to the grave. A fall, a shot, a stroke, a lightning flash, and he is *no more*. Mortal pain, fear, curse or punishment cannot reach him further. He has hid him behind the shadow of death. Has he escaped forever? Is this the fitting *final* end of vice? Human nature answers, “No—if there is a God above there is a hell beyond.”

In proof that this is the declaration of human nature, look at the various systems of heathenism. What is their universal fabling of Elysium and Tartarus, but expressions of their feelings that the ends of justice require a future life? though the grounds of that feeling they were not able philosophically to analyze and set forth. They show that untaught nature, the common sense of man, rejects the dogma that virtue and vice work their own punishment here in all cases. True, they tend to it, but the consummation of that tendency—the full effect of the slow poison introduced into the soul—requires time, and often longer time than is found this side of death. God, too, assures us of another life by the conscience within us, that He has commissioned to accompany each act of deliberate guilt with a prophecy of coming doom. It is He that has bid it start up universally at the consciousness of committed crime, and inflict on the soul the sense of guilt, which is nothing else than a recognition and expectation of punishment as the fitting complement of its act. This universal apprehension of the soul cannot be a lie—it is the voice of the God of the soul—a whisper already reaching it from the great White Throne—a gleam from its intolerable brightness already flashing through the dark frontier of a future world.

Now, in view of the above facts, we believe in the immortality of the soul, as we believe that God is true; for he assures us of an hereafter by assuring us of his reasonableness, justice, and benevolence; and he assures us of these attributes in Himself by the very constitution of our natures, which constrain us to reason from our souls to him—by irrepressible feelings and intuitive inferences, as indubitable as those on which a proposition of Euclid is based. Moral intuition no more admits of question than intellectual. The negation of the distinction between right and wrong is as absurd as the denial that things equal to the same are equal to one another, or that a stone un-
sup-

ported in free space will fall to the earth. The law that like causes produce like effects holds as well in regard to moral as to physical causes, and compels us to reason from the soul to its Maker as from a machine to the machinist. And as we cannot but regard feelings and belief flowing from its original constitution as the voice of its Maker, so we cannot but regard its Maker as true.

Is it said that intuitive and irrepressible inference from the soul to God may deceive? Then all reasoning may deceive—all first truths may be first falsehoods. The uniformity of physical and moral law alike may be but a dream of the imagination. If a man choose to deny these primary feelings and consequent convictions of the human mind, there is no further arguing with him. One can only say, "God has so constituted me that I cannot help so feeling and so believing. It is my Maker that constrains me thus to feel and believe. If I am thereby deceived, God is chargeable with making my reason and whole nature a lie—with being Himself a liar. If I am thus mocked of God, it matters little what I believe or disbelieve—indeed it is impossible to reason at all—my intellect, my conscience, yea, this great universe itself is a lie. Nature reels around me, all is falsehood, phantom, impression, mockery, myself a sham, catching at shams amid a sham universe. I know not what or where I am, or that I am at all—the eternal heavens fade into a dream—the solid earth passes from underneath my feet—my own being I am no longer certain of—I cannot by self-consciousness be sure of my own soul, I can grasp nothing real. The pillars of the Eternal Throne give away. Amid infinite vacuity I clutch and clutch and clutch in vain. The truthfulness of my nature denied—the truthfulness of God going with it—the highest, the only absurdity in the universe, is to reason or believe at all.

✓ Let us now pause a moment, and contemplate the enormous credulity of that man, who can believe the soul dies with the body. He believes that God is neither benevolent, nor reasonable, nor just, nor true, and that our nature which declares him so, is a lie; and yet, though all is delusive, he can reason out this fact which disqualifies him from reasoning at all. Or he believes that a God reasonable, and benevolent, and just, and true, has created a soul capable of endless progress in knowledge, virtue, and happiness; has placed it in this wondrous school of His universe for threescore years and ten, and by

stimulating and necessitating the constant exercise of thought, and reason, and study, and patience, and courage, and of conscience, and faith, and love, has been disciplining it to an angelic capacity for action, and bliss, and progress, merely to quench the glorious creature in the eternal grave. He can believe that such a God has led man as his child between this glorious earth and sky, and bid him look through all up to Him—to love, trust and commune with him—has placed in him a reason to converse with truth—a moral nature to sympathize with the right, the good, the beautiful, and the holy—a conscience to warn of duty and point to a coming retribution—and waked in him hope and faith that look beyond the sun's walk to the face of the Invisible—merely to dash the infant archangel down the everlasting void. He believes God can leave guilt to depart from the stage of being eternally in triumph, and can lead virtue through a life of toil, and penury, and pain, and disease, and sorrow, and conduct it mid racks, and chains, and scourges, and starvation, and flame, and diabolic sneer, and hate, and curse—to utter annihilation. If such be a God of justice, reason, truth and love, we do not see how the God of evil himself could show more dark or malign. The shadows of the infernal throne would almost seem a relief to the cruel gloom of supernal empire. Admit such a God on the throne of the universe, and who would care to believe at all, or to be? Annihilation would be an escape. Well might man rush on the eternal grave as to a bridal. Gladly might he haste to hide in everlasting night from the face of such almighty misrule.

In the whole circle of falsehood that the most abject and abhorred superstition ever fabled, is there one more hideous, or more monstrous, than those which the credulity of skepticism has here embraced? Strange that men can so believe, and still stranger that they can glory in so believing! "Methinks," one might remonstrate, "could I come to such a view of God and the destiny of the human soul, it would impend constantly over me like a horrid dream, too horrid for words—as some dreadful, abhorred, deadly thing, such as men speak of, not in places of glad light and life, but whisper with pale lips, in foul accursed glooms, and amid charnel-houses, where forms of corruption and horror gather on the senses and on the soul. I could not haste to proclaim it as some blissful discovery to mankind, and call upon my fellows to come and rejoice and be exceeding glad with me, when I had found the eternal grave. Methinks

I could not *triumph* to think that my soul, with its vast aspirations after the Everlasting Good and Fair and Great—its memory and affection, its hopes, its reason grasping after imperishable truth, its thoughts that wander through eternity—its faith and love that have gone forth toward an imagined Holy One, and its moral nature capable of wearing immortal glory and beauty, was soon to lie down on the breast of corruption and cease to be—that HEAVEN, the mourner's dream, the martyr's goal, the pilgrim's home, the life-hope of suffering virtue, had become to me a dull meaningless word—a beautiful mirage vanished from the illimitable desert of being—that the loved ones, that have faded away from my side, who still rise in the dreams of memory and sleep, are utterly perished—that the mighty, and gifted, and holy dead of past time are now nothing. Methinks, if I could come to such a conclusion, it would be in silence and sorrow. I would keep the awful secret in my own breast—I would not whisper it to my dearest friend—I would not breathe it in the ear of solitude and darkness. I would take my Bible and sit down for one more beautiful and happy dream, and then in mercy hand it over to mankind, and wait in mute despair till Almighty Accident or Tyranny should lay me in everlasting sleep with the brutes.”

But such is not the language of Nature with reference to God and the soul. Strange and horrible perversion must have passed on the human mind before, when reflecting on God its Maker and its Fountain, it could come to a conclusion that the soul is thus mocked by Him. “Were it not so I would have told you,” was the language of Christ; and Nature says the same—or at least, that God, if not designing man's immortality, would not in so many ways have mocked him with delusive promises of it.

Thus Nature argues intelligibly and convincingly, if we would listen to her, for a future life, in the same way that she does for the existence and reasonableness, justice, benevolence, and truth of God. But in neither case does she force her voice on man. These two doctrines are also mutually inter-dependent. God rightly believed, is the basis of all argument from nature for the soul's immortality; while the soul's immortality denied, reflects darkness over the attributes and the being itself of a God.

The argument from nature being thus founded on a true idea of God, perished necessarily with that idea. Men “changing the glory of God into a lie,” changed that of the human soul

also—for God being misconceived, all reasoning from him became perverted, and darkness gathered alike over the present and future world. The great central orb being put out, the central attraction destroyed, reason and conscience wandered in twilight—the forces of the moral system were broken, and the universe was chaos. The present and the future were no longer a moral and reasonable whole, banded together by moral law and all-pervading reason. Darkness thick and palpable was gathering in the horizon of time, through which had glimpsed eternity. Death was a mighty and rayless chasm, over which no rainbow of Divine Love bridged to another life, and no flaming sword of justice pointed to a world of doom. All beyond was emphatically “a land of darkness and shadow of death where the light was as darkness.”

Such had, to a great extent, become the condition of the ancient world. Socrates alone, of its philosophers, placed his argument on the right ground—the true idea of God. The Academics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans, Stoics, and Epicureans, in discussing this question, attempted, from the physical nature of the soul, to prove its natural and necessary immortality or death. Of all these the Pythagoreans and Academics alone teach clearly the personal immortality of the soul, while the Epicureans, from a different theory of the substance of the soul, assumed with equal want of proof, argue its necessary perishableness. The face of God was in eclipse, and philosophy groping without His light could only throw over the mighty question “dimness of anguish.”

Thus for ages was the world living and dying under the darkening of the face of God, and consequently the destiny of the human soul. But this darkening of the future world was throwing back meanwhile its baleful shadow over the present. The clouds which before, gathering around the sunset of life, had been kindled by the light reflected from another sphere into forms of celestial glory and beauty, or those angry and portentous, and shedding on man a salutary awe, were now becoming a lifeless blackness. Not even the life of the lightning and thunder was there, but an utter stillness and darkness, more fearful than either, was throwing its chilling death-shade over human hearts. The moral interests of man were perishing—virtue was losing its incentives, vice its deterrents; appetite and sensualism, the clamors of present passion, the power of

the immediate and the physical were fast prevailing over the flickering glimpses of another life.

One was needed to come from heaven to reveal God anew. But heaven opened not her gates of light. One was needed to come as a witness from the grave, but death was too strong—he unbarred not the doors of his prisoners. The world had waited long, but none returned. Age after age, the brave, the mighty, the gifted, the good, the beautiful, had gone down to him, but none came back. Long had the earth held down her ear to the grave and listened, but no voice came from its silent realms. Nor the wail and prayer of stricken millions, “nor hero’s lyre or lover’s lute,” nor the posthumous acclaim of nations that shook the skies above, could startle a whisper in that lower world—an infinite, awful stillness; a dark, dead, unbottomed, illimitable emptiness, into which life’s successive millions, its glory of majesty, and power, and beauty, and genius, and eloquence, and song, and bannered battalia of noisy war, fell without an echo.

Long had the earth waited and listened, but none returned, and human nature was gathering itself up in agony to die, when lo! in that hour of her despair, One mightier than death appears—with vesture dipped in blood up the dark vale he comes—travailing in the greatness of his strength. In his hand he bears the gates of the grave and the vanquished sting of death. He brings to light immortality. He comes its conqueror and living witness. Of a future existence “God hath now given assurance to all men, in that he hath raised Jesus Christ from the dead.”

Such are the relations of nature and revelation to this doctrine. Their testimony harmonizes, yet that of neither is superfluous. Revelation is a reaffirmance of Nature in a more direct and explicit manner, rendered necessary, not by a defect in the original declaration of God, but by the moral pravity of man. There is a “*nodus, deo vindice dignus*,” but it is of man’s own creating. By this view, the relations of nature to revelation in this, is harmonized with their relative position in other parts of the revealed system. The common view jars with it, and that most disastrously. It shocks a sense of moral fitness, and cannot fail to stagger faith, to be told, on the one hand, that man’s obligations to moral law are written by nature on the heart, and revelation is but a republication of what was before in the human constitution; but, on the other, that there is preindicated by nature no future tribunal where

this law shall be vindicated—nor future being where its natural and moral retributions can take effect. Indeed it seems almost an absurdity in terms to speak of a moral law under a moral God, with no judgment or world of retribution to vindicate the law. The former seems necessarily to imply the latter. Could one of these be disjoined from the other in God's revelation to man, it would be a monstrous discrepancy, distorting and destroying the whole system. The continued existence of the soul seems so indispensable a basis of a moral system relating to man, that one could hardly be disclosed or authenticated apart from the other. It could hardly seem possible that moral distinctions themselves, should they not be annihilated, could fail at least to lose their authority, when the soul in which they inhere, might at any moment utterly perish alike from all retribution and all consciousness. The natural language of the heart would be, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;" and we cannot suppose a wise moral governor would have disclosed a moral system in such a fragmentary, unsymmetrical, and powerless state. The common view, as it violates the fitness of things and the general analogy of natural and revealed religion, must tend to universal skepticism; while the one we have endeavored to present, approving itself to a philosophic analysis of the human mind, and agreeing with the uniform testimony of the faith, if not the philosophy of heathenism, and harmonizing the natural and revealed systems, must tend powerfully to corroborate the latter. Especially it may arrest the madness of the infidel to find that, could he silence the voice of revelation, he gains nothing. Still in himself a prophet of evil utters its fearful vision, though the word that blends mercy with justice were forever stifled. Still the grasp of moral law is on him forever, and an eternity of retribution is treasured up in the eternity of his moral existence. Though the revealed doom were only a hideous dream, still the tendencies of character move on eternally, and causes guiltily originated here accomplish their consequence hereafter. Still lives Remorse, "the undying worm"

still drags Despair her endless chain—and Memory pours out her fiery lake—and Conscience brandishes her scorpion sting. Still undying sin, "the second death," her hideous shade waited on by the pale armies of fear, and hate, and sorrow, and shame, stalks down the ever-thickening darkness of an immortal ruin.

This view, too, while it justifies the God of nature, glorifies the God of revelation. It shows us what we owe to Christ.

Appearing as he did to man in this eclipse of God and of the human soul, he stands virtually in the attitude of the Original Revealer of immortality. To this he adds, that through the agonies of death he has wrought out for us the testimony of experience, and has given to what was before prediction, the assurance of a witnessed fact. To Christ we owe it, that we *know* we are to live forever—that we may lay our loved and our beautiful in the dust, and *know* that they are not perished. We can now permit the mighty and overwhelming *certainly* of immortality to come in and enravish the soul. How changed thereby this whole universe! How changed our attitude in it! No longer a child of corruption, and brother of the worm, man is now the only abiding thing beneath the stars. A moral significancy inheres in him, which is everlasting. No longer is he overpowered and crushed to earth by the amplitude and duration of the material universe—no longer does he wander amid its frail and flower-like delights, its scenes of fading light and loveliness, and list the swift flight of the hours as they forever pass, with the sorrowful thought, “I am still frailer and briefer than ye—I pass, to come not again—one thrill of youth, the morn, the moonlight, the balmy spring, the glory of thought, and the raptured vision of truth, alike warn me as they pass—‘so much we take from the capital of thy existence.’” He knows that “He who alone hath immortality,” hath breathed on him, and Christ has opened to him, beyond the seen and perishable, the new heavens and the new earth—where the mountain lifts its everlasting masses from the heart of the earth to the sky, the grave-stone of elder worlds—where the cataract pours forth its mighty anthem from the birth of time—where the hoar ocean peals its solemn organ-tone since the song of the morning stars; he no longer crouches, awe-crushed, trembling, earthward, creature of an hour. No longer does he shrink with agony into dark and desolate nothingness, as the sense of eternity descends upon him from the shining universe of night. Through the mighty agony and triumph of Christ, opens on him a destiny that shall outlive, outsing, outshine them all. He knows there is that within him which shall abide, when the fast-bound mountain has fled—which shall sing the hymn of life, and reflect the unapproachable brightness, when the organ of Ocean is mute, and Niagara has given up her harp to God, and the shadow of Death shall stretch through the starry infinite. Beyond the sun’s fading beam—beyond the storm’s waning beauty—beyond

the curtain-work of the visible, he looks to the Ancient of Days as his father, and the eternities that engird His throne as his home. From the dark grave of the brute to the vision of such a height, has the arm of Christ raised our race.

But there are other thoughts, solemn and fearful, that crowd upon this mighty idea. What consequences are bound up in moral immortality? In the imperishableness of moral acts, and the everlasting continuance of the present moral laws of our being? An eternal soul starting in a wrong direction—each successive guilty act impelling, by a stronger moral necessity, to deeper guilt—on forever—acquiring by a natural law of moral descent an increased velocity of ruin each moment of its fall through interminable ages—what created intellect can fathom the depth of its eternal fall? By its own moral gravitation—by the force of the essential laws of its being which must grasp it forever—must it not set at last in the bottomless darkness? Suppose the process of moral deterioration we witness here, to go on in its natural geometric ratio forever—the maddening of the passions—the ferocity of the appetites—the hardening of the heart, and blinding of mind, and searing of conscience—the binding of habit, the blunting of the moral tastes, and brutalizing of the entire moral nature—each moral act immortal, and etching itself imperishably on the soul—each crime an evil angel dogging it in its ever-darkening and downward career—all its past being aggregated into character, and pressing in constantly accumulating *Ætnean* masses on the soul;—suppose such a process for ages of hopeless end, and the Arch Fiend himself, in the depth he has now reached since the fall of the morning stars, might well start back from the deeper hell and more hideous spectre of ruin, which the perspective of the laws of its own moral nature, operating eternally, discloses to the human soul. The mind grows dizzy, and shrinks back with horror from gazing down such an infinite descent—it shudders at the laws and powers of everlasting death it bears within itself. Sure by the light of nature it requires no red right hand to scoop out hell—no thunder to drive the guilty soul to the shades below. Its own nature digs its eternal dungeon-house. Were then the hell of the Scriptures put out, itself would kindle anew the fires of its endless torture. Were Sinai to be quenched—the great white throne to disappear—the laws of its own moral being would disclose another apocalypse—another Sinai would thunder, and a tribunal of eternal

judgment start up from the depths of the soul itself—and branded on its very being stand forth the curse, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Could it vault over the flaming bands of the universe, and escape from its Omnipresent punisher—still it would be under the lash of its torturer, and girt in by retribution—still within it the undying worm—still around it the quench-fire.

But nature reveals not only an immortality of natural sequences, but of judicial doom. Over that eternity which she discloses, glitters the flaming sword—mutters the wrathful thunder—rises the judgment throne of a personal, moral, just God. Thus a double necessity, natural and judicial, binds the guilty soul on the wheel of eternal death!

At this fearful aspect of destiny, human nature pauses and feels that, alas! IMMORTALITY is not LIFE! Her enravishment with the hope of immortal existence disappears—she stops, and in anxious misgivings for the race inquires, "What must be the eternity of spiritual destinies already here begun?" From the presages of Nature she starts back with fear, and is almost ready to let fall from her lips the cup God has proffered of immortal existence. When lo! again in her extremity Christ appears—the new revealer of God and new creator of the human soul—its ransom from judicial curse, and from the horrible necessity of ruin dragging it darkly and forever downward. The face of Jehovah comes out of its long eclipse—the clouds which ages of falsehood had thrown up before it disperse—the thick darkness, gleaming with wrath and shedding gloom on a guilt-stricken world, passes from before the eternal Majesty—a vision of strange celestial beauty, unseen before by the eye of Nature, opens on the ravished universe—and God, its Forgiver, its Heavenly Father, smiles once more on the human soul. It feels the blessed attraction—its dreadful descent is arrested—its *Ætnean* masses of guilt vanish away—the chain of moral ruin is broken—upward it moves again toward celestial light and love.

Again, but now in chaster, meeker, holier rapture, human nature looks up to the Ancient of Days, and receives from him the boon of endless being, and in adoration and love ineffable, casts her crown of immortality at the feet of Him that weareth "the vesture dipped in blood," who, by the triumph of his mighty agony, has brought to light, not only Immortality, but LIFE.

ARTICLE III.

REVIEW OF CARLYLE'S PAST AND PRESENT.

By Professor J. T. SMITH, of Newton Theological Institution, Mass.

Past and Present. By Thomas Carlyle. Boston : Charles C. Little and James Brown. pp. 296.

THE present condition of England must be confessed by all to be most extraordinary and unparalleled in the history of the world. With an empire commensurate with the circumference of the globe, a government efficient on every sea and under every sky, she seems to be the regulator of the world. When the Pacha of Egypt rebels against his legitimate lord, the Sultan, she sends her fleet, batters down the walls of Acre, prescribes their limits to Mehemet and his son Ibrahim, and then leaves the parties to manage their own government in their own way. When the Emperor of China concludes he had better keep his tea than have his subjects made dead men or living idiots by the use of opium, the fleets and cannon which were so effectual in maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire are found not less potent in regulating Chinese sumptuary laws; and the Emperor is convinced that it is best to leave the questions about opium and idiocy to be settled between British merchants and Chinese public or private opinion. Wherever she chooses to exert her power, whether in protecting weak nations or in subduing strong ones; in liberating Africans, or in worse than enslaving Asiatics—she is resistless. And yet that government is in debt beyond the possibility of payment—to all intents, bankrupt. That government, so strong externally, is convulsed internally with English Chartism, Welch Rebeccaism, Scottish Kirk dissension, and Irish Repeal agitation, to such a degree that my Lords and Gentlemen of Parliament, Sir Robert Peel, and Queen Victoria, seem at their wit's end, uncertain whether to advance, recede, or stand still.

Not less extraordinary is England in her private operations than in the operations of her government. Her benevolence, with commendable zeal, is going to the ends of the earth, seek-

ing ignorant vicious heathen to reclaim and enlighten, while multitudes of her own population are degraded in vicious ignorance, almost to the condition of the heathen. Her sense of justice has raised from the condition of chattels to that of freemen and citizens the Africans of her own colonies, and is exerting itself to the utmost to effect the same result in other countries, while millions of Englishmen, the producers of England's wealth, who by some law are surely entitled to a subsistence, are dying of hunger, or dragging out a miserable existence. At the same time, the country which thus pays its workers its purse-bearer for the world; it can dig canals, lay rail-roads, and furnish bank-stock for all nations. With cloth enough to cover naked backs the world over, the very weavers are without covering. With unbounded supply for human want of every kind, two millions in England and Wales alone, sit in work-houses, or receive out-door relief, and five millions more are starving in hunger-cellars.*

This most anomalous and paradoxical condition of England excites many thoughts in thinking minds, and occasions the utterance of many words, both in speech and in print. The problem to be solved is one of sternest necessity: very existence depends upon its solution. "To be, or not to be: that is the question." How shall these crowded millions, increasing in number, be fed? A very intelligible and practical question, but a question, how difficult to be answered; which yet must be answered, at whatever cost; a heavy penalty awaiting the failure to answer it. Among those who are speaking at this crisis, is that most vigorous, unique, and original thinker and writer, Thomas Carlyle. If Carlyle speaks, he will utter his own thoughts in his own way. A book which gives the feelings with which a sincere and earnest thinker regards the present social condition in England, and the remedial measures he would recommend, is certainly worth reading, whatever we may think of the views it may present.

A method of his own, we have said, Carlyle would adopt to get his opinions before the public. The occasion he seized upon was the following. A certain Jocelinus de Brakelonda, a Monk of St. Edmundsbury Convent in the 12th century, wrote in Monk-Latin, a book entitled, "*Chronica de rebus gestis*

* Past and Present. pp. 1, 172.

Samsonis Abbatis Monasterii Sancti Edmundi.”* “Jocelin,” says our author, “was a kind of born Boswell, though an infinitesimally small one, neither did he altogether want his Johnson, even then and there.” This Chronicle, published by some Antiquarian society in its original Monk-Latin, Mr. Carlyle undertakes, by an abstract, to bring before the public; and around it, as a nucleus, he has arranged his remarks about past, present, and future things. His object we will give in his own words:

“Certainly, could the present Editor instruct men how to know Wisdom, Heroism, when they see it, that they might do reverence to it only, and loyally make it rule over them—yes, he were the living epitome of all Editors, Teachers, Prophets, that now teach and prophesy; he were an *Apollo-Morrison*, a *Trismegistus* and *effective Cassandra*! Let no Able Editor hope such things. It is to be expected the present laws of copy-right, rate of reward per sheet, and other considerations, will save him from that peril. Let no Editor hope such things: no; and yet let all Editors aim toward such things, and even toward such alone! One knows not what the meaning of editing and writing is, if even this be not it. Enough; to the present Editor it has seemed possible some glimmering of light, for here and there a human soul, might lie in these confused Paper-Masses now intrusted to him; wherefore he determines to edit the same. Out of old Books, new Writings, and much Meditation not of yesterday, he will endeavour to select a thing or two; and from the Past, in a circuitous way, illustrate the Present and the Future. The Past is a dim indubitable fact: the future too is one, only dimmer; nay, properly it is the *same* fact in new dress and development. For the Present holds in it both the whole Past and the whole Future; as the LIFE-TREE IGDRASIL, wide-waving, many-toned, has its roots down deep in the Death-kingdoms, among the oldest dead dust of men, and with its boughs reaches always beyond the stars, and in all times and places is one and the same Life-tree!” p. 36.

The whole work is divided into four books. Book first, appropriately headed “The Proem,” contains six chapters. The first three chapters, under the titles of Midas, The Sphynx, Manchester Insurrection, set forth in a strong light the present social condition of England, the miseries of the working classes, the unhappiness of the unworking classes, and the necessity of entering upon some decisive measures of reform. These topics are illustrated by the two fables and the one fact which form the captions of the chapters. If there are admirers of England and

*Chronicles of the Life of Samson, Abbot of St. Edmund's Convent.

England's institutions, who are skeptical as to the fact that misery exists there, untold and unspeakable, Carlyle, not less an admirer of England than they, and ready to apologize for her to any reasonable extent, does not sympathize with them in their doubts. It is scarcely possible for any writer to set it forth in stronger colors than he does in various parts of his work. Carlyle is a writer, who, in his own phrase, looks into the internal realities of things as well as the external appearances. He not only surveys and appreciates in its full extent, the outer bare part of literal starvation and insupportable physical suffering, but also internal misery, broken hearts, the anguish of the spirit, far deeper and more immeasurable than physical suffering. After describing briefly the great amount of pauperism in the United Kingdom, and its most baleful effects in every point of view, he proceeds:

"Why dwell on this aspect of the matter! It is too indisputable, not doubtful now to any one. Descend where you will into the lower class, in town or country, by what avenue you will, by Factory Inquiries, Agricultural Inquiries, by Revenue Returns, by Mining-Labourer Committees, by opening your own eyes and looking, the same sorrowful result discloses itself: you have to admit that the working body of this rich English Nation has sunk, or is fast sinking, into a state to which, all sides of it considered, there was literally never any parallel. At Stockport assizes, a mother and a father are arraigned and found guilty of poisoning three of their children, to defraud a "burial society" of some £3 8s. due on the death of each child: they are arraigned, found guilty; and the official authorities, it is whispered, hint that perhaps the case is not solitary, that perhaps you had better not probe farther into that department of things. "Brutal savages, degraded Irish," mutters the idle reader of newspapers, hardly lingering on this incident. Yet it is an incident worth lingering on. Such instances are like the highest mountain apex emerged into view, under which lies a whole mountain region and land not yet emerged. A human Mother and Father had said to themselves, What shall we do to escape starvation? We are deep sunk here in our dark cellar, and help is far. Yes, in the Ugolino Hunger-tower stern things happen; best-loved little Gaddo fallen dead on his Father's knees! The Stockport Mother and Father think and hint. Our poor little starveling Tom, who cries all day for victuals, who will see only evil and not good in this world: If he were out of misery at once; he well dead, and the rest of us perhaps kept alive? It is thought, and hinted; at last it is done. And now Tom being killed, and all spent and eaten, is it poor little starveling Jack that must go, or poor little starveling Will? What an inquiry of ways and means!

"In starved sieged cities, in the uttermost doomed ruin of old Jerusalem fallen under the wrath of God, it was prophesied and said,

"The hands of the pitiful women have sodden their own children." The stern Hebrew imagination could conceive no blacker gulf of wretchedness; that was the ultimatum of degraded God-punished man." pp. 3, 4.

As a fit appendix to the above, we quote the following, illustrative of the spirit and earnestness with which he enters into the question of wages:

"These poor Manchester manual workers mean only, by day's wages for day's work, certain coins of money adequate to keep them living; in return for their work, such modicum of food, clothes, and fuel as will enable them to continue their work itself! They as yet clamor for no more; the rest, still inarticulate, cannot yet shape itself into a demand at all, and only lies in them as a dumb wish; perhaps only, still more inarticulate, as a dumb, altogether unconscious want. *This* is the supportable approximation they would rest patient with, That by their work they might be kept alive to work more! *This* once grown unattainable, I think your approximation may consider itself to have reached the *insupportable* stage; and may prepare, with whatever difficulty, reluctance, and astonishment, for one of two things, for changing or perishing! With the millions no longer able to live, how can the units keep living? It is too clear the nation itself is on the way to suicidal death. What is the use of your spun shirts? They hang there by the million unsaleable; and here, by the million, are diligent bare backs that can get no hold of them. Shirts are useful for covering human backs; useless otherwise, an unbearable mockery otherwise. You have fallen terribly behind with that side of the problem! Manchester Insurrections, French Revolutions, and thousandfold phenomena great and small, announce loudly that you must bring it forward a little again. Never till now, in the history of an Earth which to this hour nowhere refuses to grow corn if you will plough it, to yield shirts if you will spin and weave in it, did the mere manual two-handed worker (however it might fare with other workers) cry in vain for such 'wages' as *he* means by 'fair wages,' namely, food and warmth! The Godlike could not and cannot be paid; but the Earthly always could. Gurth, a mere swineherd, born thrall of Cedric the Saxon, tended pigs in the wood, and did get some parings of the pork. Why, the four-footed worker has always *got* all that his two-handed one is clamoring for! How often must I remind you? There is not a horse in England, able and willing to work, but *has* due food and lodging; and goes about sleek-coated, satisfied in heart. And you say, It is impossible. Brothers, I answer, if for you it be impossible, what is to become of you? It is impossible for us to believe it to be impossible. The human brain, looking at these sleek English horses, refuses to believe in such impossibility for Englishmen. Do you depart quickly; clear the ways soon, lest worse befall." pp. 19—27.

In the remaining chapters of this book, he briefly discusses remedies, on which we will not dwell, as they are but obscure-

ly hinted at here, and more fully brought out in a subsequent part of the work.

The second Book is entitled "The Ancient Monk;" and contains the abstract before mentioned of Jocelin's chronicle. Five chapters are occupied with describing with much vivacity, with a lively conception, often with a most amusing quaintness of expression, Bozzy Jocelin, St. Edmund's town and convent, how Landlord Edmund became a Saint, Abbot Hugo, and the 12th century, the whole interspersed with curious and original observations on various circumstances of ancient and modern times. We give an extract from this part of the work for the double purpose of showing how, in our author's conception, men became saints in former times, and the satirical power of his pen:

"Very singular, could we discover it! What Edmund's specific duties were; above all, what his method of discharging them with such result was, would surely be interesting to know: but are not very discoverable now. His Life has become a poetic, nay, a religious *Mythus*; though, undeniably enough, it was once a prose Fact, as our poor lives are; and even a very rugged unmanageable one. This landlord Edmund did go about in leather shoes, with *femoralia* and body coat of some sort on him; and daily had his breakfast to procure; and daily had contradictory speeches, and most contradictory facts not a few, to reconcile with himself. No man becomes a Saint in his sleep. Edmund, for instance, instead of *reconciling* those same contradictory facts and speeches to himself; which means *subduing*, and, in a manlike and godlike manner, conquering them to himself—might have merely thrown new contention into them, new unwisdom into them, and so been conquered *by* them; much the commoner case! In that way he had proved no 'Saint' or Divine-looking Man, but a mere Sinner, and unfortunate, blameable, more or less Diabolic-looking man! No landlord Edmund becomes infinitely admirable in his sleep.

"With what degree of wholesome rigor his rents were collected we hear not. Still less by what methods he preserved his game, whether by 'bushing' or how—and if the partridge-seasons were 'excellent' or were indifferent. Neither do we ascertain what kind of Corn-bill he passed, or wisely-adjusted Sliding-scale: but, indeed, there were few spinners in those days; and the nuisance of spinning, and other dusty labor, was not yet so glaring a one.

"How, then, it may be asked, did this Edmund rise into favor; become to such astonishing extent a recognised Farmer's Friend? Really, except it were by doing justly and loving mercy to an unprecedented extent, one does not know. The man, it would seem, 'had walked,' as they say, 'humbly with God;' humbly and valiantly with God; struggling to make the Earth heavenly as he could;

instead of walking sumptuously and pridefully with Mammon, leaving the Earth to grow hellish as it liked. Not sumptuously with Mammon? How, then, could he 'encourage trade,'—cause Howel and James, and many wine-merchants to bless him, and the tailor's heart (though in a very short-sighted manner) to sing for joy? Much in this Edmund's Life is mysterious.

"That he could, on occasion, do what he liked with his own is, meanwhile, evident enough. Certain Heathen Physical-Force Ultra-Chartists, 'Danes,' as they were then called, coming into his territory with their 'five points,' or rather with their five-and-twenty thousand *points* and edges too, of pikes, namely, and battle-axes; and proposing mere Heathenism, confiscation, spoliation, and fire and sword—Edmund answered that he would oppose to the utmost such savagery. They took him prisoner; again required his sanction to said proposals. Edmund again refused. Cannot we kill you? cried they. Cannot I die? answered he. My life, I think, is my own, to do what I like with! And he died under barbarous tortures, refusing to the last breath; and the Ultra-Chartist Danes *lost* their propositions; and went with their 'points' and other apparatus, as is supposed, to the Devil, the Father of them.

"Well-done! Well-done! cried the hearts of all men. They raised his slain and martyred body; washed his wounds with fast-flowing universal tears; tears of endless pity, and yet of a sacred joy and triumph. The beautifullest kind of tears—indeed, perhaps the beautifullest kind of thing: like a sky all flashing diamonds and prismatic radiance; all weeping, yet shone on by the everlasting Sun: and *this* is not a sky—it is a Soul, and living Face! Nothing like the *Temple of the Highest*, bright with some real effulgence of the Highest, is seen in this world.

"Oh, if all Yankee-land follow a small good 'Schnüspel the distinguished Novelist' with blazing torches, dinner invitations, universal hep-hep-hurrah, feeling that he, though small, *is* something; how might all Angle-land once follow a hero-martyr and great true Son of Heaven! It is the very joy of man's heart to admire where he can; nothing so lifts him from all his mean imprisonments, were it but for moments, as true admiration. Thus it has been said, 'all men, especially all women, are born worshippers;' and will worship, if it be but possible. Possible to worship a Something, even a small one; not so possible a mere loud blaring Nothing!"

The remaining twelve chapters of this Book relate very graphically, the election of Monk Samson to the priorship of the convent, and his administration of affairs, interspersed with some keen remarks on the present social, civil, and religious condition of England. We will insert here the following paragraph, as an illustration of the strong admiration which Mr. Carlyle seems to have of the men and manners of the middle ages.

"The great antique heart: how like a child's in its simplicity, like

a man's in its earnest solemnity and depth! Heaven lies over him wheresoever he goes or stands on the earth; making all the Earth a mystic temple to him, the Earth's business all a kind of worship. Glimpses of bright creatures flash in the common sunlight; angels yet hover doing God's messages among men: that rainbow was set in the clouds by the hand of God! Wonder, miracle encompass the man; he lives in an element of miracle; Heaven's splendor over his head, Hell's darkness under his feet. A great Law of Duty, high as these two Infinitudes, dwarfing all else, annihilating all else—making royal Richard as small as peasant Samson, smaller if need be! The 'imaginative faculties?' 'Rude poetic ages?' The 'primeval poetic element?' Oh, for God's sake, good reader, talk no more of all that! It was not a Dilettantism this of Abbot Samson. It was a Reality, and it is one. The garment only of it is dead! the essence of it lives through all Time and all Eternity!" p. 115.

The third Book, entitled "The Modern Worker," is a series of essays on the various phases of the social fabric of England. Every class receives a share of the author's consideration, and every power of his mind seems put in requisition to set them forth in their proper character. Especially has he made a conspicuous mark of the Aristocracy, whom he characterizes as an idle, rapacious, partridge-hunting, game-preserving, corn-lawing set of men, blindly rushing on to imaginary El-Dorados, but real iron spikes and French Revolutions. No matter what his subject, he is constantly on the alert to find some opportunity of letting fly a shaft at them. Sometimes by sober reasoning, sometimes by keen irony and bitter sarcasm, sometimes by bold denunciation and invective, but always with power and effect, he hurls his missiles at them. Their idle and unproductive modes of life, their extravagant and fruitless expenditure, and their oppressive legislation, he lashes in the most unsparing manner. As examples of his style of attack we subjoin the following extracts:

"Perhaps few narratives in History or Mythology are more significant than that Moslem one, of Moses and the Dwellers by the Dead Sea. A tribe of men dwelt on the shores of that same Asphaltic Lake; and having forgotten, as we are all too prone to do, the inner facts of Nature, and taken up with the falsities and outer semblances of it, were fallen into sad conditions—verging, indeed, toward a certain far deeper Lake. Whereupon it pleased kind Heaven to send them the Prophet Moses, with an instructive word of warning, out of which might have sprung 'remedial measures' not a few. But no: the men of the Dead Sea discovered, as the valet-species always does in heroes or prophets, no comeliness in Moses; listened with real tedium to Moses, with light grinning, or with splenetic sniffs and

sneers, affecting even to yawn; and signified, in short, that they found him a humbug, and even a bore. Such was the candid theory these men of the Asphalt Lake formed to themselves of Moses, That probably he was a humbug, that certainly he was a bore.

"Moses withdrew; but Nature and her rigorous veracities did not withdraw. The men of the Dead Sea, when we next went to visit them, were all 'changed into Apes;' sitting on the trees there, grinning now in the most *unaffected* manner; gibbering and chattering *complete* nonsense; finding the whole Universe now a most indisputable Humbug! The Universe has *become* a Humbug to these Apes who thought it one! There they sit and chatter to this hour; only, I think, every Sabbath there returns to them a bewildered half-consciousness, half-remembrance; and they sit, with their wizzened, smoke-dried visages, and such an air of supreme tragicality as Apes may; looking out, through those blinking, smoke-beared eyes of theirs, into the wonderfullest universal smoky Twilight and undecipherable disordered dusk of Things; wholly an Uncertainty, Unintelligibility, they end it; and for commentary thereon, here and there an unmusical chatter or mew: truest, tragicalest Humbug conceivable by the mind of man or ape! They made no use of their souls, and so have lost them. Their worship on the Sabbath now is to roost there, with unmusical screeches, and half remember that they had souls.

"Didst thou never, O Traveller, fall in with parties of this tribe? Meseems they are grown somewhat numerous in our day." pp. 152, 153.

"Two million shirtless or ill-shirted workers sit enchanted in Work-house Bastilles, five million more (according to some) in Ugo-lino Hunger-cellars; and for remedy you say—what say you? 'Raise *our* rents!' I have not in my time heard any stranger speech, not even on the Shores of the Dead Sea. You continue addressing those poor shirt-spinners and over-producers in really a *too* triumphant manner:

"'Will you bandy accusations, will you accuse us of over-production? We take the Heavens and the Earth to witness that we have produced nothing at all. Not from us proceeds this frightful overplus of shirts. In the wide domains of created Nature, circulates no shirt or thing of our producing. Certain fox-brushes nailed upon our stable-door, the fruit of fair audacity at Melton Mowbray; these we have produced, and they are openly nailed up there. He that accuses us of producing, let him show himself, let him name what and when. We are innocent of producing; ye ungrateful, what mountains of things have we not, on the contrary, had to "consume," and make away with! Mountains of those your heaped manufactures, wheresoever edible or wearable, have they not disappeared before us, as if we had the talent of ostriches, of cormorants, and a kind of divine faculty to eat? Ye ungrateful! and did you not grow under the shadow of our wings? Are not your filthy mills built on these fields of ours; on this soil of England, which belongs to—whom think you? And we shall not offer you our own wheat at the price that pleases us, but that partly pleases you? A precious nation! What

would become of you, if we chose, at any time, to decide on growing no wheat more?"

"Yes, truly, *here* is the ultimate rock-basis of all Corn-laws; whereon, at the bottom of much arguing, they rest as securely as they can: What would become of you, if we decided, some day, on growing no more wheat at all? If we chose to grow only partridges henceforth, and a modicum of wheat for our own uses? Cannot we do what we like with our own? Yes, indeed! For my share, if I could melt Gneiss Rock, and create Law of Gravitation; if I could stride out to the Doggerbank some morning, and, striking down my trident there into the mud-waves, say, 'Be land, be fields, meadows, mountains, and fresh rolling streams!' by Heaven, I should incline to have the letting of *that* land in perpetuity, and sell the wheat of it, or burn the wheat of it, according to my own good judgment! My Corn-lawing friends, you affright me." pp. 172, 173.

"Nature's message will have itself obeyed: messages of mere Free-trade, Anti-Corn-law League, and Laissez-faire will then need small obeying! Ye fools, in name of Heaven, work, work at the Ark of Deliverance for yourselves and us, while hours are still granted you! No: instead of working at the Ark, they say, 'We cannot get our hands kept rightly warm;' and *sit obstinately burning the planks*. No madder spectacle at present exhibits itself under this Sun. My rosy fox-hunting brothers, a terrible *Hippocratic look* reveals itself (God knows, not to my joy) through those fresh buxom countenances of yours. Through your Corn-law Majorities, Sliding-scales, Protecting-Duties, Bribery-Elections, and triumphant Kentish-fire, a thinking eye discerns ghastly images of ruin, too ghastly for word; a hand-writing as of MENE, MENE. Men and brothers, on your Sliding-scale you seem sliding, and to have slid—you little know whither! Good God! did not a French Donothing Aristocracy, hardly above half a century ago, declare in like manner, and in its featherhead believe in like manner, 'We cannot exist, and continue to dress and parade ourselves, on the just rent of the soil of France; but we must have farther payment than rent of the soil—we must be exempted from taxes too; we must have a Corn-law to extend our rent!' This was in 1789: in four years more—Did you look into the Tanneries of Meudon, and the long-naked making for themselves breeches of human skins! May the merciful Heavens avert the omen; may we be wiser that so we be less wretched." pp. 178, 179.

"Parchments? Parchments are venerable: but they ought at all times to represent, as near as they by possibility can, the writing of the Adamant Tablets—otherwise they are not so venerable! Benedict the Jew in vain pleaded parchments; his usuries were too many. The King said, 'Go to, for all thy parchments thou shalt pay just debt: down with thy dust, or observe this tooth-forceps!' Nature, a far juster Sovereign, has far terribler forceps. Aristocracies, actual and imaginary, reach a time when parchment pleading does not avail them. 'Go to, for all thy parchments thou shalt pay due debt!' shouts the Universe to them, in an emphatic manner. They refuse to pay, confidently pleading parchment: their best grinder-tooth, with horrible agony, goes out of their jaw. Wilt thou pay now? A

second grinder, again in horrible agony, goes: a second, and a third, and, if need be, all the teeth and grinders, and the life itself with them; and then there is free payment, and an anatomist-subject into the bargain!

"Reform-bills, Corn-law Abrogation-bills, and then Land-tax Bill, Property-tax Bill, and still dimmer list of *et ceteras*; grinder after grinder: my lords and gentlemen, it were better for you to arise and begin doing your work, than sit there and plead parchment!" p. 181.

"Hast thou looked on the Potter's wheel, one of the venerablest objects—old as the Prophet Ezekiel, and far older? Rude lumps of clay, how they spin themselves up, by mere quick whirling, into beautiful circular dishes. And fancy the most assiduous Potter, but without his wheel; reduced to make dishes, or rather amorphous botches, by mere kneading and baking! Even such a Potter were Destiny with a human soul that would rest and lie at ease, that would not work and spin! Of an idle unrevolving man, the kindest Destiny, like the most assiduous Potter without wheel, can bake and knead nothing other than a botch; let her spend on him what expensive coloring, what gilding and enamelling she will, he is but a botch. Not a dish; no, a bulging, kneaded, crooked, shambling, squint-cornered amorphous botch—a mere enamelled vessel of dishonor! Let the idle think of this." p. 197.

"And who art thou that braggest of thy Life of Idleness; complacently showest thy bright gilt equipages; sumptuous cushions; appliances for folding of the hands to mere sleep? Looking up, looking down, around, behind or before, discernest thou, if it be not in Mayfair alone, any idle hero, saint, God, or even devil? Not a vestige of one. In the Heavens, in the Earth, in the waters under the Earth, is none like unto thee. Thou art an original figure in this creation; a denizen in Mayfair alone, in this extraordinary Century or Half-century alone! One monster there is in the world: the idle man. What is *his* 'religion?' That nature is a Phantasm, where cunning beggary or thievery may sometimes find good victual. That God is a lie; and that Man and his Life are a lie. Alas, alas, who of us is there that can say, I have worked? The faithfullest of us are unprofitable servants; the faithfullest of us know that best. The faithfullest of us may say, with sad and true old Samuel, 'Much of my life has been trifled away!' But he that has, and, except 'on public occasions,' professes to have, no function but that of going idle in a graceful or graceless manner, and of begetting sons to go idle; and to address Chief Spinners and Diggers, who at least are spinning and digging, 'Ye Scandalous persons who produce too much,' My Corn-law friends, on what imaginary still richer Eldorados, and true iron-spikes with law of Gravitation, are ye rushing!" p. 202.

In the fourth Book, entitled "The Horoscope," he discusses the prospective view of things as compared with the present, and brings out more particularly certain indispensable measures of reform. The Legislative measures he proposes are, Free Trade, Land Taxation, permanent relations between Masters and Workers, Popular Education, and a regular system of emi-

gration. After proposing and discussing these with sufficient distinctness, he sums up the whole with "more home application" in the following terms:

"For the rest, let not any Parliament, Aristocracy, Millocracy, or members of the Governing Class, condemn with much triumph this small specimen of 'remedial measures;' or ask again, with the least anger of this Editor: What is to be done, How that alarming problem of the Working Classes is to be managed? Editors are not here, foremost of all, to say How. A certain Editor thanks the gods that nobody pays him three hundred thousand a year: two hundred thousand, twenty thousand, or any similar sum of cash, for saying How; that his wages are very different, his work somewhat fitter for him. An Editor's stipulated work is to apprise *thee* that it must be done. The 'way to do it' is to try it, knowing that thou shalt die if it be not done. There is the bare back, there is the web of cloth; thou shalt cut me a coat to cover the bare back, thou whose trade it is. 'Impossible?' Hapless Fraction, dost thou discern Fate then, half unveiling herself in the gloom of the future, with her gibbet-cords, her steel-whips, and very authentic Tailor's Hell; waiting to see whether it is 'possible?' Out with thy scissors, and cut that cloth or thy own windpipe!" p. 267.

Mr. Carlyle, as we have before intimated, when writing on one subject, takes occasion to express his opinions on any other that comes to his mind. Some of these expressions of opinion, scattered through his work without much regard to systematic connexion, are worthy of notice both from the fact that they are *his* opinions, and from the peculiar manner in which they are expressed; an indescribable combination of seriousness and burlesque, irony and sarcasm, in which he is unsurpassed. Some of these we will present, without detaining the reader with particular explanations, as each one discovers its own object with sufficient explicitness.

"Governments are of very various degrees of activity: some altogether lazy Governments, in 'free countries' as they are called, seem in these times almost to profess to do, if not nothing, one knows not at first what. To debate in Parliament, and gain majorities; and ascertain who shall be, with a toil hardly second to Ixion's, the Prime speaker and spoke-holder, and keep the Ixion's wheel going, if not forward, yet round? Not altogether so: much, to the experienced eye, is not what it seems! Chancery and certain other Law-Courts seem nothing; yet, in fact, they are, the worst of them, something: chimneys for the devilry and contention of men to escape by; a very considerable something! Parliament too has its tasks, if thou wilt look; fit to wear out the lives of toughest men. The celebrated Kilkenny Cats, through their tumultuous congress, cleaving the ear of Night, could they be said to do nothing? Hadst thou been of them, thou hadst seen! The feline beasts labored, as with steam

up—to the bursting point; and death-doing energy nerved every muscle: they had a work then; and did it! On the morrow two tails were found left, and peaceable annihilation; the neighborhood delivered from despair.

"Again, are not Spinning Dervishes an eloquent emblem, significant of much? Hast thou noticed him, that solemn-visaged Turk, the eyes shut; dingy wool mantle circularly hiding his figure; bell-shaped; like a dingy bell set spinning on the *tongue* of it? By centrifugal force the dingy wool mantle heaves itself; spreads more and more, like upturned cup widening into upturned saucer; thus spins he, to the praise of Allah and advantage of his country, fast and faster, till collapse ensues, and sometimes death!" p. 257.

"Oh, Anti-Slavery Convention, loud-sounding long-eared Exeter-Hall—But in thee too is a kind of instinct toward justice, and I will complain of nothing. Only, black Quashee over the seas being once sufficiently attended to, wilt thou not perhaps open thy dull sodden eyes to the 'sixty thousand valets' in London itself who are yearly dismissed to the streets, to be what they can, when the season ends; or to the hunger-stricken, pallid, *yellow-colored* 'Free Laborers' in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Buckinghamshire, and all other shires? These yellow-colored, for the present, absorb all my sympathies: If I had a Twenty-Millions, with model-Farms, and Niger Expeditions, it is to these that I would give it! Quashee has already victuals, clothing; Quashee is not dying of such despair as the yellow-colored pale man's. Quashee, it must be owned, is hitherto a kind of block-head. The Haiti Duke of Marmalade, educated now for almost half a century, seems to have next to no sense in him. Why, in one of those Lancashire Weavers, dying of hunger, there is more thought and heart, a greater arithmetical amount of misery and desperation, than in whole gangs of Quashees. It must be owned thy eyes are of the sodden sort; and with thy emancipationings, and thy twenty millionings and long-eared clamorings, thou, like Robespierre with his pasteboard *Etre Suprême*, threatenest to become a bore to us, *Avec ton Etre-Suprême tu commences m'embêter!*" p. 276.

"'Man of Genius?' Oh, Mecænas Twiddledee, hast thou any notion what a Man of Genius is? Genius is 'the inspired gift of God!' It is the clearer presence of God Most High in a man. Dim, potential in all men; in this man it has become clear, actual. So says John Milton, who ought to be a judge: so answer him the Voices of all Ages and all Worlds. Wouldst thou commune with such a one—*be* his real peer then; does that lie in thee? Know thyself, and thy real and thy apparent place, and know him and his real and his apparent place; and act in some noble conformity therewith. What! The star-fire of the Empyrean shall eclipse itself, and illuminate magic lanterns to amuse grown children? He, the God-inspired, is to twang harps for thee, and blow through scrannel-pipes; sooth thy sated soul with visions of new, still wider Eldorados, Houri Paradises, richer lands of Cockaigne? Brother, this is not he; this is a counterfeit, *this* twangling, jangling, vain, acrid, scrannel-piping man. Thou dost well to say with sick Saul, 'It is naught, such harping!' and, in sudden rage, grasp thy spear, and try if thou canst pin such a one to

the wall. King Saul was mistaken in his man, but thou art right in thine. It is the due of such a one; nail him to the wall, and leave him there. So ought copper shillings to be nailed on counters; copper geniuses on walls, and left there for a sign!" p. 290.

"Democracy, which means despair of finding any Heroes to govern you, and contented putting up with the want of them—alas, thou too, *mein Liber*, seest well how close it is of Kin to *Atheism* and other sad *Iams*: he who discovers no God whatever, how shall he discover Heroes the visible Temples of God? Strange enough, meanwhile it is, to observe with what thoughtlessness, here in our rigidly Conservative Country, men rush into Democracy with full cry. Beyond doubt his Excellenz, the Titular-Herr Ritter Kauderwälsch von Pferdehuss-Quacksalber, be our distinguished Conservative Premier himself, and all but the thicker headed of his Party, discern Democracy to be inevitable as Death, and are even desperate of delaying it much!

"You cannot walk the streets without beholding Democracy announce itself: the very Tailor has become, if not properly Sansculottic, which to him would be ruinous, yet a Tailor unconsciously symbolizing, and prophesying with his scissors, the reign of Equality. What now is our fashionable coat? A thing of superfine texture, of deeply meditated cut; with Malinnes-lace cuffs; quilted with gold; so that a man can carry, without difficulty, an estate of land on his back? *Keineswegs*, by no manner of means! The Sumptuary Laws have fallen into such a state of desuetude as was never before seen. Our fashionable coat is an amphibium between barnsack and drayman's doublet. The cloth of it is studiously coarse; the color a speckled soot-black or rust-brown gray; the nearest approach to a Peasant's. And for shape—thou shouldst see it! The last consummation of the year now passing over us is definable as Three Bags: a big bag for the body, two small bags for the arms, and, by way of collar, a hem! The first Antique Cheruscan who, of felt-cloth or bear's hide, with bone or metal needle, set about making himself a coat, before Tailors had yet awakened out of Nothing—did he not make it even so? A loose wide poke for body, with two holes to let out the arms; this was his original coat; to which holes it was soon visible that two small loose pokes or sleeves, easily appended, would be an improvement." p. 215.

"Methodism with its eye forever turned on its own navel; asking itself with torturing anxiety of Hope and Fear, 'Am I right, am I wrong? Shall I be saved, shall I not be damned?' what is this at bottom, but a new phasis of *Egoism*, stretched out into the Infinite; not always the heavenlier for its infinitude! Brother, so soon as possible, endeavor to rise above all that. 'Thou art wrong; thou art like to be damned;' consider that as the fact, reconcile thyself even to that, if thou be a man; then first is the devouring Universe subdued under thee, and from the black murk of midnight and noise of greedy Acheron, dawn as of an everlasting morning, how far above all Hope and all Fear, springs for thee, enlightening thy steep path, awakening in thy heart celestial Memnon's music!

"But of our Dilettantisms and galvanized Dilettantisms; of Pusey-

ism—O Heavens, what shall we say of Puseyism, in comparison to Twelfth-Century Catholicism! Little or nothing; for, indeed, it is a matter to strike one dumb.

The Builder of this Universe was wise,
He plann'd all souls, all systems, planets, particles :
The Plan He shaped His Worlds and Æons by
Was—Heavens! Was thy small Nine-and-thirty Articles?

That certain human souls, living on this practical Earth, should think to save themselves and a ruined world by noisy theoretic demonstrations and laudations of *the Church*, instead of some unnoisy, unconscious, but *practical*, total, heart-and-soul demonstration of *a Church*; this, in the circle of revolving ages, this also was a thing we were to see. A kind of penultimate thing, precursor of very strange consummations; last thing but one!" p. 116.

"The Popish Religion, we are told, flourishes extremely in these years; and is the most vivacious-looking religion to be met with at present. '*Elle a trois cents ans dans le ventre*,' counts M. Jouffroy; '*c'est pourquoi je la respecte*!' The old Pope of Rome, finding it laborious to kneel so long while they cart him through the streets to bless the people on *Corpus-Christi* Day, complains of rheumatism; whereupon his Cardinals consult; construct him, after some study, a stuffed cloaked figure, of iron and wood, with wool or baked hair; and place it in a kneeling posture. Stuffed figure, or rump of a figure; to this stuffed rump he, sitting at his ease on a lower level, joins, by the aid of cloaks and drapery, his living head and out-spread hands: the rump with its cloak kneels, the Pope looks, and holds his hands spread; and so the two in concert bless the Roman population on *Corpus-Christi* Day as well as they can.

"I have considered this amphibious Pope, with the wool-and-iron back, with the flesh head and hands; and endeavored to calculate his horoscope. I reckon him the remarkablest Pontiff that has darkened God's daylight, or painted himself in the human retina, for these several thousand years. Nay, since Chaos first shivered, and 'sneezed,' as the Arabs say, with the first shaft of sunlight shot through it, what stranger product was there of Nature and Art working together? Here is a Supreme Priest who believes God to be—What in the name of God *does* he believe God to be? and discerns that all worship of God is a scenic phantasmagory of wax-candles, organ-blasts, Gregorian Chants, mass-brayings, purple monsignori, wool-and-iron rumps, artistically spread out—to save the ignorant from worse." p. 138.

We have thus presented an analysis of the work before us, accompanied with examples sufficient to give an idea of the plan of its author and the mode of its execution. It is superfluous for us to say that it is a work of much interest. Whether considered as a literary, political, or religious production, it is certainly a rare curiosity. It is the production of a pen which has won for its author a high reputation among the English and Scotch Essayists. It is the utterance of the opinions of a

profound thinker, on a variety of subjects which excite a large share of public attention. It contains many noble and truthful sentiments, uttered, if not in an attractive style, with an energy which must command respect. He who has read Carlyle's "Heroes," will have perceived that his sympathies are with the sturdy, gigantic mythology of the Scandinavians, rather than with the light graceful mythology of the Greeks; and this partiality exhibits itself in full development, both in his style of thought and expression. Rudeness and strength, rather than elegance and beauty, are the characteristics of his mind. One is often reminded in this book, of Old Thor, with his thunder hammer, doing battle with the frost and mud götnus. We are surprised at the boldness with which he attacks every existing institution in England; Ministry, Parliament, Judiciary, Aristocracy, Clergy. But to our mind, the work has strongly objectionable features. There are passages which indicate, to say the least, a weakness in the author, and others still, which are clearly and radically erroneous. While we find in it much to admire and praise, we must, on the whole, characterize it as a book in style barbarous, in politics incendiary, in philosophy dubious, and in theology execrable. But we will be more specific.

In the first place, the work breathes an overweening, morbid admiration of the past. A striking instance of it may be found in the extracts which have been given. It is a trait which gleams out on almost every page. Whatever subject is treated, the sole standard by which it is tried is the past. Nothing at present existing, in the whole civilized world, seems to afford Mr. Carlyle any satisfaction, unless it be a germ of some institution, which to his vision affords dim promise of shaping itself in the forms and spirit of the past, or a relic of some obsolete barbarism. On the other hand, there is nothing in the past ever so revolting to common minds, but it elicits, in some aspect of it, his admiration. Scandinavian savagery, Mohammedism, with its lying imposture, 12th century Catholicism, with its bigotry and heathenism, the fighting barons of feudal times, whose digest of common law was,

"That he should take who had the power,
And he should keep who can;"

Pope Gregory, Hildebrand, William the Conqueror, Oliver Cromwell, and even the French Revolution and Bonaparte, all

present to him some phase worthy of special notice and admiration. Religion, as at present exhibited, he characterizes as a cant, hypocrisy, and quackery. The present systems of Government he characterizes as huge chaotic imbroglíos, administered by sham heroes, valets, flunkies, inevitably running into Chartism, French Revolutions, Sans Culottic Democracy, and all other frightful terminations. The Catholicism of the 12th century is infinitely preferable to any religion now extant, however sincere and earnest; and no reform in religion is of any value which does not bring us back to that standard. Government must be reorganized after the same model, with such modifications as the change of circumstances requires. The Hero must be found by some means, and set to rule with absolute power; if nobody else can find him he must find himself, as Wilhelmus Conquestor and Oliver Cromwell did. A fighting Aristocracy, like that of the 12th century, is no longer possible; the idea is an obsolete one and cannot be revived; the genius of our time requires a working Aristocracy. But the relation of villanage, which subsisted between the old feudal proprietors and the peasantry, must be restored between the masters and workers, with absolute authority on the part of the one, and quiet obedience on the part of the other. "Despotism," he says, "is essential in most enterprises; they do not tolerate freedom of debate in a seventy-four. Republican Senate and Plebiscita would not answer well in cotton mills." This is probably the reason why he sympathizes so little with the "Anti-Slavery Convention, loud-sounding, long-eared Exeter Hall, and Black Quashee beyond the seas." Indeed, American Slavery seems to be essentially the system he recommends. The injustice and cruelty of certain masters he would deprecate; but the permanence of relation, and despotic authority are essential features of his system, and these being given, the abuses which exist in American slavery must necessarily exist in any society similarly organized, so long as human nature remains what it is at present.

Against any such system of social reform, all the past and all the present remonstrate with one voice. A single objection which lies against it, obvious and insuperable, is sufficient to condemn it without searching for more. It has been tried and found wanting. Suppose the world were brought back to the spirit of the 12th century: would not the same elements, again

set in operation, reproduce the same results? Mr. Carlyle himself tells us, more than once, that the present and future are necessary developments of the past; "the Life-tree Igdrasil has its roots down deep in the Death Kingdoms, among the oldest dead dust of men, and with its boughs reaches among the stars;" 12th century religion and politics produced the Reformation, French Revolution, and all the present "Atheistic Quackeries" in politics and religion. Of course, if the world could all be reorganized after the model of the 12th century, it must, from the operation of the same causes, return to a state similar to its present state, and in a period of time somewhat shorter than the *Annius Magnus* of Plato. Mr. Carlyle believes in progress; is this what he means by it? Did he ever visit an old fashioned New England cider-mill, and see a horse fulfilling his "Life task," by travelling round in his own tracks?

We have accorded to Mr. Carlyle a large share of discernment—we have pronounced him a profound thinker, nor would we reverse that opinion. And yet, such a notion of things we call, in his own phrase, "a most poor platitude of a world." "Such a platitude of a world," we should say, "it were best to end; to have done with it, and restore it once for all to the göttnus, mud giants, frost giants, and chaotic brute gods of the beginning." Had we no higher notion of progress, we would engage, heart and soul, in praying for the coming of Father Miller's Millennium, the sooner the better, and call on all good people to join us. We can sympathize with Mr. Carlyle in his dissatisfaction with the present state of things. The world is surely in a most sad condition. But for remedies—he who can look to nothing higher than the religion of the dark ages—12th century Catholicism, improved or deteriorated by German Transcendentalism, must surely have a very low range of vision. We are not disposed to despair of the world. We are looking for a radical, permanent amelioration of human society. But the light by which we look upon such an amelioration as a certain event, is not any faith we have in the perfectibility of human nature, nor any confidence in the influence of principles such as are developed in this book. We regard the event as rendered certain by the declaration of Him who has said, "I will overturn, overturn, overturn it; and it shall be no more until he come whose right it is; and I will give it him." "Behold I make all things new." We see a pledge of its fulfilment in the influence of principles which have already, to a partial

extent and on a limited scale, proved their efficiency ; principles which are "mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God."*

Another objectionable feature in Mr. Carlyle's work, considered as a political production, is the frequency and constancy with which he insists on the necessity of a "French Revolution" in England. The following passage in which he very distinctly expresses this opinion, is only one of many :

"Yes, when fathers and mothers, in Stockport hunger-cellars, begin to eat their children, and Irish Widows have to prove their relationship by dying of typhus-fever; and amid Governing 'Corporations of the Best and Bravest' busy to preserve their game by 'bushing,' dark millions of God's human creatures start up in mad Chartism, impracticable Sacred-Mouths, and Manchester Insurrections; and there is a virtual Industrial Aristocracy only half-alive, spell-bound amid money bags and ledgers; and an actual Idle Aristocracy seemingly near dead in somnolent delusions, in trespasses and double-barrels; 'sliding,' as on inclined planes, which every new year they soap with new Hansard's-jargon under God's sky, and so on sliding ever faster toward a 'scale' and balance-scale whereon is written, *Thou art found wanting*; in such days, after a generation or two, I say, it does become, even to the low and simple, very palpably impossible! No Working World, any more than a Fighting World, can be led on without a noble chivalry of Work, and laws and fixed rules which follow out of that—far nobler than any chivalry of Fight-

* Mr. Carlyle finds some grains of consolation even in this age of Atheism, Mammonism, and all other despicable *isms*. "Truly it is beautiful to see the brutish Empire of Mammon cracking every where, giving sure promise of dying or being changed. A strange, chill, almost ghastly day-spring strikes up in Yankee-land itself; my Transcendental friends announce there, in a distinct, though somewhat lank-haired, ungainly manner, that the Demiurgus Dollar is dethroned; that now, unheard of Demiurgus-ships, Priesthoods, Aristocracies, Growths and Destructions, are already visible in the gray of coming time. Socinian preachers quit their pulpits in Yankee-land, saying, 'Friends, this has all gone to a colored cobweb, we regret to say!'—and retire to the fields to cultivate onion-beds and live frugally on vegetables. It is very notable." p. 294.

If Socinian preachers are, in any considerable numbers, coming to the conclusion that Socinianism has all gone to a colored cobweb, we will agree with our author that it is a most auspicious symptom.

ing was. As an anarchic multitude on mere supply-and-demand, it is becoming inevitable that we dwindle in blind suicidal convulsion and self-abrasion, frightful to the imagination, into Choctaw Workers. With wigwam and scalps—with palaces and thousand pound bills; with savagery, depopulation, chaotic desolation! Good Heavens, will not one French Revolution and Reign of Terror suffice us, but must there be two? There will be two if needed, there will be twenty if needed; there will be precisely as many as are needed. The Laws of Nature will have themselves fulfilled. That is a thing certain to me." p. 271.

We will not undertake to say how excitable the English people are, but we should think that amidst anti-corn-law leagues, chartisms, and insurrections of a people goaded on to madness and despair by grim starvation, it were of doubtful utility to tell them that the overturning of the Government and the violent death of the nobility is as inevitable as the unalterable laws of Destiny. His final hope is a hero-king: "Yes, friends: Hero-kings, and a whole world not unheroic—there lies the port and the happy haven towards which, through all these storm-tost seas, French Revolutions, Chartisms, Manchester Insurrections, that make the heart sick in these bad days, the Supreme Powers are driving us. On the whole, blessed be the Supreme Powers, stern as they are! Towards that haven will we, O friends: let all true men, with what of faculty is in them, bend valiantly, incessantly, with thousandfold endeavor, thither, thither! There, or else in the ocean-abysses, it is very clear to me we shall arrive." p. 35.

Now if there are any considerable number of men in England, who would like to have a Revolution, would not a strain of reasoning like the following be very natural: 'Mr. Carlyle tells us that the Paradise of Heroes lies beyond a French Revolution, and to that we must tend with thousandfold endeavor; nay, the Supreme Powers are driving us thither with stern necessity, and resistance to them is useless; the sooner we get through that Revolution the better, and the sooner we begin, the sooner we shall get through. Let us bend valiantly, incessantly, thither, thither, O friends!'

But such a conclusion would not depend upon mere inference; the thing is occasionally more plainly spoken.

"In all cases, therefore, we will agree with the judicious Mrs. Glass: 'First catch your hare!' First get your man; all is got: he can learn to do all things, from making boots to decreeing judgments, governing communities; and will do them like a man. Catch your

no-man ; alas ! have you not caught the terriblest Tartar in the world ? Perhaps all the terriblest, the quieter and gentler he looks. For the mischief that one blockhead, that every blockhead does, in a world so ferocious, teeming with endless results as ours, no ciphering will sum up. The quack bootmaker is considerable ; as corn-cutters can testify, and desperate men reduced to buckskin and list-shoes. But the quack priest, quack high-priest, the quack king ! Why do not all just citizens rush, half-frantic, to stop him, as they would a conflagration ? Surely a just citizen *is* admonished by God and his own Soul, by all silent and articulate voices of this Universe, to do what in *him* lies toward relief of this poor blockhead-quack, and of a world that groans under him. Run swiftly ; relieve him, were it even by extinguishing him ! For all things have grown so old, tinder-dry, combustible ; and he is more ruinous than conflagration. Sweep him *down*, at least." p. 87.

"The most Conservative English People, thickest-skinned, most patient of Peoples, is driven alike by its Logic and its Unlogic, by things 'spoken,' and by things not yet spoken or very speakable, but only felt and very unendurable, to be wholly a Reforming People. Their Life as it is has ceased to be longer possible for them.

"Urge not this noble silent People ; rouse not the Berserkir-rage that lies in them ! Do you know their Cromwells, Hampdens, their Pym and Bradshaws ? Men very peaceable, but men that can be made very terrible ! Men who, like their old Teutsch Fathers in Agrippa's days, 'have a soul that despises death ;' to whom 'death,' compared with falsehoods and injustices, is light ; 'in whom there is a rage unconquerable by the immortal gods !' Before this the English People have taken very preternatural-looking Spectres by the beard ; saying virtually : 'And if thou wert "preternatural ?" Thou with thy "divine-rights" grown diabolic wrongs ? Thou—not even "natural ;" decapitable ; totally extinguishable !' Yes, just so godlike as this People's patience was, even so godlike will and must its impatience be. Away, ye scandalous Practical Solecisms, children actually of the Prince of Darkness ; ye have near broken our hearts ; we can and will endure you no longer. Begone, we say ; depart while the play is good ! By the Most High God, whose sons and born missionaries true men are, ye shall not continue here ! You and we have become incompatible ; can inhabit one house no longer. Either you must go, or we. Are ye ambitious to try *which* it shall be ?" p. 164.

Nor can it be said that this is a forced construction put upon a single passage or two, wrested from their connection. It is scarcely possible to construct a chapter more calculated to stir up a whole people to violent revolt, than that from which the last extract is taken. But as this is not a subject of practical concernment to us as Americans, we have accomplished our object by simply calling attention to it, as a feature of the work. Whether the present age is to witness a Reign of Terror in England, or not, we shall leave to the political prognostica-

tors to settle among themselves; but if it does, posterity will point to Mr. Carlyle as a direct instigator of it.

There are some passages in the work before us, that we know not whether to characterize as weaknesses, or wilful misrepresentations. The following is one out of many that might be selected:

"God's absolute Laws, sanctioned by an eternal Heaven and an eternal Hell, have become Moral Philosophies, sanctioned by able computations of Profit and Loss, by weak considerations of Pleasures of Virtue and the Moral Sublime.

"It is even so. To speak in the ancient dialect, we 'have forgotten God;' in the most modern dialect and very truth of the matter, we have taken up the fact of this Universe as it *is not*. We have quietly closed our eyes to the eternal Substance of things, and opened them only to the Shows and Shams of things. God's Laws are become a Greatest-Happiness Principle, a Parliamentary Expediency: the Heavens overarch us only as an Astronomical Time-Keeper; a butt for Herschel-telescopes to shoot science at, to shoot sentimentalities at: in our and old Jonson's dialect, man has lost the *soul* out of him; and now, after the due period, begins to find the want of it!" p. 137.

The phrases "Profit and Loss," "Greatest-Happiness Principle," "Benthamee Utility," are of frequent occurrence in the satirical and denunciatory outbreaks of Mr. Carlyle on the morality and religion of the present. And from the use of the epithet "Benthamee," one might suppose he has particular reference to Mr. Bentham, and other writers who have advocated the system of optimism in morals. But however charitable such a supposition might be, it is a supposition which a reading of his book will not sustain. It is perfectly clear that he intends to characterize all the morals and religion of England (which includes America, since the American mind is essentially English in its characteristics), so far as public expression is given to it, as built on a false foundation. Compare the extract above with the following:

"But now in these godless two centuries, looking at England and her efforts and doings, if we ask, What of England's doings the Law of Nature had accepted, Nature's King had actually farthered and pronounced to have truth in them—where is our answer? Neither the 'Church' of Hurd and Warburton, nor the Anti-church of Hume and Paine; not in any shape the Spiritualism of England: all this is already seen, or beginning to be seen, for what it is; a thing that Nature does *not* own. On the one side is dreary Cant, with a *reminiscence* of things noble and divine; on the other is but acrid Candor, with a *prophecy* of things brutal, infernal. Hurd and Warburton are

sunk into the sere and yellow leaf; no considerable body of true-seeing men looks thitherward for healing: the Paine-and-Hume Atheistic theory, of 'things well let alone,' with Liberty, Equality and the like, is also in these days declaring itself naught, unable to keep the world from taking fire.

"The theories and speculations of both these parties, and, we may say, of all intermediate parties and persons, prove to be things which the Eternal Veracity did not accept; things superficial, ephemeral, which already a near Posterity, finding them already dead and brown-leaved, is about to suppress and forget. The Spiritualism of England, for those godless years, is, as it were, all forgettable. Much has been written: but the perennial Scriptures of Mankind have had small accession: from all English Books, in rhyme or prose, in leather binding or in paper wrappage, how many verses have been added to these? In brief, the Spoken Word of England has not been true."—p. 168.

Here we have it! most unequivocally spoken. If Carlyle is to be charged with obscurity of style, he is surely not guilty of it here. Every thing that has been written in England since 1660, is without exception condemned. Do such sweeping charges require refutation? What if Hume, Adam Smith, Paley, and Bentham have published false systems of morals, and other writers have endorsed them, does it therefore follow that no religious teachers in England, in the last two centuries, have believed that there is such a thing as Eternal Right, and Eternal Wrong, independent of utility? Take the first sentence in the extract from page 137, and although it must be confessed that the religious teaching of England, for the last two centuries, has in plainness and pungency fallen far below the Cromwellian era, yet do not the facts warrant a simple denial of the charge? especially if we include the religious teaching of America, which is essentially English in its intellectual and moral characteristics.

But with what grace can Mr. Carlyle make charges of this sort? If he had a right to make them before he published "*Past and Present*," he certainly has not now. Nothing can be more inconsistent than the culmination of such charges in that book. With what frequency he points out the evils which England now suffers, as the penalty for her present social organization, and her errors in religion—how constantly he dwells upon the greater miseries impending over her unless a radical reform be effected, the extracts already given are sufficient to show; and if more light on this point were needed, it is sufficient to say that this is the burden of his book—apparently his

object in writing it. All conceivable blessings are described as following in the train of "Herohood," while untold miseries and penalties are represented as inseparably connected with "Quackhood" and "Unveracities," "each unveracity escorted by its corresponding penalty."

Nay, it is Mr. Carlyle himself who has denied "God's absolute laws, sanctioned by an eternal Heaven and an eternal Hell." God's Moral laws, given to men who have power to obey or disobey them, are changed by him into Pantheistic "Laws of Nature," "Laws of Destiny," "Laws of the Universe," which must and will be fulfilled; and the *interest* of man is to observe their operation, and conform himself to them. "To reconcile Despotism with Freedom—make your Despotism *Just*, rigorous as Destiny and its Laws. The Laws of God; all men obey these."* If the Laws of God are Laws of Destiny, of course all men obey them; they cannot help it. Compare this with the following from "Heroes:†" "'*Allah akbar*,' 'God is great; and then also '*Islam*,' that we must *submit* to God. 'If this be *Islam*,' says Goethe, 'do we not all live in *Islam*?' Yes, all of us that have any moral life; we all live so. It has always been held the highest wisdom for a man, not merely to submit to necessity,—necessity will make him submit,—but to know and believe well that the stern thing that necessity had ordered, was the wisest, the best, the thing wanted there. To cease his frantic pretension of scanning this great God's world, in his small fraction of a brain; to know that it *had* verily, though deep beyond his soundings, a Just Law; that the soul of it was Good; that his part in it was to conform to the Law of the whole, and in devout silence follow that; not questioning it; obeying it as unquestionable. I say this is yet the only true morality known." Compare further the following: "Had he faithfully followed Nature and her Laws,—Nature, ever true to her Laws, would have yielded increase fruit and felicity to him; but he has followed other than Nature and her Laws;" that is, he has not conformed himself to the operation of the laws of nature, which "will have themselves fulfilled," and now he is suffering for it, just as the man who throws himself from a precipice will have

* Past and Present, p. 279.

† Appleton's edition, p. 71.

his bones broken, as a penalty for not conforming himself to the law of gravitation. "I quitted the Laws of Fact, which are also called Laws of God, and mistook them for the Laws of Sham and Semblance, which are also called the Devil's Laws." "Ye have forgotten God; ye have quitted the ways of God; it is not according to the Laws of Fact ye have lived." "We have departed far away from the *Laws* of this Universe."*

Such being the nature of the Laws of God, one may easily infer what, in the estimation of such a writer, the penalty of those laws, or Hell, would be. To show that we have not mistaken our author in the extracts given above we will give his views on this point.

"READER, even Christian Reader as thy title goes, hast thou any notion of Heaven and Hell? I rather apprehend not. Often as the words are on our tongue, they have got a fabulous or semi-fabulous character for most of us, and pass on like a kind of transient similitude, like a sound signifying little.

"Yes, it is well worth while for us to know, once and always, that they are not a similitude, nor a fable, nor a semi-fable; that they are an everlasting highest fact! "No Lake of Sicilian or other sulphur burns now any where in these ages," sayest thou? Well, and if there did not! Believe that there does not; believe it if thou wilt, nay, hold by it as a real increase, a rise to higher stages, to wider horizons and empires. All this has vanished, or has not vanished; believe as thou wilt as to all this. But that an Infinite of Practical Importance, speaking with strict arithmetical exactness, an *Infinite*, has vanished or can vanish from the Life of any Man: this thou shalt not believe!"—p. 145.

"Under baleful Atheism, Mammonisms, Joe-Manton Dilettantisms, with their appropriate Cants and Idolisms, and whatsoever scandalous rubbish obscures, and all but extinguishes the soul of man—religion now is; its Laws, written if not on Stone Tables, yet on the Azure of Infinitude, in the inner heart of God's Creation, certain as Life, certain as Death! I say the Laws are there, and thou shalt not disobey them. It were better for thee not. Better a hundred deaths than yes. Terrible 'penalties' withal, if thou still need 'penalties,' are there for disobeying. Dost thou observe, O redtape Politician, that fiery infernal Phenomenon, which men name FRENCH REVOLUTION, sailing, unlooked-for, unbidden, through thy inane Protocol Dominion; far-seen, with splendor not of Heaven? Ten centuries will see it. There were Tanneries at Meudon for human skins. And Hell, very truly Hell, had power over God's upper Earth for a season. The cruellest Portent that has risen into created space these ten centuries: let us hail it, with awe-struck repentant hearts, as the

* Past and Present, pp. 26, 27.

voice once more of a God, though of one in wrath. Blessed be the God's voice; for it is true, and Falsehoods have to cease before it! But for that same preternatural quasi-infernal Portent, one could not know what to make of this wretched world in these days at all. The deplorablest quack-ridden, and now hunger-ridden, down-trodden Despicability and *Flebile ludibrium* of redtape Protocols, rotary Calabashes, Poor-law Bastilles: who is there that could think of its being fated to continue?

"Penalties enough, my brother! This penalty inclusive of all: Eternal Death to thy own hapless Self, if thou heed no other. Eternal Death, I say, with many meanings old and new, of which let this single one suffice us here: The eternal impossibility for thee to be aught but a Chimera, and swift-vanishing deceptive Phantasm, in God's creation; swift-vanishing, never to reappear: why should it reappear! Thou hadst one chance, thou wilt never have another. Everlasting ages will roll on, and no other be given thee. The foolishlest articulate-speaking soul now extant may not he say to himself: 'A whole Eternity I waited to be born; and now I have a whole Eternity waiting to see what I will do when born!' This is not Theology—this is Arithmetic. And thou but half discernest this; thou but half believest it? Alas, on the shores of the Dead Sea on Sabbath there goes on a tragedy!" p. 229.

Of a kind similar to the charges which have been considered, are Mr. Carlyle's representations of the prevailing views of the Universe. There is apparent in many parts of his writings an affectation of some superior discernment, into the nature of things; a penetration into what he calls, after Goethe, "the open secret of the Universe;" which from frequent repetition it becomes a weariness to read. Himself, Goethe, Mahomet, the old Scandinavians, and all heroic men discern a profound mystery in the universe; but these "poor scientific babblers, with their nomenclatures and classifications," seem to imagine they have explained it all, and left nothing to wonder at. "The Heavens overarch us, only as an astronomical time-keeper; a butt for Herschel-telescopes to shoot science at, to shoot sentimentalities at."* "The power of fire we designate by some trivial chemical name, thereby hiding the essential character of wonder that dwells in it." "From us no chemistry, if it had not stupidity to help it, would hide that Flame is a wonder." "Thunder was not then mere Electricity, vitreous or resinous."†

Now whether the explorers of physical science, with their

* Past and Present, p. 137.

† Heroes, p. 25.

"nomenclatures and classifications," have effected any thing *useful* for men, or not, (an inquiry which seems to be regarded by our author with peculiar antipathy,) we will not decide. The utilities of science—the steam engines it has built, the commercial facilities it has afforded by improving navigation, discovering, as it has very literally, so excellent a time-keeper in the over arching heavens, its beneficial effects on manufactures and agriculture, its lightning rods and its electrical mail carriers, though a very respectable story might be made out in this department of things, all these we will pass by, and account them with any one who chooses to designate them thus, as the "poorest babblings." But that nothing has been gained by interrogating nature for the last two centuries, that none of her mysteries have been wrested from her, it is not so easy to admit. We believe that much has been discovered in nature, in consequence of the patient efforts of scientific men; that the human mind has been enlightened in relation to many things which were formerly hidden from it in the profoundest darkness. Nor does it seem to us so much a matter of regret as of gratulation. We much prefer the intelligent observation of nature, which one familiar with the facts of science is able to take, to the gaping wonder of savages, never so earnest, expressed in never so sincere worship. But while scientific men claim to have met with some success in their investigations, such as serves to stimulate them to push those investigations with more ardor and perseverance, we think Mr. Carlyle is the first one who has found in them a notion that they have set up any Hercules' pillars, or attained any *ne plus ultra* in discovery. On the contrary, did not the great pioneer in modern scientific discovery express the earnest conviction of all who have followed him, when he compared the stupendous discoveries he had made to a few beautiful pebbles which a child might pick up on the shore, while the boundless ocean of truth lay before him all unexplored? And in the discoveries which have been made, the all pervading influence of gravitation, its exact law, the identity of lightning with electricity, "vitreous or resinous," the influence and laws of caloric, the laws of light and color, who pretends to know any thing beyond the naked facts, or to be able to tell *what* gravitation, electricity, light, or caloric *is*? The farther science has pursued her investigations, the more profound have her mysteries been shown to be, and the more occasion has there been, not for inane wonder at sensible phe-

nomena, but for intelligent adoration of God, the Great Mystery, and the unsearchable cause of all other mysteries.

But Mr. Carlyle, not content with frequently throwing out insinuations derogatory to the smallest common sense of the age, comes out occasionally with graver charges. In his accustomed style of sweeping satirical denunciation 'he observes: "Nature in late Centuries, says Sauerteig, was universally supposed to be dead; an old eight-day clock, made many thousand years ago, and still ticking, but dead as brass,—which the Maker, at most, sat looking at, in a distant, singular, and indeed incredible manner? but now I am happy to observe, she is every where asserting herself to be not dead and brass at all, but alive and miraculous, celestial-infernal, with an emphasis which will again penetrate the thickest head of this Planet by and by!"* "How mean, dwarfish, are their ways of thinking in this time,—compared not with the Christian Shakspeares and Miltons, but with the old Pagan Skalds, with any species of believing men. The living TREE Igdrasil, with the melodious, prophetic waving of its world-wide boughs, deep-rooted as Hela, has died out into the clanking of a world-MACHINE! 'Tree' and 'Machine;' contrast these two things. I, for my share, declare the world to be no Machine; it does not go by wheels and pinions at all!"†

Now if such a Deistical, virtually Atheistical view of the relations between God and the universe is very extensively current, Mr. Carlyle is entitled to the thanks of all thinking men, for setting his face so decidedly against it, and all good people ought to join him, with might and main, opposing it with such weapons of argument, satire, and denunciation, as each one is best able to wield. But is there not here a charge quite too decided and universal? The world, it must be confessed, has ever been sufficiently blind to the indications every where, not only of divine direction and arrangement, but also of divine efficiency and execution. The old Hebrew notion, that whatever occurred, whether in a miraculous manner, or by the agencies of nature, was performed by the direct hand of God, it is to be feared is getting somewhat obsolete. That what are called the laws of nature, are but the stated modes of God's direct and personal action, is certainly a very Christian hy-

* *Past and Present*, p. 27.

† *Heroes*, p. 210.

pothesis, and it is worth while to inquire whether it is not also the most philosophical hypothesis. But however this may be, that the Machine hypothesis has ever become very current, we have yet to be convinced. Open Infidels, Deists, may advocate it, but it is to be observed that Mr. Carlyle is writing, not of avowed Atheists and Deists, but of the prevailing religionists and politicians of the age. In the religious world, the belief of a Divine Providence, acting in all the events which take place, has prevailed with a greater or less degree of distinctness, even during the last two "godless" centuries.

But let us inquire with some definiteness, what Mr. Carlyle would substitute for the "Brass Clock," and the "Machine, with wheels and pinions." "Nature," he says, "is every where asserting herself to be not dead and brass at all, but alive and miraculous, celestial-infernal." In the other extract, he declares his partiality for the Scandinavian symbol of the Universe, a Tree, which is throughout this work a favorite comparison with him.

These two representations are identical; the one speaks of Nature as alive and active, and the other embodies that life under a definite conception. They admit of two modes of explanation. The powers of nature may be alive and active by a derived life; a life originally imparted to them by the Creator, by virtue of which they continue to act independent of Him. Or secondly, Nature, or the Universe, may be only a manifestation of God, and, so far as it has any substantive existence, be identical with God. There is a third theory of the relations of God to the Universe, which supposes God to be present in all things, acting constantly and efficiently through the agencies of nature, which of themselves have no efficiency. But this theory is not consistent with the representations of our author. We could not in accordance with it say that Nature is alive; we could not compare it to a living tree. Nature, according to this theory is supposed to be inert, powerless, and its agencies, instruments in the hands of an ever living, ever acting God. Of the two explanations of which they are susceptible, the first cannot convey the meaning intended by Mr. Carlyle, for that, as we understand it, is the Machine hypothesis, so decidedly repudiated by him. The second, then, is the only explanation possible; and his language accords well with this view.

Nature might, in this theory, very properly be said to be

alive and miraculous. That it must be one of the three is, we think, clear; for the three include all the hypotheses supposable; the first and second expressing the two extremes of Deism and Pantheism, and the third the intermediate ground, which we suppose the majority of English writers occupy—the doctrine of Divine Providence, in its various modifications. That it is not this third, is equally clear, for the simple reason, that Nature could not, on this theory, be said to be alive, except in the language of very bold metaphor.

The Pantheistic tendency of Mr. Carlyle's Theology, we intimated in our remarks on his views of the Law of God. This feature it is impossible for one not to discern in his writings, and especially in his "Heroes" and "Past and Present." Carlyle says much of God, and speaks of Him in such terms, that sometimes a superficial reader might think him a man of extraordinary piety. He speaks of a universal inattention to, and forgetfulness of God, in a strain of eloquent rebuke, that might vie with the oburgations of the old Prophets. But amidst all this we look in vain for the God of the Bible. In his most indignant rebukes of practical Atheism, one feels a painful suspicion that all is not right with him, and that the God whom he would have men know and acknowledge, is not the God whom man's moral nature requires; and as he reads and watches, the fact comes flashing out occasionally, in all its clear and bold deformity. God, with Carlyle, is the Soul of the World, and a synonym with Nature, Destiny, Universe. To satisfy the reader of this we will quote a few paragraphs.

"This Universe, ah me!—what could the wild man know of it? what can we yet know? That it is a Force, and a thousandfold Complexity of Forces; a Force which is *not we*. Nay surely, to the Atheistic Thinker, if such a one were possible, it must be a Miracle too, this huge, illimitable whirlwind of Force, which envelopes us here; never resting whirlwind, high as Immensity, old as Eternity. What is it? God's Creation, the religious people answer; it is the Almighty God's! Atheistic science babbles poorly of it, with scientific nomenclatures, experiments, and what not, as if it were a poor dead thing, to be bottled up in Leyden jars and sold over counters: but the natural sense of man, in all times, if he will honestly apply his sense, proclaims it to be a living thing,—ah, an unspeakable, god-like thing, towards which the best attitude for us, after never so much science, is awe, devout prostration, and humility of soul; worship, if not in words, then in silence." *Heroes*, p. 14.

A rational man, surely will not worship what is no God.

"The world, which is now divine only to the gifted, was then divine to whomsoever would turn his eye upon it. He stood bare before it face to face. 'All was Godlike or God.'" Id. p. 15.

"This then, is what we made of the world: this is all the image and notion we could form to ourselves of this great mystery of a Life and Universe. Despise it not. That matter is a thing no man will ever, in time or out of time, comprehend; after thousands of years of ever new expansion, man will find himself but struggling to comprehend again a part of it: the thing is larger than man, not to be comprehended by him; an Infinite thing!" Id. p. 40.

Is any thing infinite but God?

"To his eyes it is for ever clear that this world is wholly miraculous. He sees what all great Thinkers, the rude Scandinavians themselves, in one way or other, have continued to see; That this so solid-looking material world is, at bottom, in very deed, Nothing; is a visible and tactual Manifestation of God's power and presence,—a shadow hung out by Him on the bosom of the void Infinite; nothing more.....At the last day they shall disappear like clouds; the whole Earth shall go spinning, whirl itself off into wreck, and as dust and vapor, vanish into the Inane. Allah withdraws his hand from it, and it ceases to be. The universal empire of Allah, presence every where of an unspeakable Power, a Splendor, and a Terror not to be named, as the true force, essence, and reality in all things whatsoever, was continually clear to this man. What a modern talks of by the name Forces of Nature, Laws of Nature; and does not figure as a divine thing; not even as one thing at all, but as a set of things, undivine enough,—saleable, curious, good for propelling steamships!" Id. p. 87.

Compare the sentence "The universal empire of Allah," &c., with the following from the Apostle of Pantheism, and its chief exponent—Spinoza: "The great reality of all existence is substance. There is but one reality, and that is God. All substance is necessarily infinite. There is but one infinite substance, that is God. Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be conceived. He is the universal being of which all things are manifestations."*

"That divine mystery, which lies every where in all Beings, 'the Divine Idea of the World, that which lies at the bottom of Appearances, as Fichte styles it; of which all Appearance, from the starry sky to the grass in the field, but especially the appearance of Man and his work, is but the *vesture*, the embodiment that renders it visible. This divine mystery *is* in all times and in all places; veritably *is*. In most times and places it is greatly overlooked; and the Universe, definable always in one or the other dialect, as the realized Thought of God, is considered a trivial, inert, commonplace matter;

* Westminster Review, No. LXXVII., Art. IV.

as if, says the Satirist, it were a dead thing, which some Upholsterer had 'put together!' Heroes, p. 101.

Observe the resemblance between the phrase, "the Universe definable as the realized thought of God," and this fundamental proposition of Spinoza: "God has two infinite attributes, Extension and Thought. Extension is visible Thought, and Thought is invisible Extension."*

To these may be added the references to Past and Present, in the account given of Carlyle's views of the laws of God: in which the reader will observe the constant interchanging of the phrases, "Laws of God," "Laws of Nature," "Laws of Destiny," "Laws of this Universe," and of consequence, the synonymous use of the words, God, Nature, Destiny, Universe.

These extracts require no comment. If Pantheism is taught any where, it is here. As a proper consummation of these views, we will add, that the Bible is reckoned by our author on a level with Rituals, Liturgies, Mythologies.† Sinai's Thunder is no more worthy of attention than any other story told to work on the minds of the vulgar.

Personal religion is mentioned with a sneer.‡ That religion, which depends somewhat on the state of the affections, and inculcates self-examination—the religion of Baxter, Flavel, and Edwards—is styled a "morbid methodism," "an Egoism stretched out into the infinite," unworthy to be compared with the secular religion of the monks of the 12th century.§ The only devil to be feared is set forth in very unequivocal terms:

"Could he (i. e. the Priest) but find the point again—take the old spectacles off his nose, and, looking up, discover, almost in contact with him, what the *real* Satanas, and soul-devouring, world-devouring *Devil*, now is? Original Sin and such-like are bad enough, I doubt not: but distilled Gin, dark Ignorance, Stupidity, dark Cornwall, Bastille and Company, what are they? Will he discover our new real Satan, whom he has to fight; or go on droning through his old nose-spectacles about old extinct Satans—and never see the real one, till he *feel* him at his own throat and ours!" Past and Present, p. 243.

His views of Eternal Death, and Hell, have already been given. His views of Inspiration, Jesus Christ, and other kindred topics, may easily be inferred from the references hereto-

* Westminster Review, IV.

† Past and Present, p. 229.

‡ Ibid. p. 59.

§ Ibid. p. 116.

fore made; especially if the reader has some acquaintance with the works of Rev. Theodore Parker, O. A. Brownson, and similar writers of our time.

The attentive reader cannot fail to notice the harmony of this view of God, with the notion expressed by the various terms, Fate, Destiny, Necessity, for which Mr. Carlyle expresses a great partiality in the extract on Islamism. If there is no free, intelligent, personal God; no God, apart from the manifestations of Extension and Thought, in the universe of matter and mind, what can be more natural than to refer the changes which take place, to some indefinable, unbending Destiny, some fixed inflexible Necessity, and patiently to endure what we cannot remedy, not as irremediable *evils*, but as the wisest and best thing that can be; the only *right* thing; and to settle down on the maxim,

"In spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear; whatever is, is RIGHT."

And yet, an apologist for Mr. Carlyle, might contend that he often uses the word God in the popular sense, and fortify his opinion by many more quotations than we have adduced to prove a contrary opinion. It is true he does; the word God is one of frequent and very familiar use with him; a frequency and familiarity bordering on profanity. In a similar manner he uses the word Devil, in the popular sense, as if he believed in a real, malignant, superhuman being; but after reading the extract quoted above, it were idle to pretend that he believes in any such being. It is evident that he frequently uses the word God, because it is a popular and effective word, and will give force and energy to his style. He sometimes appears to use it as an *argumentum ad hominem*; those to whom he was writing, believing in such a God, an argument with them would receive strength from that source. It is by no means uncommon for him to reason on principles admitted by those with whom he is reasoning, although clearly contrary to his own views. Plainly, his use of the word in some instances does not harmonize with his use of it in others; and we regard the above as the most natural solution of the disagreement. His more loose and popular expressions, must be explained by his more philosophical and unequivocal statements; and many of those cannot be reconciled with the belief of a free, personal God, above and around, as well as in the Universe.

• We have thus noticed as briefly as the nature of the subject

would admit, some of the more noticeable and objectionable features of the work before us, and, with two or three general remarks, we will take our leave of it. With all his faults of style and matter, Mr. Carlyle is an author of high and rare excellencies. In strength of thought he is unsurpassed. He seizes upon his subject with a giant's grasp, and with his own mind filled with it, he comes directly in contact with the mind of his reader. He is remarkable for clearness and vividness of conception. In describing St. Edmund's Convent, and the history of Abbot Samson, from Jocelin's Monk Latin, he brings the scenes of the 12th century, with all its obsolete modes of thinking and acting, in as clear, living light before the reader, as one could spread out the transactions of the present. One seems, in reading it, to look in upon the convent, with the distinctness of an eye-witness; and the Hero Samson, John Lackland, Cœur de Lion, Henry II., and the other personages introduced, stand before us with all the reality of living, veritable men.

It is profitable for a discriminating mind occasionally to read Carlyle. It is scarcely possible for one to spend a short time in communion with him, without feeling the sluggish current of thought quickened and the whole mind invigorated. He is, indeed, rough, uncouth, barbarous in his choice of words; but he makes an ample compensation in his bold imagination and nervous diction. He strides on in his own way, with as much independence as if Murray's Grammar, and Campbell's Canons of Good Use had never been written. Instead of stringing out through several lines, unmeaning sonorous words for rhetorical effect, he comes pouncing down, commonly in plain Saxon, word and blow at once. And though we are sure no man in his senses would deliberately imitate him in his barbarisms, yet we have no disposition to find fault with him for clothing his own thoughts according to his own taste. The grand question with us in regard to a book, is, Have we any *thoughts* here, clothed in a comely or uncomely costume? In the words of our author, "If many kinds of books are permissible, there is one kind not permissible—the kind that has nothing in it."

The style of Past and Present is, in general, more barbarous than the author's former works. Polish and grace in composition cannot be reckoned among its characteristics. Yet, with all its roughness, it contains passages of great beauty. As the extracts which have been given are chiefly of the bar-

barous kind, justice to the author will require us to commend to the notice of our readers, a passage or two of a different character, with which we will close.

"Brave Sea-Captain, Norse Sea-King—Columbus, my hero, royallest Sea-King of all! it is no friendly environment this of thine in the waste deep waters; around thee mutinous discouraged souls, behind thee disgrace and ruin, before thee the unpenetrated veil of Night. Brother, these wild Water-Mountains, bounding from their deep bases, (ten miles deep, I am told,) are not entirely there on thy behalf! Meseems they have other work than floating thee forward: and the huge Winds, that sweep from Ursa Major to the Tropics and Equators, dancing their giant waltz through the Kingdoms of Chaos and Immensity, they care little about filling rightly or filling wrongly the small shoulder-of-mutton sails in this cockle skiff of thine! Thou art not among articulate speaking friends, my brother: thou art among immeasurable dumb monsters, tumbling, howling wide as the world here. Secret, far off, invisible to all hearts but thine, there lies a help in them: see how thou wilt get at that. Patiently thou wilt wait till the mad Southwester spends itself, saving thyself by dexterous science of defence the while; valiantly, with swift decision, wilt thou strike in, when the favoring East, the Possible, springs up. Mutiny of men thou wilt sternly repress; weakness, despondency thou wilt cheerily encourage; thou wilt swallow down complaint, unreason, weariness, weakness of others and thyself, how much wilt thou swallow down! There shall be a depth of Silence in thee, deeper than this Sea, which is but ten miles deep; a Silence unsoundable, known to God only. Thou shalt be a Great Man. Yes, my World-Soldier, thou of the World Marine-Service—thou wilt have to be *greater* than this tumultuous unmeasured world here round thee is! thou, in thy strong soul, as with wrestlers, shalt embrace it, harness it down; and make it bear thee on—to New Americas, or whither God wills."—p. 199.

"Not on Ilion's or Latium's plains; on far other plains and places henceforth can noble deeds be now done. Not on Ilion's plains; how much less in Mayfair's drawing-rooms! Not in victory over poor brother French or Phrygians; but in victory over Frost-jötuns, Marsh-giants, over demons of Discord, Idleness, Injustice, Unreason, and Chaos come again. None of the old Epics is longer possible. The Epic of French and Phrygians was comparatively a small Epic: but that of Flirts and Fribbles, what is that? A thing that vanishes at cock-crowing—that already begins to scent the morning air! Game-preserving Aristocracies, let them 'bush' never so effectually, cannot escape the Subtle Fowler. Game seasons will be excellent, and again will be indifferent, and by and by they will not be at all. The Last Partridge of England, of an England where millions of men can get no corn to eat, will be shot and ended. Aristocracies with beards on their chins will find other to do than to amuse themselves with trundling-hoops.

"But it is to you ye Workers, who do already work, and are as

grown men, noble and honorable in a sort, that the whole world calls for new work and nobleness. Subdue Mutiny, Discord, wide-spread Despair, by manfulness, justice, mercy and wisdom. Chaos is dark, deep as Hell; let light be, and there is instead a green flowery World. Oh, it is great, and there is no other greatness. To make some nook of God's Creation a little fruitfuller, better, more worthy of God; to make some human hearts a little wiser, manfuller, happier—more blessed, less accursed! It is work for a God. Sooty Hell of Mutiny and Savagery and Despair can, by man's energy, be made a kind of Heaven; cleared of its soot, of its Mutiny, of its need to mutiny; the everlasting arch of Heaven's azure o'erspanning it too, and its cunning mechanisms and tall chimney-steeples, as a birth of Heaven; God and all men looking on it well pleased.

"Unstained by wasteful deformities, by wasted tears or heart's-blood of men, or any defacement of the Pit, noble, fruitful Labor, growing ever nobler, will come forth—the grand sole miracle of Man; whereby man has risen from the low places of this Earth, very literally, into divine Heavens. Ploughers, Spinners, Builders; Prophets, Poets, Kings; Brindley's and Goethes, Odins and Arkwrights; all martyrs, and noble men, and gods are of one grand Host: immeasurable; marching ever forward since the Beginnings of the World. The enormous, all-conquering, flame-crowned Host: noble every soldier in it, sacred, and alone noble. Let him who is not of it hide himself; let him tremble for himself. Stars at every button cannot make him noble; sheaves of Bath-garters, nor bushels of Georges; nor any other contrivance but manfully enlisting in it, valiantly taking place and step in it. Oh, Heavens, will he not bethink himself; he too is so needed in the Host! It were so blessed, thrice-blessed, for himself, and for us all! In hope of the Last Partridge, and some Duke of Weimar, among our English Dukes, we will be patient yet awhile.

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| <p>1. "The Future hides in it
Good hap and sorrow;
We press still thorow,
Naught that abides in it
Daunting us—onward.</p> | <p>3. But heard are the Voices,
Voice of the Sages,
The Worlds and the Ages:
'Choose well, your choice is
Brief and yet endless;</p> |
| <p>2. And solemn before us,
Veiled, the dark Portal,
Goal of all mortal:
Stars silent rest o'er us,
Graves under us silent.</p> | <p>4. Here eyes do regard you,
In Eternity's stillness;
Here is all fulness,
Ye brave, to reward you,
Work and despair not." GOETHE
p. 296.</p> |

ARTICLE IV.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN IN HIS SPIRITUAL RELATIONS.

By SAMUEL ADAMS, M. D., Professor of Chemistry and Natural History, Illinois College.

Und was die innere Stimme spricht,
Das tauscht die hoffende Seele nicht.—SCHILLER.

Moral Condition of the Human Race.

WHENEVER any of the inborn wants or desires of a sentient being remain unsatisfied, and when its active powers fail to move in their appropriate sphere of action, that being is involved in disorder ;—its own nature is in conflict with itself, and with the circumstances which surround it. Such a conflict must sooner or later work the ruin of that being, unless destiny itself shall cease to hold on its course, and will check its all-sweeping tide in deference to individual necessity.

It requires no argument to prove, that the human race is in such a state of disorder. We read this on the pages of the Bible, in the vision of the seer, and in the poet's lament. We trace the same mournful fact along the bloody track of history ; and we still recognize its existence in the jarring passions and conflicting interests of individuals, sects and parties among us. This position might be established by an appeal to the records of human thought and feeling, from the first glimmerings of fabulous antiquity down to the present moment.

But consciousness not only decides the human race to be in a state of disorder, but in a state of *moral* disorder,—that is, a disorder involving guilt. The Bible refers to an original defection of man from a state of moral purity and happiness. The fable of a golden age of purity, peace, and universal benevolence, and of the subsequent departure of the human race from the standard of moral purity, forms an important element in most of the pagan mythologies. The discrepancies of these records do not invalidate their testimony as it bears upon the point for which they are referred to. The question is not whether any or all of these records represent real events. The question is not whether the various embodiments, which imagin-

ation has given to the spontaneous convictions of the human mind, are all true to specific facts; but whether the *convictions themselves* are true to nature and true to the moral condition of man. Viewed in this light, a universal consciousness testifies that the human race is in a state of moral disorder; and yet it recognizes man as standing related to an original state of moral purity. This conviction holds its sway over the mind through all the various shades of skepticism and religious belief. The believer and the infidel are agreed on this point. The one may believe that the moral disorder which curses our race has come down in an hereditary line of descent from the progenitors of mankind; while the other may trace its origin to priestcraft, ignorance, and superstition. Both alike admit the fact.

We are not about to enter upon the discussion of the philosophy of the fall of man, or to inquire why God has permitted the existence of moral evil. The reasons for such permission must be involved in those which may be supposed to have induced God to create moral beings at all. For the *possibility* of moral evil is necessarily incident to a moral system. Therefore, to resolve to create moral beings is to resolve to risk that possibility. This antecedent possibility, therefore, is a sufficient ground for the actual moral condition of man. All that we can say is, that what, in the nature of the case, was necessarily possible, has actually happened. But wiser heads than ours have puzzled themselves on this point to little purpose. It is enough to say of many boasted theories on this subject, that their authors have ingeniously contrived to impose upon themselves, by presenting specious statements of facts as solutions of those facts, or by specifying some prominent instances of moral disorder as the causes of that disorder; or less fortunate still, these theorists have frequently dealt in baseless assumptions, which do not even possess the merit of being the only assumptions, which if true would equally well account for acknowledged acts.

But the idea of moral disorder implies that man has failed in the attainment of the objects of his moral and spiritual wants. Hence arises dissatisfaction, unhappiness. But more even than this is implied in the idea of moral disorder. Moral disorder carries along with it the guilt of those beings who are involved in it. But guilt implies the power, on the part of the guilty person, of comprehending, so far as he is concerned, the moral order of the system to which he belongs; and that he recognizes

and feels an obligation to conform to that order. Beings not thus endowed may be involved in disorder, but not in *moral* disorder—not in guilt. The fierce bull that attacks, and kills a man, is not held guilty for the act, but the guilt passes over to the owner, who knew that he was wont to push with the horn and restrained him not.

We are aware, that there exists a certain class of ethical writers, who deny, that there is in the constitution of the mind any stable basis for moral distinctions, and who attribute our various moral decisions wholly to the influence of circumstances. Those who embrace this view might object to an attempt to trace our moral convictions to any fixed laws of the mind, or to infer from these convictions any permanent wants of human nature. We shall not stop to dispute with this class of writers, but shall be content to follow the dictates of reason and common sense, and from a uniform result shall infer the existence of a definite law. It is admitted that the universal decision, that the human race is in a state of moral disorder, has grown out of the facts around us and in our own consciousness. But it is impossible to conceive how such a decision could take place, unless the mind be so constituted as necessarily to come to it in view of these facts. It hence follows that He, who has created the human mind, and ordered the circumstances of our being, is responsible for this decision. As God is true, this conviction must be relied upon as disclosing the real condition of man.

Moral Anticipations of the Human Race.

Thus we are compelled to believe, that the human race is in a state of moral disorder. We decide man to be in this condition, because we see him knowingly and voluntarily violating the great laws of order under which he has been placed by his Creator. This conviction is the necessary response of our own reason amid the circumstances with which we are surrounded. We must trust this conviction or we can trust nothing. Indeed so strong has the reliance of the human mind ever been upon the truth of this conviction, that skepticism itself has scarcely presumed to doubt on the point. But it has been stated above, that moral disorder implies guilt—exposure to penalty. Accordingly the anticipation of penalty is one of the strongest

tendencies of the human mind, under a sense of guilt. "A certain fearful looking for of judgment," is as universal as the sentence of condemnation, which the conscience of all ages has pronounced against the human race. Each individual in his own case dreads the penalty due to his guilt, while he confidently anticipates it in the case of all others. This is that sense of justice which demands that every sin should be visited with punishment, that every wrong shall be righted, and that the deserts of all moral agents shall finally meet their appropriate awards. Unless God has contrived to mock the human mind with delusive fears, unrepented sin is approaching a fearful doom. The ulterior inferences from the mind's anticipation of doom must be deferred till some of our other moral presentiments have been considered.

But is that being who has once sinned doomed beyond the reach of hope? What is the testimony of human nature on this point? That testimony, whatever it shall be, must be taken as the declaration of the Creator of the human soul. If God had designed to leave mankind irrecoverably in this state of ruin, he surely would not tantalize them with delusive hopes, that he might mock their ultimate despair. On the contrary, if he intended to recover them from their moral ruin, he would contrive to keep alive a hope in the human breast. The inspiring influence of hope alone could nerve the soul to that energy of purpose and action which would enable it to rise from the degradation of sin to moral purity and holiness. The necessary effort could never be called forth from the gloomy depths of despair. It is therefore taken for granted, that in any scheme for the restoration of sinful man to purity and holiness, God would aim at securing the concurrence of the voluntary efforts of the sinner. Any scheme which should leave out this element, would aim at a physical, and not a moral renovation; and would do violence to the constitution of a moral being. Thus the anticipations, the hopes, the aspirations and longings of the human race, will indicate the designs of God with regard to them; that is, they will point to the moral destiny of man. What then are the anticipations of sinful man? Does the light of hope come in to scatter the gloom of despair with which sin veils the prospects of man? Or is the sinful mind forever doomed to darkness impenetrable, which a guilty conscience prompts imagination to people with the gloomy spectres of fear? The answer comes

with but one voice, resounding through the dim twilight of antiquity, and responded to on every page of history down to the present time,

“Hope springs eternal in the human breast.”

A cursory survey of the history of mankind will show that the human mind has ever clung to the belief, that there is some way of pardon for the sinner—some way of escape from the ruin of sin. So strong has been this belief that it has borne up the guilty mind through ages and ages of disappointment and uncertainty. It is doubtful whether any nation has ever been found so degraded as not to have some method for washing out the stains of guilt from the human soul. Sacrificial purifications, self-torture, and bloody sacrifices, have prevailed in all ages and nations. These bear witness to man's consciousness of guilt, and his hope of pardon. We see here the perpetual struggle of the human mind, to answer to itself the question, “How shall man be just with God?”—animated with the ever-living belief that a way of pardon was somewhere to be found. It matters not, for the purposes of this argument, that pardon has been sought by methods absurd in themselves and dishonoring to God. It is sufficient that it *has been sought*, and believed to be attainable. Here, then, is a universal conviction of the human race, that there is a method of recovery from the ruin of sin. Who can endure the thought that this is a mere delusion? Who can persuade himself that the Creator has undertaken to tantalize the hoping spirit with deceptive phantoms, that he may at last add the keen pangs of disappointment to the bitterness of despair? No, it is not so. This want of the human soul must find under the government of God a satisfying object. There must be some way by which the curse of sin shall be swept from the earth. “The desire of all nations *will* come,” and will dispel the doubts and uncertainties that hang around the destiny of man.

Man not only seeks to escape from the consequences of the past, but he aspires after complete perfection and blessedness in the future. In the bosom of solitude, while we sympathize with the beauty, order and harmony which surround us amid the lonely walks of nature, we feel that there is yet a principle and a power for good, which man may lay hold of to recover himself from his ruin. The soul that is attuned to the deep harmonies of nature, shrinks from contact with the jar and conflict of

society, and seeks in the shades of solitude the peace for which it sighs. "Oh that I had wings like a dove ! then would I flee away and be at rest. Lo, then would I wander far off, and remain in the wilderness. I would hasten my escape from the windy storm and tempest." This is the fond aspiration, which in past ages of the world has tenanted the caves of the mountain and the solitudes of the wilderness with some of the purest spirits that earth has known. The call that would rouse man to aspire after a better life, has not unfrequently been "the voice of one crying in the wilderness." The tenant of the cave has often been resorted to for instruction with regard to the high destiny of man. This disposition of the human mind to seek peace and happiness in solitude, has thrown a dignity and a charm around pastoral life, and made it the theme of some of the sweetest strains of poetry. Indeed all of the fine arts have originated in the restless strivings of the soul after perfection, in which it seeks to realize in the creations of genius that order, beauty and harmony for which it longs, but which it fails to find in its converse with the world.

But it is not enough for the mind to taste of peace in solitude, or to realize perfection in the creations of genius, if this were possible. The solitary spirit is not content to be blest alone. It seeks for, it believes in a state of perfect blessedness within the reach of the whole human race. Poets have predicted such a state, and philosophers have sought to realize it in the doctrines they have taught, and in the systems they have framed. Imagination has ever been busy in depicting the scenes which such a state will disclose ; and reason has ever struggled to devise means for the attainment of that glorious destiny ; while hope, ever aspiring, has delighted in each new picture, and eagerly embraced each new system in its turn, as each seemed better suited to satisfy the restless cravings of the soul. That such an aspiration is natural to the human mind, is proved by the extant records of human thought and feeling in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, in Heathen fable, and even in the writings of infidels. This aspiration breathes forth in the fervid language of Isaiah's prediction of Messiah's reign, its echo is heard in the "redeunt Saturnia regna" of Virgil, and far down the track of time a response comes from the wilds of Indiana—from the New Harmony of Robert Owen. It would not be difficult to establish this point by copious quotations from the sacred writings, the poetry and philosophy of all

ages. It would be easy thus to show that Jews and Pagans, Christians and Infidels, have agreed in longing and hoping for, and predicting the attainment of a state of perfection by man. The Atheist even exults in the prospect of the ascendancy of the "Divine Laws of Human Nature" over the "tyranny of custom," and predicts a complete regeneration of the human race, when that happy consummation shall take place. On this point we cannot forbear to quote the following passages from the poet and seer of Atheism. The first is from the "Revolt of Islam:"

"Victory! victory to the prostrate nations!"

* * * * *

Thoughts have gone forth whose powers can sleep no more.
 Victory, victory! Earth's remotest shore,
 Regions that groan beneath the Antarctic stars,
 The green lands, cradled in the roar
 Of western waves, and wildernesses
 Peopled and vast, which skirt the oceans
 Where morning dyes her golden tresses,
 Shall soon partake our high emotions.
 Kings shall turn pale! Almighty Fear,
 The Fiend-God, when our charmed name he hear,
 Shall fade like shadow from his thousand fanes,
 While Truth with Joy enthroned, o'er his last empire reigns."

The following extracts are from "Queen Mab:"

"Some, eminent in virtue, shall start up
 Even in perversest time,
 The truth of whose pure lips shall never die,
 Shall bind the scorpion Falsehood with a wreath
 Of ever-living flame,
 Until the monster sting himself to death."

* * * * *

"How sweet a scene will earth become,
 Of purest spirits a pure dwelling-place,
 Symphonious with the planetary spheres,
 When man with changeless nature coalescing
 Will undertake regeneration's work."

Quotations of a similar import might be multiplied almost indefinitely, from the same author.

Thus it will be seen, that Shelley assumes the prophet, as well as Isaiah, and predicts the regeneration of the human race with no less confidence than the Hebrew seer. It is true that the *two prophets* (?) do not agree in their philosophy of the moral disorder that curses our race; but both alike admit its existence.

They differ also in their views of what will constitute the state of perfection, which they unite in predicting, as well as in their notions of the means by which it is to be attained. But both alike give utterance to the undying hopes and aspirations of man—hopes which have often cheered the mind of the darkest pagan, and almost awakened the assurance of faith in the bosom of skepticism itself.

Such facts in the history of man constitute, in an important sense, a revelation. They reveal the strong impulses of human nature, like the instincts of the lower animals, reaching out after their corresponding objects. But the minutest wants of the meanest insect are all supplied by an ever-watchful Providence. And is man made a prey to restless longings, for which there are no satisfying objects? Is he alone of all terrestrial beings endowed with powers which have no appropriate end or aim? Is he doomed to float at random on the changing stream of circumstances, and destined never to reach a peaceful, quiet shore? Unless man has been made by his Creator the sport of vain and delusive hopes, this aspiration of our nature looks forward to a glorious destiny for the human race.

We are aware that some may be disposed to allege, that the wide-spread predictions of the future regeneration of man, are no evidence of the existence of a corresponding instinctive tendency of human nature. It is supposed that these predictions are mostly traditionary, and therefore cannot be considered as the spontaneous growth of the soil of the human heart. The lovers of the Bible are fond of tracing the shadowy predictions, which are scattered through the works of pagan writers, to the glorious utterances of the Hebrew prophets. Admitting all this to be true, it does not invalidate the argument which we would base upon the facts. Suppose that Isaiah were the first of mortals that ever gave utterance to the aspirations of the human soul after perfection. How does it happen that a word spoken in a corner has flown abroad upon the beams of light, on the wings of thought—has penetrated through the barriers of diversity of language—has pervaded all nations—has become a permanent element in the literature of all ages—has been consecrated in undying song, and has become universally enshrined among the cherished hopes of man? If it be admitted that such was the origin of these predictions, we cannot account for their spread and preservation without admitting what we have claimed above. If such were the nature of the facts, it would prove

the existence of an original aspiration already struggling into light. The words of the Hebrew *seer* could only have been echoed by the whole human race, because that in them a universal feeling of human nature found utterance. That universal aspiration must bind our race to a destiny transcendently sublime, or mockery and delusion are stamped upon the very lineaments of the soul itself.

But the mind of man aspires not only after ultimate social perfection, but after individual renovation. Man ever seeks a satisfying good, and believes it attainable. A life of disappointments cannot drive him from his faith in the ultimate attainableness of a satisfying portion for the soul. It is but too obvious, however, that the anticipations of man, whether of hope or fear, do not meet their complete fulfilment in this life. But the close of the career of man on earth does not forbid the realization of those instinctive anticipations, around which have clustered the hopes and the fears of this life. Fear looks forward to the hour of death, as an introduction to the arrears of penalty, which have failed to overtake guilt in the present state of existence. And hope does not expire even at the grave. We follow suffering humanity through the weary pilgrimage of life; we see the grave close over its mortal remains, and our faith in a life to come derives new strength from the failure of human hopes in this. We plant the tree of immortal hope over the wreck of mortality, and it blooms forth afresh, deriving renewed vigor from the decay of the tomb. Thus the disappointments of the present scene of things compel us to look to a future life for a supply of the deficiencies of this. Human hope, failing to meet its satisfying objects in this life, takes wing, and crossing the dark valley of the shadow of death,

“Rests and expatiates in a life to come.”

The necessity of a future life, therefore, is involved in the necessity that guilt shall finally meet its penalty, and that the cravings of human nature shall at last be satisfied. It may not be inappropriate to notice the bearings of this argument a little more in detail.

It has been remarked, that the forebodings of a guilty conscience are rarely, if ever, fully realized in this life. The threatenings of a guilty mind pursue it to the last moment of earthly existence, and still promise a fearful retribution to be realized beyond the grave. “The wicked travaileth with pain all his

days. A dreadful sound is in his ears. He knoweth that the day of darkness is ready at his hand. Trouble and anguish shall make him afraid." The life and death of many a renowned skeptic prove that this is no exaggeration of the truth. That dread word *remorse* indicates the fearful reprisals which conscience is sure to levy upon guilt. The most successful course of crime is not safe from the terrific visitations of this inward monitor. Conscience may sleep through a long course of crime, but she never dies. She shall *gnaw again*. The hour of calamity, the moment of death, arms her with tenfold terrors. If there be not, therefore, a future state of retribution, the last pang of human guilt is a lie—a lie for which the Creator is responsible. We almost tremble at the language we have used, though it be but hypothetically; and we fly to the alternative in which alone the mind can rest, that *God is true*, that man lives beyond the grave, and that the soul that perseveres in sin is hastening to a ruin, which it *must* meet at some point in its course of future existence. Such is the teaching of human nature,—such the teaching of the Author of human nature. All the efforts of a perverse ingenuity have never been able to invalidate this testimony, as it is written upon the very framework of the soul of man. However unbelief may continue to blunt the sensibilities of the conscience, and for a time to spread a delusive calm over the mind, by the influence of things seen and temporal, yet it can never change the essential nature of the soul. It may pervert its powers and bear it on to ruin, but it can never entirely tranquilize its instinctive presentiment of the doom that awaits it.

"You may break, you may injure the vase as you will,
But the scent of the roses will hang round it still."

In no case is the mind under a stronger impulse to fly for relief to the belief in a future state, than in view of the unrequited wrongs of this life. What millions have lived and died, whose lives have been one unbroken series of sufferings under cruelty and wrong! We are unable to reconcile the existence of such beings to our own sense of right, much less to divine goodness and justice, without admitting the reality of a future state, where the downtrodden and oppressed shall be released from bondage and cruelty, and the pride of the oppressor shall be brought low. There is no agony more intense, than that which springs from witnessing the protracted triumph of wrong, with

no prospect of redress for the sufferer. And yet triumphant wrong has crushed, and will continue to crush millions of throbbing hearts, without a hope of redress, unless redress be found in a life beyond the grave. But the belief in a future life comes in to the relief of the mind in its agony of almost despair. Were it not for this assurance, life would be unendurable to the victim of unrequited wrong. But how consoling to the grief-worn slave is the thought that

“’Tis but to die, and then to weep no more”—

that there is a life to come, “where the servant is free from his master,” where “the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest.” A just God cannot disappoint this last hope of suffering humanity.

If we were not obliged to infer the reality of a future state in order to solve the enigma of this life, we should still be compelled to infer it as a direct object of the instinctive anticipations and wants of the human mind. The idea and belief of immortality are found in the records of all ages, wherever the mind of man has risen above the mere instincts of the brute. It is true, that a few skeptics have professed to doubt man’s immortality, while they have united with others in predicting the future perfection of the race. But such doubts can never change human nature. Infidelity may sneer at human credulity, and raise the cry of “superstition,” “prejudices of education,” “tyranny of custom,” its proud mockings can never satisfy or extinguish the hungerings and thirstings of the soul. It avails not to try to prove to man that his hopes of immortality are delusive and vain. This can never satisfy the cravings of his spiritual nature. It is no comfort to the starving man to be told, that the food upon which his life depends is beyond his reach and his power. He will still continue to feel the gnawings of hunger, and to long for that food, which alone can satisfy his cravings. It is no comfort to the soul, unsatisfied with worldly good, to be told that its aspirations after immortality can never reach their satisfying objects. The soul will still aspire, and still wait in anxious expectation for the fulfilment of its hopes.

We are forced, therefore, to believe that man is immortal, or that human life is a delusion and a mockery. The past is strewn with disappointments, the present fails to satisfy, and the soul flies for refuge to the promises of the future. The

indebtedness of the past and the present is transferred to the future, whose ability to make full payment is never distrusted. Besides, there is in the human mind an instinctive aspiration after immortality. A future state of immortal existence is thus involved in the above fact, on the principles of reasoning which we have adopted.

THE MEANS, BY WHICH HUMAN DESTINY IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.

Having attempted to trace the great outlines of human destiny, as written on the very constitution of the mind, we come next to inquire into the means by which that destiny is to be accomplished. Two modes of inquiry here present themselves. We may examine the mind in search of some specific tendency, directed to a definite object, which object may be only one of the instrumentalities for attaining the great ends of our being. Or we may show, by a general analysis of human nature, that a given means is alone consistent with the constitution of the human mind. We propose to avail ourselves of both of these modes of reasoning, as may best suit our purposes for direct argumentation, or for answering any objections that may arise.

Revelation.

If man could accomplish his destiny unaided and alone, without the interposition of Deity, he would undoubtedly be left to himself. But if, on the contrary, the well-being of the human race requires an especial interposition on the part of God, that interposition would doubtless be granted. It is believed that such a necessity can be traced throughout the whole history of our race. The want of an especial revelation, received and believed in, has frequently left the serious mind a prey to the most gloomy forebodings. The lower animals never miss the path of happiness; while man without an especial revelation from God would seem unable in this life to reach the full fruition of his nature, or even to feel assured that he is in the path that will lead to its attainment. While the brute creation seems to revel in uninterrupted enjoyment—ever to drink at a perennial fountain of pleasure—it is but too often the sad history of human pursuit and human enjoyment, to “sow the wind and reap the whirlwind.” The phantoms of pleasure, pursued with such eagerness by man, have either perished within his grasp,

leaving the sting of disappointment behind ;—or worse still, they have remained an abhorred possession, clinging like a loathsome disease to the possessor, adding the bitterness of positive infliction to the pining of unsatisfied longing. Alas! what numbers have been forced in subdued anguish to exclaim :

“ What good is given to man
More solid than the gilded clouds of heaven ?
What joy more lasting than the vernal flower ?”

However such despairing views may seem to be justified by a survey of human life, yet man must rise above them or cease to be a rational being. To yield undisputed sway to the gloomy spectre of despair is justly regarded as one of the most frightful forms of insanity. Man does not sink irrecoverably into the abyss of despair ; but in his extremity he instinctively turns to God for light and deliverance. It would moreover seem that a revelation is needed to mark out the path to that perfection on earth, which is promised to man by the prophetic utterances of all ages and nations, by persons of every shade of religious belief.

We are not only able to prove the necessity of an especial revelation by an appeal to facts in the history of man, but a recurrence to the records of human thought and feeling in all ages will show, that man has ever *felt* that necessity. Mankind feel an instinctive interest in the secrets of futurity, and all nations have had their supposed methods of unveiling the mysterious unknown that lies along the dark track of the future. The extensive prevalence of a belief in omens, auguries, oracles, soothsaying, astrology, etc., proves that the human mind feels its need of an especial illumination over and above the ordinary light of nature. We also see in the light of these facts the prevalence of a strong conviction, that there is somewhere, accessible to man, a power which can and will give a revelation. Some have gone so far as to claim, that the bare existence of the supposed science of astrology is a strong proof, that there may be such an analogy between the movements of the heavenly bodies and the course of Providence, as that the latter may be foreseen, by our being able to predict the former ; and the star, which led the Eastern Magi to the birth-place of the infant Jesus, is referred to as an instance of the kind. Without stopping to combat this notion, it is sufficient to remark, that the fact that many have worshipped the sun, the moon, and the stars, does not prove that these lumina-

ries are really Gods. It only proves that an object of worship is a want of the human soul. Neither does the fact that many have sought a revelation in the mysteries of astrology, prove that a specific revelation is written upon the face of the starry heavens. It only proves that an especial revelation is a want of the present condition of man. It is this feeling of want that has gained credence to the thousand impostures which have been practised in the name of religion. The mind oppressed with a painful sense of want falls an easy prey to the first pretender, who promises to bring relief. Thus we have an instinctive want of the human soul looking to an especial revelation as its satisfying object. And has God made no especial revelation? Is man doomed to be the perpetual sport of delusion—the helpless victim of vile imposture? Or has God given to him a revelation—"a more sure word of prophecy, to which we do well if we take heed, as to a light shining in a dark place?" Unless the bounty of heaven is unjust to man *alone* of all terrestrial beings, God has given, or will give, to man a revelation; one which shall commend itself to reason, satisfy all our spiritual wants, solve our doubts, and ultimately supplant the vile fabrications which imposture has palmed upon superstitious credulity.

It is interesting to notice, that miracles have always been expected by mankind to accompany an especial revelation. All, who have pretended to bring a revelation, have professed to work miracles, and their claims have been admitted by their followers. The mind is, therefore, not naturally averse to believing in the truth of a miracle, when it comes forward as an accompaniment to a revelation, which professes to enlighten man on the great interests of immortality. So far is this from being true, that man has been ever ready to believe every variety of absurdity, which imposture could invent in the form of a pretended miracle.

It will be readily seen, that Hume's famous argument against miracles is directly contradicted by these facts. He argues that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false; and therefore that it is more improbable that a miracle should be true, than that testimony should be false. It has been well remarked, that the assertion "that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true," is a mere begging of the question, inasmuch as it assumes the point to be proved, viz., that universal experience is against the truth of a miracle; that is,

that a miracle has never fallen under the observation of any of the human race. If, however, he means "that it is contrary to *ordinary* experience that a miracle should be true," he but paraphrases the admitted definition of a miracle, viz., that it is a deviation from what has been observed to be the ordinary course of nature. But if he means that it is contrary to the natural, spontaneous convictions of the human mind, under all circumstances, that a miracle should be true, we deny the truth of the assertion, and appeal to facts to prove that mankind have universally expected a revelation sanctioned by miracles. This brings us to the grand fallacy in the argument of Hume. He assumes that our belief in recorded miracles is *wholly* based upon testimony. He, therefore, very naturally concludes, that if he can shake the basis of this belief, the superstructure must necessarily fall. Now it may be true, that our belief in the occurrence of a *particular* miracle rests upon testimony. But our belief in miracles *at all* rests upon an *à priori* probability, that in certain circumstances miracles would be likely to be wrought. Without such probability testimony would never command our assent to the truth of a miracle. That such a probability actually exists is proved by an appeal to the spontaneous convictions of the human race. We do not stop to inquire whether these anticipations are consistent with reason; they are a part of human nature, and as such they must have their correlate in nature. This longing and waiting for some especial manifestation of the power and wisdom that rule in nature are never to be set aside by any process of reasoning, however elaborate and subtle. It is one of the primary axioms of all reasoning, that the instinctive tendencies of sentient nature are adapted to real ends and aspire toward *real objects*. Any argumentative conclusion, therefore, which contradicts this axiom must be false. Such contradiction amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* to the assumption upon which the argument is based.

We remark, in conclusion, that an especial revelation is itself a miracle, though not necessarily the *manifestation* of a miracle. Hence a revelation, in order to gain the ear of the human race, must be attended with sensible manifestations of invisible power. The person who professes to bring a new revelation to man, must be prepared to meet the inquiry, "What sign showest thou?"

The workings of man's instinctive feeling of want, and the

belief that God would miraculously interpose to satisfy the longings of his nature, have been the fruitful source of a multitude of pretended revelations. An interesting question arises, whether all of these systems, which lay claim to our belief as revelations from God, are nothing but mere pretensions. From the foregoing discussions we derive an *à priori* probability that one of these is a true message from heaven. If it be not so, the Deity has failed to provide for the wants of the most important of his creatures here on earth. We might proceed to test the claim of the Bible to be that message, by inquiring into its fitness to meet the wants of human nature. But we are here met by certain modern objections against the necessity of an especial revelation or of miracles to confirm a revelation, if one should be given. It is alleged that reason is competent to reveal all that is necessary for man to know, or to decide upon the truth of a revelation, if one be given, without the aid of miracles. In order to answer these objections it will be necessary to go briefly into a comparative view of instinct and reason, and to notice the manner in which they adjust the relations of those beings of which they are distinguishing attributes.

Instinct may be defined to be an impulse, tendency, or propensity, which, without deliberation, urges on, and guides the animal toward the grand destiny of its being. There is always implied an internal impulse, which urges the animal to seek those objects toward which its nature aspires, and a response of its own nature, by which it recognizes those objects when it meets them. Thus we are able to see how the relations of one of the lower animals are adjusted, and the ends of its being secured. It grows into existence with an organization and instinctive tendencies, which destine it for a peculiar sphere of action and enjoyment. The laws of its own organization are so made to harmonize with the arrangements of external nature, as necessarily to bring it in contact with the objects of its wants: but till it meets with those objects, it can have no conception of what will satisfy the painful sense of need by which it is harassed. An animal, then, can have no knowledge of the objects of its wants till it meets with them in nature, and recognizes them in the enjoyment.

Take, as an illustration of this point, a young animal for the first time seeking the teat of its dam. It moves not under the mere impulse of activity, but is evidently urged on by a

painful sense of want. It seizes without discrimination upon whatever small body may happen to fall in its way. It knows not the object of its search till it is found. The question may arise, How does it recognize the object when found? We reply, that it is so constituted, that when it meets with the objects of its wants, its nature responds to the impression made upon it, and the animal feels satisfaction, enjoyment. Take the duckling and chick, neither of which has ever seen the water. Both are alike ignorant of that element. Place them side by side on the bosom of the clear lake. The one glides easily and gracefully over the gentle undulations of the surface, or darts in sportive gambols beneath the crystal wave; while the other struggles for a few moments in terror and dismay, and then sinks and dies. Here the same physical impression made upon different natures in one case, is followed by the most delightful activity and enjoyment, while in the other pain and death ensue. But why is this difference? Because the organization and instincts of the duckling adapt it to the aquatic mode of life, and its nature responds to the impressions made upon it,—it *feels itself at home*. The nature of the chick, on the contrary, is adjusted to altogether different relations, and hence it spontaneously reluctates against those impressions which are not congenial to it. Hence, in order to secure the good of the one and prevent the destruction of the other, an inward impulse leads the duckling to seek and the chick to avoid the water.

Thus we see that the animal knows nothing of its sphere of action and enjoyment, till it finds itself in that sphere, and acts, and enjoys and meets the objects of its wants. It is not sufficient that beings affected with wants should exist, together with objects to satisfy those wants. In addition to the constitutional want and its corresponding object, there must be the inward impulse leading the animal to seek the object, and a spontaneous recognition of it when found. Thus it will be seen that instinct does not reveal to the animal the objects of its wants. It only urges the animal to seek them, and recognizes them when found. An overruling Providence provides and presents or *reveals* to the lower orders of animals, the objects which are adapted to their natures. Instinct, then, is not a *revealer*, but it seeks and embraces those objects which are presented by the providence of God.

It would seem from the foregoing remarks, that instinct is

twofold in its operation, *impelling* the animal to seek the objects toward which its nature aspires, and securing or *regulating* the enjoyment of the object, when it is attained. For the want of better terms, we may therefore speak of the animal instincts as divided into *impelling* and *regulating* instincts. The former would impel the water-fowl to seek its favorite element; the latter attaches it to the water, and regulates its motions in skimming over its surface or diving beneath it. The one cheers and urges on the animal in the path of its existence; the other patiently labors to overcome the obstacles incident to the way, and to secure the enjoyments which the journey affords. Both principles go together in the lower animals, acting and reacting upon each other. They may, for aught we know, be equally impulsive in their action upon the animal. The distinction refers not so much to the precise mode of their action, as to the results to which they lead.

We come next to take a comparative view of the nature and relations of a rational being. And first, we are at once struck with the wider and loftier range of objects, towards which a rational nature aspires. The nature of the lower animal finds a full satisfaction in sensual gratification. Man has spiritual wants. His nature aspires towards the good, the beautiful, the true, the right, the noble, the divine. The objects designed to gratify mere sensual wants are brought in contact with animal nature by impressions upon the senses. Those objects which are designed to supply man's spiritual wants, can only come in contact with his nature by being *apprehended* by the intellect, or *comprehended* by the reason. Animal nature finds its enjoyment in mere sensible objects. The object of our spiritual wants is frequently an idea believed in as the representation of a reality. Reason, then, differs from instinct in the nature and dignity of the objects which it embraces.

But let us compare instinct and reason with reference to the manner in which they operate in adjusting the relations of those beings, to which they belong. Animal nature is brought in contact with the objects of its wants by the force of *impelling* instincts, by the exertion of physical, sensitive, and sometimes of feeble intellectual powers. A *regulating* instinct recognizes and embraces the object, when it is reached. These principles apply strictly to man as endowed with an animal nature. But reason subjects him to higher wants, and introduces him to nobler objects. Man's rational nature is brought in contact with

the objects of his spiritual wants by the force of *impelling* instincts, by the exertion of physical, sensitive, and intellectual powers. The objects, when reached, are recognized, responded to, and embraced by *reason*. The scope of the active powers and intellectual faculties of man corresponds to the wider range of objects to which he is introduced by reason. Reason then bears the same relations to *its* objects, as the regulating instincts to *theirs*. Reason is sometimes confounded with deliberation, reasoning, or argumentation. These are more properly intellectual processes accompanied by successive responses of the reason, as new truths arise before the mind. This brings us to another point, in which man differs from the lower animals, viz., in the power of protracted, well-directed and regulated attention. Thus reason frequently is brought in contact with its objects by voluntary deliberation. A regulating instinct is brought in contact with its object by the force of blind impulse. But as the intellectual powers are the servants of reason, it is obvious that the range of truth to which reason is introduced must vary with the different grades of intellectual development. Hence the same circumstances which suggest sublime truths to one mind, fail to produce any impression upon another. In the latter case the truth does not come in contact with the reason, for the want of a *medium* of communication.

If the above analysis be correct, reason is no more a *revealer* than instinct. It attaches itself to nobler objects; but they must be presented in order to be embraced. Man knows not what will satisfy the longings of his spiritual nature, till he finds those longings satisfied. God must present the objects to satisfy our spiritual wants, through the medium of perception, consciousness, or living utterance. Reason is adequate to recognize and respond to the truth, when it is thus presented, but not to reveal it from its own unaided resources. Reason is not the *light* but the *eye* of the soul. It does not *reveal*, but it *perceives* truth by a light not its own. It is not the office of reason to ascend up into heaven to bring the Word of truth down from above, or to descend into the depths to bring it forth from some region of darkness below, but to recognize that truth which is nigh unto us, even in our mouths and in our hearts. It is not the business, therefore, of reason to reveal truth, but to interpret a revelation when one has been given.

It would seem to follow from the above remarks that all truth is *revealed* truth. This in a certain sense is true, but it is not

necessarily an *especial* revelation. We may be told, that in proving that reason is not a revealer of truth we have not proved the necessity of an especial revelation. It may be said, that we have only transferred the responsibility of giving a revelation from reason to universal nature. The question, therefore, becomes, not whether reason is competent to reveal all that man needs to be apprised of, but whether *nature has revealed* all that is important for him to know.

In the foregoing discussion we have considered the Bible a part of the light of nature. The question now arises, whether that be a just estimate of its character. The universal belief of the human race that God has given or will give an especial revelation to man, creates a strong probability that such a revelation exists. To determine whether the Bible be that revelation we may first withdraw it from the light of nature, and see whether there still remains a complete solution of the destiny of man, and full satisfaction to all his spiritual wants. If the light of nature be found to fail here, we may then bring in the Bible, and see whether it supplies the deficiency, whether it possesses the essential characteristics of an especial revelation, and conforms to the instinctive anticipations of the human race in the mode in which it solicits our acceptance. The discussion of these points must be deferred for a future communication.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE V.

THE WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS REVIEWED.

By Enoch Pond, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.

The Works of Jonathan Edwards, D. D., late President of Union College; with a Memoir of his Life and Character, by Tryon Edwards. In two volumes. Andover: Allen, Morrill, & Wardwell. 1842.

RIGHT glad were we, when we saw it announced, some few years ago, that the works of the late Dr. Edwards were to be collected and published in a uniform series. This is an object which we had long desired to see accomplished, and for which we had exerted an influence with at least one of the connexions of the family, to induce him to carry it into effect. The volumes before us leave us almost nothing further to wish on the subject.

The ancestry of Dr. Edwards was among the most honorable and venerable that can be traced in this or in any country. By common consent, his father stood at the head of American theologians in his own day; nor is it likely that his equal has been found among us since. His paternal grandfather was also an eminent minister, and for more than sixty years the pastor of a single church. His paternal great-grandfather, the Rev. Solomon Stoddard, was contemporary with the Mathers, and next to Increase Mather, exerted, perhaps, a greater influence than any clergyman in New England. On his mother's side, Dr. Edwards was descended directly from Rev. James Pierrepont, a distinguished minister of New Haven, Conn., one of the principal founders of Yale College; and remotely from the excellent Thomas Hooker, first minister of Hartford, who is still acknowledged as "the father of the Connecticut churches."

Dr. Jonathan Edwards, the second son and ninth child of the first President Edwards, was born at Northampton, Mass., May 26, 1745. He was but a child when his father was dismissed from Northampton, removed to Stockbridge, and became teacher and minister of the Indians residing there. The circumstances

of young Edwards, after the removal of the family to Stockbridge, are thus stated by himself :

“When I was but six years of age, my father removed with his family to Stockbridge, which at that time was inhabited by Indians almost solely ; as there were in the town but twelve families of whites or Anglo-Americans, and perhaps one hundred and fifty families of Indians. The Indians being the nearest neighbors, I constantly associated with them ; their boys were my daily schoolmates and play-fellows. Out of my father’s house, I seldom heard any language spoken, beside the Indian. By these means I acquired the knowledge of that language, and a great facility in speaking it. It became more familiar to me than my mother tongue. I knew the names of some things in Indian, which I did not know in English ; even all my thoughts ran in Indian ; and though the true pronunciation of the language is extremely difficult to all but themselves, they acknowledged that I had acquired it perfectly ; which, as they said, never had been acquired before by any Anglo-American. On account of this acquisition, as well as on account of my skill in their language in general, I received from them many compliments applauding my superior wisdom. This skill in their language I have in a good measure retained to this day.”

The rapid progress which young Edwards made in acquiring the language of the Stockbridge Indians, (the Muhhekaneew, commonly called Mohegan,) encouraged his father to provide him the means of extending his knowledge of the different Indian dialects. Accordingly, when he was nine years old, he was sent with Rev. Gideon Hawley, a missionary, to reside among the Oneida Indians. . Owing to the war then in progress between the English and French colonies, which involved also the Indian tribes, his residence with the Oneidas was not long. Still, while he was with them, he made much progress in overcoming the difficulties of their language, and was a great favorite among the people.

The knowledge which Dr. Edwards thus early acquired of the Indian languages, was of considerable service to him in after life, and through him to the world. In a paper, first communicated to the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, and which has been several times published, he states many facts, and furnishes much important information, respecting the language of the Aborigines of this country. The Muhhekaneew (alias Mohegan) language, he informs us, is more extensively spoken than any other in North America. It is the language not only of the Mohegans, properly so called, but, with some variation of dialect, of the Delawares, the Penobscots, the St. Francis Indians in Canada, the Shawanese on the Ohio, the Chippewas, to

the westward of lake Huron ; also "of the Ottowas, Nanticooks, Munsees, Menomonees, Messisaugas, Saukies, Ottagaumies, Kilitinoes, Nipegons, Algonkins, Winnebagoes, etc." Mr. Elliot's Bible was printed in a dialect of this language, and could be read without difficulty by Dr. Edwards.

It is a singular fact, that the language of the Mohawks, which was also that of the Six Nations, was entirely different from the Mohegan. "There is no more appearance of a derivation of one of these languages from the other," says Dr. Edwards, "than there is of a derivation of either of them from the English. I have never noticed one word, in either of them, which has any analogy to the corresponding word in the other."

In the year 1758, young Edwards met with an overwhelming affliction, in the death of both his parents, he being at that time but thirteen years old. He was not left, however, without friends, by the aid of whom he was enabled to prepare for College, and to pass respectably through it. He was graduated at Nassau Hall, in September, 1765.

It was in the summer of 1763, while a member of College, that Mr. Edwards became impressed with a sense of his lost condition as a sinner, and his need of salvation through a crucified Redeemer ; and finally obtained a hope of his reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ. This was during the presidency and under the impressive preaching of Dr. Finley. In September of this year, he made a public profession of his faith in Christ ; preceded by a solemn and formal consecration of himself, with all his powers, possessions, and influence, to the service of the Redeemer. He pursued the study of theology with Rev. Dr. Bellamy, the particular friend and correspondent of his father, and commenced preaching in the autumn of 1766. The following year he was appointed tutor in Princeton College, and had the offer of the Professorship of languages and logic, which he thought proper to decline.

On the fifth of January, 1769, Mr. Edwards was ordained pastor of one of the Congregational churches in New Haven, Conn. In connexion with this event, an incident occurred, illustrative of the talents and attainments of Mr. Edwards, which is thus described by the author of the memoir :

"The day of the ordination had arrived ; the hour was fixed for its public services ; and the ordaining Council was assembled for the examination of the candidate, which was ordinarily but a brief and a somewhat formal work. But as the examination of Mr. Edwards

went on, they were so much interested and profited by it, that they felt it alike their duty and privilege to continue the questions long after the time appointed for divine service at the church, so that, in consequence, they deferred the ordination services several hours, merely for the privilege of continuing the examination, and of hearing his answers, which were so ready, pertinent and instructive. The incident shows the respect and deference which they paid to the man, and also the practical influence of the clergy of that day over the people, in thus deferring divine service from ten o'clock in the morning, until late in the afternoon or evening."

The period of Dr. Edwards's pastoral life in New Haven, lasting something more than twenty-five years, was peculiarly unfavorable to success or comfort in the ministry. In the first place, the extravagances into which the great revival of 1740 had degenerated, under Davenport and others, were followed by a lamentable reaction, and decline of vital piety. Then this was the period of the Revolution, when naught was heard or talked of but wars and rumors of wars, and when the concerns of religion were comparatively neglected. A portion of his church, too, were in favor of admitting children to baptism, on the ground of the half-way covenant; and because he could not consent to this, they separated from him, and constituted another church. During the latter part of his ministry, several members of his congregation—men of influence and property—began to call themselves *liberal* Christians, and to advocate the principles of Dr. Priestley. It was this latter circumstance which led to the dismissal of Dr. Edwards; though the ostensible reason assigned, on both sides, was the want of support. He was dismissed, May 19, 1795; all parties—the church, the society, the council—uniting in the most ample testimonials to his abilities and faithfulness.

In January of the following year, he was installed over the Congregational church and society in Colebrook, Conn. Here he continued to preach to an affectionate and united people, until May, 1799, when he was elected to the presidency of Union College. His acceptance of this important office, and his arrival in Schenectady to enter upon the duties of it, were celebrated, both by the students and citizens, with unusual demonstrations of joy. He was fully sensible of the magnitude and responsibility of the work in which he was about to engage, and he went to it with earnest desires and prayers that he might be divinely assisted and strengthened to be faithful.

The period of his presidency, however, was short. In July,

1801, after much fatigue from preaching and other labors, he was seized with an intermittent fever, which, in less than a month, brought him to the grave. The circumstances of his disease, during the latter half of it, prevented his making a full expression of his feelings; but his death was altogether submissive and peaceful. "It becomes us," he said, "cheerfully to submit to the will of God. He is wise and gracious. He orders every thing for the best. The blood of Christ is my only ground of hope."

His funeral was one of deep and unfeigned sorrow. He was greatly lamented, not only by the surviving officers and students of the College, but by an extended circle of acquaintances and friends, and indeed by the religious community generally. All felt, to borrow the language of the preacher at his funeral, that "a golden pillar in the temple of God had fallen; that a radiant lamp in the seat of science was extinguished; that a star of the first magnitude had set."

Dr. Edwards was twice married, and had four children, two of whom, it is hoped, are still living. The first Mrs. Edwards was accidentally drowned, in June, 1782, greatly to the grief of her husband and of her numerous friends. The second Mrs. Edwards survived her husband several years.

In person Dr. Edwards is represented as slender, erect, and somewhat above the ordinary stature. His complexion was rather dark; his features bold and prominent; his hair black; his eye keen, piercing, and intelligent to a remarkable degree; his expression thoughtful and serious; and his countenance and entire appearance such as to command the highest respect of every one in his presence. One individual, who remembers him, says of his eye, that "it seemed as if it would look him through and through;" and another, that "after he first saw it, its calm and intensely penetrating look haunted him for weeks."

Dr. Edwards was constitutionally a man of strong passions, but he had learned to subdue them. Though keenly sensitive to injury, he never allowed himself in resentment, and was ever ready to forgive. He was very exact in all his business transactions; punctual in the performance of his promises; in prosperity but little elated; in adversity not much cast down; deliberate in devising plans of conduct; prompt to enter upon their execution; and resolute and unwearied in surmounting all obstacles to their completion.

The principal works of Dr. Edwards are his Reply to Dr.

Chauncy on Universal Restoration; and his Reply to Dr. Samuel West on Liberty and Necessity. Besides these, the volumes before us contain twenty-nine Sermons, a variety of articles first published in the New-York Theological Magazine, and other miscellaneous publications.

Of the sermons before us, some were written in the earlier part of Dr. Edwards's ministerial life; others are the fruits of matured reason, and a longer experience. Some were delivered on important public occasions; others seem to have been designed especially for his own pulpit. Some were published soon after delivery, and under the immediate eye of the author; others are now first brought to light, having been transcribed and edited from posthumous manuscripts. The most of these sermons are specifically *doctrinal*; though some are of a moral and practical character;—for example, that on “the Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave Trade, and of Slavery,” that on “the Marriage of a Wife’s Sister,” that on “Submission to Rulers,” his farewell sermons, and those entitled “False Refuges Unsafe,” and “the Broad Way.” The last two here mentioned are admirable specimens of close and faithful dealing with the conscience, and will well compare with some of the awakening revival sermons of the first President Edwards.

The intelligent, faithful minister will studiously endeavor to adapt his discourses to the circumstances of the age in which he lives. He will meet and refute—not old, exploded heresies and objections, but the living errors of the times—those which are advocated and propagated around him. Of such wisdom and faithfulness Dr. Edwards was an eminent example. The age in which he lived was one of *infidelity*—open, unblushing infidelity. This was the natural result of the sympathy extensively felt among us for the pseudo-republicans, the revolutionists of France. Accordingly we find Dr. Edwards strenuously exerting himself to meet this aspect of the times. He has one sermon on “Depravity the source of Infidelity;” and another admirable election sermon entitled, “the Belief of Christianity essential to Political Prosperity.” Among his miscellanies, are two articles on the same general subject: “Deistic Objections, with Answers;” and “Short Comments on new Texts.” The new texts here commented on, are short passages from Thomas Paine, which are dissected, retorted, used up, in the fewest words possible, in a manner peculiar to Dr. Edwards.

It was said by the Deistical writers of that day, that Chris-

tianity had rather corrupted than improved the morality of nations; that the morals of ancient heathen nations were even better than those of modern Christians. In his election sermon before referred to, Dr. E. takes up this objection, and proves conclusively that, however degenerate the Christian world may be, still, in point of temperance, chastity, truth, justice, humanity, indeed every thing which enters into the idea of public virtue, it is greatly in advance of the most enlightened heathen nations of antiquity.

It was while Dr. Edwards was on the stage, that Priestley came to this country, and commenced propagating his various errors. Though his professed followers were never numerous, still there were many, especially in our cities, who were ready to lend him a listening ear. This was the case, as we have said, with some of Dr. Edwards's congregation. Accordingly we find him, like a faithful watchman on the wall, sounding the alarm, prepared to combat the incipient error in all the forms which it had then assumed. In one sermon, he refutes the materialism of Priestley, and his unscriptural doctrine of an unconscious sleep between death and the resurrection.*

He has several elaborate discourses on the *atonement*—its nature, consistency, and necessity; a doctrine which, of course, Priestley and his followers denied. He shows in several places, and by various forms of argument, that "mere repentance furnishes no ground of pardon," and that a principle of this nature, adopted and acted on in any government, would work its ruin.

We regard Dr. Edwards's sermons on the atonement as among the most valuable of his publications. They did much towards changing the previously common mode of thinking and teaching on the subject, and led to the adoption of those consistent and scriptural views, which have since generally prevailed among the evangelical clergy of New England. By considering justice under the three divisions of commutative, distributive, and public or general justice, and showing that it is *the latter* which is satisfied by the atonement, he proves, what in no other way can be proved, that a full atonement, and a free, and full, and gracious pardon, are entirely consistent ideas.

* By mistake, parts of this sermon are published twice. Compare Vol. II. pp. 303 and 309, with pp. 497 and 529.

Among the errors of Priestley, was that of universal restoration. Nor was it peculiar to him and his followers. It came up, in a more threatening aspect, from another quarter. The Rev. Dr. Chauncy, who had been for more than half a century pastor of the first church in Boston—a man of great mental vigor and power, of much and varied learning, and of almost unbounded influence in certain quarters, who commenced his ministerial life a Calvinist, but was afterwards known as an Arminian, closed his downward career by publishing a volume in proof of universal restoration. It was, indeed, published anonymously, and in the first instance, we believe, in London; but it soon came to this country, and was acknowledged as the work of Dr. Chauncy. About the same time, other works of the same general import made their appearance in New England. Indeed, the doctrine of universal salvation began to be *preached* here, and preached at New Haven, under the very droppings of Dr. Edwards's sanctuary. In such circumstances, it was not in the nature of things for the learned Doctor to sit an idle spectator. He preached against universal salvation. He refuted Mr. Murray, who had promulgated the doctrine in New Haven, on the spot. He published remarks upon the principal works which inculcated the fascinating error. To the volume of Chauncy, he prepared and published an extended and elaborate reply—sufficient of itself, if he had written nothing else, to establish his reputation as one of the acutest reasoners and soundest divines that the world ever saw. We shall have occasion to advert to this work again. His strictures upon Murray are some of them so amusing and convincing, that we cannot forbear quoting a single passage. In reasoning from the Divine goodness, Mr. Murray had made his appeal to parental affection, in the following terms; “Can you, an affectionate parent, take your own child, and cast it into a glowing oven? No. But hath not God as much goodness and tenderness as you? How then can you suppose that he will cast any of his children into the lake of fire and brimstone, and confine them there for ever?” In reply, Dr. Edwards gives this turn to the argument, in order to show that, if it proves any thing, it proves vastly too much.

“Can you, an affectionate parent, throw down your child from eminences, so as to break his bones, mangle his flesh, and dislocate his neck? Or can you plunge him into a raging sea, and leave him to the mercy of the waves? Can you cast him to be devoured

by lions or tigers? Can you voluntarily bring on him the tortures of convulsions, of the colic or of the stone? Can you set your house on fire, and in it consume your wife, your children and whole family together? I know you cannot think of doing any of these. But hath not God as much goodness and tenderness as you? How then can you suppose that he will ever treat any of his children in this manner? Yet in fact he doth all those things to his children. The instances are very common. This shows the absurdity of all such arguments as that stated above; which however are the most popular, and, with many, the most convincing arguments employed to prove universal salvation. It is mere trifling to argue against future punishment, on principles which cannot be reconciled with God's common providence; and to assert boldly that God cannot do what we all see and know that he in fact doth."

Other errors of the times of Dr. Edwards, and these prevailing among ministers and churches of his own denomination, were of decidedly an Arminian character. The great doctrines of grace, such as the entire depravity of the natural man, the necessity of regeneration by the special influence of the Holy Spirit, Divine sovereignty, and personal election, were openly rejected and impugned. The Arminianism prevailing at that day in many of the Congregational churches, was not that of Wesley and his followers. It was cold, formal, lifeless, heartless, doubting as to the reality of experimental religion, and sneering at those who made pretensions to it, or were earnestly endeavoring to promote it. It was precisely through this channel that Unitarianism crept into the Congregational churches of New England; and the leaven was already at work, visibly, fatally, in the days of Dr. Edwards. Accordingly, much of his preaching and writing had respect directly to the class of errors here referred to. The title of one of the sermons in these volumes is, "God the author of all good Volitions and Actions;" and of another, "The Acceptance and Safety of the Elect." In his miscellaneous articles, he wrote on "the Doctrine of Election," on "Moral Agency," and on "Free Agency and Absolute Decrees reconciled." His Reply to Dr. West, which, next to his Reply to Chauncy, was the most important work of his life, had an immediate bearing on the same general subject. His great object in this discussion, like that of his father in his treatise on the Will, was to show, that the Calvinistic doctrines of Divine decrees and election were entirely consistent with the free agency of man.

In the early days of New England, ministers of the gospel were accustomed to take an important part in political proceed-

ings and discussions. Their advice was often sought by legislators and governors; and public measures were remarked upon with much freedom, even in the pulpit. This custom extended down to the times of Dr. Edwards; and we have a singular illustration of it in his sermon entitled "Submission to Rulers." It was "preached at the annual Freemen's Meeting for Voting," in the year 1775, at the very commencement of the American Revolution. The text was Romans 13: 1, 2—"Let every soul be subject to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." After an extended and elaborate exposition of the text, the preacher came to the following conclusion:

"Upon the whole, I think we may justly infer that the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance are not the doctrines of the Bible, and that non-resistance to the supreme powers is no more taught in the Scriptures, than non-resistance to our fellow men, and even to thieves, robbers, and those who use the most abusive violence. I hope, therefore, that our text, and some other passages of Scripture, all of which are to be taken in the same sense, will no more be quoted to prove and sustain the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance, especially in times like these. The truth is, and the whole spirit of Scripture sustains it, that rulers are bound to rule in the fear of God and for the good of the people; and if they do not, then in resisting them we are doing God service."

In applying the subject, Dr. Edwards urged upon the attention of his hearers, the freemen of New Haven, assembled in town meeting for the choice of representatives, the following considerations:

1. "As you ought always on this anniversary to make choice of those only to rule over you, who are real friends to your country and its constitution, so you ought to be especially careful in this day when the rights, the liberty, and the peace of our country are so immediately threatened. One man who is not a friend to the rights and liberty of his country, now chosen to any office in the civil government, may do more harm than ten good men in the same office can do good."

2. "You ought by no means to vote for a man who declares 'that he considers the citizens of Boston not as suffering in the common cause of American liberty, but as suffering the fruits of their own folly and rashness.' Such speeches have been made, and by some who would like to be chosen to office. But you ought to mark such men, and show your disapprobation of their sentiments and your love for your country, by refusing to give them your votes."

3. "Nor ought you to vote for those who speak contemptuously of the late law of our Assembly so necessary to put us in a posture of

self-defence; who either say, that it was foolish to make any such law, and that it is the most easy thing in the world for Great Britain to subdue this country; or who say, that they never were for these armings and trainings of the soldiers; that all the burden comes upon the farmers; that they must pay the expenses of the soldiers' training, and also must train themselves; and that they must go to Boston, and expose their lives in battle, for that gentlemen, and particularly the gentlemen of the Assembly, never expected to go there or any where else to fight."

4. "Once more, let me caution you against giving your votes for a man who being a farmer himself, and a known candidate for office, goes round among the farmers and tells them that it is by all means best for them to send a farmer to the Assembly, and not one that lives in the town or city. Such barefaced impudence is intolerable! I am astonished at it! And he must be shortsighted indeed, who cannot see through it. As well might such a one say, 'gentlemen, I would have you vote for me. I am the fittest one in the town to be sent as your representative. Let me have your votes.'"

5. "Finally; I would observe that we of this town, by some means or other, are become the objects of suspicion to many of our neighbors of the other towns about us. They suspect that we are not sincere and hearty friends to the cause of American liberty. This day we have a fair opportunity to remove this suspicion, by unanimously choosing men to represent us in the next legislature, who are known, and who on all occasions have appeared themselves to be, not only men of integrity and ability, but also hearty friends of the rights and liberties of their country, and steady opposers of every encroachment on these rights."

These extracts are presented, for the double purpose of illustrating the spirit and customs of the age, and of showing how much we are indebted to the ministers of that age—pious, orthodox ministers, for our national existence and independence. Had they taken different ground—had they stood up before their people as the apologists of oppression, or as the cringing advocates of passive obedience and non-resistance, we might have worn the yoke of colonial servitude to this very hour.

It appears from Dr. Edwards's sermon on "the Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave Trade and of Slavery," preached before "the Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom, and for the Relief of Persons unlawfully held in Bondage," in the year 1791, that anti-slavery in this country is no new thing. We have not time to go into an extended analysis of this able sermon; but thus much we may safely say, there is scarcely a sound anti-slavery position or argument, brought forward by abolitionists at this day, which was not taken and urged, close and home, by Dr. Edwards, more than fifty years ago.

It has been remarked already, that the principal, the great works of Dr. Edwards, were his reply to Chauncy, and his reply to West. Of these it may be proper to speak more particularly.

Universalism, properly so called, is of comparatively recent origin in this country. It was scarcely avowed, and it had no respectable advocates, till subsequent to the American Revolution. It has assumed different forms at different times; and has been argued upon varying, conflicting, opposite principles, involving entirely different systems of theology. And yet there has been little disagreement or dispute among its advocates; thus showing that with them the *conclusion* is the main thing—the means of arriving at it a matter of comparative indifference.

One of the first forms of Universalism advocated among us, was that of Rely, Murray, Dr. Huntington, and others, who based their conclusion entirely on the atonement of Christ. They believed that men were sinners—great sinners; and that Christ, a Divine Saviour, had loved them, and died for them. By taking upon himself our nature, they believed that Christ became *one* with the human race; that for them he obeyed the law, and suffered its penalty; that in his life he wrought out for them a perfect righteousness, and in his death discharged their whole debt to justice; so that now the law has no further demands, and never will have, against any son or daughter of Adam.

A second form of Universalism was based upon very different grounds. This supposes that the law has been transgressed, and that punishment is merited; but it will be inflicted upon the sin, and not the sinner. The sins of men will be punished with everlasting destruction, but themselves will go free. In proof of this strange theory, a passage in Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians used to be quoted: "If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss; but *he himself shall be saved*, yet so as by fire."

Next came the Universalism of the Necessarians or Fatalists. These were the strenuous advocates of Divine decrees; but they held them in such a way as to destroy free-agency, and nullify the distinction between right and wrong. 'There is no such thing as sin in the universe. One man does the will of God as much as another. Every man accomplishes perfectly the Divine purpose respecting himself, answers the end for

which he was made, and is a fair candidate for everlasting happiness.

The Universalism chiefly prevalent at the present day is very different from either of the above. This supposes that men sin more or less, and that they suffer the full penalty of the law in the present life. Every sin brings its own punishment directly along with it. The soul of man naturally is not immortal. His existence terminates at death. This lost existence is to be renewed, indeed, in the resurrection; and to reveal this fact is the principal object of the Gospel; but that is to be literally a *new* existence, having no connexion with the present, and not affected at all by the character sustained here. This form of Universalism is supposed to have originated with Mr. Hosea Ballou, Sen., and is that which is held and taught by most of the present promulgators of the doctrine.

Beyond and behind all the above theories, is that of a *universal restoration*. This asserts the existence of sin, and the desert of punishment, and of greater punishment than is inflicted in the present life. It extends into the other world, and will be felt, in the case of some at least, for *long ages there*—a period long enough to be set forth by the scriptural term for ever and ever. This punishment, however, is all disciplinary; intended only for the good of the sufferer; intended and adapted to bring him to repentance. He deserves no other kind of punishment than this, and in no greater measure than is necessary to secure his repentance. When this object is effected (as in the progress of things it infallibly will be,) the sufferer is at once released, restored to favor, and raised to heaven.

Such was the kind of Universalism advocated by Dr. Chauncy, and other Restorationists, and of which Dr. Edwards undertook a formal refutation. And to say that he accomplished what he undertook—most thoroughly, effectually accomplished it—is only to repeat what has been on the lips and in the heart of every candid evangelical inquirer, who has read his book, from the day of its publication to the present. He begins, by drawing out “the fundamental principles of Dr. Chauncy’s system,” comparing them together, and showing their utter inconsistency one with another. He proves in various ways the absurdity of considering all Divine punishment as disciplinary, and that none other is merited by the transgressor. He shows the consistency of endless punishment, with, not only the justice but the goodness of the Supreme Being. He goes into a full

consideration of the testimony of Scripture on the subject, refuting the arguments of Dr. Chauncy, and bringing forward an array of proof-texts in support of eternal punishment, which can never be set aside, but by rejecting the Bible. In conclusion, he says, "I have no apprehension that the doctrine of endless punishment will suffer at all by a thorough discussion. In the course of the discussion, many may be perverted to fatal error; yet the final result will be the more clear elucidation of the truth. However many may run to and fro, yet knowledge shall be increased."

We never look over this work of Edwards without strong emotions of gratitude to God, that he was spared, disposed, and assisted to write it. It is the most perfect refutation of the system of restoration, that has ever been given to the world. It is "the great storehouse of arguments to all who have since written on the subject." It was never more needed than it is at the *present time*, when the refuted error, if not openly professed, is secretly cherished by great multitudes. Most of the Unitarian ministers, throughout the world, are supposed to be believers in universal restoration.

The second great work of Dr. Edwards was his Reply to Dr. West, on Liberty and Necessity. The first President Edwards published his treatise on the Freedom of the Will, about the year 1753. After a considerable time, strictures upon this great work were prepared and published by Dr. Samuel West, of New Bedford, Mass.* It was to these strictures that Dr. Edwards replied, in the Dissertation now before us, which was published near the close of the last century, during the author's residence at Colebrook. The subject of moral agency was not, at this time, new to him. He has one chapter upon it in his reply to Chauncy. He had preached upon it before the General Association of Connecticut, before his dismission from New Haven. He had read and pondered the treatise of his venerated father, from his earliest years. He begins, as was usual with him, by defining terms; and by pointing out the important distinction between natural and moral necessity, and natural and moral ability and inability. In his chapter on "Liberty," he has some remarks on the importance of settling the signification of terms, especially in metaphysical discussions, which we wish to present for the consideration of our readers.

* A very different man from Dr. Stephen West, of Stockbridge, the immediate successor of the first President Edwards.

"I have long since thought, that this controversy concerning *liberty* and necessity, so long agitated, might be easily settled to mutual general satisfaction, if the disputants would but fully explain their own ideas of the subjects of the dispute. But till this is done, what prospect or possibility is there of settling it? Our opponents accuse us of denying the liberty of moral agents. Now the truth or falsehood of this charge depends on the ideas they affix to the word *liberty*. If by *liberty* be meant what Law in his notes on King* defines it to be, 'A certain physical indifference or indeterminateness in its own exercise;' then we do deny liberty. We deny that a man is or can be indifferent in the exercise of his liberty or his will. Or, if by liberty be meant an exemption from all previous certainty, so that it is a matter of uncertainty and mere chance, what our volitions are to be; in this sense also we deny liberty. Further, if by liberty be meant an exemption from all extrinsic causality or influence, so that our volitions are efficiently caused by ourselves; this also we deny. But, if by liberty be meant a power of willing and choosing, an exemption from coercion and natural necessity, and power, opportunity and advantage to execute our own choice; in this sense we hold liberty."

His next chapter, which is that on "Self-Determination," is, perhaps, the ablest in the work. He pursues, in general, the same course of reasoning which his father had done before him, showing that the alleged power of self-determination is not only unnecessary, but is an utter impossibility, involving the absurdity of a volition before the first. The position has been controverted in our own times, and to make its overthrow the more sure and easy, a *bad name* has been affixed to it. It has been called "the *Dictum Necessitatis*." As an offset to this, we would with deference propose another name—the *Cruz Oppugnatorum*; for, most assuredly, a *Cruz Oppugnatorum* it has proved itself to be, to all who have undertaken to refute it, or explain it away.

When a voluntary exercise arises in our minds, there is a *change* in our minds; and this change, like every other in the universe, must have a cause. And if we may not look without the will for it—if the cause is to be sought in the will itself, what cause can be assigned, except that we chose because we *would* choose. We put forth an exercise of will, because we *chose* to put it forth. Here, then, is an exercise of will caused by a previous exercise of will. And this previous exercise of will, for the same reason, must be caused by one previous to that; and so on, ad infinitum.

Or, if we look at the subject in another view, the same absurdity will follow. If we originate our own voluntary exer-

cises, we must do it either voluntarily or involuntarily. If we do it involuntarily, there is nothing gained, certainly, on the score of freedom. There can be no freedom or voluntariness in an involuntary act of origination, more than there is in the beating of the heart, or in the process of digestion. But if we originate our own voluntary exercises voluntarily, this is the same as saying that we originate one voluntary exercise by another; which runs us into the same absurdity as before.

But we assume in this reasoning, it is said, that before we can admit the operation of a cause, we must be able to understand the *manner* of its operation—which no man living *can* understand. “No man is competent to answer the question, *How does a cause act?*” Nor do the defenders of Edwards assume to know *how* a cause acts; but only that it *does act somehow*. It moves, it energizes, it does something; else it is not a cause. And what can a will do, in originating its own volitions, but *to will*? And if it originate its volitions, by first willing them, then is there a volition before the first.

The old advocates of the self-determining power used to admit freely, that the mind chooses, because it *will* choose; it puts forth voluntary exercises, because it *will* put them forth. But our modern defenders of this kind of liberty have become more wary. They are afraid—as well they may be—of Jonathan Edwards’s net; and prefer to leave the whole matter of self-determination as a *mystery*—an inexplicable mystery. But according to their statement of the subject, it is something more than a mystery. It is an *absurdity*—an *impossibility*. Here is a cause acting, and yet not acting; bringing forth results, producing effects, and yet doing nothing to produce them; which is impossible.

In the subsequent chapters of this masterly Dissertation, Dr. Edwards discusses the subject of motives, and their influence, together with other important collateral questions; and concludes with a prolonged and elaborate reply to objections. In nothing are the controversial writings of the Edwardses more remarkable, than for the manner in which they meet and remove objections. To use the language of another, “What must have been extremely mortifying, not to say *provoking*, to an opponent, in the writings of the Edwardses, is, that they would anticipate more objections than he ever dreamed of himself, and then answer them in such a way, as to discourage every attempt at reply. We have often, from our very hearts, pitied the prostrate theologian; and have been ready to sue for quarter in his

behalf, when we found that he was too far gone to speak for himself."

On one point respecting the will, the younger Edwards is more full and explicit than his father; we mean that of *Divine efficiency*. The elder Edwards had no particular occasion to go into this question; and he seems not to have wished to embarrass his argument with a subject which did not necessarily belong to it. It was enough for him to refute the Arminian notions of indifference and contingency; to demolish the proud fabric of the self-determining power; to show that the will is under the influence of motives, and is always (in the sense explained) as the strongest motive, so that, being thus subject to an established law, it may be guided and controlled with infallible certainty, and yet without infringing at all on its freedom or voluntariness;—it was enough for the first President Edwards to accomplish these important objects—so at least he seems to have thought it—without entering directly on the question of Divine efficiency. And yet it can hardly be doubted that he believed, and (if called to it) would have defended, this latter doctrine. He certainly held that our volitions, like every thing else that comes into existence, must have an adequate *efficient* cause. And where could he have placed this efficiency but in God? To have placed it in man, or in the will of man, would have been to set up again that self-originating, self-determining power, which he had demolished. To have placed it in motives, would have been absurd; since motives, in the sense of Edwards, are but the occasional, instrumental causes of volition—the reasons why they are put forth, and not the efficiency that produces them. Where, then, we ask again, could the first President Edwards have rested this efficiency, but in the great First Cause of all?

But what is matter of inference in regard to him, is absolute certainty with respect to his son. Dr. Edwards says expressly, "The Deity is the primary efficient cause of all things. *He produces volitions in the human mind*, through the influence of motives." Again: "He who established the laws of nature, so called, is the primary cause of all things. *He is the efficient cause of volition*, by a general law, establishing a connexion between motives and volitions."

In the structure of their minds, and their modes of thinking and reasoning, the two Edwardses, father and son, were in many respects alike. And yet there were characteristic differences

pretty strongly marked. The elder Edwards had more invention than the younger, more imagination and originality, more ardor of emotion and of feeling. He was more capable than his son of profound investigation, of plunging into deep and untried subjects, of traversing unexplored regions of thought and of truth. He was also a more moving, effective preacher. But in polemic theology, properly so called—the power of exhibiting and defending acknowledged truth—the ability to overwhelm and annihilate an opponent—we regard the younger Edwards as more than equal to his father. The difference between them, in point of intellect, was well stated by Dr. Emmons: “The senior President had more *reason* than his son; but the son was a better *reasoner* than his father.”

The mental resemblance between the two Edwardses was more than equalled in the similarity of their acts and lives.

“The name, education, and early employments of both were alike. Both were pious in their youth; were distinguished scholars; and were tutors for equal periods in the colleges where they were respectively educated. Both were settled in the ministry as successors to their maternal grandfathers; were dismissed on account of their religious opinions, and were again settled in retired country towns, over congregations singularly attached to them, where they had leisure to pursue their favorite studies, and to prepare and publish their valuable works. Both were removed from these stations to become presidents of colleges; and both died shortly after their respective inaugurations, the one in the fifty-sixth and the other in the fifty-seventh year of his age, each having preached on the first Sabbath of the year of his death, on the text, ‘This year thou shalt die.’”

It would be interesting to trace the character of Dr. Edwards as a child, a brother, a husband, a father; as a Christian, and a Christian pastor. But time would fail to dwell on these several interesting points; and the labor would be superfluous, as his character in these respects is ably drawn in the Memoir before us, to which we must refer the reader.

Dr. Edwards was not one of those who, conscious of the possession of genius, *rely* upon it, and neglect the requisite means of improvement. Through life he was a systematic and laborious student. It was his custom to rise and retire early, and to live much by rule, in consequence of which he avoided numberless interruptions, and was enabled to perform much in a little time. The first and last hours of every day were given to communion with his own soul and with God.

During his pastoral life Dr. Edwards superintended the theo-

logical studies of quite a number of young ministers. These were thoroughly instructed, and guided into a clear and well digested system of religious truth. Among his students were the late Dr. Dwight, President of Yale College, and Dr. Griffin, President of Williams College, both of whom regarded him, to his dying day, with the utmost respect and veneration.

Of Dr. Edwards's presidential life, it can only be said, that it was one of high promise. From the nature of the case it could not have been more. He had time only to enter on the duties of his office, and show to his friends and pupils what they had reason to expect from his labors, when he was prematurely summoned to a higher sphere. His loss was severely felt in the city to which he had but just removed; and carried gloom and sadness to every heart connected with the Institution over which he was placed.

Of the works of Dr. Edwards it may be said, in conclusion, that they are not only excellent in themselves, but almost entirely *unexceptionable*. Some great men are left to write and publish improper things. Men of profound minds, who give utterance to the most important truths, sometimes so strangely clothe their thoughts, and mix them up with so much that is *exceptionable*, that we hardly know whether to commend them or not. But in reading the works of Dr. Edwards, we find scarcely a sentence or expression which we could wish to have been otherwise. There is little or nothing to correct or blot. The sentiments are just and weighty, the style perspicuous and appropriate, the arguments sound, the reasoning conclusive; all is in good and proper keeping, and we wish it to stand just as he left it. And this can be said of almost no other man, who wrote so extensively as he, and on so abstruse and difficult subjects.

We have only to say further, that the religious community is under great obligations to the Editor and Publishers, for issuing these instructive volumes. We cannot doubt that they will be extensively read, and will be a means of rich benefit, both to the ministry and the church.

ARTICLE VI.

SOUTH'S SERMONS REVIEWED.

By GEORGE SHEPARD, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.

Sermons preached upon several occasions by Robert South, D. D., Prebendary of Westminster, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. A new edition in four volumes, including the Posthumous Discourses. Philadelphia: Sorin and Ball, 1844.

WE were glad when we saw it announced that the sermons of Dr. South were in the press at Philadelphia, and would soon be placed within the reach of American preachers and students. We wonder that it has not been done before. Some years since, we had a desire to become acquainted with the productions of this singular man, and we procured the Oxford edition of 1822 at more than double the cost of the present almost equally well executed edition. We have never regretted the purchase even at that rate; as they have been a rich source of entertainment and profit. We do not agree with the author on many points; we vehemently dissent from him on some; and must be permitted, in this notice, freely to speak our mind—to say of him just what we think.

His was an age crowded with remarkable events. He was a youth when Charles I. was beheaded; he lived through the Protectorate; through the reign of Charles II.; through the reign of James II., of William and Mary, of Anne, and died soon after the accession of George I. He witnessed both the "Rebellion" and the Revolution. His was an age crowded also with remarkable men; this of course; for great events always bring forth and mature great men. There were on the stage at the same time with him, Howe, Baxter, Bates, Flavel, Owen, Bunyan, Bishop Hall, Cudworth, Jeremy Taylor, Barrow, Tillotson, Atterbury. The list might be greatly extended. When has there been brought together a nobler galaxy?

Robert South was born in 1633; and in 1660 he appeared in the full strength and attractiveness of his powers. He enjoyed

the best advantages of education. After being four years at Westminster under the care of the famous Dr. Busby, he was elected student of Christ Church, Oxford, "where he made those advances in literature, that gave him the admiration and esteem of the whole university, and drew upon him the eyes of the best masters of humanity, and other studies." South was a fellow-student, at the university, of Mr. John Locke, subsequently so distinguished in another department. He took the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1654, and proceeded to the degree of Master of Arts in 1657, at the age of twenty-four. Notwithstanding his talents and scholarship, he met with some difficulty in attaining to this degree, on account of the opposition to him on the part of Dr. Owen, then dean of Christ Church, whom South had displeased by his manifested attachment to the Liturgy and to monarchy,—the Doctor plainly telling him, in rebuke of his proud and satirical spirit, "*He was one that sat in the seat of the scornful.*" In 1658, Dr. South was admitted into Holy Orders, according to the rites of the Church of England, by a regular, though deprived bishop; and in 1659 he was selected to preach before the judges: here we find him in the employ of the Presbyterians, and hurling his sarcasms at the Independents.

Having preached on the 29th of July, 1660, his sermon, entitled—*The Scribe well instructed*,—before the king's commissioners, he was made public orator to the university on the 10th of August following. It appears that some of our author's purest and finest sermons are among his early efforts. All the simplicity, strength, and maturity of the later productions, are found in some of those he first put forth. The sermon entitled,—*The Creation of man in God's image*,—written when the author was short of thirty, and which he calls, in his dedicatory epistle, "a raw endeavor of a young divine," is surpassed, we think, in all the great properties of thought and language, by no discourse in the whole collection. In 1663, he was installed Prebendary of Westminster, and in 1680, was made Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. He enjoyed many sinecures and many honors; and that a man of his great ability and burning zeal for the church was not made a bishop, is not a little strange. The probability is, he had overtures which he saw fit not to accept. His death occurred on the 8th of July, 1716. He was buried with distinguished ceremony, and praised, on the marble, for some qualities he never possessed.

Dr. South was a very remarkable man, altogether original and

peculiar in his character. He certainly possessed a noble intellect. There were strength and closeness of ratiocination, when he chose to employ them; a keen metaphysical acumen; the power of clear statement, and striking illustration; he was at once solid and brilliant; and all his strongly marked powers received the full benefit of the most perfect discipline and scholarship.

His moral qualities do not appear to so good advantage as his intellectual. He is thought to have been rather too pliant, in those changing times, for the credit of a stern integrity. Cromwell received his praises, then the Presbyterians; finally, in his zeal to bless the establishment, he cursed all the rest. Dr. South proved himself to be a great and notable hater. The Puritans, the Papists, the Socinians, all infidels and atheists—the extremes of the godly and ungodly—he hated with perfect hatred. His wit, sometimes keen, at others coarse, his merciless sarcasms, his grinning caricatures, his club-like opprobiums, were dealt out in all these directions, with the utmost heartiness. He was a churchman of the highest and most exclusive order; all that could save the soul or the state, in his view, was bound up in the establishment. His adhesion to monarchy, and his attachment to the kings of the realm, no matter what their character, were really ludicrous for their extravagance. When we read his beautiful portrait of Charles I., and his fulsome eulogy of the scoffing and lecherous son, it seems to us, that Dr. Robert South would not have withheld his homage nor his heart from a goat or jackass, if clad in the habiliments of royalty. His loftiness in some respects, his meanness in others, his greatness and his degradation, are perfectly amazing. His bigotry, his hate, and his snappish intolerance, existed in connexion with traits of kindness and generosity, such as are rarely surpassed.

We come now to Dr. South's character as a preacher; and propose to exhibit, as far as our limits will allow, his commendable and faulty qualities. We have, in these volumes, seventy-two sermons carefully prepared for the press by himself, and published under his own eye, and sixty-two more published after his death from his somewhat imperfect manuscripts. No one can read far in these sermons, open where he may, without perceiving that they are vigorous, strongly marked productions; taken together, they are very extraordinary sermons.

They present this rather singular feature, namely, a rigid orthodoxy on most points, at the same time a great want of the

evangelical spirit. The doctrine of the Trinity he held most tenaciously, and defended most furiously. The doctrine of original sin, he states in terms sufficiently strong to satisfy the extremest advocates of the article. He says, "We were sinners before we were born, and seem to have been held in the womb, not only as infants for the birth, but as malefactors in prison. Could we view things, *in semine*, and look through principles, what a nest of impurities might we see in the heart of the least infant, like a knot of little snakes wrapt up in a dung-hill." He recognizes the utter impotency of the sinner, and the necessity of a new creation—that he be born from above. He tells us that "the habit of holiness, finding no principle of reproduction in a nature wholly corrupt, must needs be produced by supernatural infusion; and consequently, proceed not from acquisition but gift. It must be brought into the soul, it cannot grow or spring out of it." To introduce unconverted persons to the Lord's Supper is "as preposterous, as for one who makes a feast to send to the graves and church-yards for guests, or entertain and treat a corpse at a banquet."

We find the doctrines of the atonement and election, in the strictest sense. Christ, the Infinite and Vicarious Sufferer, "by eternal compact receives from the Father the donation of a certain, determinate number of persons to be his people;" he provides for their justification and their sanctification, and will bring every one of them home to heaven. On the absolute eternity and the intolerable nature of the punishment of the wicked, he speaks in the most unqualified terms. The lost sinner is represented as doomed to feel God's hand, and never to see his face; he shall roll himself upon a bed of flames to all eternity; omnipotence shall do its utmost upon his soul; the cup God then administers to him shall be all justice without mercy—all wrath and venom—all dregs and yet no bottom—a cup never to be drunk off, inexhaustibly full, inconceivably bitter: such is a specimen of his terms descriptive of the miseries of the lost. He speaks in severe reprobation of those who undertake to limit this punishment;—who represent God's threatenings as having "a very comfortable latitude in them for men of skill to creep out at;" who would cut short the term of suffering, and foster the presumption, that after a certain period "there will be a general gaol delivery of the spirits in prison." The doctrine of satanic agency is brought out on all occasions in the boldest way. The Adversary is no figure of speech, but

a veritable and terrible personage ; all spirit indeed, but no less a devil for that ; the grand architect of mischief ; the great Sophister and Prince of darkness ; the implacable and insatiable devourer of souls, working in all crafty ways, accomplishing his objects by the most notable fetches ; here playing the white devil, and there the black devil ; often quick as the lightning, bites and shows his teeth at the same time.

It is a remarkable fact, that our author should be so clear on the great points of Calvinism, when he undertakes to state them ; because he was so high and extreme in his Episcopal tendencies. High-churchism and Calvinism did not often go together. To be consistently high-church, or prospectively high in the church, it was necessary to put on the milder aspect and looser garb of Arminianism. The strict Calvinist was deemed "a doctrinal puritan ;" and the dispensers of ecclesiastical honors and livings looked upon such with great suspicion. But this should be said respecting South : Calvinism is not at all obtrusive in his sermons ; here and there we find a great bone, an arm, an artery, a sinew of the system, but they appear rather as fragments ; not as built and compacted into a symmetrical structure, and moved aggressively by a living spirit. It is one thing for a man to state the doctrine now and then in his preaching ; quite another thing to have the doctrine pervade and characterize his discourses. This is just the difference between our author and the Puritan and Reformer of Elizabeth's reign. With one the doctrine was an isolated statement, lying inoffensively in its solitary position ; with the other, it was a spiritual weapon for the pulling down of strong-holds. If South stated a doctrine clearly, he did not use it vigorously, as he might have done, on the conscience and the heart. Men care not how heavy the club, or sharp the knife we bear, if we will only be so civil as not to strike them with the one, or cut them with the other.

But we must make some little abatement from our author's orthodoxy. While he held to the Trinity—and woe to the man who dared to mar the doctrine, if within his reach—while he held also to the high points of Calvinism, he was not altogether clear on the doctrine of justification by faith alone. It is true, man had no merit and never could work out any ; his salvation is all of grace—all comes through the merits of the Vicarious Sufferer ; and yet our author represented, that faith *alone* was not the condition : no one could secure a title to heaven but by

a course of obedience. He teaches that where justification is ascribed to faith alone in the Bible, "faith is used by a metonymy of the antecedent for the consequent, and does not signify a mere persuasion, but the obedience of a holy life. This justifies not meritoriously but instrumentally, as a condition appointed of God, where he freely imputes Christ's righteousness as the sole cause of our justification. Thus it is not one single act of credence, but the whole aggregate series of Gospel obedience, which gives a title to a perfect righteousness without us, by which alone we stand justified before God." This is not Paul's doctrine, as Paul stated it, nor Luther's, nor the doctrine which has ever been powerful to subdue the soul and give it peace with God. The true doctrine is that *faith alone* justifies, and that the sinner is justified *the moment* he believes; and it is also true, that this faith will show itself in good works; a subsequent holy life. Before leaving this point we wish to say, that this doctrine of justification by faith alone is the one which may not be changed or modified in the least; and cannot be with impunity. Strike away this, and you strike with palsy the whole body of Christian truth. Yet this is the doctrine upon which high-churchism has ever laid its meddling hands, and for it ever received in return the scathing curse of God. The English Reformers made this doctrine stand out in its just place and proportion; but the servile conformists that followed, succeeded at length in sinking it out of sight; and when we are taught by the whole history of the church, that the love of mere forms has always encroached upon, and, in the end, crowded out this great doctrine, pre-eminently the power of God unto salvation, we pray God to deliver us from the witchery and foolery of forms.

While it is very manifest, that there is a great want of the right spirit, the true evangelical spirit—the spirit of God—in these sermons; the heart and the soul, the living fire throughout, which smites, and electrifies, and saves, it is equally manifest and more to be lamented, that there is so much of a positively bad spirit. We have said that South was a great hater; and he poured out at times the whole fury of his hatred from the pulpit. In no other sermons in the language, certainly in none characterized by so many excellencies in other respects, can there be found so atrocious specimens of temper; the utterance of such bitter prejudices; such barbarous attacks; such enormous and malignant misrepresentations, as in some of these ser-

mons ; and the most gallish of all his hate, and the most stinging of all his sarcasms, came full and square upon the person of the Puritan. He exhausted his whole vocabulary of abuse (and what man ever had a greater ?) against those who took part in reforming the church from Episcopacy to Independency and Presbyterianism. He speaks of them (here we adduce his identical phrases) as persons of so capacious consciences that they stuck at neither robbery nor murder,—as men who can smile in your face while they are about to cut your throat,—men of a large and sanctified swallow,—hypocrites, perverters of Scripture, and murderers of souls,—pulpit engineers, reforming harpies,—thriving regicides, sure of heaven, but quite as sure some of them would take Tyburn on the way,—men whose mouths are too foul to be cleansed, and too broad to be stopped, spitting poison against monarchy, against discipline and decency ; whose boasted power of godliness, means the godly party in power,—brainsick, fanciful opinionators, delivered over of God to their own sanctified and adored nonsense,—as mountebanks and quacks in divinity, pitifully ignorant, and fit for little else but to show how fools may be imposed upon by knaves ; as men praying with incoherence and confusion,—with endless repetitions and insufferable nonsense ; and with such length, that two whole hours, at a fast, used to be considered a moderate dose,—as men of screwed face and doleful whine,—speaking bad sense with worse looks,—as those who, like St. Paul, would work with their hands, and in a *literal* sense, drive the nail home, and were able to make a pulpit before they preached in it.

It does seem to us, that such stuff is altogether too bad ever to have been preached ; and some will say, it ought never to have been printed ; certainly not reprinted in our times ; it ought to have been all purged out. We say no—let us have the whole man just as he was, with no mutilating and no softening. We thank the American publishers for giving us the entire work, every line and feature, every beauty and deformity. These grossly offensive things, which, in their day, were envenomed arrows in the direction they were thrown, are now perfectly harmless. They are so extreme, so overdone, that nothing is done by them. We let it all pass by as we do the rant of a madman : then here, the frenzy is so fine often, there is so much keenness in the hits, such gleamings of genius ; he does the thing so handsomely now and then, and always so heartily ; he so makes us laugh under his most scorpion lashings ; it is

manifestly such a comfort to himself, he seems so to clear out and relieve his own laboring stomach, that we really enjoy it: we derive much intellectual sweet from the foulest and bitterest dregs of his obloquy. And we have little doubt that the author has regretted his own uncivil, unchristian sayings and doings: he is ashamed of them in his new abode,—if in heaven, most heartily ashamed, as he sees there some of the men he despised and defamed as unworthy a standing on the earth, far above him in the ranks of that state. If one star differs from another star in glory, if those who turn many to righteousness are to shine as the brightness of the firmament, and as the stars for ever and ever, then Howe, Flavel, Baxter, and Bunyan, the outcasts from the church below, are far more honored and exalted in the church above, than this, or any, the most zealous of the defenders of a lauded establishment.

But leaving what is objectionable, we come to what is praiseworthy in these sermons. We put up with the insolence they are seasoned with, for the sake of other and good qualities which are found in them. We may learn something from them—may derive much benefit from them. Still, as models, they are not to be followed; as specimens of effective preaching, they are greatly wanting; they have not the structure and spirit which arouses, convicts, and converts the soul. The author did not aim at any such result; was very little conscious, probably, of what Baxter felt, and called “a thirsty desire for men’s conversion and salvation.” Of course, not *meaning* to do this immediate work upon the souls of his hearers, he did not do it. It is not said that these sermons have nothing to do with the conscience and the heart. There is much faithful dealing in them. A large part of the subjects discussed are serious and weighty; not mere moral topics, frigidly relating to the conduct and decencies of life; we are entered, we are invaded by many stirring and salutary truths. God’s character is set before us in its awfulness and majesty—the all-seeing and sin-avenging God, the full power of whose anger none on earth or in hell can know; the impossibility of avoiding detection after we have transgressed, is made to appear—*Be sure your sin will find you out*: then the place of punishment is set before us, in colors that cause shuddering; the necessity that the heart be changed is enforced, if we would avoid that place of torment; and that the affections be in heaven, if we would

reach in person that glorious world : the hearer is stripped clean of all possible merit in the sight of God, and is pointed for pardon to the sufferer of Calvary, there bleeding under the sword of Infinite justice. He is urged to agree with his adversary quickly, while in the way with him ; to beware of delay in the matters of the soul, as the night cometh in which no man can work ; the utter inefficacy of mere death-bed repentance is strongly stated and drawn out ; the deep treachery of the heart vividly exposed ; the hope of heaven, the hearer may be cherishing, is assailed by very searching tests, that he may know whether it will abide the day of trial. Such is a specimen of the topics treated by our author ; more spiritual and penetrating as a whole than those we find in Barrow : but still they are not such topics, and so treated, as to pierce the sinner, and cause him actually to flee to Jesus. Had one of our author's missiles by chance entered the heart of a hearer, and had that hearer come to him in the anguish of conviction, asking, what he must do, the Doctor would probably have assured him, as a preacher in this country, not long since, assured a similarly wounded hearer,—“ that he was sorry if he had hurt his feelings ; it was the farthest possible from his intention.” Though the sermons of Dr. South cannot be very highly prized, as means of conversion and growth in grace, yet for other qualities and purposes they are exceedingly valuable.

Leaving, then, the design and spirit, let us pass to the more intellectual features of these sermons. For simplicity of outline, cleanness of discussion, clearness and point of phraseology, freedom from the abstruse, the pedantic, and the complicated, South was half a century in advance of his age. Our author always has a plan, an obvious plan, with clear, strong points, clearly and strongly stated. He very emphatically calls attention to his main positions, and repeats them, that no hearer may miss them. The simplicity of the plans is wonderful, considering they were made in days of great complication and confusion ; when every important idea that went into a sermon, wore at least seven heads, and every head branched out as many as ten horns. In some of his sermons, our author does not much exceed the modern preacher in the number of his divisions. The splitting and sub-splitting system, which can serve only to split the heads of those who try to keep the reckoning while hearing or reading them, he seems to have measurably set aside.

The following is a specimen of his plans:—The text, Numbers 32: 23. Subject—Concealment of sin no security to the sinner. I. Men sin upon a confidence of concealment. II. The grounds of this confidence. III. The certainty that they will be defeated. 1. This very confidence helps to bring out the sin. 2. Providence operates to do it. 3. One sin the means of discovering another. 4. The sinner often his own discoverer—forced to it by conscience and the judgments of God. Lastly, His guilt will follow him into another world, if he chance to escape in this. The order and consecutiveness of these sermons is an admirable feature of them. The author had a mind that loved and produced order. There were no mobs allowed amongst his ideas.

These sermons are rather propositional than textual; indeed there seems to have been but little strictly textual preaching in those times. The author frequently discusses a subject in a series of propositions which constitute the steps of his argument. More rarely does he lay down a single logical proposition, and then address himself formally to prove it. He does, however, prove his points: there is much thorough discussion in these discourses; they are solidly argumentative, not dryly, but freshly, rhetorically, argumentative. As a specimen of the argumentation, we may take the sermon on the passage—*Can a man be profitable to God?* The doctrine is—That it is an impossible thing to merit of God. In the general outline the author admirably consults the memory. In the words there is, I. Something implied. II. Something expressed. III. Something inferred. IV. Something objected. It is implied that men are naturally prone to persuade themselves that they can merit of God, because they place too high a value upon themselves, and have too low and mean apprehensions of God. What is expressed is, that such opinion or persuasion is false or absurd. Here comes in the argument. The author lays down four unquestionable conditions of merit, and shows that man's best actions necessarily come short of all these conditions. 1. The first condition is, that the action be not due. 2. That the action may add to the state of the person of whom it is to merit. 3. That the action and reward be of equal value. 4. That the action be done by man's sole power, without the help of Him of whom he is to merit. The thing inferred is, that this persuasion of merit is the foundation of the great corruptions of religion—Pelagianism and Popery. The thing objected is, that

the doctrine discourages right practice, which objection is shown to be without foundation.

In making a sermon, it is important that the preacher understand the object he has to accomplish, by his argument, and what the nature of the argument required, in order to gain that object. Our author exhibited a good degree of skill in this respect. He was metaphysical when necessary, yet moderately so, for those hair-splitting times. He was descriptive in his argument, when a thing was best proved by making it appear. There is a good deal of "showing" in his sermons, as on the text, The wages of sin is death:—I. Show what sin is—original, actual. II. Show what is comprised in death. III. Show in what respects death is called the wages of sin. This "showing," unquestionably, is the best sort of reasoning for no small part of the subjects discussed in the pulpit. Here the imagination is brought into the service of the preacher. In order to success in this mode, a certain degree and kind of imagination are indispensable. Dr. South, we think, had the kind and degree. He undertook, in his early days, to be a poet, and even aspired to be the Laureate of the Protector. But he had not the poet's imagination: it was not sufficiently rampant and exursive for the poet—not keeping sufficiently long on the wing, brooding over the darkness, and making worlds out of nothing. South was endowed with strong, native, good sense; and this taught him that he could never distinguish himself as a poet, and consequently that he had better let poetry alone. Most wisely he dropped it; and if many others would do the same, they would act as wisely as he. For the relief of mankind, it would be well, were it a universally received maxim, that he, who is not made for a poet, should never make any poetry.

Though South had not the poet's imagination, he had the orator's. His imagination was of that restricted sort which produces the forcible simile and metaphor. These were not, in his case, the dull comparisons of the understanding, but bold and striking figures: they came from the imagination, and they went to the imagination. He had a most wonderful faculty of perceiving analogies. The fertility here was amazing, and this is the basis, to a great extent, of his wit, his raciness, his point, and his force. The boldness and strength he adventures upon in bringing out some of his figures of this sort are extreme. For example, speaking of certain wretches at the holy sacrament, he says,—“When I consider the pure and blessed body of our

Saviour, passing through the open sepulchres of such throats, into the noisome receptacles of their boiling, fermenting breasts, it seems to me a lively but sad representation of Christ's being first buried and then descending into hell." It is not quite so extravagantly, but better said, that—"Showers of tears and volleys of sighs, will no more purge a man's heart, than the washing of his hands can cleanse the rottenness of his bones." Our author thinks that Judas, "to receive and swallow, as he did, the sop, seasoned with those terrible words, 'It had been good for that man if he had never been born,' must have had a furious appetite and a strong stomach, thus to catch at a morsel with the fire and brimstone all flaming about it, and, as it were, digest death itself, and make a meal on perdition." The man of mere mouth charity, such an one as the Apostle James describes, instead of substantially helping his suffering neighbor, "thinks to lick him whole again with his tongue." In one of his sermons a person is represented as coming forth and saying—"I am a great hearer and lover of sermons; it is the very delight of my righteous soul: indeed, I am so entirely devoted to the hearing of them, that I have hardly any time left to practise them; and will not all this set me right for heaven?" Who but South could have perceived the analogy, and brought out such an image, as we have in the reply,—"*Yes, no doubt, if a man were to be pulled up to heaven by the ears.*"

Our author's quick perception of analogies both near and remote, and in subjects in most respects dissimilar, very often carried him into the regions of wit and humor. It is obvious that the same talent which enables a speaker to be forcible in the metaphor and illustration, gives him the other more questionable property, wit. The very striking metaphor usually borders on wit; and he who can go thus far, can ordinarily go farther: those who can execute well rhetorical painting, are commonly skilled in what Campbell calls "the limning of wit." This author makes wit a subordinate species of eloquence. The power is not only kindred with the oratorical, when properly used, particularly in the secular field, it is often a great help to it. Dr. South's fault is excess—enormous excess for one occupying the pulpit. Wit is a dangerous article to bring into the pulpit at all; our author brought it in without measure. So strongly is he characterized by it, that those who have only heard of him suppose that he has nothing else. He seems to be ever looking out for the queer resemblance, the piquant

turn, the facetious hit. There is apt to be a too studied aim or design about it: still he does succeed; and perhaps no man is more sudden and surprising in his strokes than he often is. When we are least expecting it, he slips out a parenthetical flash, and passes on as though nothing had happened.

Our author is almost unequalled in presenting before us a ludicrous image; especially when he wishes to put upon his object the lash of satire and ridicule. "Can any thing be so vile and forlorn as an old, broken, decrepit sensualist, creeping, as it were, to the devil upon all four?" A person who undertakes to be a preacher without being fit for it, in the figure of the author, "runs his head against a pulpit." The wit very often grows out of the queerness and singularity of the imagery—the analogy very remote and yet laughably striking: for instance, in the following most satirical passage:—"As it is observed in greyhounds, that *the thinness of their jaws* does not at all allay the ravening fury of their appetite . . . so woe be to that man who stands in the way of a meagre, mortified, fasting, sharp-set zeal, when it is in full chase of its spiritual game." Sometimes this queerness of imagery is combined with Scripture allusion; as where he refers to a time when preaching was wonderfully in vogue,—every thing must be done by preaching, which, he says, "went to pamper a proud, senseless humor, or rather a kind of spiritual itch, which had seized the greater part of the nation, and worked chiefly about the ears." The figure here is made ludicrous by mere expansion, and an artful confounding of the proper and metaphorical sense. Dr. South is fond of making his wit turn upon a passage of Scripture, and for this he is very reprehensible,—“Let Christ and His flock lie open, exposed to all weather of persecution, *foxes* will be sure to have holes.” Whoever throws before the community passages of God's word into ludicrous associations, does a great injury to the moral sense of the people. Occasionally the wit lies in the single pat word, again in what Barrow calls “the lusty hyperbole,” but oftener in the sly allusion, and the epigrammatic turn. In this last the author shows a singular smartness and felicity. He says—“Cain was the only person I have read of, who sought to divert his discontent by *building* cities, but the reason was, because there were none for him to *pull down*.”

The fact that our author employed his wit prominently in the work of satire and ridicule accounts for the lowness of his

descent now and then ; it was, that he might run equally low the contemned objects of his shafts. Very few men could have said with any effect the things which South has said ; so that he, in a sense, verifies one of his own sly and shrewd remarks, "that some men cannot be fools to so good acceptance as others."

Our author sometimes employs his wit to show off the ridiculous absurdity of some opinion and practice. In the following, the prophet was beforehand with him. The prophet says : "A man hews him down a tree in the wood, and a part of it he burns, with the residue thereof he maketh a god." Upon this South comments :—"With one part he furnishes his *chimney*, with the other his *chapel*," (a sort of paronomasia the author was fond of.) "A strange thing that the fire must consume this part, and burn incense to that ; as if there was more divinity in one end of the stick than in the other."

Dr. South not unfrequently means, that his wit shall do the work of argument : occasionally, however, the argument utterly fails, leaving nothing but the wit. He tells us, that the great principles of religion can be inserted in the mind only by catechising, in the proper season of it. "To expect this to be done by preaching, or *force of lungs*, is just as if a smith or artist, who works in metals, should think to frame or shape out his work only *with his bellows*." This is a laughable conceit, but puerile as argument ; equally so, when he attempts to argue against extempore prayer, from the analogy of literal parturition ; declaring it to be "monstrous and unnatural to conceive and bring forth together ; all abortion is from infirmity." According to the argument of this passage, every thought, no matter what it relates to, should lie some months in the head before it is suffered to see the light.

The attribute of our author's mind, which makes him so quick and keen in his wit, gives him great vivacity throughout. Briefness and a graphic precision are indispensable to wit ; and where these are found, there will of course be life and force to the style. Dr. South is never impassioned : he attempts not the higher flights and figures of the orator. Indeed, we find these very rarely, if at all, in the English pulpit. The English preacher keeps down to the earth ; he rarely ventures beyond the metaphor ; while the French preacher will soar aloft, bear you away, show you the distant, and will give life to the dead and speech to the dumb. There may be an arresting force to speech with-

out these extreme resorts of rhetoric. Few sermons have the admirable quality of vivacity to a higher degree than those now before us; and this quality is gained to them, in part, by the thick sprinkling of bold metaphor the author has charged them with. In his phrase—"Lies are drawn with cords of blasphemy, and nonsense with a cart-rope.—The winds *are crushed* into a calm.—The whole creation *bends and cracks* under the wrath of God: the strokes of this wrath, when they fell upon Christ, as it were *shook and staggered* Omnipotence itself.—Malice *vomits* out its scandal and reproaches.—An enraged conscience takes the sinner by the throat, and hell *sends up* its flames into his face.—God turns the worm of conscience into a scorpion, and smites it with the invisible stings of his wrath, such as fester and rage inwardly, *gnaw and rake* the very entrails of the soul." The precision here and throughout is perfect. Our author commits no blunder in getting hold of his words. What he wants he knows, and that he is sure to seize. If there is a vigorous, robust word in all the language, precisely fitted to serve his idea and go into a particular place, he is sure to lay his hand on that word, and put it in that place. It is true that his precision and strength not unfrequently run into coarseness. In bringing in the most graphic words of the language, he brings in the low and the vulgar. He is not satisfied with discoursing about man in general, he must touch upon all the parts of a man—head, neck, pate, throat, back, belly, lungs, entrails. "The ungrateful person is a monster, all throat and belly." His scale of rather coarse terms, is long and varied. We have—scurvy instances, sneaking looks, pampered carcasses, crabbed studies, cases of grumbling and snarling. There is no mincing, no mealy-mouthedness with our author, no diluting paraphrases, no polite circuitousness to get round a hard expression. He speaks it right out, rough and heavy as it may be; he "kicks," and "cuffs," and "mauls," and "stabs," and "butchers."

South runs pretty often into an extreme harshness of expression. Some sinners are "hell and damnation proof." The sinner, in high life and of high living, is "fattening for the slaughter of eternity—he is damned in state, and goes to hell with more ease, more flourish, and magnificence than others." It was an age of coarse mouths, and even the most classical and accomplished preachers did not wear off all their roughness. Dr. South did not try to. He manifestly had an affection for

what was common and familiar; his illustrations are from the most obvious sources. He could lay his hands upon the meanest objects; and did not shrink from thrusting them into the dirt, and even the dunghill. A large measure of his power arose from this obvious, palpable style of illustration. The remote, the fine-spun, and the finical, we find every where in Jeremy Taylor; nowhere in Robert South. The latter, we think, is vastly the superior, as imparting to others the true style of effective address.

The style of these sermons is strikingly idiomatic: there is a large infusion of the Saxon element. Perhaps no scholar of the period, has so large a proportion of native words and phrases as does our author. Hence the singular *clearness* of his diction. If a reader can understand any thing, he can understand these sermons. The meaning is nowhere dissipated by vague generalities; it is nowhere suspended and vibrating between artful ambiguities; it is nowhere buried from view under heavy heaps of verbiage. It stands definitely and boldly forth. It is here, it is there, it is throughout; we know where it is, and what it is. The reader is not sent in the capacity of a hound, snuffing through the discourse—a miserable compound of weeds and flowers, briars and underbrush—to find out, if any sagacity can, in what part the game lies hid.

The fact that clearness and sententiousness are united in our author, which together constitute the true pith and force of style, adapts his discourses, particularly the best passages of them, to a powerful delivery. These sermons are more highly oratorical in their structure, than most English sermons are found to be. This, indeed, is a rare quality in the sermons that have been given to the public. The majority are conformed to, and cannot be raised above, a tame enunciation. But here the weight of voice comes naturally upon the nouns and the verbs. They are so significantly chosen, and so full of meaning, that they instinctively draw the pressure to themselves; and they are able to bear it. The force is not divided amongst a half-dozen competitors. The author gives us the privilege of what may be termed, emphatic concentration: he never puts us upon the task of wearily gasping out a string of senseless adjuncts. There is a great deal of the skilful antithetic structure, always condensed, well balanced, and well fitted to the mouth and the lungs.—“Some are atheists, not because they have better wits than other men, but because they have corrupter wills; not because they reason better, but because they live worse.”

There is not only great compactness and strength in the style of these sermons; there is also a finish, a delicacy, a chaste beauty, in many of the paragraphs, which hold us in admiration. Had we room, we might quote passages from nearly all his sermons, which are as fine specimens of the high and rare qualities of style, as the range of English literature furnishes. We are surprised that any one, at that early period, should have used the language with such maturity and perfection. In this respect, he was greatly in advance of his age. The quaintness which was then so common and so much thought of, he had the good taste to leave behind. He gives us pure, strong, pointed, unembarrassed English. Perhaps the sermons of Dr. South, so far as mere style is concerned, come as near to the right model and medium for the pulpit, as any sermons in the language.

They are sermons which we love to read, whilst a majority of the sermons, then put forth, are heavy and perplexing; to go through them is hard wading. But here we are entertained, allured on, surprised, often electrified, on the way; the mind is kept on the alert; in a state of expectancy for something that is to come; and it very surely does come. South greatly improved upon most of his contemporaries, on the score of tediousness. It was an age of wearying prolixity; sermons were drawn out to an awful length, because preachers insisted upon pressing their thoughts to the last extremity of dribbling. Our author was not one of this school. He did not draw out and twist every idea he started into a string or noose, and then haul his hearers with it all over creation. He could let a thought go when he had got what he wanted out of it. He discussed his points, so far as related to his main design, and then left them.

We were exceedingly amused, and not a little astonished recently, in looking over a communication from a Sandwich Island youth to his benefactor in this country. He writes a sentence, and adds, "This thought is done." He then writes another sentence, upon another point, and adds again, "*This* thought is done." We were amused at the simplicity of the expression, and astonished at the greatness of the discovery. That a discovery which seems to have eluded the great majority of educated and disciplined minds in this enlightened land, should be thus made by one just emerging from a state of barbarism, is indeed astonishing. Were all who speak in public, especially all who occupy the pulpit, to make the discovery on their own produc-

tions,—to perceive instinctively, and to say to themselves at the right spot, *This thought is done*, and stop hammering upon it, turning it about and fumbling it over, but pass to something else, the relief to those who hear would be unspeakably great; it would be somewhat like removing mountains from their shoulders.

These sermons, we think, could never have been strictly popular. Nor could sermons now which should be as strongly characterized by the intellectual quality; for thought is not, and never has been, a remarkably popular commodity in discourses. There are some to appreciate it and be benefited by it; it is the article they love best. But these are not the mass. A preacher may go before some of our more refined and reputedly intelligent auditories, and utter clear, rich, forcible thought and argument, in a terse and attractive style, and he will encounter a vacant, unresponding listlessness from no small portion of those he addresses; but let him go before the same auditory, and deal a little more in finery, and “flourish it in tropes,” and be poetic and “eloquent,” yea, let him open his mouth and pour out by the hour a stream of silken, silvery nonsense, and this same class will look at him and admire; will even gape upon him, and gulp it down, and scarcely shall there have died away the echo of the benediction, before he shall be enveloped in the thick incense of their praise. Though these sermons will not suit this sort of readers and hearers, they will suit those who have mind enough to appreciate their merits, and they will benefit, intellectually at least, those who have intercourse with them.

We like the sermons chiefly for their strong original thought, most forcibly and strikingly uttered. There is a great want of that most essential quality of good preaching—essential, if the great objects of preaching are to be gained—namely, unction. Still there is an earnestness, a something which reaches you, stirs you, grapples you; it is the vigor of the thinking; it braces you, and makes you strong, to feel even that you can think likewise. Preachers, it seems to us, cannot come within this influence, and not be made stronger and more effective by it. The good may be chosen and appropriated; while the objectionable spirit and features are left where they are. No one, indeed, could now indulge in the rancor of South, without hazard of ejection from all good society. No one could now attempt in the pulpit the wit of South, without making a fool of himself.

ARTICLE VII.

DIVINE AGENCY AND GOVERNMENT, TOGETHER WITH HUMAN AGENCY AND FREEDOM.

(Continued from p. 137, Jan. 1844.)

By the Rev. LEONARD WOODS, D. D., Prof. Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF MAN.

THE chief difficulty on this subject appears to arise from the wrong methods in which men attempt to settle the question, whether they are accountable for their actions. If we rely upon any logical reasoning, or if we undertake to determine, *a priori*, what is necessary to constitute an accountable being, or a fit subject of moral government, we shall fail in our attempt, and shall fall into great perplexities. *That we are accountable to God*, is an ultimate fact, which, aside from revelation, is ascertained in one way only, that is, by a direct inward perception, or consciousness. We know that we are moral, *accountable* beings, just as we know that we are *intelligent* beings. Do we ever go about to convince ourselves by argument that *we think*, or that *we love*, and *desire*? And why do we not? Because there is nothing more obvious and certain, than that we do think, and love, and desire; in other words, there is nothing which has the nature of *proof*;—*proof* being something more clear and obvious, than the thing to be proved. Our accountability (we may say) is *self evident*. The belief or feeling of it, in some way, is unavoidable. We perceive, and must perceive, an inherent difference among our mental acts. Some we see and feel to be right and praiseworthy, and some, wrong and blameworthy. This is as unquestionable as that one thing is agreeable to our taste, and another disagreeable. In a mind not totally perverted, one class of exercises is invariably accompanied with a feeling of self-approbation, and another with a feeling of self-disapprobation. Now to say I am conscious of right and wrong, is the same as to say I am conscious of being *responsible*. For right and wrong presuppose a law; and a law,

a lawgiver; and a lawgiver, a moral government. Under this moral government I know myself to be placed; inasmuch as I do, from the very constitution of my mind, approve or condemn myself, according as I obey or disobey the law. Thus the consciousness of an inherent difference among the acts of my own mind, as right or wrong, involves the sentiment that I am accountable for those acts. I do, and must, in some way, call myself to account for them, and pass judgment upon myself with reference to them. And in this judgment, there is always a felt or implied reference to a higher judge than myself, and a higher tribunal than my own conscience. Here is the sentiment of *accountability to God*.

My position is, that our accountableness to a Supreme Lawgiver and Judge depends, essentially, upon the constitution of our mind, just as it is, and is inseparable from it. We are never to turn aside from this point, and to take it upon us to determine, that we must have such or such powers of mind, or be placed in these or those circumstances, in order to our being accountable agents. Whatever may be found true in regard to our mental powers or our circumstances, we *are* accountable. It is proper for me to inquire, whether I do possess this power or that, and what are my circumstances as to dependence on divine control, and in other respects. But my inquiries ought not to be embarrassed by any prepossession; and whether the result of my inquiries be this or that, I know that I am accountable for my actions, and that I am rightly placed under a moral law. Whatever I may find to be true as to the existence and extent of the divine predetermination, or as to divine providence, or as to the actual subserviency of all my actions, under a divine control, to a good end; in short, whatever else may be true or not true; my just accountableness is evident. Of this I am certain. No other truth, no other fact respecting either God or man, can interfere with the certain fact, that I am an accountable agent.

DOES GOD'S UNIVERSAL AGENCY CONSIST WITH ANY OTHER AGENT OR AGENCY? AND DOES HIS BEING THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS ADMIT OF OTHER CAUSES?

It is sometimes said, that if God is the cause of all things, as the Calvinists represent, if, as the supreme cause, he is through all and in all, there can be no other cause. If he is the uni-

versal agent, and is always and every where active, and if all beings and events are absolutely dependent on him, then there is no room for any other agent or agency. All things must be absorbed in God ; and pantheism must be acknowledged as the true system of theology.

Now God's being the supreme, independent, and universal cause, having a perfect efficiency in all beings and events, does indeed imply that nothing else can be a cause in the same sense in which God is the cause ; that is, nothing else can be a supreme, independent, and universal cause. But because there is only one *supreme* cause, it does by no means follow that there are no *subordinate* causes. Because there is only one *first* cause, it cannot be inferred that there are no *secondary* causes. Subordinate, secondary causes may result *from* the supreme, first cause. Sir Isaac Newton, and all Christian philosophers before and since his day, and all Christian divines, have held, that there is only one supreme and universal cause, but that there are many subordinate causes, dependent on the supreme, and all having a measure of efficiency, from which result various and important consequences. The omnipotent energy of the first cause is so far from precluding secondary causes, that it gives them a real and permanent existence. The divine cause produces, not shadows, but substances ; not illusions, but realities. Created things, things which result as effects from the Supreme cause, may have as real permanent existence, as that which exists independently of a cause. And those things, which exist as effects of the first cause, may, in the above sense, be the cause of other things, resulting from them as effects ; and these effects of secondary causes, may become causes of other effects ; and there may be an endless series of dependent causes and effects. The created universe, both material and spiritual, is manifestly such a system of dependent causes and effects, all proceeding from God, arranged by his wisdom, and leading on to glorious results in an endless progression.

The supposition, then, that the doctrine of Edwards, the senior, or the junior, or of the other Calvinists, precludes the existence of any cause, except the first cause, or of any agent or agency, except the Supreme Agent or Agency, would be wholly unfounded. Indeed, we can much more satisfactorily conceive of a universe of things having a real and permanent existence, as effects dependent on an infinitely wise, powerful and, all-pervading cause, than in any other way. For here we come

at once to that, which is a manifest and sufficient ground of the existence of dependent things. But the moment we start from this principle, and begin to contemplate created things in any other light than as effects of the first cause, we are met with the inquiry, how things which are not eternal come into existence; or how things which are at first dependent on the first cause can afterwards acquire independence; how things which owe their existence to the efficacious act of God's will can continue to exist without the continued act of that will; or, on the other hand, how an unchangeable God can efficiently will the permanent existence of dependent beings, and yet not continue thus to will it; or, if he does thus continue to will their continued existence, how that will, which was at first an efficacious cause, can cease to be a cause, or lose its causal influence, and the things which first owed their existence to the influence of that divine cause, can turn about and say they have no further need of the influence of that cause. When we enter on such inquiries, and admit suppositions which are contrary to the obvious sense of Scripture, what was plain before, at once becomes perplexed, and the mind wanders about, "in endless mazes lost."

But *how* can *moral, spiritual* agents, who are entirely dependent on a supreme, all-efficient cause, and constantly under its controlling influence, be capable of actions for which they are *justly responsible*?

To the question *how* this can be, my answer is, I know not. But, from my own consciousness and the word of God, I know the fact that moral agents exist, who are thus dependent on God, and who, at the same time, are justly responsible for their actions. I cannot but regard it as an illusion of a speculative imagination, that independence in any respect is necessary to accountability. And as I give no place to such an illusion, and as I hold, what every man of common sense must hold, that a state of dependence is consistent with a just accountableness to a moral government, and is the only state where such accountableness can be found, I escape at once all the difficulties which any man must experience, who denies the fact that dependent beings are accountable, because he cannot understand the *mode* of it. In regard to the fact, I make my appeal directly to conscience. And I call for some instance in which a man of plain, unbiassed conscience feels himself less accountable for his actions, because he lives, and moves, and has his being in God. Who that believes the Scriptures can doubt that God can cre-

ate and sustain accountable agents, and exercise a sovereign control over their actions? Did he not by the measures of his righteous providence actually harden the heart of Pharaoh and Sihon, without interfering with their accountable agency? And cannot he do the same now? Does he not work faith and love in believers, without interfering with their moral agency? No one can say, that, because God influences and controls the acts of moral agents, he does it by a *force* or *compulsion* which supersedes their freedom and accountableness. For surely God has other ways of influencing and governing moral agents besides compulsion; and those other ways are such as correspond with the nature of moral agents. It is as certain as any thing can be, that God can adapt his efficacious influence to *moral* and *accountable* agents, as well as to material substances. His influence in both cases, however different in its nature or modes of action, is equally sure to accomplish its objects. When we contemplate this subject, we have constant reason to exclaim, How wonderful is the power and wisdom of God! His ways are past finding out!

If you inquire of me how I satisfy myself that I am a free, accountable agent, and that I am also in a state of entire dependence on God, and that I act under his sovereign control; my answer is, that I learn my own free, accountable agency from the uniform testimony of my own consciousness, and also from the manner in which God treats me in his word and providence. My accountableness is then certain. It cannot be doubted. The other point, that is, my dependence on God, is made out with equal clearness by the aid of reflection and divine revelation. By these I am taught that God sustains me; that all my actions are under the control of his sovereign providence; and particularly, that he governs my good actions by the influence of the truth, joined with the influence of his Spirit. These two points, then, are made known to me in different ways, but with equal certainty. I give them both full credence. I receive them into my heart, and leave them to work out their own consistency. If this cannot be done satisfactorily in the understanding, it can be done in the heart. Long labor has taught me, that the reconciliation of these two points, comes not within the province of speculative reason, and is not to be made out by any processes of intellect. But it is made out with perfect clearness by inward experience. Never, in any instance, have I felt the least incompatibility between the two

facts; never found that they interfere with or encumber each other; and I have been brought to the conclusion, that any idea of such interference is an illusion of the imagination. Free, accountable agency has been going on, for thousands of years, under an effective divine superintendence and control, by which it has been so shaped and directed, as to accord with God's purposes, and accomplish his holy ends; and yet, during these thousands of years, and amid countless millions of men, good and bad, there has never been one who has experienced any loss of conscious freedom, or any interruption or inconvenience in the use of his own faculties from the divine power which has effectually swayed all his actions. And thus it will be forever: God supreme, governing all his creatures, and all their actions, according to the counsels of his own will, and at the same time moral beings, good and bad, acting with all conceivable freedom, conscious that they themselves, while swayed by a power above them, and acting under the control of an invisible hand, must be regarded and treated as accountable agents, and that the whole of their conduct, whatever it may be, must be imputed to them as their own, and that a divine reward will be conferred, or punishment inflicted upon them, according as they have obeyed or disobeyed the divine law. Happy they, who view these things in the light of truth—as every one does whose moral faculties are awake, and who is blessed with the teaching of the Holy Spirit. The plain Bible Christian, who walks with God, has no difficulty here. But if any one shuts his eyes against the light of reason, conscience and revelation, and, because he finds in the existence of evil and in the supremacy of the divine government mysteries which he cannot fathom, stumbles at well-known facts,—let him stumble.

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

On this subject, strange as it may seem, it has become necessary to give line upon line, line upon line. There is so much confusion in the writings of some men in relation to cause and effect, that it is difficult for any one to peruse what they have written, without having his own mind confused. There are not a few at this day, who are so fond of innovation, that they make it an object to unsettle long-established principles, and to introduce novelties, really preferring what is new, though doubtful, or even erroneous, to what is old, however true. And there are

those, who are inclined to deny or doubt what is clear and certain, because there is something pertaining to the subject, which they find to be obscure or uncertain. If they would confine their habit of doubting to what is unknown and unknowable, they would act reasonably. But they extend the same habit to what is clear and certain.

A *cause* I understand to be that on which something else depends, or from which it results. And an *effect* I understand to be that which depends on something else, and results from it. It is not correct to say, that whatever *exists* has a *cause*. For a Being does and must exist, that has no cause. But it is manifest, that whatever exists in the *creation*, or whatever *begins* to exist, results from a cause. It is the beginning or continuance of existence among created beings, or some change in what exists, that we refer to a *cause*. The existence of an *uncaused cause*, is certain. But whatever else exists, and whatever event occurs among created things, we do necessarily ascribe to some cause. If a full moon should appear a week sooner than common, we should inquire for the *cause*. And if we should be unable to discover the cause, it would still be our instinctive belief, that there is a cause. The same in the moral world. If a parent, who was once kind and tender, becomes hard-hearted and cruel, we ascribe the change to some cause,—either to a physical disorder, or to the treatment he has received, or to the influence of his circumstances, or to something which is concealed from us. That there is a cause, no one doubts. And if any one should answer the inquiry, What is the cause? by saying the *man himself* is the cause, we should think the answer very indefinite and unsatisfactory. It is true the change may have taken place gradually, under the operation of principles in his own mind. And it is also true, that one of those principles is, that the disposition and state of a man's mind is affected by other things, either without or within him. Such a change as that just mentioned, may result from insanity. If so, we say, insanity is the cause. It may come in consequence of wicked and abusive treatment from his children; and then we should say, that is the cause. But suppose that by intemperance, or other evil practice, he brought the insanity upon himself; or suppose that in any other way he voluntarily put himself in circumstances which induced the change in his disposition, it might be proper to say, that he himself was the cause, the criminal cause of the unhappy change, or that he hardened his

own heart. Still our meaning would be, that he produced or helped to produce the change, *by his sinful conduct*, referring to that conduct as what had the unhappy influence upon his domestic disposition. We know it to be one of the laws of the mind, that particular mental states or exercises, and particular external acts, have an effect, good or bad, upon our subsequent states or exercises. But those previous states of mind had a cause as well as the subsequent. A particular mental state or habit, say avarice, may be said to be a development of principles, which essentially belong to the human mind. But how does it happen that this development is made in one man and not in others? We naturally look for a *cause* of this difference. We may find it in the influence of some well-known circumstances which have been acting upon the individual, or in something peculiar in the original structure of his mind. And in case we are unable to discover any particular cause, and are obliged to acknowledge that we cannot account for the fact, we still hold fast to the belief, that there is a cause, though hidden from our view, and that the difference in the effect is always owing to a corresponding difference in that which has operated as a cause.

The principle we are now considering, may be illustrated by what took place a few years since in this vicinity: the murder of White by Knapp. White was a kind, honorable man, and a particular friend to Knapp. The general inquiry was, Why did Knapp take away the life of his relative and friend? What was the *cause* of his doing such a deed of inhumanity and cruelty? What was his *reason* or *motive*? If any one had told us, that *Knapp himself* was the cause of the murder, we should probably have said, We know that Knapp was the *murderer*, or the author of the murder. It was he that committed the foul deed, but what was the *cause* of his doing it? What *reason* or *motive* had he for such an act? By and by we were informed that Knapp was a relative of White, and would inherit his estate if he died without a will. We found, then, that *avarice* was the cause of his committing the crime. He did it, *because* he hoped in that way to make himself rich. The love of money was the *motive* which influenced him; the *reason* or *cause* of his doing the particular act.

In common discourse among intelligent men, the words *cause* and *effect* are applied as familiarly to the acts or states of the mind, as to the motions or states of material substances. It is

common to speak of the cause of the hatred which Herodias felt against John Baptist, and of that hatred as the *effect* of John's faithful reproof;—of that which *caused* Joseph's brethren to envy and hate him, and of their envy as the *effect* of their father's partiality to Joseph. It is in accordance with good usage to speak of the conduct of Mordecai the Jew, and the malignant feeling of Haman, as *cause* and *effect*.

Some writers, who have taken a part in recent controversies, have shown an unwillingness to apply the words *cause* and *effect* to the determinations and actions of free, moral agents, and have often repeated the affirmation that *the law of cause and effect* cannot relate to man's accountable agency. The only reason which they have given for their position is, that the words *cause* and *effect*, when applied to *physical subjects*, have a meaning which is not suitable to moral subjects, and that the *law* of cause and effect in regard to material things, is such that it cannot be predicated of the actions of the mind. It is indeed true, that the words cannot be applied to the mind in the same sense in which they are applied to material things. But the same is true of other words without number. And if we should refuse to use words in relation to the mind in a different sense from what they have in relation to matter, that is, in a tropical sense, we should set ourselves against the most approved modes of speech, and deprive ourselves of the language best suited to express strong emotions, and to make strong impressions. Do we not constantly employ the word *understanding* in relation to the mind? Do we not speak of the mind as *seeing* and *perceiving*, as being *dark* or *enlightened*, as *moved*, *agitated*, *quiet*, etc.? And does any one need to be told, that these, and thousands of other words, which are familiarly applied to the mind, are used not in a literal or physical sense, but in a tropical or mental sense? No man can speak the English language, or any other language, without often using words in a secondary or figurative sense in relation to his own mind, or the minds of others. As to the words *cause* and *effect*, no man, in the exercise of common sense, is in danger of mistake. If they are applied to physical subjects, as cold and heat, vegetation, electricity, etc., we know they have a physical sense. And what the law of physical cause and effect is, we learn by our senses, and by instruction in the science of physics. If the words are applied to the affections or acts of the mind, we know at once that they have a sense corresponding to the nature of the mind; and what

the law of cause and effect is here, we learn by consciousness, or by observation of what passes within us. It is just as easy for us to distinguish between the literal and physical sense of the words, and their tropical or moral sense, as to distinguish between the literal and figurative sense of any other words. And the same principle that would lead us to object against applying these words to moral subjects, would lead us to object against the universal practice of taking words, originally appropriated to material things, and using them in a figurative and moral sense. And if an objection so unreasonable should prevail, it would make a most calamitous revolution in speech, and would set aside the language which inspired writers and the Saviour himself commonly employed in giving instruction to men. And as there is so wide a difference between the physical and the moral sense of cause and effect, we cannot found any arguments or conclusions respecting the *moral* sense, on the supposition that it is the same as the physical sense.

Some writers admit that there is a cause of moral actions, but hold that *man himself is the cause*. Here the chief point of inquiry evidently relates to the use of *words*; and it may be that those who differ in this respect, substantially agree in their conceptions of the subject.

We all hold that man himself is the *agent*; that it is he, and he alone, that wills and acts; and that he does this in the free use of his own powers and faculties. If a man acts, he is the actor. If he thinks and reasons, he is the thinker and reasoner. And this is little more than an identical proposition. Now when you say, man is the *cause* of his own acts, what more do you mean, than that he is the *agent*? You may explain yourself by saying, that he *originates* his own volitions and acts. To this I also agree, if you mean that he is truly the *agent*—that he himself puts forth his mental and bodily acts—that they proceed from him, and are the result of his own active powers. If the language means more than this, I have found no one who could point out what that additional meaning is. I must then, for the present, consider the meaning of those who choose to say, that a man *originates* his own acts, to be, that he is truly the *agent*, and does himself put forth the acts. The question, however, still remains, in what way and on what principles or conditions a moral agent puts forth his volitions and acts. If he *causes* or *originates* his own mental and bodily acts, it is still obvious that he must do this in a manner suited

to his rational nature. He cannot act under the influence of those principles which govern the action of dead matter or brute animals. As a rational being, he must act *rationally*. If he *causes* or *originates* his own acts, he must do it on rational principles, and under a rational influence. And what is a rational influence but the influence of motives addressed to the mind, or of inducements acting upon the mind. Ask a man *why* or *wherefore* he wills or does such a thing, and in his answer he gives you the *reason* or *cause* of his doing it. The *cause*, in this use of the word, is the *motive* or *inducement* which leads to the determination or action. But the word is sometimes used in a higher sense, as when it is said, God is the cause, that is, the Supreme, Almighty, all-controlling cause of the actions of men. In a manner suited to their moral nature, He influences their minds, and governs all the circumstances which operate upon them as motives to action. This application of the word *cause* is, however, uncommon. When it relates to the actions of men, it is ordinarily employed to denote the *reason* on account of which the actions are performed, or the *motive* or *consideration* which induces men to perform the actions. The love of money is the *cause* of a man's determinations and efforts in pursuit of wealth. If we inquire what is the *cause* of his undertaking such wearisome labors, you say, it is his *covetousness*. It would not meet the inquiry at all, to say he himself is the cause,—meaning that he is the person who undertakes the labors. What we wish to know is, the *reason* or *motive*, which influences him to act in that particular way. This is the *love of money*; and the particular course of action which he pursues, is the *effect* of this cause.

Now as to the words *cause* and *effect*, a writer may use them, and will find occasion to use them, in relation to different subjects. And in each case we are to determine from the nature of the subject, and other circumstances, what their particular meaning is; whether they are used in a higher or lower sense, in a physical or moral sense. And when they are applied to the affections or acts of the mind, we must remember that *the laws of the mind are not to be inferred from any sense previously given to the words employed, but that the sense of the words is to be inferred from the known laws of the mind. The laws of the mind, as really as the laws of matter, are fixed and immutable; while the meaning of words is variable, and always conforms to circumstances.*

CONNEXION OF VOLITIONS WITH THE DISPOSITIONS, DESIRES, AFFECTIONS, AND ACTIONS.

It is sometimes said, *the will governs the whole man*. But it is said inconsiderately. For every one knows, that many of the bodily functions, and many attributes and acts of the mind, are not controlled directly by the will, and some of them neither directly nor indirectly. What power is there in an act of the will to direct and control the process of digestion, the beating of the heart, the motion of the blood, the growth of the body, or the color of the hair? The Author of our being has given the will an influence over our bodily organs just so far as he has seen to be best. Our sensations are often the effects, indirectly, of our previous volitions. But they are sometimes independent of our choice, and sometimes contrary to it; but they always result from their appropriate causes. The same is true as to intellectual exercises. To a certain extent they are under the direction of the will. But it is often otherwise. A man is sometimes obliged to think on subjects contrary to his choice, and to remember things which he wishes to forget. The attention and imagination are sometimes excited by causes which are entirely beyond our control. No theory on this subject is of any value, except that which is founded on actual experience. Experience and consciousness must teach us when, and how far, and in what circumstances the will has influence. We are to learn what are the facts in the case. And we shall do well to remember, that the facts will be just what they are, whatever our speculations may be. If you say the will is the cause of the activity of the other mental faculties, you say what is partly true, and partly not true. It is a well-known fact that the faculties of our minds are frequently roused to action, and sometimes to the most intense action, by causes which operate independently of our previous choice, and even contrary to it. The convictions of a man's conscience, for example, do not always conform to the dictates of his will. Indeed, the chief power of the will over the other faculties, when it has any power, is to bring those objects before the mind, or those influences to act upon the mind, which are suited to produce the desired effect.

As to the affections and emotions in general, every man of reflexion knows, that there are appropriate causes on which they immediately depend, whether the will acts in directing

those causes or not. Take a few examples. We do not feel the emotion of *pity* because we *will* to feel it, but because some object comes before us which is suited to excite it. And if, at any time, we do will to have the emotion, we can excite it in no other way, than by bringing the proper object before the mind. And if that object happen to come before us without any previous volition on our part, the effect is of the same nature as though it had been presented before us by our own choice. Ordinarily a man is not *angry* because he previously *wills* to be angry, but because he receives some insult or injury. It is this, and not an act of the will, which kindles the emotion of anger. A man does not feel the emotion of *envy* because he wills or wishes to feel it, but because he sees others raised above him. And when the *cause* or *occasion* of this base passion exists, the passion frequently takes possession of the heart, in opposition to the will; and the man is conscious of a feeling of envy, which he wishes to avoid. The affection of *love* is called forth, not by the power of a volition, but by the sight of a *lovely object*. Whether such an object is brought before the mind by a previous act of the will, or in some other way, it excites the affection. Good men love God, not because they previously will to love him, but because they see him to be lovely and glorious. Whether their thoughts are turned to God voluntarily, or in some other way, it matters not; it is that divine object which excites their love. They do not wait for an order of the will. As soon as they see God, they love him. They may turn their attention to his character by an act of the will; or some word may be spoken in their hearing, or some event take place which directs their thoughts to God. But in whatever way he is presented before their minds, it is the sight of his character which kindles their love. And it is equally true, that an ungodly man hates God, not because he previously wills to hate him, nor because he turns his thoughts toward him for the purpose of exciting his hatred, but because the character of God is contrary to his unholy, selfish heart. However such an object is presented to his view, his enmity will be excited as the consequence. And in whatever way the thoughts of men are turned to God, their affections toward him have a direct relation to the moral law. Love to God is obedience; and obedience is holiness. Hatred of God is disobedience; and disobedience is sin. And this is equally true whether a man's act in loving or hating is the direct or indirect effect of a previous volition or not.

Some have said that love to God and enmity against God, are themselves *acts of the will*, and are therefore of a moral nature. The propriety of this representation depends on the extent of meaning which is given to the word *will*. But at the present day, there are few, if any, distinguished writers, who use the word *will* in the wide sense which it formerly had, including all the affections and emotions, as well as the executive volitions,—it being so evident that there is a foundation in the constitution and operations of the mind, for a distinction between *affections* and *volitions*.

There is nothing in moral philosophy which is, in my view, more false, or more plainly pernicious, than the position, that no emotion or affection is morally good or evil, until it is voluntarily repeated and cherished,—a position which makes the character of the exercises of the mind depend, not on their *nature*, but on their circumstances. The position contradicts the decision of conscience and common sense. If the inward monitor and judge pronounces any sentence promptly and decisively, it is, that a rational being does what is morally right and commendable, when he truly loves God, and what is morally wrong when he hates God, whether the emotion of love or hatred is the first, or the second, or the tenth in a series. Conscience, if unperturbed, looks at things *as they are*; and it sees that the *first* emotion of love or of enmity is of the same nature with any subsequent emotion. It would never occur to plain common sense, that while love to God is the grand virtue of a Christian, his first act of love is no virtue at all; or that, while the first act of love to God is destitute of goodness, following acts of love to the same object are morally good. The repetition of an affection may increase its strength, but cannot change its nature. If there is no sin in the first emotion of enmity, what law of God or of conscience forbids us to repeat and indulge it? Does not our instinctive conviction and feeling, that we ought not to repeat and cherish enmity to God, imply that any emotion of enmity is sinful? Indeed, is not the fact that the emotion of love or hatred to God rises *spontaneously* in the heart of a man, as soon as the object is presented, a clearer evidence of the goodness or badness of his character, than the same emotion when elicited by his voluntary effort? If a rational being is completely holy, he has no occasion for any effort of will to excite his love to God. The affection is kindled as soon as he sees the object. And the same is true of *enmity*, in a moral

agent who is the subject of entire and unrestrained depravity. The emotion of enmity rises instantly, whether he wills it or not, as soon as the real character of God comes before his mind. That the goodness or badness of a man's character is specially manifested by the *spontaneous* exercise of his affections in view of their appropriate objects, is, I think, clear and certain to an unbiassed conscience.

The scheme I am opposing is manifestly contrary to the *divine law*. That law extends over the whole of our intelligent and moral existence, and requires our *first* affections, as really as any subsequent affections, to be holy. If an intelligent being at the commencement of his existence truly loves God,—if his first emotion, however feeble, is an emotion of love, he so far obeys the divine law. The law says nothing of circumstances. It requires that one thing, *love*. If at any time, and in any circumstances, an intelligent being loves God, his love is obedience; and obedience is holiness. No other view of the subject corresponds with the principles of the divine law.

The same view is to be taken of the divine *prohibitions*. The law forbids pride, selfishness, malice, envy, revenge. If any one, at any period of his life, has pride, selfishness, hatred, envy, or revenge in his heart, he is a transgressor. If at the very commencement of his being, he *begins* to have either of these affections, he *begins* to transgress. The law will no more excuse a man for the *first* exercise of these hateful affections, than for any subsequent exercise.

The scheme on which I have animadverted, tends to diminish in the minds of men the sense of the evil of sin, and to do away the difference between what is right and what is wrong. If men admit the idea that the first actings of selfishness, pride, and ill-will in their hearts are blameless, because they do not result from previous volitions, they will naturally conclude that these and all similar actings of the depraved mind, in subsequent life, are blameless, when they do not follow as effects from a previous volition. And as they will find this to be the case with a large proportion of their evil affections, they will of course excuse them, or palliate their guilt. And how pernicious the tendency of this habit of mind must be in regard to our spiritual interests, will be obvious to every one who carefully reflects on the subject.

It is well known that the philosophical scheme under consideration, is substantially the same with that which Dr. John

Taylor, Socinus, and Pelagius maintained. But the scheme has been and is rejected by orthodox ministers and churches, throughout Protestant Christendom, as subversive of the essential principles of the Gospel. The scheme is sufficiently exposed by Edwards, in his work on Original Sin; and I deem it unnecessary for me to say more on the subject.

In the article in the number of the Repository for January, 1844, page 124, line 11 from the bottom, after "otherwise," insert *with me*.

[Concluded in the next number.]

ARTICLE VIII.

SKETCHES IN GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. William S. Tyler, Professor in Amherst College, Mass.

INTRODUCTORY.

Socrates.

IN the first year of the ninety-sixth Olympiad (B. C. 396) there died at Athens a martyr to the truth—a victim to popular prejudice—who has been justly styled, by way of eminence, the Moral Philosopher, and whose influence, embodied in the Grecian Philosophy, will live and spread itself with the imperishable literature of Greece, till earthly knowledge shall vanish away. He was of humble origin, but Wisdom adopted him as her favorite son, and gave him a nature of unfading glory. The son of a statuary and a midwife, he playfully remarked, that, at different periods of his life, he followed the profession of each of his parents—that of his father in earning his daily bread, and that of his mother in developing the character of his numerous disciples; for in the height of his fame as a philosopher and a teacher, this aged sage claimed no higher pre-

rogative, than simply to *evolve* from his pupils the ideas and sentiments which lay dormant within them—a conception of *education* so just and true, that it has been incorporated into the very structure of the Latin and the English language. Yet in the education of himself, he had not only to cherish the growth of good seed, but to check the seminal principles of much evil. With the head of a Silenus, as he is described by a favorite pupil, and with all those gross propensities of which such a physiognomy is indicative, as he himself confessed, he formed a character of unblemished purity and extraordinary wisdom. With Xantippe for a wife, he congratulated himself on living in so fine a school of patience. When she pelted him with a storm of angry words within doors, he avenged himself by teaching his sons a lesson of filial duty to their mother. When she threw water on him, as he left the house, he *dryly* remarked, that rain was to be expected after so much thunder. With Crito for a patron, and several of the chief men of Athens for his providers, he lived in a style of the plainest simplicity and the strictest temperance. More than two thousand years before the boasted era of the temperance reform, he had discovered the fundamental principle of that reformation, and recommended to those who were given to appetite, as the only rule which would afford them safety, entire abstinence from such articles of diet and luxury as stimulated them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when they were not thirsty.

In an age of Sophists, he taught a true philosophy and a genuine eloquence. The style and spirit, as well as the result, of his teaching may be seen in the following tribute from the pleasure-loving yet aspiring Alcibiades, as recorded in Plato's Banquet of Philosophers: "When I heard Pericles or any other great orator, I was entertained and delighted, and I felt that he had spoken well. But no mortal speech has ever excited in my mind such emotions as are kindled by this magician. Whenever I hear him, I am, as it were, chained and fettered. My heart leaps like an inspired Coryphant. My inmost soul is stung by his words, as by the bite of a serpent; it is indignant at its own rude and ignoble character. I often weep tears of regret, and think how vain and inglorious is the life I lead. Nor am I the only one that weeps like a child and despairs of himself; many others are affected in the same way." Never was there penned a more perfect description of true effective eloquence. The eloquence of the pulpit especially should be that

of Socrates. The hearer should go away, not thinking how well the orator has spoken, but stung to the inmost soul, indignant at his own rude and ignoble character, and weeping tears of shame and repentance over his vain and inglorious life.

In an age of polytheism and idolatry, and among a people proverbial for their superstition, Socrates taught, so far as uninspired reason can teach, a true and spiritual religion. He believed in one supreme and eternal God, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, and just, and good, who created the universe, who governs the natural and the moral world, who hears prayer, who gives wisdom to those that ask it of him, and who will reward the truly pious by the everlasting enjoyment of himself, in a future life. Socrates furnished the elements and outlines of Paley's Natural Theology; it is greatly to be regretted that he had not contributed as largely to the Moral Philosophy. For the system of the heathen moralist is as much superior to that of the Christian, as virtue is a higher and better end than happiness, and the claims of duty are paramount to the considerations of personal interest.

In like manner, his sentiments on providence and prayer, as they were not only uttered by his lips, but illustrated in his life, might well put to the blush many a doubting and many a philosophizing Christian. His was an intelligent and yet an unwavering faith, a childlike trust in superior wisdom—the truly believing spirit acting itself out habitually in a corresponding life. Amazed that men should be so easily swayed from a course of known duty by the flatteries or the frowns of the world, he declared that he would no more swerve from that path when disclosed to him by the wisdom of God, than he would follow a blind and ignorant guide in preference to one who had the clearest vision and the most perfect acquaintance with the road he wished to travel. With humility only equalled by his wisdom, he simply prayed, that God would give him good things, without further specification, since the Deity knew infinitely better than himself what things are truly good. To pray, as too many did, for pleasure, power, riches, or any so-called earthly good, was as foolish in his estimation, as to pray for a game of chance, or any thing else, which was as likely to prove a bane as a benefit, and might peradventure involve his utter ruin. In the same spirit of deference to divine authority, he bowed to the oracular response, which pronounced him to be the wisest of men, but he modestly put this construction upon it: Others thought they

knew far more than they did know; he was sensible he knew almost nothing: and in this particular he must acknowledge his own superiority to them. Yet the modesty of Socrates was at the farthest possible remove from the affected ignorance of the skeptic. He had a moral and religious creed, to which he held with unbroken firmness, and which linked him to the Eternal throne. He was modest, not because he knew nothing, but because there was so much more which he did not know. This modesty was that of the philosopher, when he looks out over a boundless universe—and like that of the Christian, when he looks up to an infinite God.

Socrates was a reformer in politics, as well as in religion. With a devotion to his country which often led him to peril his life in her service, and a deference to her laws and lawfully constituted authorities which would not let him evade, when he might, the execution of her unjust sentence against himself, he at the same time made no secret of his dislike for her ultra-democratic constitution, and the tyrannical exercise of unlimited power by her excited populace. With a consistency not to be found in the ultra-democracy of modern times, the Athenians asserted their perfect mutual equality, by casting lots for public officers among the entire list of citizens. Socrates told them that not a man of them would be such a fool as to act upon the same principle in the selection of a pilot, or a musician, or in the pettiest of all his private concerns. In his defence, written by Plato, and imagined to be spoken before the people, (a fictitious defence, indeed, but yet true to the character and spirit of Socrates,) he assures them that they have always ostracised or condemned by form of law, or otherwise persecuted their most distinguished citizens, and no man can expect to live long, who tells them the truth, or advises them for their good.

Here we see the secret of his accusation, condemnation, and death. He taught his fellow-citizens a wisdom too pure, spiritual and sublime for their comprehension. He told them truths which they could not bear to hear; and they sent him the cup of hemlock. His last hours he spent with his disciples, conversing on the immortality of the soul. He bade them to dispose of his body as they saw fit; but to conceive of Socrates as an emancipated, happy spirit. His last words are variously interpreted. We cannot speak of them with confidence. But may we not hope they were not the words of an idolater? Do not his known character and established opinions authorize, if not

require us to give them an allegorical interpretation? "Offer a cock to Esculapius;" as if he had said, "Render a thank-offering to the God of health; I am almost well. I shall soon recover, and rise to a higher, better life." Words, thus understood, worthy to fall from the lips of the dying Christian! The whole scene was so affecting that his disciples were bathed in tears; and Cicero says, he could never read of it without weeping!

Socrates may have had his blind panegyrists—his indiscriminate admirers. Doubtless he has. Perhaps the writer is among them. If any think so, we would only say, with his disciple and biographer, Xenophon: Compare any other man's character with his—take into view the age in which he lived, and the difficulties which he encountered, and then decide between them. Quite sure we are, he has had his unjust censure—his unreasonable detractors. Critics and theologians have united to misrepresent and decry him.

Macaulay has done him no little injustice, in his brilliant and fascinating, but partial and sophistical review of Bacon. He represents him (on the authority of Bacon, too, he would have us believe) as the author of a reformation, which was far from being an improvement in the Greek Philosophy—as the father of a system of barren speculation, which could not condescend to the humble and degrading office of ministering to the comfort of human beings, and which gloried in nothing so much as its splendid unprofitableness. But is this said of *Socrates*—who stanchd the wounds of the bleeding Xenophon, and bore away from the battle-field the fallen Alcibiades; who cheered the solitary artisan in his shop, and instructed him in the principles of his art; who, by his wise counsels and his personal influence, comforted so many desponding minds, and soothed so many aching hearts; who reconciled family feuds, regulated social and convivial entertainments, and put a check to legislative and judicial injustice; who silenced the declamations of sophists, baffled the rage of tyrants, and withstood the lawless violence of the popular assembly: in a word, whose characteristic glory it was, in the opinion of the academic Cicero, that he brought Philosophy down from heaven to earth, and made her the companion and guide of men in the private walks of life? Surely, here must be some mistake. There was doubtless ground enough for such a charge against many of the so-called Socratic schools of speculative philosophy, which were founded by his

disciples. Plato may be obnoxious to it, whom the reviewer represents as watering the tree which Socrates planted, but who in fact cultivated quite another tree, or inoculated it in almost every branch with buds from other and far less fruitful stocks. But *fruit* was the aim and end of Socrates, not less than of Bacon himself; and we could scarcely have found language more truly characteristic of the Athenian, than that which Macaulay has employed to set forth in contradistinction the spirit of the English philosopher. If any man was ever marked for "*a philanthropy so fixed in his mind that it could not be removed, a majestic humility, and a persuasion that nothing is too insignificant for the attention of the wisest, which is not too insignificant to give pleasure or pain to the meanest,*" that man was Socrates. Again, in the extended comparison, which the reviewer draws between Plato and Bacon, as to the views they severally took of the proper use of the mathematical and physical sciences—such as Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Medicine, his description of Bacon, not of Plato, is manifestly characteristic of Socrates. Hear him. He holds, in substance, the following language, though somewhat condensed: "Plato would have his disciples apply themselves to these studies, not that they may be able to buy or sell, or measure land, or steer a vessel; not that they may qualify themselves to be book-keepers, or travelling merchants, or surveyors, or practical navigators, but that they may discipline their minds, cultivate their rational and spiritual faculties, withdraw their attention from the ever-shifting spectacle of this visible, tangible world, and fix it on the immutable essence of things. Bacon, on the other hand, valued these sciences only on account of their uses, with reference to that visible and tangible world which Plato so much despised. He speaks with scorn of the mystical Arithmetic of the later Platonists, and laments the propensity of mankind to employ on mere matters of curiosity powers, the whole exertion of which is required for purposes of solid advantage." Now hear Xenophon's account of Socrates' views. "Socrates recommended the study of Geometry, so far as to be able, if need be, to *measure off land*, in exchanges or divisions of estates, or to show others how the work is to be done. But he disapproved of extending the study to perplexing diagrams, and complicated propositions; *for of what use that could be he did not see. Such studies were sufficient to wear out a man's life, and kept him from other and more useful pursuits.*"

Equally practical were his views of Astronomy and medicine. Natural philosophy, as then understood, he renounced entirely, for two reasons—both mistaken, as is proved by the present state of the physical sciences, but both indicative of a mind eager almost to excess in the quest of fruit, viz. : the laws which govern the elements of the heavenly bodies could never be ascertained, in the first place ; and in the second place, if they could, they were entirely beyond our reach, and so incapable of being subjected to our *use*. Is this a philosophy that disdains to be useful ? If any fault is to be found with it, it is too utilitarian. It does not attach due importance to these studies as a means of disciplining the mind.

The reviewer informs us that *Bacon*, in the first edition of his *de Augmentis*, enumerated *mental discipline* among the advantages of mathematical study. But in an edition published twenty years later, he omits all reference to that collateral advantage, and asserts that the mathematics can claim no higher rank than that of an appendage to other sciences and a handmaid to Natural Philosophy. So it required in Bacon himself the study and experience of a long life to become as Baconian as Socrates—as stanch and exclusive an advocate for usefulness as that father of a barren and speculative philosophy—as orthodox as that great heresiarch of antiquity !

In our view Socrates occupies the happy medium—the juste milieu—between Plato and Bacon in this respect. His powers of speculation and imagination were not inferior to those of Plato. But he did not allow them so loose reins. He gave them a more practical and useful direction. His powers of observation and common sense were not less quick or sagacious than those of Bacon. But he did not confine them in their exercise so much to the material world. He chose to direct them towards higher and better objects. Like Plato, he dwelt chiefly in the province of mind. Like Bacon, he labored there only to do good. He was a better Platonist than Plato, because he speculated more wisely, and better knew his own spirit. He was a better Baconian than Bacon, because he explored a better world, and discovered richer clusters of *fruit*. Plato never contemplated with more rapt admiration the divine beauty of truth and virtue. Bacon never sought after wisdom with more child-like docility at the oracles of nature and of God. He was less proud and vain than Plato ; less earthly and grovelling than Bacon. Plato was certainly not so much a Christian philosopher

as Socrates; and we sometimes fear Bacon was not so much of a Christian man. With the aid of revelation, he would probably have combined the excellencies of both, without the faults of either.

And this brings us back to the other of the two points, which we suggested, but which we did not intend should occupy us so long. We said, critics and theologians have united to misrepresent and decry him. We have done with the critic. Let us pass to the theologian. He too shall be a popular author—his theology a standard work. We refer to Dick; though his is only a specimen of wholesale denunciation of heathen philosophy, which is too common in theological works, and which is as bad policy as it is questionable morality. Near the beginning of his theology, he speaks thus of Socrates: "Were this wisest of men according to the oracle, this pattern of every excellence according to the nonsensical panegyrics of pedants and fools, now to appear among us, no man with correct ideas of piety and morality would choose to be seen in his company." However much Dr. Dick's reputation for virtue might have suffered from the society of Socrates, we think he might have learned from him a lesson of meekness, modesty, and Christian charity. Such language may befit a heated polemic in the excitement of a doubtful discussion. But it ill becomes a grave Doctor of Divinity, in the calm advocacy of unquestionable and infallible truth. Between the philosopher and his critic, it can harm only the latter; and if the mischief ended there, we would only cry, for shame! and pass over the stricture in silence. But it injures also the cause it was designed to subserve. It incurs the suspicion of weakness, where there is impregnable strength: *Haud istis defensoribus tempus eget*. Christianity asks no such boastful, yet timid and feeble advocacy. When the sun rises in his majestic brightness, he sends no pioneer to go before him and extinguish the lesser lights. On the contrary, the brighter the stars that fade away at his approach, the more emphatic and impressive is their silent homage. Rather let Socrates stand forth in all the purity and dignity of his noble nature—invest him with all the charms of mere earthly wisdom, and then let him bow down and worship at the feet of Jesus. We love to think of Socrates as a sort of type and forerunner of Christ under the dispensation of Providence. The Philosopher too went about doing good, instructing the ignorant, reclaiming the vicious, comforting the afflicted, and conversing with the poor.

The Philosopher also taught the people in parables ; presenting truth in the most perspicuous and impressive manner ; illustrating it by familiar objects and pursuits, making the brute animals to rebuke the ignorance and stupidity of men, and giving a tongue to every thing in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, to bear witness for truth and virtue and God. The Philosopher awed his opposers, so that they durst not ask him any more questions ; silenced his accusers, stood unabashed before judges and magistrates, and when his followers were overwhelmed by the approaching execution of his unjust sentence, he administered to them that consolation which most men would have needed to have administered to themselves in such an hour of trial. The Philosopher had numerous and powerful friends, who at his call would have hastened to his rescue ; but he was born to die a martyr to the truth, and he was ready for the sacrifice.

Would that we could go further and say, that Socrates prayed for the forgiveness of his enemies. But no ; he did not die for them. Socrates died only like a Philosopher, Jesus Christ died like a God ! Would that he had shown more of the tender sensibilities of our nature by commending in his last agony a mother, a wife, or some other helpless friend, to the care and affection of a beloved disciple. But no ; Socrates died like a Philosopher. Jesus Christ died like a man.

Socrates was sensible of his own ignorance and imperfection, as well as the blindness and depravity of his race ; and if we may credit Plato, he anticipated the advent of one like Jesus of Nazareth, of humble origin, yet heavenly wisdom, who should be a Divine Teacher and yet a martyr to the cause of truth and mankind. We are not prepared to join with a venerable father of the ancient Church in saying : Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis. We cannot admit the probability, that many of the heathen will be saved without the gospel ; for very few of them live and die in a state of mind to embrace the Saviour, if revealed to them. But we cannot refrain from indulging the hope, that one who possessed so much of the Christian spirit, will one day join with Christians in casting their crowns at His feet, who is the fountain of wisdom and goodness in every age.

Socrates did not himself commit to writing his philosophical system, though he had a system of moral philosophy well digested in his own mind. Content to live in the minds and hearts and writings of his numerous disciples, he gave himself up to

the fulfilment of his mission, which was to exert a direct, controlling, personal influence over as many as possible of all classes of his fellow citizens. The multitude were his hearers in the crowded market-place. Men of rank and wealth, statesmen and scholars, poets and historians, orators and philosophers, were among his followers. Seven distinct schools of philosophy grew up among his disciples, and vied with each other for the honor of bearing his name. Four of them were established in Athens. There—in that seat of literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, that city of Minerva and the Muses—surrounded by all that can inspire a generous and noble emulation, they struggled long and hard for the pre-eminence. And thence they sent out an influence, which has been felt, for good or for evil, in every subsequent age, sometimes lending the sanction of antiquity and a great name to a time-hallowed error; sometimes contributing to the support and adding to the fascinations of a universal and perpetual truth; and always imparting at once stimulus and direction to the energies of many powerful minds. The Cynic sect had the fewest followers, and was the most short-lived. The Stoic has its admirers—its virtual disciples—to this day. Transplanted from its own native clime, it flourished even more in Roman than in Grecian soil. Its memory will never die while the name of Cato lives. Its spirit will be cherished, wherever Roman heroism and Roman virtue are admired. There will always be individuals—there will always be communities where the Stoic Philosophy will meet a cordial reception, and find a congenial home. But the Academic, and the Peripatetic are the sects, whose influence, ‘perennius aere,’ has been most wide-spread and enduring. Alternately they ruled the church and the world till the Reformation. Now the literary and theological world is almost equally divided between them. No other uninspired men have set their seal on such a mass of mind, as the founders of these two sects. Indeed Plato and Aristotle may be regarded as the impersonations severally of the ideal and the actual—those great antagonist principles or tendencies, which ever have and ever will agitate and divide mankind.

Plato.

Sprung from the noble stock of Cadmus and of Solon, endowed with a commanding form, and a countenance of rare intellectual beauty, educated in childhood in the best schools at

Athens, and spending eight of the brightest years of his youth under the teaching of Socrates, Plato was one of nature's noblemen, formed and finished by the nicest touches of the hand of art. Or, as the superstitious and imaginative Greeks will have it, he was the offspring of Apollo, and the god of song had no reason to be ashamed of his son—the pupil of the Muses, and they might well have been proud of his proficiency. Laid on Mount Hymettus, while his parents were employed in offering a sacrifice to the deities of the place, the bees came and filled the mouth of the infant with cells of honey, thus prefiguring, says Olympiodorus, the sweet and persuasive eloquence which flowed from his lips as from those of the aged Nestor: τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυνίων ἔειν αὐδῆ.

To complete the list of marvels, he was introduced into the Academy with the following romantic accompaniments: The night before, Socrates had one of those imaginative, half-prophetic dreams, for which he was remarkable. A young swan flew away from the altar which was consecrated to Love in the Academy, and alighted on the lap of Socrates, and at length rose into the air with an enrapturing song. As the philosopher was relating the dream the next morning to his disciples, Ariston came with his son. Struck with the external appearance of the youth, which bespoke superior genius, he turned to his pupils and said: There is the swan of the Academy. Another account, still more exquisitely tasteful and appropriate, makes the swan to have been *destitute of wings* when it first alighted in the lap of Socrates; but there it immediately acquired wings, and flew away with so sweet a song as to charm all the hearers.

It suits not our present purpose to follow Plato while perfecting his education by foreign travel, and at the same time imparting more valuable instruction than he received; nor while making his three successive visits to the court of Syracuse, which he succeeded in converting for a season into a school of morals and philosophy; but where he was ere long in imminent danger of losing his liberty, if not his life, at the hands of the capricious tyrant. These embrace almost all the *incidents* which diversify his long and, for the most part, happy life.

Romantic and instructive as some of these incidents are, we would exchange our knowledge of them all for a minute history of a single month of his more private life, as a teacher in the Academy, and a student at home. A home, in the ordinary sense, he had not; for, wedded only to Philosophy, he lived exempt

alike from family cares and family joys. A *scholar's* home he doubtless had and loved, where he spent much time absorbed in his beautiful speculations, and delighted in weaving them into that graceful and enduring form, in which they have come down to us. But a veil of impenetrable darkness hangs over it. We strive in vain to catch a glimpse of his personal and intellectual habits in that retirement where such a spirit chiefly lives, and moves, and has his being. None but Plato could write the life of Plato. A faithful autobiography is what we need to give us an insight at once into his character and his works. Compared with such a delineation of his own private and inward life, as he could have furnished us from his own pen, the best biographies extant are meagre chronicles, and all the commentaries that were ever written on the Platonic Dialogues, are idle romance. As to the Academy, we read enough of its outward attractions; its gently flowing stream, and lofty plane-trees, its statues, and temples, and altars, and tombs; enough of the crowds that were attracted thither, not so much by the charms of the place as by the fame of Plato, many from distant cities, and some women even in men's attire. But what we want is a copy of the Academic "Laws," or the last "Annual Catalogue," or something answering to those very satisfactory, though not very classical exposés of our modern systems of education. Or a "file of morning papers" containing full reports of the "last evening's Lecture or Debate" in the Academy, would let us into the very midst of the school, to breathe its air, and catch its spirit. But unhappily for us, (we will not say for them,) the ancients had no press to stereotype and transmit to posterity those minute features of every-day life, which are "the very form and pressure" of the age. If *our* age has any thing worth knowing, it will be known and preserved. If it has not, that too will be known. For every phase of social, and, to a great extent, of individual life, is now daguerreotyped, as it passes; and our greatness and our meanness, our wisdom and our folly, our knowledge and our nonsense, will all be open to the inspection of the curious in subsequent times.

The circumstances of Plato's death, as they are transmitted to us by the wonder-loving Greeks, are as poetical as those of his birth and early life. At once a teacher and a scholar to the last, he died on the first day of his eighty-second year, through the mere decay of his physical nature, in the full possession of his mental faculties, breathing out his life in soft slumber among

friends at a wedding banquet. He was buried near the Academy, in the Ceramicus, the Westminster Abbey of Athens. And the Athenians erected for him in the same place a monument with this inscription: Apollo had two sons, Esculapius and Plato—the one to heal the body, the other to cure the soul.

Plato's moral character has been assailed, like that of his master, and with as little reason. Not that we think him as fine a specimen of high moral development as his master. He certainly had not the broad philanthropy, the practical piety, the truly Roman patriotism, and high moral courage of Socrates. We doubt whether he had all his modesty, or unaffected simplicity, or single-hearted love for the truth. But the positive vices with which he has been charged, would never have been heard of but for the jealous rivalry of contending sects, and are quite inconsistent, not only with the direct testimony of unprejudiced witnesses, but with the entire spirit of his writings, and the uniform tenor of his life.

His intellectual constitution will be more or less highly appreciated by different minds, according as it is more or less congenial to their own taste. We may as well plead guilty at once to the charge of not admiring his philosophy. Of course we shall be pronounced incapable of understanding it. We are not anxious to exculpate ourselves from this accusation. We only say to our readers, let him among you that is without sin in this respect cast the first stone. There are some features in the character of Plato, which no one can mistake, who knows his history, and has read, to any considerable extent, his works.

With small powers of observation, he gave himself up almost entirely to reflexion and reason. Instead of exploring the world to see how it is made, he sits down in his study, and draws out of his own reason and fancy a system of geography and geology, which to him is just as real as if it had been the result of the most patient observation and induction. In like manner, in astronomy and physical science in general, the only inquiry worthy of a philosopher is, how is it *best* that things should be constituted? That once determined, the all-wise Creator of the universe must of course have constituted them so.

Physical science, however, received very little attention from Plato. We hear of his going to Sicily among other things to examine Mount Ætna. But when he arrives we hear no more of the volcano, we find him teaching the pure mathematics and the Platonic Philosophy in the court of Syracuse. The soul of

man, its spiritual nature, and high capacities, its origin and destiny; the Deity, his essence, and his relations to the universe; being in general, its attributes and laws—such were the themes on which he delighted to dwell. What is the essence of knowledge? what is the nature of virtue? what constitutes true piety? what are the laws of legitimate reasoning? what would be a perfect state of society? what is the highest good of the individual man?—these are some of the questions which most exercised his thoughts. And in the discussion of them, he discovers a singular fondness for abstract ideas, for subtle and remote analysis. He can be satisfied with nothing short of the *essential, elementary principle* of knowledge, of virtue, of piety, and of being in general. What we regard as simple ideas, and therefore incapable of definition or analysis, are but the first steps in his analytical processes. He would fain apply a further abstraction to the most abstract conceptions of the human intellect. As might be expected, we find him making little progress in such inquiries. He refutes easily enough the answers of others. But it is not so easy to give a satisfactory answer of his own; and very often he does not even make the attempt. Many a long dialogue is nothing but a graceful tissue of beautiful negations.

An enthusiastic admirer of mathematical science, he would allow no one to enter the Academy, who was unacquainted with geometry. But it was only the *pure* mathematics that he commended. He eschewed all physical and mechanical applications as quite degrading the heaven-born science. And he would gladly have reduced *intellectual and moral philosophy* to a system as purely abstract and ideal as the pure mathematics.

Plato's reasoning, so far as it was based on the causal relation at all, was from cause to effect, rather than from effect to cause. He inferred the actual from the logical, not the logical from the actual—how things are, from how they ought to be, not how things ought to be from how they are. A monstrous *ἵστανον πρότερον*, as it appears to us! Yet this strange inversion of the reasoning faculty seems to have been as natural to most of the old Greek philosophers, as it is to the German metaphysicians of our own day. Plato would not condescend to call any thing a cause except the reason, which rendered it *best* for a thing so to be. *Final* causes were the only causes that should be investigated, whether in physics or in metaphysics.

But Plato was more inclined to reason from analogy, than

from the relation of cause and effect. He is often merely adducing analogies, when he seems to think he is establishing logical conclusions. And he relies upon the result of an analogical process with undoubting confidence, as not merely affording a presumption, but creating a certainty, so far as any thing is certain. By far the greater part of the famous arguments for the immortality of the soul in the *Phædo*, are drawn from analogy, and cannot fail to strike the modern reader as rather specious than sound—more pleasing than convincing. They are hasty generalizations of an abstract nature, and to our American intellects scarcely furnish presumptive evidence of the doctrine to be proved. Is there not something puerile and almost ludicrous in an argument like this for instance: A person becomes greater from having been previously smaller, smaller from having been greater; worse from better, better from worse; awake from asleep, asleep from awake; and therefore(?) must he not only from alive become dead, but also from dead, alive again! Yet this is the substance of his principal argument for the immortality of the soul! If there is any truth in phrenology, the upper and middle portion of “the frontal bone” must have been enormously developed in Plato’s cranium. Such a predominance of “the reflective” over “the perceptive faculties,” and of “comparison” over “causality,” would have furnished a capital subject for a Gall or a Spurzheim.

Tradition has transmitted to us one characteristic feature of Plato’s cranial structure. He is even said by some authorities to have derived his *name** from a singular *breadth* of his *forehead*. The Phrenologist would explain this feature by a large development of the organs of Wit and Ideality, and in the correspondence between this outward development and the known character of the Philosopher, would perhaps find a confirmation of his science. One thing is certain. Plato must have had those faculties in large measure. His wit was playful rather than severe. He was often humorous, not so often sarcastic. His temper was probably too mild and generous to indulge his wit in any malignant sallies. But he exhibits in its perfection the good-natured, yet effective irony of his master. Plato’s Socrates never strikes down his adversary at a blow with the fiery logic of Demosthenes, and then “with the abrupt and

* *Πλάτων*, from *πλατύς*, broad.

terrible interrogations of the same orator, tramples him in the mire." But he plays upon him the shafts of railery and good humored ridicule, till he drives him from his position—sometimes from his presence, to the no small merriment of the spectators.

But Ideality was the grand, distinctive feature of Plato's character. Ideality gave their coloring, if not their cast, to all his conceptions. Ideality shed its rainbow hues over the Universe, as he beheld it. Perhaps we should say, it *created* an ideal universe, which concealed from his view the real. He fashioned for himself an ideal earth, an ideal heaven, an ideal man, and an ideal republic. He imagined a sort of world of ideas, distinct alike from the creation and the Creator, pure and perfect, eternal and immutable, which constituted the only proper field of scientific investigation—in which the Philosopher should live, and move, and have his being. Plato was not insensible to the sublime and beautiful in nature. He admired them still more in literature and the arts. The moral sublime and beautiful, he worshipped with idolatrous veneration. Even such an object of worship was the ideal Socrates, whom he introduces as the leading character in all his dialogues, invests with many imaginary qualities, and commends to our reverence and our love. He must have been enamored of many of his own creations, as Narcissus was of his own image in the fountain. Even such a creation was his fancy sketch of our world, of which he conceived the known part to be but a comparatively narrow, dark, and deep chasm, filled with murky vapors, deformed by mountains and marshes, and inhabited by ignorant and guilty men; while around the brink of the chasm, (like our earth around the sea,) spread out broad Elysian fields, where better men trod on sparkling gems, breathed the pure ether and walked among the stars. But it was in his world of ideas, of which we have spoken, that his sense of the sublime and beautiful found its highest gratification. There his rapt spirit gazed on beauties which eye has not seen, listened to music which ear has not heard, and swelled with emotions to which not even his seraph tongue could give utterance.

If Jupiter were to speak in the Greek tongue, says Cicero, he would borrow the style of Plato. Such was the estimation in which the ancients held Plato as a writer! Even the judicious Quinctilian is smitten with admiration, and not only calls

him the Prince of philosophers, but ascribes to him a Homeric and superhuman eloquence, insomuch that he is to be regarded as instinct, not so much with the genius of a man, as with the very spirit of the Delphic oracle.

Yet ancient critics were not all blind to his faults. Dionysius of Halicarnassus particularly censures Plato for the harshness of his metaphors and his bold innovations in the use of terms; and quotes from his *Phædrus* examples of the puerile, the frigid, and the bombastic in style. It must be admitted, that some of his earlier productions, to which class we suppose his *Phædrus* belongs, *are* florid, perhaps bombastic. Occasionally, in his later works, you meet with sentences which are artificial and turgid, or loose, wordy, and unmeaning. Many of his dialogues are excessively obscure. Some apology for this may be found in the subtle and tenuous nature of the subjects which he treats. But it should never be forgotten, that some writers are always perspicuous, that any author can make any subject intelligible which he understands himself, and that the only proper treatment of other subjects is not to treat them at all. We are aware that it is the custom of a certain class of critics to charge all the darkness there is in the case to the readers of Plato. We say nothing of the modesty of this assumption. But to our mind, it is a self-evident proposition, that there is real and unpardonable obscurity in the writer, be he poet, orator, or metaphysician, whom only half a dozen minds in all Christendom can understand, and they only as the result of the study of a long life. His countrymen and contemporaries complained of his obscurity. One of his ancient biographers records, that when near his end, Plato saw a vision. "He saw himself transformed into a swan, hopping from branch to branch, and flying from tree to tree, and thus perpetually foiling the efforts of the fowler to take him. Simmias, the Socratic philosopher, put this interpretation upon the vision. Plato will not be easy of apprehension to those who in subsequent times shall undertake to explain his works." Seldom has a dream or vision proved more prophetic. Scholars always have been and always will be disputing the meaning of Plato.

Still few, on the whole, have ever approached so near to perfection in the use of any language, as this same Plato has done in his best writings—particularly in his more practical and more purely Socratic Dialogues. Whenever he comes as it were under the influence of Socrates, we not only admire but

love him. Then he writes like himself—then he is perspicuous, natural, earnest, always beautiful, often sublime. The perfection of his style was among the last, as it ever was among the most strenuous, labors of his life. After his death, the beginning of his Republic was found in a process of revision so careful and thorough, as to evince an extreme anxiety to amend and improve the expression. He never attains to the nervous conciseness of Demosthenes, seldom to the artless simplicity of Xenophon. But there is a fertility of genius, a felicity of illustration, a delicacy of conception and expression, a harmony of language, an indescribable charm in the whole composition, which is scarcely to be found in any other prose writer, and which is, as Quintilian terms it, truly Homeric. Let him, who would learn the power of words as music to the ear and painting to the soul, study Plato. There lies his strength and true glory. Our transcendental friends will esteem it an unpardonable heresy; but we must utter the conviction of our own hearts, and, as we believe, the sentiment also of nine-tenths of all his English readers. We cannot but think there was in him far more of rhetoric than of logic, and more of poetry than of either. Much of his logic is mere rhetoric, and very much of his philosophy is Oriental poetry. His reason is just what we of more earthly mould have always called imagination. Taste usurps the place of judgment, and feeling is more sacred and more *real* than fact. His very faults as a reasoner contribute to his fascination as a writer. His analogies are not conclusive as arguments, but they are exceedingly attractive as illustrations. And no writer has a greater exuberance of them. Besides the more extended comparisons which form the very texture of his discourse, and which are always in good taste, however bad the logic may be, the reader is surprised and delighted at every step by the discovery of some graceful allusion—some new and slight perhaps, yet pleasing resemblance. His pictures, like those of the daguerreotype and like the productions of nature, are full of those minute yet completely delineated beauties, which escape a mere passing observation, and appear only the more perfect as they are subjected to a closer inspection. Quintilian says that from Plato, more than any other source, Cicero drank in his divine eloquence. That Plato himself could have become a brilliant and persuasive orator, none can doubt after reading his bold, manly, and irresistible Defence of Socrates. Swayed by its truthful and

earnest appeals, inspired by its pure and lofty spirit, we only wish it could have been delivered before the judges of Socrates, and we could have sat by and seen them alternately blush and turn pale before it. It would doubtless have exasperated them, but it would also have made them tremble. We are told that, when young, he composed poems, but seeing their inferiority to those of Homer, he committed them to the flames. Many a beardless scribbler, with infinitely less of the poet's soul in him than Plato, has given his effusions to the public, and gone on composing rhymes all his days without once suspecting their inferiority to the minstrelsy of the Prince of Grecian Bards. His dissatisfaction with his first attempts only proves, that Plato had set up for himself a higher standard. We suspect he would have returned to his lyre, and succeeded, had he not fallen in with Socrates, in whom the beautiful and the true were so harmoniously blended as to captivate the whole soul of the aspiring youth. Certainly he has given us every thing but the *metre* of poetry in his Dialogues. And his *diction*, Aristotle and Quintilian agree in characterizing as a middle species between prose and verse. He had a noble instrument to play upon—the Greek language in all the infinite flexibility of its nature, in all the matchless perfection of its highest development; the new Attic dialect, with all its soft, sweet, flute-like melody; and he drew from it strains of enchanting, unearthly music. The epigram which he composed in honor of Aristophanes might, with equal propriety, have been inscribed on his own tombstone: The Graces, seeking to find some sacred and imperishable abode, found the *soul* of *Plato*.

Aristotle.

From the Academy, we now pass to the Lyceum—from a contemplative and ideal, to a metaphysical and practical philosophy. From Plato, we turn to his most distinguished pupil—from the personified Rhetoric and Poetry to the embodied Logic and Metaphysics of Greece and the world.

The birth-place of Aristotle is commemorated in the surname by which he is familiarly known—the Stagirite. The influence of his parentage is perpetuated in his love for the physical sciences—his father was a physician in the court of Macedon, and traced the origin of his family back to Esculapius. Deprived of his parents at an early age, he left his na-

tive country, and after a short sojourn in Aternea, found a home in Athens—a father in Plato. Different as they were in the constitution of their minds, he soon attracted the attention of his master, and gained his admiration to such a degree as to become a favorite pupil. Plato used to call him the Mind of the school, and to say when he was absent: “I speak to a deaf audience; Intellect is not here.” After disciplining himself for twenty years in the Academy, and perhaps teaching rhetoric during a portion of the same time in a school of his own, he repaired to the court of Philip of Macedon, to take charge of the education of Alexander, then a youth of fifteen—a charge to which he had long before been invited in the most flattering terms by the father, who, in announcing the birth of the child to the philosopher, professed to be grateful to the gods, not so much for giving him a son, as for permitting him to be born in the time of Aristotle. Despite these extravagant expectations, Aristotle executed his trust to the entire satisfaction of pupil and parents. Philip admitted him to his public counsels, rebuilt at his request the town of Stagira, and restored to the inhabitants their ancient privileges, and gave him many other unequivocal tokens of gratitude and esteem. Alexander professed himself more indebted to his preceptor than to his father; since Philip had only given him life, while Aristotle had taught him the art of living well. And the truly noble character of the youthful hero, till it was marred by uninterrupted success; his command of his passions, till he was corrupted by flattery; his regard for literature, science and the arts; the surpassing greatness of mind which he displayed in all the earlier measures of his reign; and indeed the grand and comprehensive schemes of public policy which he was forming and maturing to the very last, go far to justify the sentiment of Alexander, and scarcely shed more lustre on himself, than they reflect upon his aspiring and far-seeing teacher.

Returning to Athens after an absence of some half a dozen years, and finding Xenocrates installed in the chair of the Academy, Aristotle established a rival school of philosophy in the Lyceum, a public grove in the vicinity of the city, which had been highly adorned by Pisistratus and Pericles, and was used as a gymnasium for military exercises. Here he held daily conversations with such as resorted to him, walking as he conversed; whence he and his followers derived the name of Peripatetics. He was present at the Lyceum twice every day. The forenoon

was devoted to his intimate pupils, to whom he then expounded the difficult parts of science ; his Esoteric Philosophy ; his subtle notions touching Being, Nature, and God. This he called his Morning Walk. In the evening, he admitted all who were desirous of hearing him ; and then he discoursed in a more familiar manner on subjects more closely connected with common life ; such as Rhetoric, Logic, Ethics, and Political Economy, which constituted his Exoteric Philosophy. This he called his Evening Walk. Aristotle continued his school in the Lyceum twelve years. Deprived of the patronage of Alexander, and regarded with a jealous eye on account of his intimacy with that ambitious prince ; conspired against by demagogues, and charged with impiety by the priests, he at length left Athens, with the observation (alluding to the condemnation of Socrates) that he would spare the Athenians the guilt of a second crime against philosophy. He retired, with most of his pupils, to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died soon after in the sixty-third year of his age, as some say, from poison administered by his own hand, but more probably from exhaustion and decay induced by excessive watchfulness and application to study. His body was conveyed to Stagira, where his countrymen, in reverence for his genius, and in gratitude for his services, did what they could to honor and preserve his memory by an altar and a tomb. But Aristotle has done far more to embalm and perpetuate the name of Stagira ; his was a chequered though by no means a romantic or eventful life. He received the highest honors which are bestowed on genius and learning. He experienced also the neglect and persecution which have too often been the allotment of gifted souls. His sun set in clouds ; but his name shines with increasing brightness, like a star of the first magnitude, through the darkening night of ages.

We shall give a somewhat more minute analysis of his character and habits, as we wish in the sequel to call attention particularly to him and his works. The person of Aristotle was far from commanding or prepossessing. His short stature and slender form gave additional pertinence and emphasis, if they did not in part give rise, to the surname of Intellect by which he was distinguished in the Academy. His eyes too were remarkably small. His nose (perhaps by way of compensation) seems to have been the most largely developed member. To complete the catalogue of his physical disadvantages, he is said to have lisped and stammered in his speech.

Conscious of his ungracious person, Aristotle is said to have been anxious to compensate for it by the richness and elegance of his dress. His mantle was of costly materials and brilliant colors. He wore rings of great value; and he shaved both his head and his face, while the other disciples of Plato wore long hair and long beards.

His diet was not luxurious, like his dress, but simple and wholesome. His constitution was naturally feeble; but he strengthened it by temperance and exercise; and, by a strict observance of the laws of health, in that proper union of physical with mental exertion which is so strikingly symbolized by his *Peripatetic* lectures, he enjoyed almost uninterrupted health through a long life of the most intense study and thought.

The natural disposition of Aristotle, we are inclined to think, was kindly, affectionate, and generous. In his *domestic* and *social* relations, he certainly does not show that cold, passionless and heartless character, which is so characteristic of his *works*. True, he did not marry till the unsusceptible, unpoetical age of thirty-seven—the very age, too, which his unbiassed judgment had pronounced to be the proper age for a man to marry. But it is the more remarkable that, at that period of life, he should be capable of a match of friendship and affection. Such was his marriage to the niece and adopted daughter of his deposed and murdered friend Hermias, whom he wedded, not when she was heiress to a throne, but when she was a fugitive and an exile, with no attractions but her personal charms, and no dower but her virtues. And when his wife, as well as his friend, was no more, so lavish was he in the tokens of his grateful and affectionate remembrance, so nearly divine were the honors with which he commemorated their virtues, that the Athenians charged him with impiety—with treason against the majesty of the gods. In like manner, after the death of his master Plato, he wrote verses in his praise, erected altars in honor of him, and inscribed upon his monument an epitaph of which a Latin version is preserved:

Gratus Aristoteles struit hoc altare Platoni,
Quem turbæ injustæ vel celebrare nefas,

But as he grew older, his generous nature seems to have been eaten up by his inordinate ambition. The desire of distinction and the pride of intellectual superiority prompted him to measures which were alike ungenerous and unjust. We give no

credence to the improbable story of his jealous and furious quarrel with the aged Plato. Of this the above epitaph were alone a sufficient refutation. We do not severely censure, indeed we scarcely wonder at his indignation and disgust at the preference of Speusippus and Xenocrates to himself in the succession to the Academic Chair. It was not unworthy of the man, though it was hardly becoming the philosopher, to cherish instead of checking the ardor and ambition which fired the breast of Alexander for the conquest of the Persians, who were esteemed the common enemies of all Greece, and to whose sovereign Aristotle felt a special animosity for putting to death his friend Hermias. All these offences against the purity or dignity of philosophy, we can overlook. But we know no apology, we can conceive of none, for the studied injustice with which he misrepresented the opinions of other philosophers, depreciated the wisdom of former ages, and erected his own edifice upon the ruins of every other structure, insomuch that Lord Bacon, with no less truth than severity, remarked, that "like a Turkish despot, he thought he could not reign secure, till he had first slain all his brethren." He seeks to disguise this injustice under the garb of zeal for the truth, as appears from a favorite adage of his, which has come down to us in a Latin dress: *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis tamen amica veritas*. But this is only adding insult to injury, as every reader feels, when he sees that this supreme regard for the truth is only a cover for vaulting ambition and overweening self-love. Aristotle had friends, and loved them; but they were personal, not literary. They might command his affections, and to some extent his services, but they must not interfere with his ambition. He had a heart, but he kept it at home. It never appears in his works, unless it be in the form of one absorbing passion—the desire of intellectual pre-eminence.

The ambition, of which we have been speaking, was not an unmixed evil. We are doubtless indebted to it in part for the prodigious exertions and no less prodigious achievements of this most intellectual of all philosophers. In him, exorbitant ambition, indefatigable industry, and extraordinary talents, conspired to do a work whose variety and vastness are amazing to look upon, and would be quite appalling when undertaken by almost any other man. Plato early observed of him, that he required the rein rather than the spur. In the Academy, his industry in perusing and copying manuscripts was unexampled, well

nigh incredible. He was named, *par excellence*, the reader, or the student. And he doubtless kept up these studious habits through life. Hence the astonishing fecundity of illustration from books, which is so apparent in his works. It would seem as if there were not an opinion in philosophy, or a fact in history, but he knows it and refers to it—not an oration ever spoken, or a poem ever sung, but he has read it and quoted from it.

His talent and industry were no less remarkable in the *observation*, whether of natural phenomena or of passing events. He was largely endowed with those perceptive faculties, in which Plato was so deficient. He would seem to have been formed by nature and education for universal knowledge. There is scarcely a phenomenon on the land or on the sea, in the air or in the starry concave, which he does not describe, as if from personal observation. There is scarcely an animal in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, which he does not speak of as if he had dissected its frame and learned from personal inspection all its habits. If we were called on to select at this day the book, which contains in the smallest compass the greatest number of curious and instructive facts touching every variety of animals, we do not know but it would be the Natural History of Aristotle. In reading it, though we know that the resources of the conqueror of the world were employed in furnishing the materials, and the energies of a master mind were long devoted to the examination of them, still we wonder how he came by such a vast accumulation of zoological knowledge in an age and country so little given to physical researches.

But remarkable as Aristotle was for the observation of facts, he was still more remarkable for the use he made of them by reflexion and reason. If we may be allowed to retain a phrenological classification which we borrowed in speaking of Plato, and which, whatever may be said of its metaphysical accuracy, is quite convenient in practical and descriptive analysis, those reflective faculties which had such undue prominence in Plato, were developed in Aristotle in wonderful harmony with his perceptive faculties. If we confine our attention to his *intellectual* nature, few minds were ever better balanced than Aristotle's. He had in due proportion the faculty of comparison, and he understood the legitimate use of it. We see it in the frequent and pertinent *illustration* of his doctrines by corresponding principles and analogous facts. His comparisons are

not mere figures of speech. They are designed to illustrate, not to embellish his discourse. His analogies are presented *as* analogies, not as proofs—as affording a presumption or confirmation, not as establishing a conclusion. Again we see it in his marvellous power of *classification*. He observes facts, not so much for the purpose of knowing them, as of arranging them in due order and method. An isolated fact, stated for its own sake, without regard to any principle—out of its relation to any system—would be an anomaly in this philosopher's works. In Natural History, he collects his materials before he touches his pen; and when he commences writing, his great business is to classify and explain them. *Comparative Anatomy* (in its broadest sense) was a favorite subject with him. We know of no one, who so well deserves to be called the Father of that science. In his works on Intellectual, Moral and Political Science, he uses facts to confirm and establish principles. For it is a mistake to suppose that Aristotle was unacquainted with the method of induction in Philosophy. Macaulay has shown conclusively, in the Review to which we have already alluded, that the ancient philosophers differed from the moderns—that Aristotle, for instance, differed from Bacon—not so much in the means which he knew how to employ, as in the ends which he chose to pursue. Had Aristotle sought to discover the elements and powers of nature, and to lay them under contribution to the necessities, the comforts or the pleasures of man, he would have used the Inductive Method. Any man would; for it is the dictate of common sense, which, we take it, is not so very uncommon as to be the exclusive prerogative of modern times. Aristotle *did* follow that method more or less in all his practical works. His rules in the Art of Poetry are either deductions from the practice of the best poets, or inferences from those facts in human nature, which the testimony of consciousness establishes. In like manner, his Rhetoric rests upon the twofold basis of mental consciousness and rhetorical usage. Even his Logic, which it has become so fashionable to decry, as wholly speculative, barren of utility, and remote from the practice of mankind, is neither more nor less than a classification or analysis, and a masterly one too, of the manner in which men actually reason, and always have reasoned, and always will, while they continue to reason correctly. And yet wise men and great men, ever since the time of Bacon, have plumed themselves on the discovery, that the syllogism can never lead

to the discovery of new truth, inasmuch as nothing can be deduced in the conclusion which was not already involved in the premises—a fact which Aristotle knew as well as Bacon or Reid—but a fact which detracts nothing from the merit of Aristotle, or the value he attached to the syllogism, since he never recommended it as a means of discovering new truth, but as a test of the proof by which known truth is professedly established, and never proposed it as a new method of reasoning, but only as a classification or analysis of the essential steps by which men must proceed if they would reason correctly. We might also take up the *Ethics* and *Politics*, and show that the author every where recognizes and proceeds upon the Inductive method. The latter, especially, as we may show more fully hereafter, was in its original and complete form an enlarged induction of political principles from observed facts, which can scarcely be matched in all the political treatises of modern times. But we cannot enlarge in this connexion. Let a few more Whateleys arise to bring back one science after another to the basis on which they were placed by Aristotle, and the public mind will at length be disabused again of a world of prejudice, which has too long pressed like an incubus on the name of the illustrious Stagirite. The fact is, that no one man ever did more to classify isolated facts, and to reduce to a system the undigested materials of human knowledge. This is the chief merit of Aristotle, as a philosopher. He would have done an incalculable service to the cause of science, had he merely set the example, and marked out the way. But in some departments, he seems not only to have marked out the way but to have arrived almost at the end of human attainment, as all would be more ready to allow, were they more familiar with his admirable but much neglected practical treatises, and as all do virtually concede who acknowledge the superiority of Whateley's *Rhetoric* and *Logic*, since the characteristic excellence of those works consists in a return to the essential features of the Aristotelian method.

We have said, that Aristotle had the faculty of comparison in due proportion. And we have shown that he knew how to use it. But causality was perhaps his leading organ. And reasoning from cause to effect, rather than from effect to cause, seems to have been his supreme delight. When he saw an effect, he was always eager to know its cause. He knew how to reason *à posteriori*, and he was not averse to it. This is evi-

dent from his Natural History, Meteorology, and other practical treatises, in which he, for the most part, proceeds from an observation of the facts to a discovery of their causes or principles. But he was more fond of *à priori* argumentation. He loved to retire beyond the boundaries of sense and dwell in a world of pure, untrammelled reason. He delighted to go back of phenomena, and revel among the essence and abstract qualities of things. This is most strikingly manifested in his Physics. This work has nothing to do with any of the subjects which make up our treatises on Chemistry and Natural Philosophy. It lies entirely back of these. It is made up of what we should call *meta-physical* disquisitions on the nature of time, place, motion, cause, essence, and the like abstractions. And if such be his Physics, what must his Meta-Physics be? If his Physics carry us beyond the boundaries of sense, whither will his Meta-Physics—his Beyond-Physics—conduct us? We leave the question for the imagination of our readers.

Judging from his *Works*, we should take Aristotle to be, just what he is commonly considered, the most remarkable example of pure Intellection, the world ever saw. If he observed facts, it was that he might reason upon them. If he used a comparison, it was always for the sake of illustration or confirmation, never for the sake of embellishment. If he had taste, it was wholly a judgment—scarcely at all a feeling. If he had imagination, it was wholly employed in conjuring up entities and quiddities for the exercise of his ratiocination. If he had wit, it discovered no incongruities, but those of an argument. If he ever laughed, it was at the awkward position in which he had put his adversary. If he ever wept, it was because he found himself in such a position. He writes upon Poetry without a sign of emotion—upon Ethics, as if virtue were an intellectual habit, rather than a state of the heart. His treatise on Rhetoric aims at furnishing the speaker with matter to the almost entire exclusion of manner. He discusses taste and imagination without a particle of either. He treats of the passions as if he had seen them in others, but never felt them himself. He tells all about figures of speech, but never perpetrates one bolder than a logical comparison.

Now when in addition to all this it is considered, that Aristotle was deficient in the organ of language, it is easy to imagine what sort of a figure he makes in his writings. He uses words, as if he was continually oppressed with the fear of ex-

hausting his meagre stock. Particles, in which the Greek language is singularly rich, and which so adorn the style of the elegant Plato, scarcely belong to his vocabulary. Rhetorical epithets would seem as much out of place in his writings, as flowers in a snow-bank. Nouns and verbs, coupled together by the causal conjunctions, compose the whole structure of his language. And there is not enough to clothe his ideas. Moreover they are put together in the clumsiest and most uncouth style imaginable. His translator must expand his language to twice its original compass, and reconstruct his sentences, and then he must alter the arrangement of whole paragraphs to suit the ear or the taste of an English reader. He uses a kind of shorthand language, which, as the inventor is not at hand to explain it, you must often study long before you can discover the clew by which it may be deciphered. He gives you his process, as it were, in algebraic signs—clear and satisfactory enough doubtless to the author, but he has forgotten to furnish his reader with any explanation of their significance. He sets before you, as it were, a series of geometrical diagrams, which, to his perspicacious view, are a sufficiently full and distinct image of his science, but which leave to his reader the not very easy task of making out for himself the propositions and demonstrations the best way he can. It is for this reason—his singular conciseness and obscurity—his absolute clumsiness and repulsiveness as a writer—that Aristotle has been so grossly misunderstood and so greatly depreciated. But whoever will take the trouble to break through so hard and rough a shell, will find himself richly rewarded when he comes at the kernel.

It is interesting to compare the founders of the Academy and the Lyceum. There is a marked contrast between them; and it extends to their persons no less than their characters; to their manner of life no less than their systems of philosophy. They were both of illustrious parentage; but Apollo was never fabled to have been the father of Aristotle, and no bees were ever fancied to have clustered around his lips in sleeping infancy. Fiction has adorned the birth of Plato with the most romantic tales, while history simply records of Aristotle, that he was born at Stagira, in the first year of the 99th Olympiad. Plato devoted much of his youth to the cultivation of poetry; Aristotle spent the same period of life in the study of medicine. Romance presided over Plato's introduction to the pursuit of philosophy; Science was the presiding genius at the

initiation of Aristotle. Plato's master called him "the Swan of the Academy;" Aristotle's master surnamed him "the Intellect of the School;" the latter was employed in copying manuscripts, collecting facts, and canvassing opinions, while the former was absorbed in studying his own nature, gathering in beautiful fancies, and writing imaginary Dialogues. Plato had a large frame and a comely face, but paid very little regard to dress or personal appearance; Aristotle's stature was diminutive and his features irregular, but he strove to compensate the disadvantage by the richness and elegance of his outward adornings. Aristotle was twice married; Plato, never—the former lived on earth, the latter in the air. Both visited Courts and instructed Princes; but the one trained his pupil to gain the mastery of the real world, while the other would fain have taught him to establish an ideal Republic. Each established a new and independent School; but the one sat before his pupils, and taught a speculative and musing philosophy, while the other walked among his scholars, and taught a practical and reasoning system. Plato was all Ideality, Aristotle had none. Plato was a better writer than reasoner, Aristotle could reason far better than he could write. Plato reasoned more by analogy; Aristotle more by induction. Both were too fond of *a priori* speculations: but the one believed in his, because he admired them as beautiful; the other held to his, because he thought he could prove them true. The one argued; the other felt: the one established by inference; the other saw by intuition. Plato's reason was seated very much in his heart; Aristotle's feelings lay wholly in his head. The one was the personification of German Idealism; the other the embodiment of Scotch Metaphysics. Aristotle would have made a good Englishman; Plato could not have breathed the air of London. Goethe has well characterized them:—Aristotle as a man of architectural genius who seeks a solid basis for his building, but seeks no further, who describes an immense circuit for its foundations, collects materials from all sides, arranges them, and lays one above the other, and thus ascends in a regular form pyramidally, while Plato, like an obelisk, nay, like a flame, seeks the heavens. We can readily conceive of them, as they are painted by Raphael in his School of Athens. * Aristotle with a look of

* See a fine article on Plato in the *Encyclopædia Americana*.

deep thought, and penetrating eyes directed forward; while Plato raises his eye and lifts up his right arm, as if testifying of the worlds above, like a prophet.

As compared with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are more brilliant and imposing, but less symmetrical and complete.—they are better fitted to dazzle and excite admiration. But he is the man to command our veneration and attract our love. Plato may have had more imagination and emotion; Aristotle more intellection and ratiocination—the heart may have been more developed in the one and the head in the other. But in Socrates, head, heart and hand; reason, feeling, and action, were all combined, duly proportioned, and perfectly harmonized.—Plato and Aristotle must have been put together to make a Socrates. They are the extremes, and he the mean, in a moral proportion. Or, to draw a better illustration from the analysis of light, in them are seen the separate colors of the spectrum, from the soft violet to the blazing red; in him those colors are blended into a pure and perfect white. He is like a plane mirror, which reflects the exact complexion of nature, and images every object just as it is. They are like refracting lenses, which form magnified or diminished images and clothe them with the brilliant hues of the rainbow. A writer of the transcendental school has grouped the three philosophers with other men of transcendental genius, and characterized them thus: There is a large class of writers, who take a side and defend it the best they can—such were *Aristotle*, Lucretius, Milton, Burke. A smaller class state things as they believe them to be—*Plato*, Epicurus, Cicero, Luther, Montaigne. Two or three disinterested witnesses have been in the world, who have stated the facts, as they are, and whose testimony stands unimpeached from age to age—such were Homer, *Socrates*, Chaucer, Shakspeare. These men never mistake. You might as well say there was untruth in the song of the wind, or the light of the sun.” Plato was great in writing, Aristotle in reasoning. Socrates might have been great in either, but he was chiefly great in that which is greater—in acting. They could shine in the Court and the School. So could he; but he could also rule in the Camp and the Forum. Aristotle could convince the understanding of men, and Plato could delight their fancy; but Socrates could sway their hearts and their lives. In them, you may admire the Poet, the Scholar, the Philosopher; in him, you must reverence the Hero, the Prophet, the MAN.

ARTICLE IX.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE
LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by O. T. Dobbin, D. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, England.

Continued from p. 459, Vol. XI.

PART II. *Arguments adduced to show that Christ, the Apostles, and all the Jews used the Hellenistic tongue.*

OUR former part has been devoted to an exposition of the means by which the Greek language was introduced into Palestine. Our present task is to sustain, as best we may, the position that all the Jews, Christ and his apostles, employed no other tongue as the common medium of their intercourse but this. We must, however, prelude our argument to this effect with a remark or two designed to throw light upon all that is to follow. We begin, then, with stating:

In the first place, that the Greek language was widely diffused throughout Palestine 199 years before the Christian era, and that under Antiochus Epiphanes it struck its roots deeply into the national mind. In the second place, that the Jews retained the use of the Chaldee until the time of the Maccabees, so as to be bilingual. Thus among themselves they used the Chaldee, which they called their *native tongue* (*linguam patriam*), and with foreigners the Greek, the vernacular language of their masters. This fact is proved by innumerable passages in the books of Maccabees, and the works of Flavius Josephus, which mark with sufficient clearness the distinction between the one as a recent introduction, and the other as native to the land. Thus, in the second book of the Maccabees, we read that the second brother replied to the one who asked him would he eat swine's flesh or die, in the following words in *his native tongue*, "I will not do it;" and again a little after it is said, "Their mother exhorted each of them in *their native language* boldly." So also when the mother was summoned by Antiochus, and enjoined to persuade her only surviving son to eat the swine's flesh, she promised the monarch, in Greek, that she would do as he desired, but directly addressing her son in his native idiom, urged

him to persist, and bending towards him, mocked the tyrant while she said, "Have mercy upon me, my son,—fear not this cruel monster," etc., etc.* Judas Maccabæus, too, when engaging in battle against Gorgias, addressed his soldiers in the same language; "Judas invoked the Lord to be their keeper and their leader in the fight, beginning in his *country's tongue*," etc., etc.† The Jews, moreover, when they had routed the forces of Gorgias, used it—for we read that "they shouted with tumultuous joy, and blessed Almighty God in their own tongue," etc., etc.‡

To the same cause must we attribute the excellency of 'he Syriac version, the translator's "*native tongue*" being the Aramean, as we gather from Second Maccabees 15: 37. This double use, however, gradually passed away, from the length and closeness of the intercourse maintained with the Greek settlers, who occupied the country for nineteen years, namely from 161 to 142 before Christ. From that period the Jews began to use the Greek exclusively, and to lay aside the Chaldee altogether. In the third place, we affirm, as we have already done more than once, that the Jews adopted no other dialect than the Hellenistic. By this we mean that the elder Jews, familiar with the Chaldee tongue, retained in their adopted Greek occasional Hebrew and Chaldee words and idioms: for instance, ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας, *son of perdition*, for an utterly abandoned person; τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου, *who will deliver me from the body of this death*, for *from this mortal body*; Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, *amen I say to you*, for *truly I say to you*; thus also εἰς γέεννάν into Gehenna, for *into the place of torment*; Ῥοῦνὰ for *save now*; Παῖσι for *master*; Παῖσι for *my master*; *heaven of heavens*, for *the highest heaven*; *to speak to the heart*, for *to comfort*; *do justice and judgment*, for *just judgment*, and unnumbered other instances of the same sort of which Solomon Glass,§ Brian Walton,|| and especially James Rheinfort, in his Syntagma of Dissertations on the

* Lib. 2 Mach. cap. 7, v. 8, 21, 27 et seq. [τῇ πατρῴῳ φωνῇ.] Joseph. de Imp. Rationis, p. 513, § 12, p. 517, § 16.

† Lib. 2 Mach. cap. 12, v. 36 et 37.

‡ Lib. 2 Mach. cap. 11, v. 19.

§ Glassius in Philologia Sacra.

|| Walton in Proleg. Polygl. p. 45 ad 48.

Style of the new Testament, treat more at large than we can venture upon here. That this dialect of Greek, called by Biblical critics the Hellenistic, prevailed among the Jews from the time of the Maccabees and was common to Christ and his apostles, I hope to demonstrate in this division of my essay. In the first place, then, as to its prevalence among the Jews in general.

CHAPTER I. *Designed to prove that from the age of the Maccabees, the Hellenistic dialect was the vernacular language of Palestine, and was that commonly spoken by the Jews.*†

§ 1. *The Jews composed their Books in the Hellenistic dialect from the time of the Maccabees.*

Most of the writers of antiquity, as was natural, composed their works in the dialect of their respective countries; but the Hebrews were impelled to the same practice, not only by the more obvious reasons, but also by a superstitious dislike to unnecessary communication with foreigners. They thought it unbecoming to study a foreign tongue, or be more than commonly versed in their own, because, as Josephus avers,* these were accomplishments shared by slaves. They therefore never wrote in any other language than that which was current among their own countrymen. Hence it was that, when the Jews spoke Hebrew, Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon, etc., wrote in Hebrew. In accordance with the same rule, when the Jews during the Babylonian captivity had taken up the Chaldee, we find Ezra, Daniel, and Nehemiah writing in that language. The Law, moreover, was translated into it, according to the testimony of the Rabbis Azariah† and Gedaliah.‡ When, then, from the age of the Maccabees, we find the Jewish books, canonical and uncanonical, alike (*κανονικοὶ ἀκανόνιστοι*) composed in the Grecian tongue, nay more, the Hebrew, and Chaldee books translated into that tongue, are we not constrained to own that about that time the Greek was the familiar and vernacular language of the Jews?§

* Joseph. in *Antiquitat.* in fine.

† R. Azar. in lib. *Meor Enaim*, cap. 8 et 9.

‡ R. Gedalias apud Waltonum, 9 Prol. p. 60. n. 14.

§ [In codice Megilla, fol. 18, lingua Græca Judæis dicitur vernacula.—ED.]

Let us, however, glance at these books and their authors in detail. We begin with those in the canon.* About the year 160 before Christ, the Book of Wisdom was written in Greek by Philo the Elder.† This volume has been called παράθερον by the Jews, as containing the sum of all virtues. About the same period the book of Ecclesiasticus was translated from the Hebrew by Jesus the son of Sirach, of Jerusalem. The third book of the Maccabees, which was the first in order, was composed in Greek; the second of the Maccabees, which was the fourth in order, was also composed in Greek; as was the first also, in the first case by its author,‡ a fact the distinguished

* It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that Diodati writes as a Roman Catholic. *Translator.*

† V. Hieronym. Præfat. in Proverb. Salomon. t. 9, p. 1294. Huet in Dem. Evan. Prop. 4, de lib. Sapient. § 11.

‡ "William Beveridge is the only writer whom I can ascertain to have known that the first book of Maccabees was originally composed in Greek. The generality of the learned, conceive it to have been first written in Hebrew or rather in Chaldee. Let us examine the reason upon which they lean.

They rely *first*, upon the testimony of Origen, who says *Ἐξω δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ Μακκαβαϊκὰ ἅπαντα ἐπιγέγραπται Σαρβῆθ Σαρβανὲ ἐλ.* Besides these, are the books of the Maccabees inscribed Sarbeth Sarbane el."¹ From this Hebrew title they infer that the first book was composed in the Hebrew language. But on such a reason as this the opponents of a Greek original ought not to lay much stress; for if from this Hebrew inscription they conclude the first book to have been composed in Hebrew, for precisely the same reason should they conclude the *second* and *third* to have been written in the same language; and this the more, because Origen does not speak of a single book but of all the books of the Maccabees (τὰ Μακκαβαϊκὰ). Yet no one has been hardy enough to venture such an assertion as this, inasmuch as all agree in assigning a Greek original to these latter. If, then, our learned opponents would but be consistent, they must own they gain little by the testimony of Origen.

But, *secondly*, they lean upon the authority of Jerome, who declares in his Prologus Galeatus, that he met with the first book of the Maccabees in Hebrew. But this of Jerome does not any more effectually aid their cause, for his assertion is not that the book was originally composed, but simply that

1) Origenes, Comm. in Psalm. 1, t. 2, p. 529, edit Paris.

Beveridge was acquainted with.* The fourth book, although anonymous (*ἀνώνυμος*), and always considered apochryphal, Sixtus Senensis † declares he saw in Greek in the library of Sanc-

he found it, in Hebrew. Is there no difference between these two assertions? Consider, moreover, that before Jerome's time all the sacred books had been translated into nearly all the languages of the world—the Persian, Indian, Scythian, Thracian, Sarmatian, Moorish, Armenian, Roman, British, etc.—as Eusebius,² Theodoret,² and Anastasius Sinaita³ testify; much more, therefore, would those books, which were not originally in Hebrew, be clothed in a Jewish garb, as the one peculiarly sacred to religion. We may, then, from these considerations, conclude that Jerome fell in with a translation of the Greek original made by some Jew. The same is indeed apparent from the very expression he employs: "The first book of the Maccabees I found in Hebrew."

Thirdly, they rely upon the circumstance that the Latin version and the Greek text (which they also call a version) are disfigured with Hebraisms, whence they smack, say they, of a Hebrew original. But are not the Evangel, the Epistolary writings and the Apocalypæ of John covered with Hebraisms? Is not this characteristic of the writings of Peter and Paul and James? Yet who would now-a-days deny that these were first written in Greek?

Granted, however, for argument's sake, that the first book of the Maccabees was written in Hebrew by its author, and that this was the text Jerome read—where, we ask, is now that Hebrew text? It is no longer extant, they tell us; the Hebrew original has perished, and the Greek version alone remains. Now is it credible, we rejoin, that those who have gone before us, the Church, the Councils, and the Fathers, would more carefully preserve the Greek translation than the Hebrew text itself? "*Credat id Judæus apella non ego.*" Not one of the Jewish doctors, however large may be their faith, could be persuaded of this. Since, then, there is no sound reason nor trustworthy authority for believing that this book was written in Hebrew, we are led to the conclusion that it

* Beveregius apud Cotelierum, cap. 9, § 2, tom. 3, p. 111.

† Sixtus Semen. in Biblioth. 5, lib. 1, t. 1, p. 51.

1) Eusebius de Laud. Constant, p. 772, t. 1, ex ed. Can.

2) Theodoretus, V. Therapeut, p. 555, t. 4, ed. Sirm.

3) Anastas. Sinait *Ὁδηγος*, cap. 22, p. 339.

tis Pagnini at Leyden. At length the whole of the other books of the Old Testament began to appear in Greek in Judea, for the

was first written in Greek, like the rest of the books of the Maccabees, and other works published about the same period. The Greek text of this book is, therefore, to be regarded as the original and not as a version from a lost Hebrew text. This conclusion is further manifest from the work itself. In the course of the book occur many epistles from the Greeks to the Hebrews¹—for instance, two from the Lacedemonians, the same number from Demetrius Soter king of Syria to Jonathan,² and others from Alexander Balas to the same.³ Demetrius Nicator wrote to Simon Maccabæus⁴—as also did Antiochus Sidetes.⁵ Now all these epistles were obviously in the Greek language, because written by parties whose vernacular was Greek. Let us assume then, for a moment, that the book in which they appear was itself written in Hebrew. If such were the case the author must either have inserted these epistles in Greek, or have given a Hebrew version of them in his history. That the former could have taken place—namely, that the Greek letters would be inserted in the text of a Hebrew narrative—none but an incompetent critic would dare to affirm; while the latter—that the author translated them into Hebrew—is incredible from his failing to notify such a circumstance. Such intimations are the prevailing usage of Scripture. Whenever a letter, speech or inscription occurs in any other language, the readers are invariably supplied with the name of the original whence the translation has been made. Thus when Ezra gives the letter of Bishlam, Mithridates, and Tabeel, he says: “The epistle was written in Syriac, and was read in Syriac, after this manner, To Artaxerxes the king, thy servants, the men beyond the river, send greeting.”⁶ So also in the book of Esther: “And he sent letters into all the provinces of his kingdom in the various languages and characters which each people could speak and read.”⁷ And a little after: “Letters were written to the Jews and to the princes

1) Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 12, v. 21, 22, et cap. 14, v. 20.

2) Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 10, v. 25, cap. 11, v. 30.

3) Ibid. v. 18.

4) Cap. 13, v. 36.

5) Cap. 15, v. 2.

6) Esdras, cap. 4, v. 7 et 11.

7) Esther, cap. 1, v. 22.

special edification and solace of the Jews. To this topic, however, we shall revert more at length hereafter

and to the governors and to the judges who presided over the hundred and twenty-seven provinces, from India to Ethiopia, province by province, and people by people, according to their language and character, and to the Jews as they could read and hear¹—and this was the substance of each letter, that in all lands and people, etc. etc.” The same rule obtains with regard to the speeches of foreigners in Isaiah: “And Rabshakeh stood and cried with a loud voice in the Hebrew tongue and said, Hear ye the words of the great King.”² It is thus in Daniel: “And the Chaldeans answered the king in Syriac, O King, live for ever; tell the dream, etc.”³ So likewise in the Chronicles: “Sennacherib cried out with a loud voice in the Jews’ tongue to the people.”⁴ The Acts of the Apostles exhibits the same form: “Paul standing upon the steps beckoned with his hand to the people, and when a great silence was made he addressed them in the Hebrew tongue, saying, Men, brethren, and fathers, hear, etc.”⁵ On another occasion in the same book: “When the multitude saw what Paul had done they lifted up their voice and said in the Lycaonian tongue, The gods are come down to us in the likeness of men.”⁶ The same rule also holds in regard to inscriptions—for instance in Luke: “And the inscription was written in Greek, Latin and Hebrew characters, This is the King of the Jews.”⁷ So also in John: “The writing was in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, Jesus of Nazereth the King of the Jews,” etc., etc.⁸

Now nothing of this kind occurs in the First of Maccabees, for the aforementioned Greek Epistles are inserted without the slightest hint that they are only translations, nor does the author introduce them with the usual notice that they had been written in Greek. The inevitable conclusion is, that the book itself was written in the same language as those Epistles—viz. in the Greek.

- 1) Esther, cap. 8, v. 9 et seq.
- 2) Isaias, cap. 36, v. 13
- 3) Daniel, cap. 2, v. 4.
- 4) Paralipom. cap. 32, v. 18.
- 5) Act. Apost. cap. 21, v. 40.
- 6) Act. Apost. cap. 14, v. 10.
- 7) Luc. Ev. cap. 23, v. 38.
- 8) Joannes, Ev. cap. 19, v. 20.

We now turn to the New Testament. That the Gospel of Matthew was written in the Hellenistic dialect, is settled past controversy by the labors of those who have recently written on that subject. Mark likewise wrote his Gospel in Greek.* John, by birth a Galilean, by trade a fisherman, composed his Gospel, three Epistles, and Apocalypse, in the same language. The fourteen Epistles of Paul were written in the Hellenistic, besides that which he addressed to the Hebrews. James, surnamed the Just, wrote his Catholic Epistle in the same tongue. Simon Peter published his two letters in Greek, while the same language was used by Jude in his Catholic Epistle.

Our attention must now be briefly given to those ancient writers who do not belong to the Canon. Of these we notice Philo the Elder first. Before the Maccabees became masters of the country, this Jew, for so Jerome calls him, wrote largely in Greek on the history of their kings and of Jerusalem. His poetical fragments, preserved by Polyhistor, are given in Eusebius.† Ezekiel, another Jew, was a tragic poet, one of his productions of superior order being the Exagoge (*Ἐξαγωγή*), in which the Exodus under Moses was celebrated. Fragments of his poem have been edited by Morell and Lectius. Some Greek poems are ascribed to Eleazar, the Jewish Pontiff,‡ who, according to common report, sent the seventy interpreters to Ptolemy. Jerome § also tells us that Eupolemus, the son of John, whom Judas Maccabæus sent as his legate to Rome,|| published a Greek history called *Archaiogonia* (*Ἀρχαιογονία*), in which the Mosaic and Jewish histories are detailed, as by Josephus afterwards. Alexander Polyhistor¶ informs us that Cleodorus Malchus, supposed to be a Jew, a supposition which his name confirms, compiled a history of Hebrew affairs in Greek, chiefly drawn from Moses. Demetrius, in like manner a Jew, and contemporary of Eupolemus, also composed an *Archæogony* in Greek, and a history of the Jewish Kings of which Clemens Alexandrinus makes frequent mention.** Of Phocylides, whom Scipio Sgam-

* Vide quæ in fine operis adnotavimus.

† Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* lib. 9, cap. 20 et 24.

‡ V. Sgambatum, in lib. 3, tit. 9, p. 479, *Arch.* V. T.

§ Hieronym. *de Viris Illustribus* in *Cl. Alex.* col. 865, t. 11.

|| Lib. 1 *Mach.* cap. 8, v. 17, lib. 2, cap. 4, v. 11.

¶ Alex. Polyh. *apud Jos.* in *Ant.* lib. 1, cap. 15, p. 44.

** Clem. Alexandr. *Stromat.* lib. 1, p. 405, ed. Oxon.

batus* proves satisfactorily to have been a Jew and a Pharisee, a Greek poem is still extant, called Noutheticon (*Νουθετικόν*). Aristobulus, not the one of the Maccabees, but another, also a Jew, and one of the seventy Interpreters, according to Anatolius in Eusebius,† published a Greek exposition of the Pentateuch. Lysimachus of Jerusalem, gave to the public an interpretation in Greek of the book of Esther, or rather, of the Epistle on the Feast of Purim.‡ Flavius Josephus, the most eloquent of the Hebrews, in the time of Vespasian composed a multitude of books in the Greek language, which remain to this day, and are in that department of composition so elegant and polished, that their author is justly styled among the learned the Grecian Livy. A contemporary and opponent of Josephus, Justus Tiberiensis, so called from his birth-place, Tiberias of Galilee, produced a chronicle of the Jewish kings, in Greek. There was, besides, according to a conjecture of Voss, a Joseph of Tiberias, who composed a Hypomnesticus in the same language.

In another class come the innumerable writings, some received in early days, others rejected, attributed to the apostles. Such are the Liturgy of Peter, the Preaching, the Gospel, the Acts, the Revelation, the Judgment, of that apostle; the Gospel, Liturgy and Protevangel of James; the Gospel and Apocalypse of Paul; the Acts of Paul and Thecla; the Epistle to the Laodiceans; the third Epistle to the Corinthians; the third to the Thessalonians also,§ &c., &c. and the Canons, the Creed, and the Constitutions of the Apostles. All these are composed in Greek, of which Sixtus Senensis speaks at length in his *Bibliotheca Sancta*,|| and Fabricius in his *Codex Apocryphus*. To draw my present argument to a close, Is not the writing of books in Greek from the period of the Maccabees, to be regarded as proof that the language itself was vernacular in Palestine at that period?

* Sgambatus, *Archivor. Vet. Test. lib. 3, tit. 16, p. 504.*

† Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles. lib. 7, cap. 32.*


‡ Calmet. *Proleg. in lib. Esther, t. 3, p. 518.*

[§ Videsis erudit. nost. Jones "On the Canon." J. A. Fabric. *Cod. Apoc. N. T. Ed.*]

[|| Cotelier. *Patr. Apost. tom. 1, p. 199. Antwerpiae 1698. Hæc monumenta Anglice conversa edidit Gul. Whiston in t. 2, libri cui titulus Primitive Christianity. Ed.*]


§ 2. *The Coins of the Jews bore Greek Inscriptions.*

Let us now look at coins and medals—the most satisfactory of all testimonies to the student of antiquity. The practice of the ancients was totally different from ours in the choice of a language for inscriptions. We use Latin while they employed the vernacular tongue. From a series of their coins, therefore, we may ascertain with the most perfect exactness, not only the language of any given people, but also the sources whence it was derived and the changes which it underwent in the lapse of time. The learned Spanheim writes very much to my purpose in the present passage: “By this means,” he says, “the unquestionable origin of languages, the primitive and the altered forms of letters, the distinctive marks of different ages, the manifold errors of the stone-cutters and other difficult questions relating to antiquity, were happily solved.” * From these premises we affirm that long before the birth of Christ, all the coins in circulation among the Jews, Galileans, Samaritans, and neighboring states, bore Greek inscriptions, and for brevity’s sake we exhibit a few as a sample, where we have it in our power to produce a host.




Here we have a coin of Herod the Great, exhibiting on one side a bunch of grapes, by which the vine-bearing region of Engaddi was represented, with the Greek characters *HPΣΑΤΟΥ*; and on the other side what Hardouin thought to be the Lily of Phaselis, but which Spanheim, whose opinion is more generally adopted, more correctly represented as a helmet, with horsetail and crest. The Epigraph is *ΕΘΝΑΡΧΟΥ*! This piece of money was coined about forty years before the Christian Era, for in the fortieth, Herod was honored with the title of King.

* Spanhemius, Diss. 2, § 1, tom. 1, p. 61, ed. Lond. Calmet. Diss. sur. les Medail. Hebraïq. in Dict. t. 1, p. 76.




This is another coin of Herod the Great, also copied in Spanheim, and reported to be in the Royal Treasury of France. On the front is an altar with a flame, and on the back the high-priest's cap, or as Spanheim thinks a helmet, the inscription on the obverse being *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΗΡΩΔΟΥ*. From this it is evident that this coin was struck after the assumption of the regal dignity by Herod; perhaps after the building of the second temple.




Here is a coin of Herod Antipas, the son of Herod the Great, whose coins are by far the most numerous.* On the upper side presents itself a palm branch, the symbol (*ιερογλυφικόν*) of Judea and Galilee, (for these countries by the testimony of Pliny† are covered with palm-trees,) having the Greek inscription *ΗΡΩΔΟΥ ΤΕΤΡΑΡΧΟΥ* and the numerals *ΛΑΔ*, the year 34 of the Tetrarchy of Herod, and 37 of Christ. On the under side a laurel wreath with the letters *Ν Κ*.

* Vide Spanhemium, loc. cit. pag. 527.

† Plinius, t. 1, p. 682, v. 26, lib. 13, cap. 4.



To the coins already exhibited, I add those of Herod Agrippa, in which two festivals of the Jews are represented, that of Tabernacles and that of Pentecost. The tent which appears on one side of them represents the feast of Tabernacles, and the ears of corn upon the other the feast of Pentecost.* The inscription is Greek, *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΑΓΡΙΠΠΑ*, or simply *ΑΓΡΙΠΠΑ*. John Villalpandus, † Antony Augustinus‡ and others assure us that the thirty pieces of silver which were the price of Christ's betrayal bore a Greek inscription also. The following is a representation of them, according to these authors:



On the one is a radiated head of the Colossus of Rhodes, on the other a rose, with the Greek word *POAION*, all which prove it to be a Rhodian coinage. One of these is preserved in the church of Santa Croce di Gierusalemma, and another in Paris in a glazed cabinet: nevertheless my own candid opinion is that these learned men have greatly mistaken about these

* Vide Spanhem. loc. cit. p. 528. Calmet. l. cit. n. 20.


† Villalpandus, lib. 2, de Pond. Disp 4, cap. 30, p. 402, tom. 3.

‡ Anton. Augustin. Dial. 2. de Numism. p. 22, ed. Rom.

coins, as Selden has clearly shown.* But enough of Jewish moneys with Greek inscriptions. They survive in such numbers that Hardouin has written a whole book upon them called *De Numis Herodiadum*, which those who require further information would do well to consult.†

* Selden. *de. Jur. N. L. I.* p. 242 et 243, ed. Lond. t. 1.

† Here some will possibly object that about this period, (1) Simon Maccabæus was permitted by Antiochus,¹ king of Syria, to coin money inscribed with the Samaritan language and character, like the following:²



And (2) that the tribute money which the Pharisees and Herodians presented³ to Christ for his opinion bore a Latin inscription, as follows:⁴



But neither of these coins is any serious objection to our argument. For, in regard to the first—John Christopher Wagenseil,⁵ Charles Patin, and Otho Sperling,⁶ some of our

- 1) *Lib. 1 Mach. cap. 15, v. 6.*
- 2) *V. Conringium de N. Hebr; Parad. p. 56. Hadrianum Relandum, de Nummis Samaritanorum.*
- 3) *Math. Evang. cap. 22, v. 17 ad 19.*
- 4) *V. Selden. de J. N. et G. lib. 2, cap. 8, p. 239.*
- 5) *Wagenseil. Annot. ad Lib. Mischnæ Sota, p. 575.*
- 6) *Sperlingius, de Nummis non cunis, cap. 16.*

In the same language also are inscribed the coins of the neighboring regions, Galilee, Samaria, and others. Many

first writers on numismatology, have declared it spurious, an opinion which commands my own most unhesitating suffrage. The passage in Maccabees goes for nothing: "I permit thee to make a coinage of thine own money," because this goes no further than the article of permission. That Simon availed himself of this license, and that he actually coined money, is neither proved by the phraseology, nor has it ever yet been proved by any author. This argument then is of no avail, for the authority of Antiochus was as despised in the country as his friendship was disregarded.

Thus we dispose of the Scripture argument; and now turn to the coins themselves, which are utterly destitute of any memorial of Simon. The inscription on them is *Sekel Ischrael, Jeruschalaim Hakkedoscha*—that is, *the Shekel of Israel, Jerusalem the holy*, and so on. But the most convincing proof of their spuriousness (*υποθετία*) is that they have a Samaritan inscription; that is an inscription in a language not then extant among the Jews. The force of this difficulty those who contend for the genuineness of the coins confess, and know not how to evade:¹ For although they urge that Simon had them struck in the cities of Samaria, this makes little for their purpose—because it is incredible that seeking to record the achievement of the national liberty of the Hebrews, he would have availed himself of the help of the Samaritans, a race held in the utmost detestation by the Jews. Would he, further, have chosen a language and character then unknown? and would he have abandoned so far the usage then universally prevailing of employing in their coinage none but their vernacular tongue? Neither would the Samaritans have originated such an inscription—Jerusalem was not holy with them, nor would they go up to it to worship, preferring their native Samaria. Nor, finally, does the effort of Augustine Calmet,² Peter Allix,³ and Father Souciet,⁴ to explain away the difficulty by assuming that there were two characters then

1) Vide Morinum, exercit. 2. in Pentat. Samar. 1, 10. Bibliotheq. Critiq. lib. 2, cap. 27, p. 404, 405.

2) Calmet, Dissert. sur le Medail. Hebraïq. p. 65.

3) Allix apud Spanhem. de P. Num. p. 72, diss. 11.

4) Souciet, Diss. sur les Medail. Hebraïques, p. 41

coins of Tiberias, the chief town of Galilee, are extant bearing Greek inscriptions to this effect, *ΚΑΤΑΙΟ ΤΙΒΕΡΙΩΝ ΕΤ. ΑΠ.*: This era is from the building of the city DCCLXX, on which see Noris,* Vaillant,† etc. The coins of Sephoris, the most strongly fortified town of Galilee, are inscribed in Greek *ΣΕΠΦΩΡΗΝΩΝ*—on which consult Vaillant ‡ and Patin.§

It was just the same with the cities of the Samaritans; many Greek coins remain of the capital, Samaria, to which Herod, out of flattery to Augustus, gave the name of Sebaste (*Σεβαστή*). A representation of these is given by Noris in his masterly work *De Epochis Syro-Macedonum*.|| On one is found the inscrip-

in use among the Hebrews—a sacred and a profane—and that in this latter, borrowed from the Samaritans, the coins were struck, settle the point to our satisfaction.

If we ask them upon what ancient and valid authority they rest this assumption—they have absolutely none to produce. Let them, then, trumpet the worth of their Samaritan coins to others, they bring them to a bad market with us, so firmly satisfied are we that they are the productions of impostors.—Sperling in fact says, that he himself saw, at Holsace, a laboratory where such shekels as these were manufactured: and Patin, a most skilful and exact numismatologist, declares that in all the cabinets of coins he has ever seen, he has never yet found a genuine shekel. From these premises, then, we conceive ourselves justified in concluding, either that Simon Maccabeus never availed himself of the concession of Antiochus to coin his own money, or that the shekels now remaining and ascribed to him, are supposititious (*ὑποβολιμαίους*).

But in regard to the tribute money with its Latin inscription, if we should concede that it was the same as the Pharisees showed to Christ, as Freher, Fischer, etc., etc., assert,¹ what is this to the purpose? The Roman tribute was paid in Roman money, but we are now arguing about the inscriptions upon *Jewish* coins—so that this, too, is travelling beyond the record, and is nought to our purpose (*nihil hoc πρὸς τὴν λύραν*.)

* Noris. de Epoch. Syro-Maced. Diss. 5, t. 11, p. 582 et seq

† Vaillant, de Num. Imp. a Pop. Græc. loq. p. 30.

‡ Vaillant, de N. Imp. a Pop. Græc. loq. p. 24 et 30.

§ Patinus, in Num. Imp. Roman. p. 183.

|| Noris. de Ep. Syro-Maced. diss. 5, p. 559 et seq.

1) Freherus. et Fischer de Numismate Census.

tion *CEBACHTHNΩN. L. ΘΡ*, of the *Sebastians the year cvi*, and on another *CEBACTHNΩN CTP. CIE*, of the *Sebastians of Syria, the year CCXV*. For these see also Patin.* Of *Sichem*, a Samaritan city called afterwards *Neapolis*, Greek coins are also found with the inscription *ΦΛΑΟΤΙ. ΝΕΑΠΟΛΙ ΣΑΜΑΡΕΙΑΣ. L. ΑΙ*. Of these several may be seen in *Spanheim*† and other writers. Not to be tedious, however, the same practice prevailed in *Cæsarea*, *Paneas*, *Raphia*, *Gaza*, *Gadara*, *Livia*, *Ramatha*, *Azotus*, *Ascalon*, and other cities that bordered upon *Judea*.

But further, these coins not only bore Greek inscriptions, but Greek names also were commonly given them by the Jews, for instance those of *Drachma*, *Dedrachma*, *Stater* and *Denarius*. (*Δραχμή, Διδραχμός, Στατήρ, Δηνάριον*.) These occur in the New Testament. That they gave these Greek names to their current coins, is clear at once from the impropriety of calling Greek moneys by Hebrew names, and from these names, and from these names only, occurring in the New Testament, and not in the Old. But the word *Stater* occurs in the Old Testament it may be said, and *Drachma* at least three times in *Nehemiah*‡; to which our reply is that it is so in our Latin Vulgate, but not in the Hebrew and Chaldee. Where we exhibit *Stateres* the Hebrew reads שקלים *Seckalim*; and the original of our *Drachma* is in the Chaldee דרבמן.

As, then, it is quite certain that, long before the time of Christ, the Jews used not only money with Greek inscriptions, but called by Greek names, we are bound to own that they must have spoken Greek.

§ 3. *The Jews made use of the Greek language in their Inscriptions.*

We here call in the aid of Inscriptions, a testimony of equal value with the last in the estimation of critics. The first of these which we shall quote will be that in the *Lorica* or outer court of the temple. By this persons were warned, on pain of death, whether Jews, the subjects of ceremonial pollution, (such as the emission of seed, the menstrual flux and those that came into contact with it,) or strangers, not to enter the inner

* Patinus, *ibid.* p. 265.

† *Spanhem. de V. et P. Numis. Vaillant. loc. cit.* p. 279.

‡ *Nehem. cap. 7, v. 70 ad 72.*

court. For this see Maimonides.* After the temple was rebuilt Josephus reports that two inscriptions were carved in the outer court—one in Greek and the other in Latin. *Ἐν αὐτῷ δ' εἰστέλεισαν ἐξ ἴσου διαστήματος στήλαι, τὸν τῆς ἀγνείας προσημαίνονσαι νόμον, αἱ μὲν Ἑλληνικοῖς, αἱ δὲ Ῥωμαϊκοῖς γραμμασι, μὴ δεῖν ἀλλόφυλον ἐντὸς τοῦ ἁγίου παριέναι.* "In it stood pillars equal distances from each other, which exhibited the law of purity inscribed both in Greek and Roman characters, to the effect that "no foreigner should pass within the Sanctuary."†

The Antiquities present another passage of the same purport. *Εἰς τοῦτο τοῦ λαοῦ πάντες, οἱ διαφέροντες ἀγνεία καὶ παρατήρησει τῶν νομίμων, εἰσῆσαν;* "Into this temple any of the people had licence to enter, provided he was free from pollution and observant of the precepts of the law."‡ On the subject of this prohibition too, Titus, the Roman General, thus addresses the Jews: *Ἄρ' οὐκ ὑμεῖς, ὧς μιαινότατοι, τὸν δρύφακτον τοῦτον προῦβάλεσθε τῶν ἁγίων; οὐχ ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ στήλας διεστήσατε, γραμμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ ἡμετέροις κεκαραγμένας;* [οὐχ ἡμεῖς] *δὲ τοὺς ὑπερβάντας ὑμῖν ἀναιρεῖν ἐπετρέψαμεν, κἄν Ῥωμαῖός τις ᾗ;* "Have not ye, accursed, put up this fence before the Sanctuary? Have ye not erected its pillars at proper intervals, engraven with Greek characters and ours? Have we not permitted you to kill those that go beyond it, although they be Romans?"§ Now if a law of such grave moment was set forth in the Greek language to be read by the Jews, who does not perceive that this language must have been their vernacular, else the purpose would not have been answered? No one assuredly who does not close his eyes against the light. As Bernard Lamy|| was ignorant of the true reason for the inscription being in Greek, he with some others has expended much labor to little purpose in the attempt to account for Josephus's not mentioning a Hebrew Inscription, as they were Hebrews for whom the premonition was chiefly intended. The reason is simply that stated above, that the Hebrews universally spoke Greek, and consequently the Hebrew Inscription was not required.

* Maimonides, de Domo Electa, cap. 7, § 13.

† Joseph. de Bello, lib. 5, cap. 5, § 2, p. 331, 332.

‡ Joseph. in Antiq. lib. 8, cap. 3, § 9, p. 427.

§ Joseph. de Bello, lib. 6, cap. 2, § 4, p. 376.

|| Lamy, de Templo. lib. 5, sect. 2. p. 813.

The next Greek Inscription to be noticed is that upon the cross of the Lord Christ, which Luke records in these words: "And a superscription also was written over him in letters of Greek and Latin and Hebrew."* Now in this triad of languages some *one* must needs have been vernacular to the Jews, in order that by them, of all others, who were most pressing for the execution, the accusation and title might be read. John confirms this verse: "This title read many of the Jews, because the place where Jesus was crucified was near the city."† Now the Hebrew was no longer in common use, inasmuch as from the period of the Babylonish captivity it had been displaced: nor in fact did the Jews any longer understand that language, as our very opponents confess, and as will be made clear as we proceed. Much less could the Latin language be their common one, inasmuch as it has never been contended that they adopted it as a people; it remains, therefore, that the Greek alone was the prevailing language at Jerusalem at that time. Nothing could more beautifully or perfectly harmonize with this conclusion than what Jochanan, the first of the Rabbins, has written of these three languages: "There are three tongues—the Latin best adapted for war, the Greek for social life, the Hebrew for prayer."‡ The Hebrew, therefore, was employed, on this occasion, because in a measure their sacred tongue; the Latin because that of their masters, the Romans; and the Greek, finally, because the familiar tongue of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. This accounts for Luke's putting the Greek first, because the most common and important—and this sacred writer, on Casaubon's showing§, has exhibited the true order of the inscriptions.||

Nor was this employment of the Greek language in inscriptions confined to Judea; we find it prevailing in the neighboring territories, also Josephus supplies us with certain Roman Edicts, that prove this beyond dispute.¶ There is that, for instance, of Caius Cæsar, conferring upon Hircanus and his sons, the perpetual government of the Jews—

* Lucas, Evang. cap. 23, v. 38.

† Joan. Evang. cap. 19, v. 19.

‡ R. Jochanan, in Midr. Tillim, fol. 25, c. 4.

§ Casaubon. exer. 16 ad Baron. An. 34, 119, p. 563.

|| Diodati makes no mention of John's putting the Hebrew first.—TRANSLATOR.

¶ Joseph. lib. 14 Antiq. cap. 10. p. 703 et ed.

which was engraven on brazen tables in the Greek and Latin tongues, in Ascalon, Sidon, Tyre, in the temples, in that of Jerusalem and elsewhere, by the order of the same Caius: "And that a brazen tablet with an inscription to this effect, be set up in public in the Capitol, in Sidon, Tyre and Ascalon, and in the temples, engraven in Roman and Grecian letters." To these might be added other rescripts for the Jews, given by Josephus in the same place, all, in like manner, published in Judea and the neighboring regions, in Greek and Latin. The Romans, of course, used the Latin because it was their own tongue, and the Greek as evidently, because the vernacular of the country, that it might be read and understood by the inhabitants.

Nor must we pass over in silence, the interesting fact that those Jews who settled and died in Rome, had Greek inscriptions cut upon their Tombs. After Pompey had subdued Judea, he took away with him to Rome immense numbers of the Jews as captives, to whom, however, liberty was afterwards given, together with the privilege of observing the usages of their ancestors without hinderance, by Augustus and Tiberius Cæsar. In the city, therefore, they had a synagogue, and outside the city a cemetery, on the way to the port, keeping up their national observances in every particular.* Bos, in the year 1602, was the first who discovered this place of interment, while tracing some subterranean passages beyond the Tiber. There he found, first of all, sepulchres in the sides of the walls, as is usual, but some also under foot, without the slightest vestige of Christianity, the only symbol being a representation of the Mosaic Candelabrum with its seven branches.—There were also earthen lamps found, made in the same shape. There were, besides, fragments of bricks of a red color, with which and mortar, sepulchres were formerly closed, and these presented, one and all, merely Greek inscriptions, which generally began thus: *ΕΝΘΑΔΕ ΚΕΙΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΕΙΡΗΝΗ*. This means, Here lies in peace; and, though a phrase prevailing among the followers of Christ, has been evidently borrowed by them from the Hebrews, among whom the same use prevailed, as the Scriptures amply show. But in addition to this, two other forms of expression occur in the more recent

* V. Bosium Roma Sotterran, lib. 2. cap. 22, p. 142; Arin-gum, in Ro. Subterr. Noviss, tom. 1, lib. 2, cap. 23.

sepulchral inscriptions given by Nicolai* and others, that prove these to have been Jewish. On one tomb in the same cemetery, is the name *ΑCΑΠΠΙΚΗ*, and on another the word *CTNΑΓΩΓ*... which every one knows is peculiar to the Hebrews. Having described these facts, Bos proceeds in a labored disquisition to inquire how the Jews whom he conceived to have spoken Hebrew, came to use Greek rather than their own language upon their coffins. The knot he thought might be untied in either of these two ways. Either that the Jews did so out of conformity to the general usage of Rome, where the Greek was then much cultivated; or that these tombs belonged to Grecian Jews, namely such as had come to Rome from Corinth, Thessalonica, and other towns of Greece. But neither of these will remove the difficulty.

The former supposition will not, because the Jews should have used the Latin if their object had been compliance with the usage prevailing around them; while the fact of the Jews notoriously shunning inter-communion of every kind with the heathen, is quite enough to show that they would not employ a language on their sepulchres, simply on the ground that it was generally known. Nor does the latter conjecture answer the purpose of Bos much better. For we have no satisfying proof that there were Grecian born Jews at Rome, while we are quite sure that Palestinian Jews were conveyed thither in thousands by Pompey, and at a subsequent period after the capture of the sacred city. And even if we were certain that there were Greek Jews there, they must have been greatly outnumbered by these latter who were born in Judea. Besides, Bos does not deny that the Jews had only one cemetery at Rome, and that this would be common to both races. If, then, it were true that the Palestine Jews spoke Hebrew, then some of the tombs at least should exhibit Hebrew inscriptions—so that each people should have the record in its own tongue. And the Hebrew inscriptions should exceed the Greek as greatly as the Palestinian outnumbered the Grecian Jews. But there are no Hebrew inscriptions at all, for Bos found them, one and all, in the self-same Greek idiom. Therefore, although we concede to Bos much more than we need in allowing that there *may have been* Greek Jews in Rome, still the inexplicable fact remains that all alike used Greek epitaphs. To him our concession is of little advantage indeed, but his discovery is all important to us.

* Nicolai de Sepulch. Hebræor, lib. 4, cap. 4, p. 237.

§ 4. *The Jews gave Greek names to their children and adopted them themselves.*

Our position is sustained still further by the nomenclature in vogue among the inhabitants. The general argument from proper names, is fully treated by the Fathers, Augustine, Origen, Jerome, Theodoret, by Aben Ezra, whom the sounder part of the Rabbins follow, and by the learned Morin, Bochart, Walton and others in their disquisitions upon the primitive language of mankind.* I follow nearly the same method in demonstrating the Hellenism (τόν Ἑλληνισμόν) of the Jews. How much pains the Jews bestowed upon the formation and imposition of names may be seen in Eusebius's treatise *Περὶ τῆς παρ' Ἑβραίοις τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος*, where the subject is discussed at length.† Even before the time of the Maccabees the Hebrews adopted Greek names. Those then in use are Philip, Alexander Lysimachus, Antipater, Antigonus, Alpheus, Andreas, Eupolemus, Numenius Dositheus, Aristobulus, etc., which occur in the books of the Maccabees, in the New Testament, and in Josephus, being without exception Greek. No one, for instance, can be ignorant that Philip, Alexander, Lysimachus, Antigonus, Antipater, were names commonly used among the Greeks, recurring as they do perpetually in Euripides, Demosthenes, Plutarch and Suidas. Eupolemus too is pure Greek, meaning *good soldier*; Dositheus, *the gift of God*; Numenius, *new month*; Aristobulus, *good counsel*; Andreas which is rendered *manly*; Nicodemus, *victory of the people*; Stephanus, *crown*; Cleophas, *all glory*; and Drusilla, *wet with dew*. In like manner might be adduced Philo, Epœnetus, Malichus, Sosipater, Timotheus, Archelaus, which are all Greek, and others, but I will not attempt the fruitless task of their enumeration.

Such is their number, that howe'er well hung,
They'd tire glib Fabius' most loquacious tongue.

Thus far, concerning the Jews, who bore Greek names from childhood. But those whose early designations were Hebrew or Chaldee, when they grew up, either transformed the old one into a Greek shape, or assumed an entirely new Greek one. To the one class, belongs Onias, the High Priest, who assumed the Greek name *Menelaus*, throwing off altogether the former ap-

* V. Waltonum Proleg. 3, n. 4, p. 15 et seq.

† Euseb. in Præp. Evang. lib. 11, cap. 6, p. 514, ed. Paris.

pellation; as also, Salome, called *Alexandra*; Cephas, *Peter*; Levi, *Matthew*, and Tabitha, *Dorcas*. To the other, the High Priest Jesus, who lived before the Maccabees, and metamorphosed his Hebrew Jesus into *Jason*; so Jacim into *Alcimus*, Simeon into *Simon*, Saul into *Paul*, Mathathias into *Matthias*; and others too numerous to cite. Now how is it reconcilable with reason that the Greeks should commonly adopt Greek names and yet continue to speak Chaldee?

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Works of Charlotte Elizabeth, with an Introduction*, by Mrs. H. B. Stowe. Volume I. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1844. pp. 502 8vo.

THE publisher has here commenced the fulfilment of a promise made some years since—to give the public a uniform series of the works of Charlotte Elizabeth. The volume is a large octavo, neatly got up and printed in double columns. It contains—Personal Recollections—Osric, (a poem)—The Rockite—The Siege of Derry—Letters from Ireland—Miscellaneous Poems;—and will soon be followed by a second volume of equal size and in the same style.

Of Charlotte Elizabeth, we have spoken so frequently, and in terms of so high commendation, that we can now say little more than commend the present enterprise to the respectful attention of the public.

Mrs. Stowe, in her brief Introduction, has well represented her as a woman of “strong mind, powerful feeling, and tact in influencing the popular mind.” She is independent, ardent, conscientious, and bent on doing good.

- 2.—*Biographical, Literary and Philosophical Essays : contributed to the Eclectic Review.* By JOHN FOSTER. With an Index prepared for this Edition. New York : D. Appleton & Co. Phil. : Geo. S. Appleton. 1844. pp. 419. 12mo.

The Eclectic Review is not unknown to our readers, as the present organ of the Congregationalists of England, nor John Foster as one of its earliest contributors, and as the author of "Decision of Character," which has been extensively read in this country and universally admired. Mr. Foster is a vigorous, effective, candid writer, who deals with his subject in a masterly manner.

The volume before us, consists of selections from the two volumes of his contributions compiled by Dr. Price, the present editor of the London Eclectic Review, and contains articles on Chalmers' Astronomical Discourses—Coleridge's Friend—Fox's James II.—Lord Kames—Benjamin Franklin—Hugh Blair—David Hume—Ireland—Epic Poetry—Spain—etc., etc.

- 3.—*Life and Eloquence of the Rev. Sylvester Larned, First Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in New Orleans.* By R. R. GURNEY. New York : Wiley & Putnam. 1844. pp. 412, 12mo.

Larned was one of those rare and brilliant geniuses which sometimes flit, like meteors, athwart the moral heavens, and shedding forth a beautiful light for a little while, then vanish suddenly before our disappointed gaze. We remember, in our youth, to have heard of him as one of the most eloquent preachers of the day : and he was, probably, among the most eloquent of any age. His career was short. Very early did he go down to the grave ; at the age of twenty-four. Some of his dearest friends in the ministry yet survive : others have followed him to the bosom of Jesus, where they rest from their labors, and rejoice together before the throne of Jehovah. Cornelius, Breckenridge, Larned, Nevins, were friends in life, and now, doubtless, glow with an eternal friendship in heaven.

The work given him to do on earth was an important one. It was soon accomplished, however, and he was not ; for God took him. His labors will never be forgotten at New Orleans : and although he laid but the foundation-stones, a great temple is rising thereon, whose topmost stones will reach unto the third heavens.

We recommend the perusal of the book as containing a brief memoir of interesting events in the life of one universally admired and loved; and some specimens of those sermons, which enchanted all, in every place, who heard them. There must have been, however, great power in the enunciation and general manner of Larned, to give his sermons the commanding influence they had over his audience; for, in themselves, they are not equal to those of many other men, who, for the want of the power of voice and expression, fall far below him in eloquence and in effect on hearers.

- 4.—*Knowles's Elocutionist ; a First-Class Rhetorical Reader and Recitation Book.* By JAMES SHERIDAN KNOWLES. *Enlarged and adapted to the United States, by EPES SARGENT. Second Edition.* New-York : Saxton & Miles. 1844. pp. 322 12mo.

The book begins with laying down some general and simple principles of Elocution, which are followed by a variety of selections in prose and poetry. As far as we have examined, the pieces are well chosen, whether we respect style, thought or sentiment. Reading books are so numerous, that the chief difficulty with teachers must be to select.

- 5.—*Elements of Logic, together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and a preliminary view of the Reason.* By HENRY P. TAPPAN. New-York and London : Wiley & Putnam. 1844. pp. 461, 12mo.

Professor Tappan is already known to the reading public as the author of a treatise on the Will, in which he undertakes to combat the views of Edwards, and support the new philosophy on that subject.

The "Elements of Logic" exhibits the same views of mental and moral philosophy, and embraces much more than is usual in a system of Logic. It is not confined to the method of deduction, the Aristotelian, which comprehends only the laws of inference and conclusion from previously established premises, but attempts to show how the primary or foundation-premises arise, and the basis on which they rest. It expounds the laws of the Reason, as the faculty of truth.

The work embraces an Introductory view of Philosophy in General—Preliminary view of the Reason—Logic Proper, including Primordial Logic—Inductive Logic—Deductive Logic—Doctrine of Evidence.

There is evidence in this book, both of reading and reflexion ;

and we take great pleasure in recommending it to the notice of teachers and of those who love works requiring attention and thought. We wish there were more such in the world.

- 6.—*A Discourse on Theological Education : to which is added, Advice to a Student preparing for the Ministry.* By GEORGE HOWE, D. D., Prof. of Biblical Literature, Theol. Sem., Columbia, S. C. New York : Leavitt, Trow & Co., and M. W. Dodd. 1844. pp. 243, 18mo.

This "Discourse" was originally delivered by the direction of the Presbytery of Charleston, on the Bicentenary of the Westminister Assembly of Divines : but now appears in an enlarged form, and with the addition of some very wholesome advice to students of theology, in respect to the course of reading and study best to be pursued. Here those, who have not the opportunity of going to a theological seminary, will find a good directory as to the best works on the several subjects of study.

The former portions of the volume contain much information interesting and useful to ministers in general—a compendious history of theological instruction in the different periods of the church, in different countries, more especially, England, Scotland, Ireland and the United States.

In speaking of Newark College (now Delaware), which arose out of the Academy established at Newark, Del., in 1743, for the education of ministers, at which were prepared some of the most eminent ministers of the latter part of the last century, Dr. Howe speaks of the College as being in the hands of Episcopalians, and refers to Dr. Hodge's Hist. of Pres. Ch. This is a mistake. At the time Dr. Hodge wrote, it was under Episcopal influence, the greater part of the original Faculty and many of the Board of Trustees having resigned in consequence of the decision of the Board to accept lottery funds from the State. But the Episcopal rule did not succeed : the College went down ; and was only revived by placing it again under the control of Presbyterians, as it has been for some years past.

- 7.—*Old Humphrey's Country Strolls.* New York : Robert Carter. Pittsburg : Thomas Carter. 1844. pp. 243, 18mo.

We are always glad to meet Old Humphrey. He is one of our favorite friends. Having accompanied him in his "Walks in London," we are equally pleased to join him in his "Coun-

try Strolls." He takes us to many interesting spots; as to the Lakes of Cumberland and Westmoreland—the Banks of the Wye—Kennilworth Castle—Stonehenge on Salisbury Plain—Burnham Beeches, etc. etc., and everywhere he makes his quaint and useful remarks. Although we do not think this equal to some of his other works, it yet bears the impress of his peculiar style.

- 8.—*Christian Fragments; or Remarks on the Nature, Precepts and Comforts of Religion.* By JOHN BURNS, M. D., F. R. S., Regius Professor of Surgery in the University of Glasgow. New York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1844. pp. 240, 18mo.

This is truly what it professes to be—"Christian Fragments." The pieces are brief, and characterized by a Christian spirit. The author has drunk deeply of the cup of affliction, and seems imbued with the spirit of holiness. These fragments may be read with profit, and the reflexions will, doubtless, express the feelings of many a devoted worshipper of God.

- 9.—*The History of Evangelical Missions, with the date of Commencement, and Progress, and Present State.* By ANDREW M. SMITH. Hartford: Robins & Smith. 1844. pp. 193, 12mo.

This is a compendious view of the origin and present condition of Missions throughout the world, which will be found very convenient for reference. It is brief and cheap, and therefore accessible to all. Every thing that may tend to promote the cause of Evangelical Missions we hail with joy. It is the noblest of causes—the cause of Zion's King—the cause which, above all others, must engage the attention and awaken the interest of the children of God.

- Memoir of the Life and Character of the Rev. Asahel Nettleton, D. D.* By BENNET TYLER, D. D., President & Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Institute of Connecticut. Hartford: Robins & Smith. 1844. pp. 372.

We have seized this Book, just issued from the press, with great interest, and have read it with uncommon satisfaction. It portrays the life and character of a man, of whom a distinguished minister* said, "He has served God and his generation with more self-denial, and constancy, and wisdom, and success, than any man living." The same writer added, that

* Rev. Lyman Beecher, D. D.

he regarded Dr. Nettleton, "through his influence in promoting pure and powerful revivals of religion, as destined to be one of the greatest benefactors of the world, and among the most efficient instruments of introducing the glory of the latter day." We are sure this memoir will be read by thousands who have been savingly profited by his labors, and by thousands who have heard the report of his labors and his success as a minister of the gospel. The book will be very interesting and useful to ministers and churches at the present day. Dr. Nettleton's views of the nature of religion and the means and the manner of promoting it, agree with those of Edwards, Brainerd and Dwight, and all the leading divines and Christians in this country. And what is more, they agree with the infallible word of God.* This memoir is ably written by a discerning and faithful friend and fellow-laborer, and is, every way, worthy of the subject. We have been delighted with the whole work, particularly with the closing part. W.

- 10.—*Observations in Europe, principally in France and Great Britain.* By JOHN P. DURBIN, D. D., *President of Dickinson College.* 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 620, 12mo.

President Durbin has evidently not travelled without making observations, and those observations followed by reflections. He did not forget, either, that he was a minister of religion and had the vows of God upon him. Hence he looks upon things in the light of God's truth, and fearlessly condemns whatever he thinks inconsistent with its principles.—Hence he has been represented, in some of the English prints, as having written in a bitter spirit. We cannot but commend him, however, for the independence with which he comments on institutions and opinions opposed, in his estimation, to truth and right.

In France he sees much to condemn: and in her king a traitor. Louis Philippe he regards as no friend to republican institutions, and as exerting all his power and wealth to estab-

* And there has now been sufficient time to apply the test of experience: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Let the revivals which took place under the influence of Dr. Nettleton be compared in respect to their *results*, with those which have since taken place under a different influence and on different principles; and the comparison will lead the community to a just and safe judgment. Sooner or later they will form their judgment in this way.

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lish the throne on such a basis as will make himself and his government acceptable to the crowned heads of the continent in this we think he is not mistaken : and we apprehend a fearful crisis is approaching, as Louis Philippe approaches his end.

These volumes are interesting in matter, and beautiful in appearance.

- 11.—*Grammar of the Greek Language, for the use of High Schools and Colleges.* By DR. RAPHAEL KÜHNER, *Corrector of the Lyceum, Hanover.* Translated from the German by B. B. Edwards and S. H. Taylor. Andover : Allen Morvill and Wardwell. New York : M. H. Newman. London : Wiley & Putnam. 1844, pp. 603, 8vo.

This, as appears from the title, is a large volume of 600 pages, printed in an elegant style. It is not, however, too large for introduction into our High Schools and Colleges. It is just what a Greek Grammar ought to be ; yet we fear it will be too extensive for the patience of many, both teachers and scholars, who prefer the old paths, principally, however, because they are easy and familiar.

Without some such Grammar as this, (and we know of none better,) our students of Greek can never become thorough scholars, capable either of accurately translating, or discriminatingly criticising a Greek author.

And we do hope to see among our young men, a great advance in knowledge of the beautiful Attic tongue—an advance which will ultimately qualify them for appreciating the deep theological researches of German scholars. Kühner's Grammar, if introduced to our Colleges and studied, will do much toward this advance. We do, therefore, most heartily commend the labors of the author and the learned translators to the acceptance of classical scholars.

The Preface gives desired information in respect to the author and his works ; and points out the chief excellences of the Grammar. These consist in—1. A profound and accurate knowledge of the principles of the language as its basis. 2. A lucid arrangement. 3. Fulness and pertinence of illustration. 4. Perfect analysis of the forms of the language. 5. Equal elaborateness of every portion of it.

An Appendix on versification has been added by the translators, who are every way competent to the task.

Our apology to the publishers for this late notice is, that

we did not receive the work until our July No. was through the press.

- 12.—*A Grammar of the Greek Language, principally from the German of Kühner, with selections from Matthiæ Buitman, Thiersch and Rost. For the use of schools and Colleges. By Charles Anthon, LL. D.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844, pp. 536, 12mo.

This Grammar, founded on Kühner's, will by no means supply the place of his own work; yet is it a good Greek Grammar to put into the hands of younger scholars—much better than very many from which our youth are instructed. Our recommendation of Kühner's is, in some sense, a recommendation of Dr. Anthon's, although the former is, unquestionably, the more complete. The publishers are entitled to praise for the manner in which the book is got up, especially its fitness for school-boy handling.

- 13.—*The Land of Israel, according to the covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. By ALEXANDER KEITH, D. D., Author of "the Evidence of Prophecy," etc.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844, pp. 388, 12mo.

This is a beautiful book, illustrated with appropriate and well executed engravings: and it is a book, too, full of interest to the Biblical student, unfolding prophecy and elucidating it by facts.

Dr. Keith views the land of Judea and Judaism, not only retrospectively but prospectively; and looks forward to a literal recovery of the land from strangers, and a restoration of God's ancient people, in accordance with a literal interpretation of the covenants with the Patriarchs. This is now becoming a very popular view; and the signs of the times give indication that it may be true. Events in the providence of God will, probably, ere long, determine the matter, and give us the only satisfactory and decisive solution of the question.

Dr. Keith's "Land of Israel" is, at all events, well worth a perusal, and will abundantly repay the reader.

- 14.—*The Poems and Ballads of Schiller. Translated by Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Bart., with a brief sketch of the author's life.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844, pp. 424, 12 mo.

Many of our readers will be glad, no doubt, to get a translation of Schiller's Poems. They know something of him,

but would know more. The poetry of one who ranks among the first poets of Germany and whose writings have acquired as much influence as any other, cannot but be interesting to an English reader.

True, whilst there is much that is beautiful and unexceptionable, there are not wanting sentiments which we should prefer to see expurgated—which rather, we could wish had never been penned.

The youthful reader should, perhaps, be cautioned against the phases of Kantism and Pantheism, which some of his pieces assume.

Then again, there was that in the *life* of Schiller, which detracts from his purity, although, even in this respect, he will compare advantageously with some other favorite sons of the muse. The memoir prefixed by Bulwer, is better than Carlyle's, because the former had access to more recent sources of information.

15.—*Adams on 2d Epistle of Peter. Greenhill on Ezekiel. Burroughs on Hosea. Manton on James. Jenkyn on Jude. Drailé on Philippians and Colossians.* London: Samuel Holdsworth.

The above are the titles of a series of most valuable reprints from the stores of the choice expository theology of the seventeenth century. They have been reproduced within the last five or six years by the labors of the Rev. Josiah Sherman, minister of Long Chapel, London, who has by this service levied largely on the gratitude of the Christian community, wherever the use of the English language can make these treasures available. Though long known by character to all who were skilled in bibliography, yet they had previously become extremely scarce, and could only be obtained, especially Adams and Greenhill, at an enormous cost. Thanks to the editorial zeal of Mr. Sherman, and the enterprise of his publishers, these noble monuments of the piety, learning, unction, and eloquence of a former age of the Church—an age rich in gifted and gigantic intellects—are now made accessible to students and ministers of moderate means, who can in no way give more effect to their studies and productions than by superinducing upon them the spirit which will not fail to be caught by a familiar converse with these admirable models. We look indeed to the divines of this period for finished specimens rather of homiletic than of exegetical exposition; but the advantage to be gained by habituation to their masculine style;

their affluent vocabulary, their fulness of illustration, their rich practical and hortatory vein immensely overbalances the hazard that may occasionally accrue of *taking on* from their pages a prolixity of descant but ill suited to the temperament of our times.

We speak thus in general terms of the collective series of volumes before us. Though all valuable and all models in their way, yet they cannot be deemed, of course, of equal merit. The work of Adams on Peter undoubtedly ranks highest on the score of talent, and is the reflexion of a genius of the loftiest order. It is scarcely to be paralleled in the whole circle of English theology, for splendor of thought and diction. Greenhill comes next in the same department, less grand, massive, and majestic, but falling little short in epigrammatic brilliancy and fertility of invention. But Burroughs, after all, we love the most, and scarcely admire any less, for his inimitable anatomy of religious experience, and the wonderful pungency and pathos of his appeals to the conscience.

But our object is not a critical estimate, so much as a hearty commendation of these noble volumes. We could yield to our prompting to say more of their value, could we assure ourselves of being able to persuade those who can afford it, by no means to have these works out of their theological collections. And we trust that the judicious and laborious editor will consider any exhortation on this head as a merited compliment for the service he has performed. Nor would we close without expressing the hope that the health, which we learn has been seriously impaired by the toil of getting up these volumes in their present beautiful style, may yet be such as to enable him to enhance our obligation still further by drawing yet again upon the storehouse of obsolete English theology.

16.— *The Hierophant ; or monthly Journal of Sacred Symbols and Prophecy.* Conducted by Geo. Bush, Prof. Heb. N. Y. City University. Complete in one volume. New York : Mark H. Newman. 800. pp. 288.

This volume is made up of a new series of original articles, almost exclusively from the pen of the editor, and devoted mainly to subjects of prophecy in which Prof. Bush is laboring with great ardor and much ability. A considerable portion of the work is occupied with a course of letters addressed to Prof. Stuart, rather sternly arraiging the principles laid

down in the "Hints on Prophetical Interpretation," in regard to the double sense, the intelligibility of prophecy, and the prophetical designations of time. Prof. B. contends strongly for the double sense in many of the Psalms and symbolical predictions of the Old Testament, and maintains also, with the older school of expositors, that a day in Daniel and the Apocalypse stands for a year, on the principle that where the events are symbolical the connected time must also be symbolical. Its pages contain, moreover, an extended view of Daniel's Judgment of the fourth Beast and his little horn, succeeded by the everlasting kingdom of the saints, the commencement of which he refers to the establishment of Christianity in the Saviour's resurrection and ascension.

The discussions of the volume are full of ripe scholarship, and cannot but be very useful to the student of prophecy, which Prof. B. affirms any student of the bible must necessarily be.

17.—*The Valley of Vision ; or, the Dry Bones of Israel Revived. An attempted Proof (from Ezekiel xxxvi. 1-14) of the Restoration and Conversion of the Jews.* By GEO. BUSH, Prof. N. Y. C. University. New York: Saxton & Miles. 8vo. pp. 60.

The principles on which the various predictions respecting the final destiny of the Jews are to be interpreted, have ever been a matter of dispute among expositors—some contending for the literal, and some for the spiritual or allegorical sense. Professor Bush, in the pamphlet before us, ranges himself uncompromisingly in the ranks of the *literal* expounders, and maintains with great strength the position, that the promised restoration of Israel to their own land, shadowed forth by the symbol of the re-collected and re-animated bones of Ezekiel's vision, has never yet received a fulfilment, and must of necessity be future. Without attempting to define the precise time of the accomplishment, he yet thinks we have arrived at the borders of the period when its incipency is to be expected, and dwells much upon the consideration, that the diligent study of their own prophets is to be itself, one of the grand means of their national regeneration. A leading feature of Prof. B.'s tract is, that the prophesying on the dry bones is *the explaining of prophecy*, and that whoever, at this day, rightly unfolds the import of the predictions respecting the Jews, is in effect performing the very office here attributed to Ezekiel. This is certainly a striking view of the drift of the passage, and it must be admitted that the author has sustained it in a fine

style of exegetical reasoning. We are not called upon to pronounce upon the soundness of the view itself, but we do not hesitate to say that a strong case is made out, and that his arguments can be met only by an equally thorough-going inquest into the meaning of the original.

- 18.—*Notes, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Joshua: designed as a general help to Biblical Reading and Instruction.* By George Bush. New York: Saxon & Miles. 1844. pp. 221, 12mo.

Notes, Critical & Practical, on the Book of Judges: Designed as a general help to Biblical Reading and Instruction. By George Bush. New York: Saxon & Miles. 1844, pp. 257, 12mo.

Professor Bush is so well known and so highly appreciated as a Biblical Commentator; and his works have been so often commended on the pages of the Repository, that we need only to announce the fact of the issue of these two additional volumes to secure their sale. These historical works are prefaced by a general introduction; and then each book preceded by one appropriate, scholar-like and useful. We know of no other commentaries on Joshua and Judges so well suited to family instruction and Sabbath Schools.

- 19—*The Prophecies of Daniel, Nebuchadnezzar's Dream of the Great Image. Nos. I & II.* By George Bush. New York: Harper & Brothers.

The above works of Prof. Bush have since been followed by the commencing portion of a new and elaborate commentary on Daniel, to be issued in ten or twelve numbers, of which the first two are before us. These embrace the prophetic dream of Nebuchadnezzar, with the inspired exposition of Daniel who has, we may say, *anatomized* the gigantic image, and shown the symbolic scope of its various constituent parts. The commentary of Prof. B. is strictly exegetical, and by presenting on his page the Heb. and Chald. originals, with several of the ancient versions, he has put the reader in the best possible position for judging in regard to the correctness of the results to which he comes. The image he regards as a prophetic personification of *the great system of despotic government* extending from the earliest ages of the world down to the period of the overthrow of all merely secular sove-

reignty, and the universal establishment of the everlasting kingdom represented by the smiting stone of the vision. In the excision of the stone from the mountain he recognizes the origin of the Christian church from the Jewish Kingdom, and his illustrations on this head are both new and interesting. The demolition and comminution of the image he supposes to be *gradually* effected, and sees no evidence of that *sudden crisis* which some interpreters anticipate in the downfall of the present dynasties of the old Roman world. The entire system of Millenarianism fares hardly before his rigid exegesis. The work on the whole we regard as rich in promise, and its completion will no doubt give the biblical reader a highly valuable commentary on this difficult and obscure book.

20.—*Religion in America ; or an account of the Origin, Progress, relation to the State, and Present Condition of the Evangelical Churches in the United States, with notices of other Evangelical Denominations.* By ROBERT BAIRD. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 343, 8vo.

This work has been some time before the public, although it has, but recently, fallen into our hands. Whilst it must be acceptable to Christians and others in Great Britain, containing as it does information important to them, it cannot but be useful to Dr. Baird's friends at home. It contains a great deal of knowledge condensed, on the several subjects indicated in the title, and will be found convenient as a book of reference. We trust its translation into French and German may do much toward opening the eyes of foreigners to the value of our system, and directing their attention to an evangelical creed and practice.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

The Autobiography of Heinrich Stilling, late Aulic Counsellor of the Grand Duke of Baden etc. etc. Translated from the German by S. Jackson. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1844. pp. 187, 8vo.

This work is far more interesting than any novel, and it has received universal admiration. It is the life of a remarkable man written by himself, in beautiful simplicity, and developing the inner workings of his pious spirit.

Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature. By JOHN KITTO. New-York. Mark H. Newman.

Parts 11 & 12 are now issued together and bring the work down to Jephthah; when complete it will certainly be an excellent dictionary.

Rabbah Taken; or the Theological System of Rev. Alexander Campbell, examined and refuted. By ROBERT W. LANDIS. New York: Mark H. Newman, 1844. pp. 135, 8vo.

The readers of the Repository will remember some articles on this subject by Mr. Landis. In this volume he has much enlarged, and is certainly entitled to say "Rabbah Taken."

Coleridge and the Moral Tendency of his Writings. By —. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1844.

This is a pamphlet of 118 pages handsomely printed, and prefaced by Dr. Skinner. It contains also a brief memoir of Coleridge. The warning we think in place, and hope it will be read. Our books exert a powerful influence over us. Let them be choice and true.

Pictorial Illustrations of Apostolical Succession. By WILLIAM PAGE, of Monroe, Michigan. Bishop Presbyterian. New-York: Ezra Collier.

This is quite a new idea in its application, but altogether according with the spirit of the age, which almost demands *illustrated* books. It is written in a somewhat queer style, but contains, withal, a great deal of argument.

ARTICLE XII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

Wm. Roscher, of Göttingen, has published one volume of his 'Olio, or Contributions to the History of the Historical Art,' embracing the Life, Writings and Times of Thucydides. This will be followed by a second treatise of Herodotus and Xenophon, and a third on the great Roman Historians. This work must be of great value to classical scholars. Plato's Staat übersetzt von K. Schneider, (Plato's Republic, translated by K. Schneider,) is spoken of in the highest terms.—Prof. W. A. Becker's "Manual of Roman Antiquities," accompanied with a plan of Rome, has recently issued from the press.—Three parts of Umbreit's Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament have already appeared; and the fourth and last, containing all the minor Prophets, is in process of publication. Alexander Von Humboldt, aged 72, is preparing a physical description of the Earth, about to be published by Cotta, entitled "Cosmos."

France.

A Volume of the "Histoire littéraire de la France" has been recently published, containing biographical notices of the French Troubadours. The first volume of this work first appeared in 1733.—The library of the late Charles Nadier, consisting of a choice collection of beautiful old books, although small, sold for 68,000 francs. So much for rare works.

Italy.

Cardinal Pacca's collection of papers and letters, marked by him "for publication," have been sent to his relatives, and will probably be suppressed. They are said to contain some confidential correspondence between himself and Frederick the Great. A memoir of Rosellini has been prepared by his friend D. Guiseppe Bardilli.—Eight volumes of Angel Mao's "Spicilegium Romanum" have appeared; the remaining two will soon be out. Here are to be found interesting documents illustrative of the middle ages, from Greek, Latin and Italian MSS. in the Vatican.

Great Britain.

Becker's "Gallus, or Roman Scenes of the time of Augustus," has been translated and published in London. This work will be valuable.

ble to classical scholars and readers of Roman history, as illustrating Roman manners and customs. The "Letters and Official Documents of Mary Stuart" are soon to be published. They amount to 700, collected from original MSS., and are written in English, Scotch, Latin, and Italian.—Two numbers of "The North British Review" have appeared and give promise of great excellence. Such men as Sir David Brewster, Drs. Chalmers and Welsh, Mr. Hallam, etc. are among the contributors.

United States.

Professor Woolsey, of Yale College, is preparing for the press an edition of Plato's *Crito & Phædo*; and Prof. Champlin, of Waterville, a translation of Kühner's *Elementary Latin Grammar*.

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ERRATA.

- Vol. XI. Page 46, l. 11 for Petoho & Zekopo, read Petaha & Zekafa
- “ “ 46, l. 12 transpose alaha and aloho, and for taera read taoro.
- “ “ 124 l. 11 fr. bot. after *otherwise* insert “with me.”
- “ “ 181 l. 17 “ for *Acaademy* read *Academia*.
- “ “ 186 l. 15 “ for *Alcintus* “ *Alcimus*.
- “ “ “ l. 18 “ for *twenty-one* “ *nineteen*.
- “ “ 242 l. 1 “ for *im* “ *in*.

